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Abstract. 
This thesis analyses institutional and organisational reform in the Former 
Soviet Union and Russia in order to examine the effects and existence of path 
dependency and institutional competition in the development of the Russian 
oil industry. Based on a New Institutional Economics and Transaction Costs 
Economics framework the thesis establishes a link between the evolution of 
the oil industry and the institutional matrix associate with the structure of state 
power. The despotic-patrimonial mode of state power of the Soviet Union 
created strong path dependency in the relationship between the state's position 
in the circulation of income and resources and the organisational and 
institutional development of the oil industry. 
Of particular importance in this respect was the emphasis of political 
efficiency over economic efficiency. The state's position in the circulation of 
income and resources ensured the maintenance of the patrimonial structure of 
state power. Organisational reform ensured that no other "centre" of power 
could emerge to challenge the state's position and aimed at reducing the 
transaction cost associated with the implementation of policy. In this respect 
the state's monopoly in re-negotiating the 'rules of the game' ex post was vital 
to preserve its power position. Informal practices throughout the system were 
conducive to portraying a semblance of systemic efficiency but further 
reduced the scope of the state by creating an antagonistic relationship between 
de jure and de facto owners. This relationship allowed for the accumulation of 
income and resources outside the official channels and later became a defining 
element in the privatisation process. 
In the post-Soviet setting path dependency is created by the state's continued 
reliance on a patrimonial structure of state power. Resource and time pressure 
and the lack of a popular reform consensus resulted in the domination of the 
former mode of state power· over the constitutional-bureaucratic system 
favoured by the International Financial Institutions. The transaction cost 
premium associated with the constitutional-bureaucratic structure and the 
11 
appropriation of income and resources created a bias towards the historic 
structure of state power. Thus state survival was an important factor in 
creating path dependency. 
However, the thesis reveals that due to the less ideologically based political 
foundation there is greater room for institutional competition. While such 
competition has remained low at the state administrative level (i.e. 
organisational and institutional reform display continuity with Soviet practice) 
the thesis find.s that there is some evidence of institutional competition at the 
industry level. Two corporate strategies (the Soviet Styled Company and the 
Western Styled Company) have emerged from the original Holding Type 
Company. These two strategies display different approaches to income 
extraction, development strategy and ownership structure. 
The two strategies constitute the basis from which potential institutional 
competition in the oil industry may develop. However, state-industry relations 
condition crucial aspects in the further development institutional competition. 
Low opportunity cost for the state (1999-2002) was conducive to the existence 
of institutional competition at industry leveL On the other hand state-industry 
relations continue to be dominated by a patrimonial structure of state power 
that is non-conducive to the emergence of a 'rule of law' society. Given a 
change in the parameters that condition the low opportunity cost it is 
questionable whether institutional competition will be allowed to alter the 
foundation upon which the Russian political and economic system is based. 
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"First there was admiration for Japan in the 
1980s, then it was Germany before the Asian 
tigers in the mid I 990s. For the last 2-3 years 
it has been the US economy. We need to take 
a longer term view and realise that there are 
actually many models of the market economy 
that work and each is specific to its particular 
culture." I 
Pro! John Kay 
The collapses of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe were accompanied by 
a wave of democratic and market economy anticipation. Conservative 
communists in the Soviet Union viewed the collapse as a result of 
Gorbachev's tinkering with Soviet principles, while others viewed it as the 
natural triumph of market principles. Then in 1992 Russia itself embarked on 
a programme of market reforms aimed at modernising the Russian State. 
However, Russia's modernisation drive dates back further than the demise of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991. Indeed the Soviet experiment itself is but 
another chapter in the modernisation efforts of Russian rulers. Attempts to 
bring Russia "up to speed" have centred on industrialisation, reform of the 
state bureaucracy and development of the military since the days of Peter the 
Great. It would be foolhardy to claim that they have all failed, and yet Russia 
continues to lag behind the countries that it wishes to be compared to and the 
core of reforms today are what they were 300 years ago. 
The inability to radically reform the system has been a common regIme 
characteristic despite the great variety of leaders and political platforms that 
have steered Russia. This suggests that in order to analyse the development 
and reform of the Russian economy one has to search for answers in the 
economic structure and the behavioural incentive structure in addition to 
political programs and intentions. It suggests that there are system specific 
costs that inhibit a radical alteration of the economic system and structure. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse such system specific costs, their origin and 
their implication for reforms in the Soviet and Russian oil industry. 
I Prof. John Kay. Newsnight 2230, Friday 28 June 2002. 
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In the development of the modem state the provision of energy (along with 
security) lies at the heart of what has traditionally been regarded as one of the 
penultimate roles ofthe state.2 A state's ability to control the energy resources 
within its borders or sphere of influence are again at the heart of the state's 
ability to provide the members of its constituency with this commodity. Such 
provision can take many forms, ranging from state supply to ensuring that 
private suppliers perform this role satisfactorily. The form and content of state 
participation in industry is reflective of the structure of state power that is 
utilised in order to ensure energy supplies. If the state owns, operates and 
controls the industry then the form of state power and corresponding 
organisation of power will differ from a situation where the state relinquishes 
a degree of control to non-state entities. Resources alone do not guarantee the 
state's ability to provide or control such. The development of the modem state 
is closely interconnected with the development of institutions, political and 
economic, and organisations to facilitate the state's ability to govern. 
Russia, and before it the Soviet Union, is in the fortunate position of being one 
of the few modem, or modernising, economies that are self-sufficient in 
primaryenergy.3 The diversity and plenty of Russian energy resources is such 
that she has emerged from the cold war as a supplier of energy to the world 
2 The view taken in this thesis is that state survival (coercion/defence) is the ultimate role of 
the state. However, as will be argued throughout this thesis, state goals are intimately linked 
and mutually dependent, energy provision will therefore be one of several factors contributing 
to state survival. 
3 The thesis does not specifically deal with the 'resource curse' argument, however, many of 
the structural components of this argument will be dealt with extensively. I.e. a rent-seeking 
bureaucracy, low energy efficiency and moral hazard. The 'resource curse' argument holds 
that countries with abundant natural resources tend to grow more slowly than resource poor 
countries. Sachs & Warner argue that reasons for this may that resource abundance renders 
the export sector uncompetitive, crowding-out of entrepreneurial activity and innovation, and 
a rent-seeking/predatory state as natural resources rents are easily appropriable. (Sachs & 
Warner, 'The Curse of Natural Resources', European Economic Review, 2001, vol. 45, no. 4-
6, pp. 827-838). As this thesis does not make any comparisons between the Russian oil 
industry and other countries' oil industries the argument will not be dealt with. However, 
Mehlum et al. find that 'the quality of institutions determines whether countries avoid the 
resource curse or not. The combination of grabber friendly institutions and resource 
abundance produces a growth trap'. (Mehlum et al., 'Institutions and the Resource Curse', 
Memorandum, no. 29/2002, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, pp. 1-28, at: 
http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/memo/memopdf/mem02902.pdO. Mehlum et al. uses the 'rule 
of law' as a measure of institutional quality, implying that countries with an accountable 
leadership and state administration are more likely to re-invest the wealth generated by 
extractive industries into society at large creating conditions of growth rather than personal 
enrichment. This thesis focuses on several aspects related to this latter argument. 
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market at large. Energy exports have been an important element in both 
Soviet and Russian policy in terms of providing the state with revenue and, 
particularly in the case of the Soviet Union, as a foreign policy too1.4 The 
demise of the Soviet Union created an opportunity for a fundamental 
realignment of Russia's position in the global economy; one of the vehicles for 
this realignment is no doubt Russia's energy abundance. This realignment is 
in no way only confined to the economic sphere, as both the political sphere 
and the social sphere have been called upon to make adjustments to 
accommodate the establishment of a market economy. Living standards have 
fallen dramatically in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the state has been 
called upon to relinquish its traditional role in the economy. 
At the present crossroad the oil and gas industries have become the pillars of 
the Russian economy and much hope is ,placed on their so-called engine 
effects. They provide the country with crucial products and revenues. They 
provide bureaucrats with ample opportunities to line their own pockets and are 
high profile political sectors. Under such circumstances it is necessary to ask 
how viable reforms can be, how successful reforms are likely to be, and what 
has to be the essence of the reforms? 
The Russian oil industry is by no means a young industry, and has undergone 
several reform periods. At the end of the 19th century Russia competed with 
the USA for the position of being the world's premier oil producer and in the 
late 1970s and 1980s the Soviet Union was the largest producer of oil in the 
4 Various forms of rent extraction from the oil industry will be considered in this thesis, 
however, energy as a foreign policy tool is beyond the scope of this study. A frequent 
argument is that Russia uses its energy abundance and the dependence of the near abroad on 
the Soviet energy infrastructure to achieve foreign policy aims in the mentioned region. (See 
for instance Rutland, 'Oil, Politics, and Foreign Policy', in Lane (ed.), The Political Economy 
of Russian Oil, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999, pp. 163-188. Peuch, 'Russian 
Interference in the Caspian Sea Region: Diplomacy Adrift', Ibid., pp. 189-212. Also, Becker, 
'Russia and Caspian Oil: Moscow Loses Control', Post-Soviet Affairs, 2000, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 
91-132). As this thesis does not deal with Russian foreign policy per se, but with the domestic 
institutional and organisational arrangements of the oil industry, this aspect of state interest 
will not be pursued any further. The argument of this thesis focuses on the relationship 
between the circulation of income/resource and the mode of state power/political institutions 
in order to explain path dependency and institutional competition. It is acknowledged that the 
argument could be made that foreign policy is an intrinsic part of state survival, however, it is 
the structure of the relationship between the state and the industry that lies at the basis of the 
'foreign policy tool' argument. It is this relationship that will be examined in this thesis. 
10 -
world. The industry's development has taken place during some of the most 
dramatic political and economic upheavals that the 20th century witnessed -
the Bolshevik coup d'etat, the introduction of a large scale administered 
economy, two World Wars, the Cold War, the OPEC oil shocks of the 70s and 
80s and finally the demise of the Soviet Union and the attempted abolition of 
the administrative state. The majority of Russian oilfields are in a mature 
stage of production, while potential new production areas remain 
underdeveloped and underexplored. By the late 1980s Soviet oil output abated 
and dropped rapidly during the political upheaval of early 1990s and the 
Yeltsin period. Yet at the beginning of the 21 st century Russia is among the 
world's premier producers of oil and gas. 
The turn around in the Russian oil industry has come as a surprise to many, yet 
the longevity of the recent development is still to be determined. What is clear 
is that Russia has managed to turn around the abysmal performance of one of 
its most important industries in the space of a decade, without the massive 
foreign direct investment (FDI) that was flaunted by international financial 
institutions (lFI) as an incentive for structural economic reforms in the early 
post-Soviet period. Performance throughout the sector has varied, and 
different corporate strategies have been employed resulting in oil firms with 
greatly different approaches to the oil business and with different relationships 
to the official political powers. The government has gradually accepted a 
different economic role, but the sector has remained highly politicised, and red 
tape remains a huge problem for domestic as well as foreign investors. What 
is cle~r though is that there is more room for institutional competition than at 
any previous time. Much of the turn around in the Russian oil industry 
originates from indigenous funds and it remains highly questionable whether 
this development is sustainable, or if it is another round of more-of-the-same 
remedies that characterised the Soviet oil industry. Even though the Russian 
oil industry has gone through several phases of reform during its long 
existence one of the main arguments in this thesis is that such reforms have 
affected form rather than substance. One of the central issues therefore, will 
be to examine whether the framework has been altered sufficiently to allow for 
a future development that breaks with the past. Such alteration must 
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incorporate both the sector's structure and the sector's role in the matrix of the 
state's raison d'etre. Without a corresponding democratisation of 
administration, can Russia's economic path be altered?5 
Perspectives on oil policy. 
Olsen has identified four approaches to analysing oil policy.6 Firstly, politics 
as rational societal development, (rational choice models). This approach 
analyses oil policy with the government as a central actor in order to achieve 
the highest possible welfare. This approach demands that the actor has a set of 
clearly defined and ordered goals and the aspirations and means to implement 
such goals. The execution of political power rests on the ability of political 
organisations to accumulate and analyse information and then formulate 
consistent goals· and solve potential conflicts. This approach usually falls 
between two extremes. Either individuals, for instance through democratic 
elections, elect (at regular intervals) a governing body to make and order 
choices on behalf of the members of the constituency, or an organisation to 
perform this role can be created through a dominant political force or a coup 
d 'etat. The rational-scientific development model envisaged by the 
Bolsheviks and the leading role of the Communist Party embodies the latter 
approach,7 although causation runs in the opposite direction compared to neo-
classical economic theories.8 The problem with this model is that goal 
definition and rationality in larger groups and organisations is an elusive 
concept. The ability to govern is dependent on information, consistency of 
goals and the analytical ability of those who govern. Both information 
problems and the departmentalisation of interests are well established in the 
5 Democratisation is here meant to imply the development of an administrative structure that is 
independent of its creators. Shepsle argues that "political institutions are ex ante agreements 
about cooperation among politicians ... [political] institutions can be seen as a capital structure 
designed to produce a flow of stable policy outcomes, and institutional change is a form of 
investment". (Eggertson, Economic Behaviour and Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 72.) This would theoretically loosen the closeness between systemic efficiency and 
political legitimacy. 
6 Olsen, Petroleum og politikk - Det representative demokratiets m@te med oljealderen 
[Petroleum and Politics - Representative Democracy Meets the Age of Oil], Tano 1989, pp. 
21-28. 
7 Lenin, What is to be done?, Penguin Books, 1988 [\902]. 
8 Caporaso & Levine, Theories of Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 
56. In neo-c1assical theories causation runs from the individual interest to economic structure, 
for Marx it ran in the opposite direction. 
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literature pertaining to the Soviet economy. 9 In a system as large and complex 
as the Soviet economy studies will become too level specific and thus lacking 
in predictive power. Due to complexity rationality in such studies stand in 
danger of becoming too circumstance specific and lacking in generality. 
Secondly, politics as institutional routines. This approach examines politics 
as the result of routine based patterns of behaviour in large formal 
organisations. Learning in organisations is seen as a function of sanctioned 
and rewarded behaviour. "When politics is perceived as a result of 
institutional routines, attention is diverted towards the norms that define 
correct behaviour by establishing rights and duties, and that define good 
results by establishing what is "natural", "acceptable" and ''just [fair]" 
outcomes".1O Institutions in this respect can be the result of political struggle, 
but institutionalised routines - modes of behaviour - are seen as having a 
qualitative dimension beyond their instrumental function. Institutions are 
vehicles for reducing the uncertainty of human action through raising the. 
probability ex ante of achieving a certain goal based on a particular mode of 
behaviour. 
Thirdly, politics as lobbying and negotiations (interest group representation). 
"Politics is a process where the participants initially have different goals and 
perceptions, but where collectively binding agreements are reached through 
negotiations and persuasion, without necessarily coming to agreement of 
mind".11 In this perspective the most significant variables of explanation are 
related to coalition constellations, sectoral interests and resources. This has 
been a prominent framework for analysing the Soviet economy. The plan 
formation process is frequently seen as a negotiation process between various 
9 See for example Zaleski, Stalinist Planningfor Economic Growth 1933-52, Macmillan 1980. 
10 Olsen , op cit. p. 25. Barzel makes an important distinction between economic and legal 
rights in the development of 'rule of law' states. '[E]conomic rights reflect the individuals' 
ability to consume or exchange commodities. These rights may exist in the absence of legal 
rights, though the latter tend to enhance the former. Legal rights are delineated by the state. 
The state, as such, chooses to enforce the rights it delineates. The means of economic rights 
that are not backed by legal rights include long-term relations'. (Barzel, A Theory q(the State: 
Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
p. 6). 
11 Olsen, op cit., p. 26. 
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levels of the Soviet economy. This perspective does not require the different 
participants to the negotiation process to have the same goals or possess the 
same information, but that they have different identifications and different 
evaluations of what is an efficient outcome. However, the perspective does 
require that participants are able to discern which groups have similar goals 
and that they are able to establish effective coalitions. 12 This, as will be shown 
in this thesis, was hardly the case in the Soviet economy. 
Finally, politics as the interpretation of situation specific circumstances. This 
approach sees political decision as "the result of temporal rather than norm or 
interest based structures".13 In this respect politicians react to circumstances 
as they arise, rather then devising mechanisms for controlling which 
occurrences are likely to surface. Generally this approach does not need to 
apply to the entire political system, but is often used to make sector specific 
policies a function of other sectors. In this perspective unplanned and often 
exogenous variables and their effects are the focus of study. Although the 
model has little predictive power, it does not exclude that actors can act 
strategically with respect to circumstances. The interpretation of a situation is 
in this respect an important result of the decision process. 14 
The new institutional economics approach. 
The assumptions regarding which approach generates the most predictive 
power is influential in determining which framework should be relied on as 
the analytical framework. This thesis belongs to the new institutional 
economic (NIE) approach and will focus on the functioning of the institutional 
and organisational structure and their implications for reform. 15 The 
12 Ibid., p. 27. 
13 Ibid., p. 28. This does not exclude that politicians may act rationally or norm based in other 
political spheres such as foreign policy, regional policy etc, but when decisions are reached 
relatively independent in other political spheres and simultaneously affecting oil policy, then 
the results may be different than originally envisaged by the decision makers within the other 
political spheres. Ibid., footnote 19, p. 28[42]. 
14 Ibid., p. 28. 
15 In the literature the term institutional economics is often used interchangeably with the 
terms neo-institutional economics and new institutional economics. The two latter concepts 
are however different in some important aspects. They both build on classical microeconomic 
theory, but crucially the neo-institutional approach retains the core of the rational-choice 
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institutional perspective is dominant in NIE, yet it also incorporates modified 
elements of the other frameworks mentioned previously. Its antecedents are 
theories of economic evolution, organisational theory and economic 
behaviour. 
Important concepts in the institutional perspective are 'path dependency' and 
'institutional competition'. Path dependence is a concept that is based on 
economic as well as sociological theories of human behaviour and the human 
learning process. North explains the concept as the scaffolding of behaviour 
through "elaborate structure of rules, norms, conventions, and beliefs 
embodied in constitutions, property rights, and informal constraints that in turn 
shape economic performance".16 In the competition between possible 
institutions the path that maximises actors' behavioural returns will prevail in 
the long run and constitute the parameters of the collective pool of knowledge 
in which behaviour is learned. 
Since 1990 there has been a gradual improvement in the recognition of the 
institutional approach. Access to data, sources and Russian academic circles 
has substantially improved our understanding of the Soviet economy. This 
approach will therefore create the best possible platform from which to firstly 
understand the Soviet past and economic structure and secondly the influence 
of these on the possibilities for institutional and organisational reform in the 
post-Soviet era. Throughout the 1990s there has been a growing body of 
literature and research applying various elements of institutional economics to 
Eastern Europe and the FSU, in diverse fields such as sociology, politics, 
economics and history.17 The ability to use the approach in a variety of fields 
and cross-field studies is clearly one of the strengths of this paradigm. 
model (stable preferences), while the new institutional approach discards this assumption in 
favour of bounded rationality. (Eggertson, op cit., p. 6). 
16 North, 'Understanding Economic Change', in Nelson, Tilly & Walker, Transforming Post-
Communist Political Economies, Task Force on Economies in Transition, National Research 
Council, 1998. (Accessed on-line at http://books.nap.edulhtml/transform/contents.htm, 28 Jan. 
2002). 
17 For good overviews in this respect see Harter and Easter, Shaping the Economic Space in 
Russia, Ashgate, 2000, and Segbers, Explaining post-Soviet patchworks, Ashgate, 200 I. 
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Despite a lack of specific antecedents in this field there are nonetheless a 
number of studies that illuminate various sub-fields of a new institutional 
economic approach. Berliner's classic work examines managerial behaviour 
and incentive structures, while Kornai's exposition illuminates system specific 
institutions as well as incentive structures. Moore has studied agency cost in 
Soviet industrial organisation. Nove contributed substantially to western 
understanding of the Soviet economy and industrial organisation and conflict. 
Gustafson has examined Soviet petroleum policy and organisational 
implications. Although not specifically a study in property rights, 
Whitefield's study of the role of the branch ministries in the Soviet economy 
is at the same time an exposition of weakly defined property rights in the 
Soviet economic hierarchy and the limitation of Soviet 'infrastructural power' .. 
Rutland and Winiecki have both examined the politicising of the economy and 
thus contributed to our understanding of goal definitions, success indicators 
and the rationality of the Soviet economy. IS 
These and others have illuminated various sub-fields of a new institutional 
economic approach sufficiently to allow for the establishment of a new 
institutional economic platform from which to analyse path dependency and 
institutional competition in the post-Soviet oil industry. Using an institutional 
approach Solnick has analysed the break down of authority in Soviet 
institutions to explain systemic collapse. 19 
A· common analogy by students of the Soviet economy is that of viewing the 
economy as one giant firm. The basis of this analogy lies in the closeness 
between the political aspirations of the leadership and the organisation of 
economic activity - the role played by the central planning organisations in co-
ordinating both the production and consumption side of the economy to 
18 Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, Harvard University Press, 1957. Komai, The 
Socialist System, Clarendon Press, 1992. Moore,' Agency Costs, Technological Change, and 
Soviet Central Planning', Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 24, Oct. 1981. Nove, The 
Soviet Economic System, Unwin Hyman, 1986. Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty, Princton 
University Press, 1989. Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State, Clarendon Press, 
1993. Rutland, The Myth of the Plan, Open Court, 1985. Winiecki, 'Soviet-Type Economies: 
Considerations for the Future', Soviet Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, 1986. 
19 Solnick, Stealing the State, Harvard University Press, 1998. 
16 -
conform with the guidelines defined by the Communist Party. In institutional 
economics the firm is viewed "as a nexus of contracts where several input 
owners make bilateral contracts with a central agent, rather than with each 
other, in order to minimize transaction costs and maximize the joint value of 
their assets"?O "[W]ithin the firm, the continuous pricing of outputs has been 
suspended and the inputs are managed by the central agent".21 NIE should be 
well suited to analyse the Soviet and Russian economy because its foci of 
study are centred on variables that are comparable over time, i.e. principal-
agent relationships. Changes in such relationships can be construed as 
modifications in contractual relations between various parts of the economy 
and the state. 
With respect to the Soviet economy this raises several conceptual 
opportunities for investigation. When a contract relationship is established, a 
corresponding division of rights and duties is bestowed upon the partakers. 
The question that will be asked here is what were these rights and duties, how. 
were they established, how were they monitored, how do principal-agent costs 
affect the mode of organisation, and how do they affect the reform parameters 
in the post-Soviet setting? 
The introduction of transaction costs in the firm's production function is one 
of the main contributions of new institutional economics. Classical 
microeconomics assume zero information cost, i.e. all participants in an 
economic exchange relationship can costlessly obtain the same information 
and evaluate the same. This proposition is just as troublesome in the Soviet 
economy as it is in a market economy. Berliner's analysis of management 
behaviour in the Soviet firm is a particular case in point. Williamson has 
examined the existence of positive transaction cost and their effect on 
economic behaviour and organisation. Williamson's framework is referred to 
as transaction cost economics (TCE). The antecedents of TCE go back to 
Coase's study of the effect of positive transaction costs on industrial 
20 Eggertson, op cit., p. 112. 
21 Ibid. p. 48. Italics in original. 
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organisation and the declining return on vertical integration.22 The questions 
that will be raised here is how did positive transaction costs affect economic 
performance and behaviour in the Soviet economy, and with respect to social 
learning, what are the potential effects of the Soviet learned framework on the 
post-Soviet reform parameters? Further, how did positive transaction cost 
affect the maximisation of goals and assets? 
If the objective of state administration is to extract as efficiently as possible 
those resources that contributes to the fulfilling of political objectives then the 
maximisation of asset return is the basis for organisation and structure of asset 
utilisation. Assets in this respect can be both economic (infrastructure, 
resources, workers etc.) and political (state bureaucracy, party organisation 
etc.) The maximisation of asset value is a complex issue and is closely 
interconnected with goal fulfilment. Efficient in this case is that which 
successfully contributes to the realisation of stated goals. 
However, that which is efficient differs between political system and between 
actors within each system. In other words there are no stable definitions of 
efficiency, this being one of the reasons why different countries and 
economies have generated different institutional arrangements. In order to 
analyse the development of economies one therefore has to firstly define to 
what purpose an asset is (was being) maximised, i.e. what is (was) efficient 
utilisation, secondly to acknowledge that this definition may not be stable 
across time and actors. This is particularly so when the central agent's ability 
to monitor the performance of its agents is reduced, for instance due to size of 
the organisation or complexity of information. 
In the Soviet economy the formal right to define this issue rested with the 
Party leadership. However, the structure of the economy and the distribution 
of property rights (de jure and de facto) were such as to allow a diversion of 
the flow of resources towards individual goals. Bromley has analysed the 
22 Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, The Free Press, 1975 and The Economic Institutions 
C?( Capitalism, The Free Press, 1985. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 1937. 
(Reprinted in Williamson, Industrial Organization, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1990). 
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concepts of property rights in natural resource industries and efficiency. 23 The 
questions that will be raised in this thesis are what was the distribution of 
property rights in the Soviet economy, what was efficient utilisation of assets, 
and how do efficiency concerns affect the post-Soviet reform parameters? An 
important element in this respect will be to examine the distribution and 
principal-agent implications of de jure and de facto property rights. 
An important dimension of analysis in this respect is to determine the 
motivation of the actors at various levels throughout the economic system. 
Kornai described the Soviet economy as a 'shortage economy' ,24 while 
Berliner's exposition of managerial behaviour emphasises asymmetry of 
information. This thesis therefore raises the questions how did these 
circumstances affect the motivation and economic behaviour of the actors at 
various levels, what were the main organisational conflict lines, and how does 
this affect the post-Soviet reform parameters? 
The thesis tries to draw a link between historic Soviet development and 
modem Russian development. The conceptual link in this case is path 
dependency. North has analysed the effects of path dependency on economic 
institutions and organisations.25 The concept does not imply historic 
determinism or the absence of free will, but it stresses that under certain 
conditions human beings are likely to be influenced by behavioural modes. 
The questions raised will be how path dependency affected both the 
developments of the Soviet oil industry and the post-Soviet reform 
parameters? 
Out of the mentioned four approaches to analysing oil policy the view taken in 
this thesis is that the new institutional economic approach is the most suited to 
establish a framework for analysis of political economy. The main contender 
is the rational choice model, however in a large and complex organisation it is 
23 Bromley, Environment and Economy, Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
24 Komai, op cit. 
25 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University 
Press 1990. 
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implausible that such a model would have any real explanatory power. It 
would be difficult to define clear and consistent goals that penetrated all levels 
of the economy. From organisational literature we know that in large formal 
organisations goal hierarchies have a tendency to fragment beyond the general 
as time and resource pressure and individual aspirations result in 
departmentalisation.26 General goals facilitate the production of consensus 
programmes, but impede normative goal oriented behaviour. This is a point 
frequently stressed by Nove when discussing the formation and 
implementation of the Five Year Plans (FYP).27 
Rather the new institutional economic literature stresses the limited processing 
capabilities of individuals - particularly so in an environment of time pressure, . 
complex and asymmetric information - and opportunistic behaviour. 28 
Limited processing capability is a result of 'bounded rationality' .29 These 
assumptions clearly are incompatible with the rational choice model and they 
generate a different framework of analysis. This shifts the analysis of politics. 
and economics from a framework of rational choice to a framework of 
contractual relations.3o The organisational, institutional and principal-agent 
arrangements (contractual governance and incomplete contracting) resulting 
from these behavioural assumptions thereby become the centre of study. 
Rather than looking at who has executive political control, and how 
differences in ideology and strategies result in differences in response to 
external and internal possibilities and constraints, the new institutional 
economic approach examines rules, norms and habits and how the 
organisational location of decisions affect their content.31 The questions 
26 March & Simon, Organizations, Blackwell Publishers, 1993 (2nd ed.). Peter Blau & 
Marshall Meyer, Bureaucracy in modern society, McGraw-HiII, 1987. 
27 Nove, op cit. 
28 See for example Williamson, 'Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual 
relations' in Williamson (ed.), Industrial organization, op cit. 
29 Behaviour is "intendedly rational", but due to 'limits of human intellective capacities in 
comparison with the complexities of the problems [], rational behaviour calls for simplified 
models that capture the main feature of a problem without capturing all its complexity'. 
March & Simon, op cit., pp.190-1. 
30 Williamson, 'The lens of contract: private ordering', The American Economic Review, 2002, 
vol. 92, no. 2, pp. 438-443. 
31 Olsen, op cit. p.29. 
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raised are what affects patterns of behaviour and what is the learning process? 
But also, can economic development paths be substantially altered in the 
short-term or long-term, what are the possibilities and constraints in each case, 
to what extent does path dependency affect the post-Soviet reform parameters 
and what has been the effect of institutional competition? 
The method and structure of the thesis. 
This thesis aims to analyse the concepts of path dependency and institutional 
competition in the post-Soviet reform parameters. In the thesis these 
parameters are institutions and organisations of the Soviet economy and oil 
industry and the Russian oil industry distributed across three institutional 
dimensions. This thesis will adhere to the definition of institutions and 
organisations as defined by North. Institutions are the 'rules of the game in a 
society or, the humanly devised constraints that shape interaction' and 
'incentive structures,.32 Organisations are 'entities designed by their creators 
to maximise wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities 
afforded by the institutional structure of society' .33 
North's approach to economIC development emphasises the interaction 
between institutions and organisations, both developing in response to and 
affecting each other. Such development is not a priori seen to be development 
towards greater economic efficiency (in the western sense of the concept), but 
rather a result of maximising the opportunities that the institutional and 
organisational matrix at any given point in time offer. The incentive structure 
of the institutional matrix - and the corresponding organisational structure - is 
not necessarily geared towards social welfare, but rather towards maximising 
the objectives of their creators.34 
32 North (1990), op cit., p. 3. North, Understanding the process of economic change, 
Occasional Paper 106, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1999, p. 9. 
33 North (1990), op cit., p. 73. 
34 Thus ideas, ideologies and dogmas will frequently affect the choice that the individual 
makes. (Ibid.) 
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However, any given point in time is not independent of the previous period -
history is held to be path-dependent. This does not imply that history is pre-
determined, but rather that change will be incremental, affected by past 
experience, present constraints (often a function of past experience) and 
conceptualisation of the future. Institutions thus represent a synergy that 
maximises the return on investment with regards to those three levels.35 
History in this respect represents the point of comparison with respect to 
return on investment and the environment within which knowledge and 
analytical skills were formed and will therefore have great impact on 
economic modes of behaviour.36 Institutional competition exists where actors 
can maximise their returns through different institutional arrangements. A 
selection will occur where one institutional arrangement generates higher 
returns than another does. Motivation and cost of investment thereby become 
important elements of study. Motivation will to some extent be reflected 
through incentive structures and organisational arrangements, while the level 
of transaction costs will affect cost of investment. Minimising transaction. 
costs will again affect organisational and institutional arrangement and 
constitute an important element of institutional competition and selection. 
TCE proposes an organisational structure that economises on bounded 
rationality and opportunism.37 It holds that these phenomena have the greatest 
distorting power in a situation where transactions are idiosyncratic or asset 
specific.38 Given such conditions TCE proposes vertical integration as a means 
35 Investment is here taken to mean the commitment of any form of resources to achieve any 
form of return, i.e. both material and immaterial returns. 
36 In sociology Bourdieu has used a similar approach analysing behaviour through the 
concepts of field, habitus and capital, (Bourdieu & Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology, Polity Press, 1992. Bourdieu, Practical Reason - On the Theory of Action, Polity 
Press, 1998). 
37 '[O]pportunism [] is a deep condition of self-interest seeking that contemplates guile'. 
Williamson, 'The Logic of Economic Organisation', in Williamson & Winter, The Nature of 
the Firm, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 92. The term self-interest will be used throughout 
the thesis for reasons of simplicity. However, it should be noted that 'economic theory is now 
routinely described as assuming not that people are relentless maximizers, but rather that some 
process of selection - perhaps the tendency of unprofitable firms to fail or the tendency of 
people to imitate their more successful counterparts - will cause us to observe people who act 
as if they were maximizing'. (Samuel son, 'Evolution and Game Theory', Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 2002, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 51). 
38 Transactions are here taken to mean any interaction between two or more individuals that 
exchanges some form of good (tangible or intangible) or service (Williamson (1975), op cit. 
Williamson (1990), op cit., pp. 223-251). Idiosyncratic and asset spec{fic transactions are 
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to economise (i.e. reduce) the effects of the behavioural phenomena.39 This 
thesis distinguishes between two forms of integration: organisational and 
political integration.4o Positive transaction costs affect the structure of both, 
and TeE has been incorporated as an integral part of 'positive political 
economy' .41 
The evolution of the oil industry will be analysed through a three-layered 
pyramid of institutions that constitute different dimensions of path dependency 
(Figure 1.1). The aim is to establish a causal chain of institutional evolution 
that can serve as an analytical paradigm for understanding both the Soviet and 
post-Soviet development. The dimensions· are ordinal running from 1 sI order 
institution to 3rd order. 
exchanges of goods and services where the value of the transaction has a second best use that 
is appreciably lower than its first best use. This means that the difference in value is large 
enough to entice either (or both) of the parties to the exchange to extract some or all of this 
difference in value as a form of quasi-rent (Klein et ai, 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, pp. 
297-326). Eggertson argues that investment yield will be discounted by the probability of 
appropriation of the quasi-rent (Eggertson, op cif.). Another form of investment that falls in 
this category is sunk-cost, meaning a non-removable (or only at great cost) and not re-
deployable investment that also has a first best second best appropriable rent. (This definition 
is somewhat narrower than the conventional definition of sunk cost). The distorting power of 
these phenomena lie therein that in a situation of transaction where a good is idiosyncratic 
small numbers markets prevail over large number markets. Thus the check (competition) that 
a large numbers market exhibits will be reduced in a small numbers market, allowing for 
abuse of market power. In Russia there is as yet no legislative framework efficient enough to 
counterbalance the effects of a small numbers market. 
39 Both North and TCE build on the Coasian approach to organisation of exchange by viewing 
the market and integration as alternative forms of governance structures, viewing governance 
as a means of economising on the cost of transacting. Idiosyncratic goods (or services) can in 
many instances be produced in-house at the same production cost as traded via a market. This 
is because for many idiosyncratic goods markets do not display the same aggregating strength 
(i.e. economies of scale) as they do in non-idiosyncratic exchanges. Being of a specialised 
nature idiosyncratic goods are not traded in the same numbers that non-specialised goods are. 
With respect to organisation there is a choice between producing or buying. The institutional 
framework that an industry operates in will affect the choice of organisational mode, as it will 
affect the total production cost. 
40 Organisational integration is the integration of different legal entities into the same 
governance and ownership structure. Political integration is the use of non-market 
transactions between independent legal entities (by market definition) in both the economic 
and political sphere. Both modes of integration are thought to reduce uncertainty by creating a 
more stable environment of operation. 
41 Alt & Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 3. See also footnote 5 for view on political institutions. 
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Conceptually this implies that the lower level orders are subjugated to the 
higher orders, while institutions within each order have interactive affects as 
well. Institutional and organisational responses to the higher order dimensions 
will take both a formal and informal character. This implies that a reform 
attempt needs to address the singular and interactive effects of each dimension 
and between dimensions, in order to create a different incentive structure for 
the channelling of information and behaviour. This model combines the 
macro level of norm setting politics and the micro level of enterprise and agent 
behaviour. It gives the researcher the opportunity to examine development as 
a multi-dimensional process with several independent variables. 
The real world situation is necessarily inftnitely more complex than this or any 
other model can reconstruct. However, new institutional economics and 
transaction cost economics as general theoretical frameworks should enable 
the researcher to construct models that have a high probability of generating 
fIrstly an inclusive framework and secondly use units of analysis that are 
comparable over time. In line with neo-classic economic theory it is here 
assumed that individuals are "economic men", but that maximisation and 
rationality is constrained by positive transaction costs creating uncertainty. 
This implies that the individual does not always have the necessary 
information or computing resources to have a stable and ordered set of 
preferences. 
Each of the dimensions in the pyramid could theoretically constitute a 
dependent variable in its own right, and more dimensions could be added as 
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could further orders. For the sake of brevity only three orders will be 
examined in this thesis. The study of economic institutions should enable us 
to determine the origin of system specific and/or country specific consistently 
high transaction costS.42 "Institutions provide the structure for exchange that 
(together with the technology employed) determines the cost of transacting 
and the cost of transformation. How well institutions solve the problem of co-
ordination and production is determined by the motivation of the players (their 
utility function), the complexity of the environment, and the ability of the 
players to decipher and order the environment (measurement and 
enforcement)".43 
Each of the mentioned dimensions can be influenced by policy and through 
choice, however, there are factors that are beyond the actors' influence that 
have and will continue to play a significant role as well. These relate to 
geological attributes of the reserves, their geographic positioning, and total 
recoverable oil, along with international factors like Middle Eastern stability, 
international trade and economic conjunctures. The former factors being 
given, and the latter factors being only partly open to Russian influence. 
Nonetheless the dimensions studied in this thesis will examine how well 
Russia has been and will be able to relate to these non-controllable factors. 
First order path dependency. It is necessary to see the development of the 
Soviet and Russian economy as an organic whole. This implies that any 
analysis must start with the historic pre-conditions for economic and industrial 
development. One can speak of two main mobilisation strategies in Europe -
direct mobilisation and indirect mobilisation. The origins of the different 
developments in this respect is not the concern of this thesis, suffice here to 
say that Russia, both historic and modem, has dominantly used a direct form 
of economic mobilisation.44 
42 North (1990), op cit., pp. 134-35. 
43 Ibid, p. 34. 
44 Christian, Imperial and Soviet Russia: Power. Privilege and the Challenge of Modernity, 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997, pp. 2-7. 
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Unlike indirect mobilisation, which relies on commercial and market exchange 
to generate appropriable resources, direct mobilisation relies on the state as the 
instigator of growth, and its coercive and persuasive powers to appropriate 
resources. Economic growth tends to be input based (rather than productivity 
based) and systems relying on direct mobilisation tend to be better at 
mobilising existing resources rather than generating new resources.45 
Implementation of the two strategies both combine despotic and infrastructural 
state power, yet direct mobilisation tends to generate state structures that 
expend more energy and resources on building despotic structures of power 
and vice versa.46 In this thesis development strategy and mode of state power 
constitute the first order path dependency. 
Second order path dependencies. The "efficiency" of such a system is reliant 
on the state's ability to ensure that its ability to monitor and control the 
economy encompasses all levels of the production chains. Such systems are 
therefore characterised by an 'administrative approach' to co-ordination .. 
While despotic power falls within the first order dimension, the state's ability 
to administer and enforce its policy - its infrastructural power - belongs to the 
second order dimension. Infrastructural power tends to exhibit either a 
bureaucratic structure, in the Weberian idealised sense, or a patrimonial 
structure where power is vested with the person rather then rules and offices.47 
The Soviet political system was based on a patrimonial structure of state 
45 [bid 
46 Mann defines these concepts as "the range of actions which the elite is empowered to 
undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups" (despotic); 
and "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically 
political decisions throughout the realm" (infrastructural). (Mann, 'The Autonomous Power 
of the State', in Hall, States in History, Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 113). Barzel defines the 
scope of the state as 'the ratio of the value of all violence-backed third party enforced 
agreements to the value of the gross product, inclusive of the imputed product, within the 
boundaries of the state'. (Barzel, op cit., p. 23). The state is defined as '(I) a set of 
individuals who are subject to a single ultimate third party who uses violence for enforcement 
and (2) a territory where these individuals reside, demarcated by the reach of the enforcer's 
power [ability to impose cost]'. (lbid, p. 22). According to these definitions a state with a 
high degree of infrastructural power will enjoy a greater scope than a state with a high degree 
of patrimonial-despotic power. 
47 Ertman, Birth 0/ the Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, 1997, chp. I. On Weber's 
exposition of the idealised bureaucracy see Weber, 'Bureaucracy', in Shafritz & Ott, Classics 
o/Organization Theory, HarcourtCollege Publishers, 2001, pp. 73-78. 
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power implementation.48 One of the reasons for using the oil industry as a 
case study for institutional and organisational reform in Russia is precisely its 
importance as a model for the development of the Soviet administrative 
system,49 and its importance in the creation of extractable rent. so Thus it 
should be possible to generalise to the wider economic situation and to 
determine the origins of positive transaction costs. Second order path 
dependencies in this thesis are organisation and administrative 
planning/legislation. The form of state power and development strategy 
affects both. 
Third order path dependencies. If indeed Russians are "economic men" then 
we would expect them to react to stimuli and incentives in a consistent and 
predictable manner, i.e. the maximisation of some utility function. These 
utility functions are necessarily constrained by positive transaction costs and 
institutional limitations. Behaviour in organisations has been a field of 
extensive study and some of this literature will be adapted to the Soviet 
economy and specifically firm behaviour in both the Soviet and the post-
Soviet setting. 5 I Third order path dependencies in this thesis are property 
rights, rent extraction and principal agency costs. All three are affected by 
mode of organisation and administrative planning/legislative framework. 
The model thus created encompasses both macro evolution as well as micro 
responses. It should be pointed out that the direction of causation is not fixed. 
Stimuli and adaptations can originate at all levels, i.e. in the form of reforms, 
the point rather to be stressed is that reforms leading to path changes are likely 
to be unsuccessful unless they lead to adaptations in the remaining orders of 
institutional dimensions. For reasons of complexity and interconnectivity one 
48 Gill, The Origins of the Stalinist Political System, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 
325-327. In this respect the Soviet structure of state power implementation displays strong 
continuity with the implementation of state power in tsarist Russia. For an account of the 
development of the patrimonial structure of state power in pre-revolutionary Russia see Pipes, 
Russia Under the Old Regime, Penguine Books, 1995 [1974], pp. 21-140. 
49 Kryukov, Institutsional'naya struktura neftegasogo sektora [The institutional structure of 
the oil and gas sector], IEiOPP, 1998, pp. 70-71. 
50 Sagers et ai, 'Resource Rent from the Oil and Gas Sector and the Russian Economy', Post-
Soviet Geography, 1995, vol. 36, no. 7, pp. 389-425. 
51 Important scholars in this field are Peter Blau, Nils Brunsson, James March, Johan Olsen, 
the late Herbert Simon, and Oliver Williamson. 
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must also assume that higher order dimensions are more difficult to reform 
than lower order dimensions. This is the case due to the wider implications 
reforms have in higher orders. For instance political sensitivity, cultural 
ideological and religious factors that surpass any specific sector will come into 
play. Although the model drawn up here will be used to analyse the oil 
industry, this sector is itself placed within the greater context of the Russian 
economy. As the point of focus moves up the pyramid, interactive effects 
with other sectors will be become more prominent. Such interaction will only 
be treated very cursorily, yet the reform process at these levels will necessarily 
have a wider scope than the oil industry alone. 
Economies evolve as organisms, a path in itself is an organism, and for a 
reform to achieve alterations to the path it must carry within itself incentives 
for changes in all the orders - irrespective of its origin. For a stable 
development process a transparent institutional matrix that allows for 
institutional competition is necessary. For behaviour to change it is necessary. 
that the costs of transacting associated with institutional structures are altered. 
In the Russian case one has to assume that institutional uncertainty will result 
in a prolongation of previous patterns of behaviour. One has to expect that an 
economic and political experiment of the Russian scale, regardless of the 
unlikely possibility of perfectly crafted laws and reforms, will take time to 
settle. Western European capitalism has taken centuries to evolve, and only 
through a process of trial and error and collective learning have economic 
actors in this area been "instilled" with the basic knowledge and understanding 
that makes our market economies work (as we understand it). 
Tatur refers to the moral embeddedness of Russian economic behaviour. She 
emphasises the historic absence of market type institutions and the publics' 
understanding of the market to explain the embeddedness of the institutions of 
reciprocity and redistribution. 52 Throughout the transition period Russia will 
have to find its own form of capitalism, one that, if the process is continued, 
52 Tatur, 'The Moral Embeddedness of the Market - Conceptualising Post-Socialist 
Transformations', in Harter & Easter, op cif. The market is in this case not solely seen as an 
exchange mechanism, but an allocational-behavioural institution in its own right. 
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will emerge from the set of previously present economic institutions and well-
meant (and not so well-meant) foreign advice and suggestions. Institutional 
transparency and reduced uncertainty can lead to a shift towards economic 
behaviour conducive to a market economy. "One of the costs of institutional 
change is the uncertainty about which outcomes the new regime will produce. 
Uncertainty implies that a given structure may ex ante be associated with a set 
of structure-induced equilibrium points. Ex ante this uncertainty is gradually 
reduced as the operational qualities of a new institutional structure becomes 
known". 53 If one assumes that Russians are economic men then transparent 
standards of evaluation should lead self-interest to promote a market type 
economy. 
Importantly it is here assumed that regardless of political intentions as long as 
some kind of market is allowed to function and/or continued participation in 
the global economy, institutional competition will affect the development of 
the Russian economy. However, in a transition period (assuming there is a. 
conscious effort to realize a structural shift) the following must be assumed as 
well. There is likely to be a lack of political consensus as to the need and 
speed of reforms, gradual learning and external factors will affect the 
consistency of reforms, and in democratic societies the need for political risk-
dispersion (coalition building) will affect both the content and the 
thoroughness of reforms. 
The basic units of analysis in this thesis will be the institutional and 
organisational framework that the oil industry operates within, and the 
behaviour of oil producing entities within this framework. In the historic part 
the formal institutional and organisational framework will be a function of the 
goals of the political leadership, in the post-Soviet era the organisational 
structure has enjoyed more degrees of freedom. Thus adaptations in the 
organisational structure will shed light on the effectiveness of institutional 
reform. Likewise the behaviour of the "oil firm" will shed light on the 
incentive structure and economic behaviour. 
53 Eggertson, op cit., p. 72. [Italics as in original] Again based on Shepsle. 
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The thesis draws on a wide body of secondary literature in English, Russian, 
Norwegian and German that analyse Soviet and Russian politics and 
economics. Various production and performance related data has been 
collected from several of these sources, however, where possible an attempt 
has been made to consult the original Soviet and Russian sources. The 
Narodnoe Khozyaistvo (Nar.Khoz.) and Stran Chlenov SEV series published 
by Goskomstat SSSR have been used for the Soviet data. For data post 1992 
the Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik series published by Goskomstat Rossii 
has been used. In addition data has been collected from company websites, 
various Russian and English journals and newspapers, and through personal 
contact with academics and company representatives. It should be kept in 
mind that, particularly, Soviet data were severely skewed and should therefore 
be taken as indicators of general trends rather than absolute numbers. 
Similarly sources disagree on the constitution of post-Soviet performance 
related data as well. An attempt has been made to maintain identical time 
series definitions when comparing performance related data, thus some of the 
data series may differ from that published by the individual companies. The 
creation of several tables was carried out in SPSS 8.0, while multivariate panel 
data analysis was carried out in Intercooled Stata 6.0. 
In the spring of 2002 a number of elite interviews were carried out with 
executives in various Russian and foreign oil companies in Moscow, Russian 
academics, Ministry of Energy officials, Duma consultants and investment 
bankers. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their present position 
either in the management of the Russian oil industry, their contribution in the 
past to post-Soviet developments or their in-depth knowledge of present 
Russian oil industry. A major aim of the interviews was to confront the 
interviewees with topics of the thesis and solicit responses and comments on 
the views held in this thesis. The interviewees have all requested to remain 
anonymous. For this reason names and identifying information has been 
omitted from the list of interviewees presented in Appendix A. 
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The research objective. 
The main intent of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is to apply the new 
institutional economics and transaction costs paradigms to aspects of the 
Soviet economy. Previous studies devoted to the Soviet oil industry do not 
fall within this approach. Although the thesis is hugely indebted to 
Gustafson's study of Soviet oil policy there are certain aspects that with 
hindsight need to be reanalysed. Gustafson describes the world of Soviet 
politics as 'courtier politics' ,54 a framework that takes into account both 
systemic and leadership qualities. Although carefully analysing the effects of 
systemic features on the development of the Soviet oil industry, he nonetheless 
concludes that "the features of energy policy that we think of as systemic 
represents policy choices among variants that the command system has 
available" and further" this is where the role of leadership comes in".55 The 
thesis agrees wholeheartedly with Gustafson that interest-group politics or 
regional politics were not the drivers behind energy policy,56 (and that 
structural reforms were necessary), however, it disagrees on the importance of 
institutional factors. 
This is important for the reformability of the oil industry. This implies that 
given the Soviet economic situation and the maturity of the system, no 
leadership would have been able to reform the economy without bringing it 
down. In the year 2003 this might seem a futile assertion, since this is 
arguably what happened, and yet it implies that reform will only be possible 
under an altered institutional and organisational structure. 
Even though the Soviet Union was dissolved more than a decade ago and has 
been replaced by "new" nations and regimes a change in name and symbols do 
not in themselves represent a change in institutional structures. The argument 
in this thesis will be that both the choices available to the Soviet leadership 
and the role of leadership were in fact less. In this respect institutions take on 
a quality independent of their creators. Reform is possible, but only if the 
54 Gustafson ( 1989), op cit., p. 3 13. 
55 Ibid, p. 319. 
56 lbid, pp. 311-314 
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entire structure of institutions and organisations are altered in a coherent 
fashion. Thus the reinterpretation of the Soviet oil industry carries, in light of 
the described methodological approach, within itself one conceptual 
framework for analysing the prospects for reform and functioning of the post-
Soviet oil industry. In other words the thesis seeks to establish a different 
understanding of the Soviet oil industry and its overall position within the 
Soviet economy than that presented by Gustafson. This is done primarily for 
understanding the development of the Russian oil industry, and is not aimed at 
a complete reinterpretation of Soviet energy policies. 
Secondly, to apply the evolutionary concepts of 'path dependency' and 
'institutional competition' to the post-Soviet development. The two objectives 
form a necessary whole. The relevance of the theoretical literature to the 
Soviet environment has to be established in order to analyse the prospects for 
institutional reform and continuity in the post-Soviet period. The ordering of 
these objectives is due to their chronological character and not a judgement on 
their importance in terms of relevance for the thesis. These concepts tie the 
evolution of the Russian economy closely to the evolution of the structure of 
state power. The institutional gap that exists between a despotic-patrimonial 
structure with a high degree of state capture and an infrastructural-bureaucratic 
structure with a higher degree of state autonomy has constituted and will 
continue to constitute the main strategic space for the development of path 
dependency and institutional competition. 
In the course of the 1990s much attention has been paid to the Russian oil 
industry, however, much of this work has focused on very specific problems 
and issues, and there have been few attempts to position the present reform 
period within the successive reform periods that have gone before. Moe & 
Kryukov and Kryukov have used TeE and new institutional economics to 
understand the post-Soviet oil industry, especially their organisational and 
industry implications. 57 Sagers et af have analysed the institution of rent 
57 Kryukov & Moe, 'The Russian Oil Industry in a new Institutional Framework', unpublished 
paper, 1996. Kryukov (1998), op cit. Kryukov,' Institutsional'nye preobrazovaniya v 
neJtegazovom komplekse: teoreticheskie osnovy i rossiiskaya praktika [Institutional 
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extraction in both Soviet and Russian oil industry. 58 In the language of this 
thesis, however, these studies concern themselves primarily with second order 
institutions. This is also the case in Lane's The Political Economy of Russian 
Oil, an analysis that incorporates several aspects of second order institutions. 
This thesis agrees with Lane that 'the study of the oil industry illustrates the 
nature of the Russian economy and polity in transition' .59 However, path 
dependency and institutional competition are evolutionary concepts, thus it 
disagrees with idea that the Russian economy lacks co-ordination, goals, laws 
and governing institutions.6o 
Brunsson & Olsen argue that reform in public administration will only be 
successful if it succeeds in establishing a new or restore a previous power and 
authority equilibrium.61 The analysis of path dependency and institutional 
competition are therefore crucial to understanding what equilibrium can be 
created, how it has been created and how it is likely to develop. In order to 
understand the reforms in the Russian oil industry it is therefore important to 
begin with asking where power, authority and property rights rested in the 
Soviet economy? And then proceed with the analysis of what equilibrium was 
established during the 1990s. 
Again conclusions can differ on the basis of the researcher's framework of 
analysis. The argument in this thesis is that power and authority throughout 
the Soviet period were closely tied to the institutional matrix associated with 
the Soviet mode of state power. Formal and informal economic behaviour 
generated by the institutional matrix was geared towards fulfilling state 
objectives while at the same time maximising individual returns. A 
discrepancy between de facto and de jure property rights resulted In 
transformation in the oil and gas sector: theoretical basis and Russian practice], INP, Moskva, 
2000. 
58 Sagers et ai, op cif., pp. 389-425. Furthermore Sagers' series of articles in Post-Soviet 
Geography, and Post-Soviet Geography and Economics on the Russian oil industry have been 
indispensable. 
59 Lane (ed.), The Political Economy of Russian Oil, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, 
p.9. 
60 Ibid., pp. 9-10. As a social system Lane defines the Russian transition process as 'chaotic 
capitalism'. (Ibid.) While as capitalism is a difficult concept to define and therefore to 
disagree with, this thesis argues that the transition is not all that chaotic. 
61 Brunsson & Olsen, The Reforming Organization, Fagbokforlaget, 1993, p. 25. 
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Looking at the post-Soviet oil industry it is therefore necessary to ask to what 
extent the institutionalisation of organisations (when the behaviour of 
organisations is determined by 'culturally conditioned rules which give 
meaning to those actions) and behaviour can explain the ongoing transition 
process? 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that continuity of institutions will 
constitute the dominant element affecting the development of the Russian oil 
industry. This proposition draws on the works of Hedlund and North. 
Hedlund has argued, in game theory terms, that the dominant strategy in 
Russia is defection.62 As impersonal trust is a prerequisite for the functioning 
of a market economy it is assumed that Soviet economic institutions will 
remain dominant over market type institutions.63 This creates a bias towards 
economic behaviour consistent with that, which will be described in part one 
of the thesis. Traditional economic behavioural patterns will remain central, 
and positively correlated to institutional uncertainty and idiosyncrasy of 
transactions. Continuity in firm behaviour will be apparent in both 
organisational structure and adjustments to institutional reforms. This will be 
particularly true in the short-term while a platform for "political consensus" is 
being established. However, as the transition process carries on institutional 
competition will result in the establishment of new patterns of firm behaviour. 
institutional competition will result in a greater variation in firm behaviour -
different strategies to maximise different goals. If reforms manage to increase 
the separation of the political sphere from the economic sphere and decrease 
institutional uncertainty, new organisation and firm behaviour will emerge that 
create greater value and more efficiently exploit the asset base compared to 
other organisations. Furthermore, as institutional competition increases 
62 Hedlund, 'Path Dependence in Russian Policy Making: Constraints on Putin's Economic 
Choice', Post-Communist Economies, 2000, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 400-401. 
63 North (1999), op cit., p. 21. 
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different definitions of value and efficiency will affect the development of 
corporate strategies and objectives. 
An important element in the separation of the political sphere from the 
economic sphere will be analysed through the redistribution of both de jure 
and de facto property rights. This process is characterised not only by the 
privatisation of state assets, but also by what property was in the Soviet Union. 
Crucially the oil industry was not only state owned and managed, but like the 
party structure and most of the economy in general it was the state.64 
Although the methodology employed in this thesis will have relevance for 
overall Russian economic reforms it nonetheless remains a study of a 
particular sector in the Soviet and Russian economy. It is hoped that although 
the thesis will not be able to explain Russia's eternal reform problem, it will 
shed light on the reform problems in this crucial sector. Being a producer of 
an internationally highly priced and mobile commodity the oil sector is in, 
many ways unique in the Russian context. 
64 For an elaboration of this argument see Hedlund, 'Property Without Rights: Dimensions of 
Russian Privatisation', Europe-Asia Studies, 2001, vo!. 52, no. 2, pp. 213-237. See also Gill, 
The Collapse of a Single-Party System, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 1-12. 
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Part I 
Historic Constraints: 
Soviet Organisation and Institutions. 
Chapter 1 
A History of the Oil Industry. 
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'You know before the 1990s we had Soviet 
power, everything was state run and we had no 
problems'. 
'Many years before - under Stalin - measures 
and steps were simple, but now there is some 
kind of sabotage, because the present 
mechanism does not work'. 
IntervielVee # 6 
Until its demise the Soviet Union was the largest producer of oil in the world. 
Production in the Soviet Union went through several phases each tied in with a 
major area of production. Although not as famous as the oil producing 
capabilities of the Middle East (to a large extent a result of the lesser 
dependence of Western Europe and the USA on these reserves) the Soviet oil 
industry was by international standards a seasoned industry with major 
achievements to its name. At the turn of the 19th century, the tsarist oil 
industry was the largest producer of oil in the world. This was followed by a 
slump as other areas started exploring and producing, and as institutional 
arrangements in Russia were insufficient to exploit the resources efficiently. 
Oil production did not pick up until the discoveries of oil in the Volga-Urals 
area and later on in Western Siberia. There has, however, been much 
controversy and interest tied to Soviet oil (and energy) resources, not least in 
strategic studies during the Cold War. In April 1977 a Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) report on the Soviet oil and energy industry concluded that the 
Soviet Union's output of oil would peak by the early 1980s and then decline.65 
The report identified several aspects of the Soviet oil industry that would lead 
to production difficulties. After what Gustafson identifies as two Soviet oil 
crises, Soviet oil output peaked in 1987.66 
Just as the Bolsheviks inherited an economic system that they had to adapt and 
build upon, so in the early 1990s the Russian Federation had to take into 
65 Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum: Half-empty or half-full? George Alien & 
Unwin, 1980, p. 6. Hewett, Energy Economics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union. The 
Brookings Institute, 1984, p. 45. 
66 Gustafson, op cif., p. 107. 
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consideration and build upon the structure that was created during 70 years of 
Bolshevik rule. Both before and after the CIA report, several Western analysts 
warned that the Soviet method of exploitation and organisation could create 
severe problems in the immanent future with respect to development pace -
over-exploitation - and efficiency of production.67 On the other hand Soviet 
specialists and party leaders themselves were acutely aware of the problems in 
the industry, and several analysts have commented on the debate that 
developed during the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.68 
Historic Overview. 
The development of the oil industry in Russia generally falls in to three broad 
periods, which by and large coincide with the main areas of production. 69 The 
major areas of production are depicted in Figure 1.1. The relative proportion 
of production and importance of the different periods can be taken from 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
The Caucasus. The main oil producing area before World War 11 (WWII) 
was in present-day Azerbaijan, and in the North Caucasus. 70 Commercial 
production on the Apsheron Peninsula east of Baku commenced in the 1870s. 
At the turn of the century Russia produced about 47% of total world output of 
crude oil.71 This proportion of world output was soon to fall as Russian 
production began to trail behind other producers. 
67 See Goldman, op cit., pp. 35-40 & 173-174. Campbell, The Economics of Soviet Oil and 
Gas. John Hopkins Press, 1968, pp. 15-57. Dienes & Shabad, The Soviet Energy System: 
Resource Use and Policies. V.H. Winston & Sons, 1979, p.263-267. Gustafson (1989), op 
cit., pp. 10-21. Hewett, op cit., pp. 9-15, 24-31. 
68 Fischer, 'Die Folgen jahrzehntelanger Misswirtschaft in der Erdol- und Erdgasindustrie der 
ehemaligen UdSSR [The consequences of decades of mismanagement in the oil and gas 
industries of the Former USSR)', in Osteuropa-WirtschaJt, 1993, vol. 38, no. 3, p. 241. 
Gustafson (1989), op cit., chp. 2 & 4. Mal'tsev, et al., 'Neftyanaya promyshlennost' Rossii v 
poslevoennye gody [The Russian oil industry in the post-war period)', VNIIOENT, 1996, Chp. 
3. 
69 In addition to the here mentioned periods and areas there has been production in some of the 
Central Asian republics, Belarus and the Ukraine. Their proportion and importance, however, 
has overall been negligible and they will therefore be omitted from this overview. (See 
Dienes and Shabad, op cit., for a more detailed account). 
70 Due to the importance of the Baku fields both to the tsarist as well as Bolshevik oil industry 
this area will be treated as a part of the development of Soviet oil irrespective of its present 
~olitical status. 
I Ebel, The Petroleum Industry of the Soviet Union, American Petroleum Institute, 1961, p. 
62. 
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Figure 1.1 - Map of Russia's oil regions. 
Source: 
I. Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus & Caspian. 5. Sakhalin 
2. Volga - Urals 6. Eastern Siberia 
3. Western Siberia 7. Lena Tunguska 
4. Komi area 
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According to Hassman tsarist legislation was short-sighted and failed to 
accommodate the needs of investors. 72 A counter-productive licensing system 
that divided fields into small and unconnected allotments made the efficient 
production of oil difficult and wasteful, with the sole intention of filling the 
government coffers.73 
Although proportionately smaller by world standards, the Caucasus was to 
keep its pre-eminence within the Soviet Union until the 1950s. Whereas the 
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1940 accounted for more than 
70 percent of total oil production, by 1950 this proportion had fallen to 39 
percent. The declining output after 1940 has several reasons. 
The war disrupted production. Although the Baku fields were not seized by 
German troops, the effects of the war (disrupted communications lines and 
Soviet instigated destruction) contributed to the decline. In addition these 
fields were among the oldest and longest worked in the USSR. The 
development of the first major offshore fields in 1951-52 contributed to renew 
growth in production, however, production began to fall again in the mid-
1970s, as the offshore fields were unable to meet their goals.74 As shown in 
Table 1.2, the proportion of Soviet oil output in Azerbaijan had by 1991 
become quite small. 
72 Hassman, Oil in the Soviet Union: History, Geography, Problems. Princton University 
Press, 1953, pp. 22-28. This was particularly the case with foreign investors who provided 
more than fifty percent of capital investment in the Baku oil industry prior to WWI. 
73 Hassman further argues that a government take of revenues close to 40% signalled a selfish 
and irresponsible attitude towards the development of the oil industry, a royalty payment is 
one of the levies that Hassman reacts to. Given present standards a 40% government take 
would be seen as highly competitive, however, under the circumstances presiding at the turn 
of the 19th century investors could find more attractive investment opportunities elsewhere. 
74 Dienes & Shabad, op cit., pSI. 
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Table 1.1 - Oil and Condensate production by region 1950-2000. (In million tons). 
Source: 
I) For data on USSR 1950-87: Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967, 1975 & 1987; for 
1991: Dienes, Istvan, Radetzki, Energy and Economic Reform in the FSU, p. 7. 
2) For data on RSFSR 1950-75 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967 & 1975; 1980-
2000: Rossiiskii Slatislicheskii Ezhegodnik 2001, except 1987: Narodnoe 
Khozyaistvo RSFSR v 1988. 
3-6) 1950-1970: Mal'tsev et al., op cit. p. 8-9; 1975-2000, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii 
Ezhegodnik 200l,except 1987: Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty, p.122. 
7) 1)-2). 
8) For data on Azerbaijan 1950-75: Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967 & 1975; 1980: 
Gustafson, op cit.; 1985-91: Strany Chleny SNG. 
* Excluding Volga areas. 
** Incl. Sakhalin 
Note: Na.: not applicable. Discrepancies due to rounding. The official Soviet sources 
do not include breakdowns into regions within the republics. Other sources have been 
used to fill in where official Soviet/Russian sources have not been available. 
Table 1.2 - Oil and Condensate Production, 1950-2002 (in percent of total USSR). 
Source: See tab. 1.1 (Discrepancies due to rounding). 
* Excluding Volga areas. 
** Incl. Sakhalin 
Note: The non-RSFSR column includes production in the Ukraine, Belarus and 
Azerbaiian. After 1991 onlv percentages for Russian Federation. 
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The Volga-Urals and Komi Republic. Oil was first struck in the Volga-
Urals region east of Perm in 1929. Although Soviet geologists seemed to 
think that the area had great potential, exploration did not intensify until 
WWII caused disruption of the traditional supply sources in the Caucasus. 75 
As can been seen from tables 1.1 and 1.2 the output of oil from this region 
grew rapidly after the war. The giant Romashkino field in the Tatar 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was discovered in 1948 and 
additional large reserves were discovered in the Bashkortostan. By the mid-
1960s the Volga-Urals area represented 71 per cent of total Soviet oil 
production. In absolute terms the area did not peak until 1975. 
Situated in the northern parts of the European USSR, the Komi ASSR has 
been producing oil since the 1930s. Production remained negligible until the 
discovery of larger reserves in 1960s and 1970s. The main Komi development 
is situated between the Pechora River and its tributary the Usa. Production in 
the Komi ASSR peaked at21 million tons in 1988.76 
Western Siberia. Before the development of the petroleum resources in 
Western Siberia, the oil industry was in a relative advantageous proximity to 
. the main industrial areas and consumers. With the development of Western 
Siberia this strategic advantage was to change rapidly. In the 1960s the 
European part of the Soviet Union accounted for approximately 90 per cent of 
national production of oil, by ·1980 the Asian part of the USSR accounted for 
more than half of total oil and condensate production. 77 In addition to being 
located at a greater distance from traditional industrial areas, the climatic, 
geographic and infrastructure conditions in Western Siberia were quite 
different from the previous oil producing regions. 
The first developments in Western Siberia were concentrated in the Konda 
River valley, but the great reserves and deposits of the region were to be found 
75 The famous Soviet geologist I.M. Gubkin was a chief proponent of the belief in oil deposits 
in the Volga-Urals area (Ebel, op cit., p. 65). 
76 Gustafson (1989), op cit., p. 22. 
77 In table 1.2 add Azerbaijan, European Russia and Volga-Ural area. 
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further east in the middle reaches of the Ob River valley. Developments 
proceeded slowly at first due to the lack of infrastructure, while climatic 
conditions limited the time during which construction material and resources 
could be shipped. The completion of a 40-inch 650 miles long pipeline in 
1976 substantially improved the infrastructural drawbacks that had hampered 
the exploitation and accessibility of Siberian oil. 
In the period 1961-1969 exploration had identified 59 oil fields in the Middle 
Ob region. 78 Among these was the supergiant field - Samotlor, nine giant 
fields and nine large fields. 79 The development of Western Siberia during the 
9th Five Year Plan (FYP) concentrated on the development of Samotlor, where 
production increased from 10 million tons in 1970 to 86.5 million tons in 1975 
before levelling of at 130-140 million tons in 1977-78. The rapid growth and 
importance of Western Siberian oil can be taken from tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
From the Middle Ob region the development of Western Siberian petroleum 
resources has taken two general directions; north into the Surgut and· 
Nizhnevartovsk districts and to the south-west - into Tomsk Oblast. 
Features of the Historic Development process. 
Soviet oil output grew in each consecutive year after the war until 1984. The 
gains in production increases were at times spectacular. The growth of the 
Soviet economy coincided with this access to ever-larger reservoirs of 
petroleum resources. But, as the industry fanned out from the Caucasus, 
increasing demands were put on the entire economic system to process 
information and on bureaucratic management to undertake appropriate policies 
for promoting the development of region specific policies. Industry grew 
because of access to cheap and plentiful energy, however as both industry as a 
whole and the oil industry grew, the oil industry increasingly consumed and 
demanded an increasing proportion of industrial output. With the depletion of 
78 This paragraph is based on Dienes & Shabad, op cif., pp. 56-61. 
79 Supergiant fields are defined as having more than 500 million tons of recoverable reserves, 
giant fields are defined as having from lOO to 500 million tons of recoverable reserves, and 
large fields are defined as having from 50 to 100 million tons of recoverable reserves. 
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easy access oil, higher demands were put on quality of supporting industries 
and of factor inputs. Since the early 1970s these trends were reflected in the 
steadily increasing production costs and the slowing down of production gains 
(Table l.3). 
Table 1.3 - Soviet and Russian output of oil and condensate 1960-2000 and percentage 
difference over previous period. 
Sources: USSR: Narodnoe Khozyaistvo various issues, except 1991 from Dienes, Energy and 
Economic Reform in the FSU, p. 7; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo v 1967 & 1975; 1970-2000 
Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2000, except 1983 & 87 from Gustafson, Crisis Amid 
Plenty, p. 122. 
Geographic shift. As the Soviet economy became increasingly reliant on its 
hydrocarbon resources for energy, these resources were found in ever more· 
remote areas and in difficult climatic conditions. From Table 1.2 can be seen 
the rapid growth and overall contribution of the oil resources located in 
Western Siberia. However, even the most accessible of these resources were 
located far from the main consumption areas of the metropolitan areas and the 
industrial Urals. Distance and remoteness were contributing factors to 
increased cost of production. 
With the shift in extracting locations the oil industry became more dispersed. 
Initially the industry had been located in Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, 
and much of the supporting industries were located close to these reserves. 
As resources had to be transported from the east to the west, equipment and 
production inputs had to be transported in the other direction which meant 
increased pressure on the logistical co-ordination and administrative 
capabilities of the oil industry and the Soviet economy. 
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Increased spatial distribution is often seen as a contributing element to 
inefficiency and economic 10ss.80 Increased spatial distribution also puts a 
strain on the organisation's ability to formulate a coherent and adequate 
development policy as the growth of production circumstances requires the 
development of circumstance specific strategies, i.e. the ability of an 
organisation to diversify its operational procedures according to the need of a 
specific region. This certainly was the case in the Soviet Union where the 
producing areas had very different characteristics. 
Dienes estimates that as a result of this production cost for the oil industry in 
real terms rose by 9.5 percent per year during the 1980s.81 The turbo-drill, 
which had contributed to the development of the Volga-Urals area proved less 
efficient in Western Siberia where rock formation is different, and at greater 
drill depths.82 In the Siberian case water-flooding was employed right from 
the beginning in order to boost production figures. The development of drill-
depths represents the maturation of the oil industry to the extent that shallower 
deposits are tapped before deeper wells (which they normally are since 
shallower wells are cheaper to drill). In the Soviet case average drill-depths of 
wells increased from 1590 meters in 1956 to 2797 meters in 1978.83 At the 
same time there was a growing awareness in the leadership that exploratory 
drilling during the 1970s was not proving up sufficiently new reserves to make 
up for the high level of exploitation.84 Their response, as noted above, was to 
increase investment - although exploration's share of total investment 
continued to decline85. Another indicator as to the exploitation intensity and 
maturation of fields is the productivity of wells - which in the Soviet Union 
has been declining rapidly for new wells since the late 1970s and for old wells 
since the early 1980s. Furthermore, in order to offset the declining production 
80 Coase, op cit., p. 397 
81 Dienes et ai, Energy and Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union; Implications for 
Production, Consumption and Exports, andfor the International Energy Markets, St. Martin's 
Press, 1994, p. 71. 
82 Gustafson (1989), op cit., p. 75. 
83 Kelly et aI., Energy Research and Development in the USSR, Duke University Press, 1986, 
r,.85. 
4 Gustafson (1989), op cit., p.76. 
85 Ibid. 
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in older fields new smaller fields had to be introduced. These fields were on a 
well to well comparison less efficient as pressure in smaller deposits is lower 
thus resulting in a slower flow. 
Not only was there a lack of infrastructure and manpower available to the 
planners as they sought to develop Western Siberia, supporting industry was 
(and to a great extent still is) heavily concentrated in the two earlier 
production regions. The lack of infrastructure implied increased development 
cost. Manpower (operating crews) had to be flown in (mainly from the Volga-
Urals region) as part of a rotating system to assist their West Siberian 
counterparts in extracting the oil and maintaining production facilities.86 The 
location of the supporting industries led to increased logistical and 
communication problems, and there was an increasing awareness that the 
equipment produced was not up to standard and thus not sufficiently suited to 
tackle the new geological and climatic conditions under which they had to 
operate.87 At the end of the 1980s more than two-thirds of the necessary oil-
and gas producing equipment was being manufactured in and around Baku. 
Smaller production centres were in Grozny and the Volga-Urals region, while 
only little of the oil industry equipment was produced in Western Siberia. In 
view of the changing geopolitical circumstances of the early 1990s this factor 
worsened. 
Reservoir and reserve quality. Reserves in the Soviet Union were 
characterised as active or hard-to-produce depending on technical 
characteristics of difficulty to produce and their well-flow characteristics.88 
Active reserves are reserves that have easy flowing oil (i.e. high rock/sand 
permeability) and have favourable geologic characteristics, while hard-to-
produce reserves have low rock permeability, high viscosity oil and less 
favourable deposit characteristics. As a result of the technical and geologic 
differences the reserves in the first category are more attractive to developers, 
as they will be cheaper to develop and easier to master. In developing these 
86 Ibid., p. 108 & 174. 
87 Fisher, op cit., pp. 241-242 
88 Dienes et al., op cit., p.47. 
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fields the Soviets followed the same pattern that other oil producing countries 
follow - they start with the easiest and least costly fields to develop. 
However, as the proportion of fields that are easy to develop declines, the 
necessity to either find new fields of the same characteristics and/or start 
developing the hard-to-recover fields increases if production levels are to be 
maintained. Both approaches increase the strain on administrative capabilities 
of the industry, require increased investments and a more diversified policy 
approach. 
While 85 per cent of production in 1976 came from active fields, by 1991 this 
had declined to 56 per cent. By then the depletion rate of the active fields was 
63 percent while that for hard-to-produce fields was only 22 percent. All in 
all, hard to recover reserves had by 1991 contributed only 6 percent of 
cumulative output in Russia.89 
Production practices. Another factor contributing to rising cost and rapid 
depletion was the very intensive way, in which the oil resources of the Volga-
Urals region and Western Siberia had been exploited. In contrast to the 
development of the Caucasus, the Soviets had made extensive use of 
waterflooding in the Volga-Urals and West Siberian fields. Waterflooding is a 
technique that involves pumping water into the wells in order to push the oil 
into the well and up to the surface by pressure maintenance. According to 
Soviet oilmen this technique enhanced total recovery, accelerated output and 
reduces cost by prolonging the period of free-flow.90 Western oilmen on the 
other hand claimed that total recovery was reduced and cost was increased 
through the greater logistical needs and use of energy to install and operate the 
elaborate network of pipes and pumps.91 The early use of the waterflooding 
recovery method will initially result in highly productive wells through 
pressure maintenance, but as the reservoir becomes increasingly filled with 
water the product will contain an increasing cut of water. It may also result in 
89 The numbers in this paragraph have been taken from Dienes et al., ibid., table 2.2 (p. 39) 
and footnote 9 (p. 221). 
90 Gustafson (1989), op cit., pp. 114-116. 
91 Ibid. 
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displacement of reserves and puts an extra strain on equipment in the form of 
proneness to freeze and water' s effect on metal (rust). 
However, both Westerners and Russians seem to be in agreement that the 
technique initially accelerates production. This again means that the well will 
peak quicker, which is what the Soviets experienced with their Volga-Urals 
fields in the mid-1970s and Western Siberian fields in the early 1980s. For 
comparison, the Soviet super-giant Samotlar initially held about 20-30% of the 
reservoirs of some of the largest Middle Eastern deposits, yet was forced to 
produce over two decades the same amount of oi1.92 Hewett in his analysis 
gives the estimates that the depletion ratio in oilfields changed from 39 percent 
in 1961-65 to 88 percent in 1981-85.93 This means that an increasingly large 
amount of resources has to be invested purely to replace previous production. 
In the Russian case the share of oil produced from free-flow wells declined 
from 52 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 1990 and water-cut was 76 percent in 
1990 while the Soviet average had been 50 percent in 1976.94 
Figure 1.2 - Production/extraction method proportions 1970-2000. 
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Source: Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2000. 
Note: The chart shows use of extraction method in the RSFSR, however, 
given the overall weight of Russia in the Soviet oil balance (over 90% 
after 1980) these numbers are representative for the entire USSR. 
92 Dienes et al. , op cit., p. 48. 
93 Depletion ratio: The proportion of additions to capacity that has to be devoted to covering 
output losses in existing fields. (Hewett, op cit., pp.48-49). Meaning the share of addition in 
production capacity - output capacity - that has to produced in order simply to cover and 
maintain reduction in already existing fields . A high ratio indicates that fields are in a mature 
and declining state, thus making total production increase relatively more costly compared to a 
low depletion ratio. A low ratio indicates a growing industry in which added capacity 
increases total production instead of covering lost production. 
94 International Energy Agency (lEA), Energy Policies of the Russian Federation; 1995 
Survey, OECD/IEA, 1995, p. 109. 
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Water-cut is the proportion of water that is pumped up together with the oil. 
Figure 1.2 shows the balance of production methods from 1970-2000. This 
predatory extraction policy enabled the Soviet producers to enjoy rapid 
increase in output, which was their main objective, but at the same time it put 
greater strain on equipment and the maintenance of such high production 
levels. As deposits became exhausted and marginal output started to slow 
down, the Soviets relied on opening up new fields to compensate for the 
expected fall in production. Table 1.4 shows the decline in well productivity 
over the last 30 years. 
Table 1.4 - Average well productivity Russia 1970-2000, tons per day. 
Source: Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2000. 
From the figures it should be obvious that increased production must coincide 
with enormous capital expenses. Efficiency gains are possible through neW' 
equipment and better production techniques and practices, but at the same time 
the Russians will need more wells and fields than in the past to produce the 
same amount of oil. 
Apart from waterflooding there are several other means by which oil can be 
"forced" to the surface - secondary and tertiary recovery methods. From a 
planning point of view these methods are more uncertain then opening up new 
fields, especially after extensive use of waterflooding which makes the levels 
of increased extraction on the basis of these methods even more uncertain. 
Further, such methods require huge capital investments over a prolonged 
period, not only in building new infrastructure but also in maintaining and 
upgrading equipment, which again raises the question of how well the Soviet 
economy was suited to such risk taking. Moreover, how willing would the 
planners have been to bring up the necessary resources for these investments 
as gas constituted a comparatively easier way of increasing energy 
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production? As shown in Chapter two, investment growth in oil was smaller 
than overall investment growth in energy during the 1 i h FYP. 
Depreciation is the largest proportion of the extraction cost. In 1987 this alone 
accounted for 68 percent of all cost, while the industry's own consumption of 
energy amounted to 18 percent of its COSt.95 In an interview with Kuhnert in 
1988 the Russian energy-specialist Kononov estimated that the extraction cost 
of the oil industry would continue to rise as a result of the increased need to 
explore increasingly remote areas and smaller deposits, under ever harsher 
conditions.96 This shift towards smaller deposits and harsher conditions is one 
of the challenges that the Russian oil industry today has to overcome. Such a 
shift is natural for any extractive industry, because larger and more favourably 
placed deposits tend to be worked sooner than smaller and more marginal 
deposits. 
However, Soviet structural factors, organisational, economic and political, 
contributed to the decline in development and exploration drilling, rising 
number of idle wells and reduction of new fields being brought into 
production.97 According to Campbell the 'conservation issue' in Soviet field 
development practice was in large part influenced by considerations of a non-
economic character.98 Though Soviet practice in the 1960 tended towards 
wider well spacing,99 pressure to maintain output growth and compensate for 
falling production in the older oil regions resulted in massive investments in 
development drilling throughout the 1970s and 1980s. lOO However, lack of 
95 Dienes et al., op cit., p. 127. The Soviet energy-specialist Kononov estimates this 
percentage to be 16 percent in 1980. (See Kuhnert, "Die Energiepolitk Der Sowjetunion: 
Zwischen Planung und Muddling Through", PhD, University of Vienna, 1989, p. 181. 
96 Kuhnert, op cit., p. 181. 
97 Sagers, 'Energy Situation Update for 1992 for the Former Soviet Union', in PlanEcon, 
PlanEcon Energy Outlook/or the Former Soviet Republics, PlanEcon, 1993, p. 3. 
98 Campbell, op cit., pp. 45-53. The 'conservation issue' relates to the field development 
plans. Briefly summaried this issue relates to the intensity by which fields are worked. For 
instance fields can have a dense clustering of production wells that results in high annual 
production and quicker exhaustion, or wider spacing that resulting in slower production over a 
longer period. Other things being equal, total extracted amount will be the same, however, the 
cost of the two strategies differ, and contingency planning, i.e. exploration, differs. According 
to Campbell, in Soviet practice output-related considerations rather than capital-intensity 
considerations dominated the issue. 
99 Ibid., p. 53. 
100 Gustafson, op cit., pp. 90-95 & 118-123. 
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high-grade equipment, low priority of maintenance and repaIr, and poor 
industrial support resulted in poor well and infrastructural quality. Finally, 
Goldman argues that the Soviets would abandon fields prematurely as cost 
increased and production abated. 101 A particular field is usually made up of a 
number of deposits of varying sizes, usually with a number of main deposits 
and a number of satellite (smaller) deposits. In Soviet practice the 
development of satellite fields was neglected in favour of moving on to new 
large deposits. This contributed to initial high production figures and "more 
secure" drilling and plan fulfilment figures. Quality of well preparation and 
maintenance of wells and infrastructure were factors leading to rising numbers 
of idle wells and rapid decline of production in the first half of the 1990s. 102 
A number of large undeveloped fields are still available in Russia,103 but 
increasingly production will have to come from smaller and more expensive 
fields. This again implies that increasingly Russian exploration efforts will 
also have to be concentrated in new and uncertain areas. As with the earlier. 
shifts in geographic location, it is questionable how well the new Russian 
economy will be able to cope with the uncertainty factor that such exploration 
constitutes. The Energy Programme of 1984 had envisaged further 
development in Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea and the continental shelf. 104 The 
two first options have as a result of the changed geopolitical circumstances 
been severely restricted. Unless Russia is willing to make greater use of 
economic standards of evaluating their involvement in these projects, it is 
unlikely that the new owners of these potential resources will invite the 
Russian State or Russian companies to co-develop these areas. With respect 
to the third option - the continental shelf - Russia is faced with a 
technological deficit. Having largely confined itself to onshore development 
Russian expertice in this field lags behind western standards. 
101 Goldman, op cit., pp. 43-48. Goldman argues that this stemmed from the incentive 
structure that Soviet managers and developers worked under, and the distribution of property 
rights with regards to capital investments and natural resources. 
102 WB, Staff Appraisal Report Russian Federation Second Oil Rehabilitation Project, WB, 
1994, p. 7. 
103 In 1994 there were 35 undeveloped large fields in Western Siberia. (Ibid.) 
104 'Osnovnye polozheniya energeticheskoi programmu SSSR na dlitel 'nuyu perspektivy [Main 
position of the USSR long-term energy programme], Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, vol. 12, 1984. 
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As one moves north, the probability of finding oil is reduced in favour of gas, 
which again increases the risk factor with regards to finding new sources of 
oil. The efforts by the Russians with regard to exploration and development in 
the Siberian Far East will therefore be a yardstick by which to measure 
changes in Russian energy and oil policy over Soviet policy. The West 
Siberian fields still hold vast resources, but the development of new uncertain 
areas will show whether the Russian oil industry is willing to take on more 
risk than its Soviet predecessor was. The Russians can rely on exhausting the 
West Siberian resources and then hope for another big find, or they can 
gradually develop other areas simultaneously thus possibly reducing the need 
for a rapid exhaustion of West Siberian resources. Crucially, this depends not 
only on Russian production practices, but the entire economic framework 
within which it operates. It would require both a change in production 
practices and a change of government policy towards the energy industries. 
Throughout the first half of the 1990s Russian production plummeted (Table, 
1.3). Production in the Russian Federation in 1996 bottomed out 46.6 per cent 
below its Soviet peak in 1987/88. The reasons for this fall were in part 
financial, economic and political turmoil. Nonetheless, the depletion of 
traditional areas was a crucial variable as well, and the Russians will need to 
start developing new areas. These will primarily be the Russian Far East, the 
Russian Caspian Sea and the continental shelf. The exploration and 
development of these areas will require substantial investments and 
administrative flexibility. The Russian state is at the moment not in a position 
to finance these undertakings itself. It will therefore be reliant on Russian and 
international capital to finance such projects. For the Russian federal 
authorities this will imply a shift in the structures by which they previously 
exercised control and secured state revenues. In short it will require a shift 
from a despotic-patrimonial structure of state power to an infrastructural-
bureaucratic structure of state power, without which the investment climate in 
Russia will remain too unattractive to attract the large-scale capital needed for 
such development. This shift must occur not only in form but also in 
substance. 
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Having said this however, it should be kept in mind that there remains a strong 
political and industry will to develop Russian oil resources without Western 
assistance and/or participation. In other words a Russian model may very well 
develop that accommodates this interest. Such a model does not implicitly 
imply a shift in state power, nor a failure to continue the development of 
Russian oil. What is being argued here though is that unless there is a 
corresponding shift in the structure of state power (and thus a change in the 
entire institutional matrix) the development of Russian oil will be hampered 
by high transaction costs that will impede both state autonomy and industry 
. development. Ultimately this may lead to a continuation of a development 
path that has failed to provide widespread welfare. 
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Chapter 2 
Energy in the Soviet Union and Russia. 
'Communism is Soviet power and 
the electrification of the whole country!' 105 
Lenin 
'So, we produced as much oil as we 
needed!' . 106 
Interviewee # 6 
Production and supply of energy lies at the heart of any modem industrialised 
society. The preferred energy carrier or carriers vary between countries and 
over time, but energy is one of the defining elements of our modem industrial 
and post-industrial civilisation. The level of consumption in urbanised and 
industrial societies is such that provision of energy has become a major factor 
in ensuring social stability and prosperity. \07 Thus any regime will attach the 
utmost importance to the provision of energy. Such provision can take various 
forms, but any state will try to control or influence ~he energy producers to 
such an extent as it deems necessary in order to fulfil its political, ideological 
and economic goals. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the USA is 
one example; national oil producers in the Gulf states are other examples. 108 
In the Soviet Union the production of energy was the sole responsibility of the 
state. All production facilities belonged to the state and various ministries 
supervised the activities of the different energy carriers. 
The GOELRO plan (State Program for the Electrification of Russia) of the 
1920s was the first Bolshevik experiment with central planning. The 
importance that Lenin attached to this plan left a lasting legacy on Soviet 
energy policy. Speaking about electrification in grand words Lenin not only 
saw it as an important factor in overcoming the Soviet Union's backwardness, 
but also tied modernisation in with the historic scientific determinism of 
105 Lenin, cited in Anne Rassweiler, The Generation of Power, Oxford University Press, 1988, 
p.3. 
106 On answering a question related to the investment burden of the Soviet oil and gas 
campaigns. 
107 In contrast to pre-industrialised societies the level of energy consumption is such that the 
average individual cannot produce the needed level of energy himself (i.e. gathering firewood, 
peat, etc.) without sacrificing a disproportionate amount of his time to this activity and thereby 
forgoing the higher standard of living that modem societies enjoy. 
108 The SPR was used as a price buffer for oil prices during the high oil prices of 2000. 
Although this was an exceptional circumstance, there seems to be at the time of writing 
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communism itself. Electricity, and in a wider perspective energy, would bring 
peasants and workers 'into the modern world of large-scale, scientific, and 
rational production' .109 Electrification would be the basis for 'modern large-
scale production' that would serve as the foundation upon which to reconstruct 
Soviet man. 110 Energy was therefore not only the means by which the 
economy would grow, but ultimately the means by which communism would 
be constructed. This political legacy of the first planning attempt has been 
reflected in the evolution of Soviet energy policy ever since. The last long-
term energy strategy of the USSR draws an important link between the 
political legacy of the GOELROplan and its own recommendation for future 
energy policy. I II In the Soviet Union the provision of energy was therefore 
ideologically and politically, as well as economically, tied in with the 
development of socialism and progress towards communism. I 12 
Electrification and dependence on electricity is an irreversible step in the 
evolution of economies that potentially can have great centripetal effects, i.e. it 
binds together the various parts of the economy in greater mutual 
interdependence. The initial cost of this transformation is such that no 
individual or group can initiate and accomplish it on their own. In having 
realised the process an economy is (in the initial stage) irreversibly tied 
together and dependent on a central authority to oversee the efficient 
distribution of energy. I 13 This authority was until the 1980s predominantly 
state run or controlled. However during the past 10-15 years various forms of 
decentralised energy supply have emerged in several industrialised countries. 
(winter 2001) a consensus in the US Senate to amend the current energy legislation to make 
the SPR a permanent tool of influencing prices on oil. (OG./) Dec. 10,200 I, pp.3I-36. 
109 Rassweiler, op cil., p. 29. 
110 Lenin, cited in Rassweiler, ibid., p. 14. 
I11 Ekonomicheskaya Gazela, op cil. The development of the program was started in the late 
1970s under Brezhnev, however, the debate about proper development and a series of deaths 
and ill-health of 3 general secretaries delayed the plan. 
112 Diskin argues that from the 1960 onwards an ideological shift occurred that increasingly 
emphasised 'growth of individual well-being, socialist legality, private initiative and 
responsibility'. (Diskin, 'Economic System of Russia: Problems of Institutional Genesis', 
Social Sciences, 1999, vol. 30, no. 2, p. 34). 
113 As economies mature and the initial set-up cost has been recuperated a decentralisation of 
energy supplies is often believed to be efficiency enhancing and to have energy conservatory 
effects. 
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Decentralisation is often seen as an efficiency measure when an industry has 
reached a natural state of declining marginal returns and rising marginal costs. 
The increased competition that decentralisation is thought to bring about is to 
ensure that rising cost of production cannot be indiscriminately transferred to 
the end-consumer, thereby encouraging cost-saving measures - i.e. 
restructuring and innovation. Traditional primary energy resources (peat, coal, 
oil and gas) are finite resources. Eventually efficiency gains in production can 
no longer be achieved by additional investment, and hence the need for 
government operative control diminishes in favour of a more diverse operative 
structure. Cost saving measures such as reorganisation and restructuring are 
likely to improve the return on capital - a process which in Western Europe 
has been accompanied by a transfer of control to the private sector and a 
greater emphasis on shareholder-returns as a measure of operating success. 
However, the public sector in these cases seeks to maintain control of the 
industries through regulation and taxation. 
Based on the Soviet experience, increased investment in the energy industries 
once these reached a certain level of diminishing returns on investment had an 
outright detrimental effect on the economy as a whole. If the authorities in 
charge of administering these industries are not able or prepared to reform 
them the result may very well have destabilising effects, i.e. economic 
slowdown or contraction. 
The provision of energy is however, not only an economic matter. Some will 
see it as a public good and as such should be part of the public sector. 
Furthermore, some may see energy as such a crucial element of a modem 
society that it disproportionately affects the wellbeing of a society, i.e. 
political considerations (the centralising effects mentioned) and power 
distribution. Issues such as sovereignty and national security are issues that 
often influence energy debates. 
The latter issue raises a point of concern in that authorities seeking to exploit 
the centralising (and hence power enhancing and legitimising) benefits of 
controlling energy in order to maintain or to create a basis for autonomy 
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and/or sovereignty, may themselves be the product of centrifugal forces. 
Examples in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
and within the Russian Federation: Chechnya, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan. 114 
Therefore in addition to the destabilising effects stemming from the capital 
drain as a result of "over-investment", a mature centralised energy industry in 
countries or regions aspiring to some form of higher autonomy is another 
long-term destabilising factor. This is because political and ideological 
considerations will be more emphasised than economic considerations thus 
either prolonging the capital drain and/or may result in non-investment due to 
unclear ownership titles and authority structure. I 15 Both results can have the 
same long-term effects, a contracting economy that is insufficiently equipped 
to provide its citizens with economic security and an acceptable standard of 
living. 
Energy policy is therefore not only about the basis upon which energy 
provision should take place, but also about the management of an industry that 
constitutes the basis for several aspects of a modem society. The energy 
policy of any country should be long-term and flexible. It should be 
developed to take into consideration a sound and long-term development of 
energy and the environment as against short-term budgetary considerations 
and should incorporate strategies for the times when return on investment is 
diminishing. 
From a political point of view, a long-term energy development plan stresses 
the common good that natural resources should be. A good that belongs to 
more than one generation, rather than immediate maximum benefits that only 
leave behind environmental devastation and reduces the economic options in 
following periods. Such strategies should ideally make provisions for the time 
114 Other examples outside the FSU are Scotland, where the Scotish National Party (SNP) sees 
the control of the North Sea petroleum reserves as a medium for securing independence. The 
energy issue has also been a component in the East Timor independence struggle. 
115 Arguments like protecting the national inheritance, protecting autonomy, independence and 
sovereignty on the part of both "seceding" and "remaining" parties. 
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when these non-renewable resources have become exhausted, and defer such 
times by enabling a shift from a Marx-pattern of growth to a Kuznets-pattern 
of growth. I 16 Growth in the former model stems from increased input of 
labour and capital, with a declining return on either input. I 17 The latter model 
of growth sees growth also resulting from increased technological innovation 
that leads to productivity gains. I 18 
Energy Policy in the Soviet Union. 
During its last decades the Soviet Union established itself as one of the leading 
energy producers and consumers in the world. Having had access to a 
plentiful raw-material base, energy became one of the driving inputs in the 
Soviet industrialisation drive. The main energy carrier in the energy balance 
went through several shifts in the post-war period, first from coal to oil and 
then to gas (Figure 2.1). From having been the world's leading producer of oil 
at the end of the 19th century, the importance of oil in the Soviet energy 
116 '[T]he distinctive feature of modem economic growth is the frequent combination of high 
rates of growth of the total population and of per capita product, implying even higher rates of 
growth of total product. .. a rise in per capita product usually means an even larger rise in 
product per unit of labour input. [Growth under these conditions] are usually only possible 
through major innovations [po 14]. Continuous technological progress and, underlying it, a 
series of new scientific discoveries are the necessary conditions for the high rate of modem 
growth in per capita income, combined with a substantial rate of growth in population [po 29]'. 
Simon Kuznets, Six Lectures on Economic Growth, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959. (The 
terminology of Marx and Kuznets pattern of growth is used in accordance with standard 
practice. It should be kept in mind, however, that Marx envisaged that ending alienation 
would increase productivity, ultimately creating an economic system more efficient than the 
capitalist system and capable of creating the material basis for an affluent communist society). 
117 In the Marxist model growth in each historic epoch is finite and competition intensifies 
class antagonism. (Marx, 'Aufhebung der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise innerhalb der 
kapitalistischen Produktionsweise selbst [The demise of the capitalist system of production 
within the capitalist system of production itself]', in Hirsch et al (ed.), Karl MarxlFriedrich 
Engels - Staatstheorie: Materialien zur Rekonstruktion der Marxistischen Staatstheorie [Karl 
MarxlFriedrich Engels - State Theory: Text for the Reconstruction of Marxists State Theory], 
Ullstein Buch, 1974, pp. 477-492). As the antagonistic relationship between the proletariat 
and capitalist class grows the proletariat will become increasingly violent. (Engels, 'Gewalt 
und Produktion [Violence and production]" in Hirsch et al (ed.), op cit., pp. 492-509). 
118 Hayami argues that early phases of industrialisation in both the Britain and the USA are 
characterised by a Marx pattern of growth (growth through capital accumulation), while 
continued growth in the following mature industrial phase was characterised by a shift to a 
Kuznets pattern of growth (increased factor productivity). However, in the USSR a period of 
increased factor productivity did not follow the initial industrialising period with capital 
accumulation and high rates of growth. Hayami further argues that such a shift was 
fundamental in ensuing the continued growth of these economies vis-a-vis the USSR. Yujiro 
Hayami, Development Economics: From the Poverty to the Wealth of Nations. Oxford 
University Press Inc., 1997, pp. 128-129. 
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balance declined in the first half of the 20th century and did not pick up until 
the 1950s. Several factors have been regarded as contributing to this trend. 
The Soviets faced a severe locational imbalance in their energy resources. 
The main producing areas - the central region, the Northwest region and the 
Volga-Urals region - were (or were believed to) be lacking in sufficient high-
calorific resources. From a planning point of view the reliance on solid fuels -
peat, shale and coal (lignite) - was therefore the rational choices. The great 
distances that alternative fuels would have had to be transported would have 
added to the cost of production. 
Campbell argues that this initial de-emphasis on liquid fuels in the energy 
balance was a result of unawareness of the plentiful resources available and a 
systemic reluctance to explore the vast Eurasian landmass that the Soviet 
Union spanned. 119 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
Systemic factors will be examined in more detail in 
Suffice here to say that for an expanding economy. 
experiencing resource pressure, there will always be a trade-off between 
allocating resources to productive use and allocating resources to innovation 
and development. In the case of energy resources there is also a trade-off 
between producing what is already present or known resources and what can 
(or cannot) be found. The Soviet administered system favoured production 
above innovation and exploration. With its emphasis on achieved levels of 
production the Soviet economy was averse to investment-risks. The initial 
unawareness of their resource situation and reluctance to develop new areas 
should therefore be regarded as a consequence of systemic factors and 
institutions. 
119 Campbell, op cit., pp. 10-13. 
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Figure 2.1 - Primary energy production in the Soviet Union 1913-90, in percentages of 
million tons of conventional fuel. 
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Source: Data 1913-1975: Goskomstat 1975, Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1975, data 1980-
90: Goskomstat 1990, Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1990. 
Note: Data for firewood is based on the official statistics. Campbell estimates that the use of 
firewood may be as much as twice the official statistics due to private consumption. 
The development of primary energy production can be seen from Figure 2.1. 
The organisational structure and economic institutions of the Soviet economy 
aggravated this risk avers nature of its actors. Although organised in 
hierarchical chains of command and with a heavy reliance on bureaucratic 
organisation, as the Soviet organisation and economy grew it failed to 
capitalise on the potential benefits associated with a standardised and 
administered system. 120 
Hydrocarbon fuels have a higher energy content than solid fuels, and are 
therefore more productive. However, it is questionable whether this was the 
main reason behind the shift towards hydrocarbon based fuels. Campbell 
argues that Soviet energy planning and fuel-cost-utilisation programming was 
still very basic in the 1960'S.121 The organisational structure of the Soviet 
energy sector underscores this point in that it lacked an organisation that dealt 
with energy planning exclusively and on an inter-fuel basis. Instead each 
energy carrier was organised in its own ministry with its own vertical structure 
of command and horizontal integration of operative units. 
120 According to Barzel 'Standards [] are public goods, and states often take part in producing 
them. In turn, as these are enhanced, contract trade and, with it, the scope of the state tend to 
increase'. (Barzel, op cif., p. 270). 
121 Ibid., pp. 20-22. 
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According to Nove there occurred a shift in Soviet economic thinking after the 
death of Stalin.122 Greater emphasis was placed on measurements that 
resembled opportunity cost considerations. However, the basis for a true 
opportunity cost based planned economy was still missing in that cost 
indicators did not reflect the full cost of production, which again meant that 
even if prices had been constructed on a cost basis, they would not have been 
very good comparative measures. In actual fact, the major shifts in the energy 
balance occurred when the output from one energy source could no longer be 
increased at the same pace as before. The cost aspect was subjugated to the 
planning aspect. Coal's marginal contribution to total primary energy growth 
had already declined for several years before it was overtaken by oil in the 
mid-1950s. The shift to gas in the early 1980s was more timely, occurring as 
oil output began to slow drastically. Figure 2.2 illustrates the percentage 
growth in the energy balance of the three main carriers. Instead of favouring a 
balanced approach, selective attention and deficiencies of the incentive 
structure associated with plan fulfilment and Soviet administrative planning 
resulted in an over-development of a single carrier at a time. 
Figure 2.2 - Energy balance: Growth in oil, gas and coal (In per cent over previous 
period). 
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Source: Calculated from various issues of Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR (see Figure 2.1). 
Note: Growth was also a function of investment (party and bureaucratic attention). However, 
the graph illustrates the unbalanced development of energy carriers. 
122 Nove, op cif., p. 175. 
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The oil industry enjoyed massive investment boosts in two consecutive FYP 
(1976-1985) although its incremental contribution flattened and then declined 
from the early 1970s. Inter-fuel planning was largely reactive rather than 
proactive - reacting to circumstances rather then effectively influencing and 
determining circumstances. As such it was a function of planning dynamics, 
which led to a development imbalance and low efficiency. Its reactive nature 
contributed to wasting the bridging effects that could have been obtained if 
planning information had been more accurate and less politicised. 123 
From the discussions on energy policy taking place throughout the latter half 
of the 20th century one can not help but feel that political and systemic 
considerations played a more important role in defining investment needs. 
Mal'tsev et al describes the euphoria that the Siberian oil reserves caused in 
party and industry leadership and how unrealistic development expectations 
connected with political ambitions came to dominate the extraction of the 
Siberian wealth. 124 The shifts occurring in the energy mix must be attributed 
more to systemic factors than to economic considerations. 
Energy Intensity and Consumption Considerations. 
The Soviet system did not favour a balanced development of the energy mix. 
The long-term approach advocated by Prime Minister Kosygin in 1976, which 
emphasised coal and nuclear poWer due to the costliness and value of oil and 
gas, was discarded in 1977 in favour of Brezhnev's crash campaigns on oil 
and gas. 125 The issue again demonstrates the pre-eminence of politics over 
economICS. At the highest level there was an awareness of the energy 
situation, but political considerations demanded measures that had negative 
long-term effects. The crash program did manage to save the oil output targets 
for the 10th FYP, but only at the expense of massive capital investments in 
123 These themes will be developed further below and in Chapter 4. 
124 Mal'tsev et ai, op cif., pp. 114-115 & 121-122. Mal'tsev was USSR minister for the oil 
industry 1977-85. They further argue that the Siberian wealth reduced the need and pressure 
for innovation and technological progress amongst the leadership and thus was an important 
factor in the economic stagnation that later developed. 
125 Gustafson (1989), op cit., pp. 22-35. 
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Tyumen, which further put a strain on the production/reserve ratio and on the 
infrastructure. The long-term approach would have reduced the immediate 
production potential of the Soviet Union due to lower overall energy 
production, a non-option from a political point of view. 
The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) calculated that during the 
years from 1965 to 1975 the Soviet Union had a unitary income elasticity of 
energy demand, but that this relationship worsened in the following Fyp126. 
Both the energy-program from 1984 to 2000 and the 12th FYP under 
Gorbachev planned to reduce energy intensity.127 Western and Soviet 
estimates differ as to the development of energy intensity, Gustafson reports 
rising energy intensity since the 1960s', while Makarov (cited in Kuhnert) 
reports declining energy intensity until early 1980s' .128 The relationship 
between production and energy consumption is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
This raises the question how successful the Soviets were at capitalising on the. 
energy bridges that they have used twice in the last century. Both the shift to 
oil and later to gas could have given the Soviet economy a breathing period 
that could have enabled them to reform their economy and make it more 
efficient, i.e. a shift to a Kuznets pattern of growth. The reactive rather than 
proactive nature of the energy shifts failed to achieve the desired bridging 
effect. 
126 U .S. Office of Technology Assessment (OT A), Technology and Soviet Energy Availability, 
Congress of the United States, 1981, p. 267. Unitary elasticity means that a I percent increase 
in GDP corresponds with a I percent increase in energy demand. 
127 Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, op cif. Ryzhkov, 0 gosudarstvennom plane ekonomicheskovo i 
sotsial'novo razvitiya SSSR na /986-/990 gody [On the state plan for economic and social 
development of the USSR 1986-1990], Pravda 19.7.1986. 
128 Gustafson (1989), op cit., p. 230. Kuhnert, op cif., p. 101. However, in a different source 
Makarov acknowledges that the abundance of cheap energy resources had led to a general 
decline in the energy conserving tendencies of the economy. (Melentev & Makarov, 
Energeticheskii kompleks SSSR [The energy complex of the USSR], Moskva Ekonomika, 
1983, p. 50). 
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Figure 2.3 - USSR Net material product and primary energy consumption 1970-1990. 
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Source: For NMP: National Accounts and Statistics: Main aggregates and detailed tables 
1980, 1983 &1990, United Nations; for primary energy consumption: BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 1989 &1992, The British Petroleum Company. 
Note: NMP is calculated in constant 1960 prices, based on the official reports. There are 
different estimates of production growth in the USSR The chart is intended to show the close 
relationship between production and energy consumption. Primary energy consumption is 
calculated in million tons of oil equivalents (MTOE) and does not include the use of wood, 
peat and animal waste. Although these sources were important early in the 20th century for the 
period covered in the chart their proportion had become quite small (see Figure 2.1.). See also 
footnote 129 on NMP calculations. 
If these shifts had occurred before the decline of the dominant carrier the shift 
would indeed have given the planners an opportunity to switch without a 
corresponding production decline. Apart from the political pressure to keep 
the economy growing there where systemic features that aggravated this lack 
of inter-fuel planning. After the OPEC oil shock in 1973 Western economies 
were restructured to become less energy intensive and in the following years 
GDP per unit of energy consumption has increased substantially. In the Soviet 
Union, however, the relationship between production and energy changed only _ 
little.129 
129 (All references in primary energy consumption as defmed in chart 2.1). If one uses the 
official estimates of Net Material Product 2.51 MTOE was consumed per 1 Mrd. Rouble of 
NMP in 1973, this relationship was 2.26 in 1990, which is an improvement of 11 %. 
(Calculated from figure 2.3). Regressing primary energy consumption on NMP (1970-90) 
gives a correlation of .991 (R2 =.98). The model fit shows the close relationship between 
primary energy consumption and NMP in this period. Using the CIA estimates of GDP 
Gustafson estimates that this energy intensity was increasing. 0.71 tons of coal equivalent 
produced $1000 of GDP in 1970, while the relationship was 0.83 in 1987. (Gustafson 
(1989),op cit. , p. 230). For comparison: One MTOE in Germany in 1973 produced 2876 
Million DM ofGDP, by 1988 this had improved by 32 % to 3793 Million DM (constant prices 
1970); one MTOE in Norway in 1973 produced 3255 Million NOK. by 1988 this had 
improved by almost 60% to 5188 Million NOK (constant prices 1970); one MTOE in the 
USA in 1973 produced 0.86 Thousand Million Dollars GDP, by 1988 this had improved by 
almost 40% to 1.2 Thousand Million Dollars (constant prices 1975). Sources see figure 2.3. 
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To some extent it is clear that although there are varying opinions about Soviet 
industrial achievements, the Soviet economy was expanding for most of its 
history. The decline that set in during the late Brezhnev period would 
probably have been worse if these shifts had not occurred. From this 
perspective, the shifts did have a positive effect on the Soviet pattern of 
growth. On the other hand, the shifts were not used to stabilise production of 
industry and energy, nor to make production more efficient. 
Although the two are inter-connected, if the Soviet economy had been less 
wasteful and the Soviet leadership could have accepted a different economic 
strategy (i.e. less emphasis on energy intensive industries, slower growth), the 
shifts could have served as bridges to make the economy more efficient. 130 
This did not happen in large part due to systemic and institutional reasons. 
Energy intensity remained high, and increased energy production through 
increased investment remained policy. The system was designed to operate as. 
an efficient political system not an economic system. 131 Thus the Soviets have 
squandered these "natural" opportunities - twice - and are now leaving it to 
the Russians to manage a restructuring without the short-term shift benefit 
potential. 
130 Speaking of slower growth becomes somewhat pointless exercise considering that Soviet 
growth had slowed to a trickle by the late Brezhnev period and declined in the 1980s. There 
has remained much discussion around Soviet growth statistics. For a discussion on alternative 
Soviet growth statistics see for instance Harrison. (Harrison, 'Soviet Economic Growth Since 
1928: The Alternative Statistics of G.\. Khanin', Europe-Asia Studies, 1993, vol. 45, no. I, pp. 
141-167). According to Aganbegian the Soviet economy stagnated between 1981-85. 
(Aganbegian, The Challenge: Economics of Pe res troika, Hutchinson Education, 1988, p. 3). 
131 In evaluating Soviet efficiency one should take care not to put to much emphasis on 
economic measures of efficiency. There is an argument to be made for that the Soviet 
economy primarily served political ends rather then economic ends. Thus efficiency must be 
seen as the economy's ability to fulfil political ends. In the SU achieving levels of production 
was not only economically important, but also politically. A politically ambitious individual 
was reliant on the functioning of industries under his jurisdiction, efficient thus became what 
fulfilled the main objectives of the plan rather than other measures. From the leadership point 
of view, efficient became that which increased its self-perceived prestige, and that which 
seemed to fulfil its political promises. 
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The Burden of Energy. 
The question then arises, to what extent did economic considerations 
contribute to the shifts and to what extent where they the result of "systemic 
selection", meaning that they occurred because they fulfilled systemic or 
political considerations rather than economic considerations. If economics 
had been the motivation behind the shifts, could we not have expected to see 
an improvement in efficiency in the production of each carrier following the 
successive shifts? Could we not have expected to see a greater emphasis on 
energy conservation? 
The Alexandrov Commission was established in 1979 to develop a Long Term 
Energy Program. Although its recommendations envisaged a more balanced 
development of energy resources the Energy Programme itself and the 
surrounding debate illustrate the conflicts at hand in policy development 
(long-term vs. short-term) and the burden of energy provision. 132 
The Energy Programme stressed the need for a balanced development of 
energy resources, with greater emphasis on a coal-nuclear energy strategy. It 
acknowledged the increasing cost of hydrocarbon resources - especially oil. It 
recommended that the overall share of oil in the energy balance should be 
reduced, particularly by reducing oil in heating stations and power generation. 
This was to be achieved by employing gas as a bridge, and then gradually 
increase the proportion of coal and nuclear energy in the overall balance. 133 
However, it also recommended increased extraction of oil from Western 
Siberia and greater exploration efforts in new prospective areas - especially 
Kazakhstan and the continental shelf. Significantly it also stressed the need 
for energy conservation, reduction in the use of liquid fuels and greater energy 
efficiency of production. 
132 Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, op cit. All references to the 'Energy Programme' in the 
following paragraphs refer to this publication unless otherwise stated. 
133 According to Soviet specialists at the time, the acceleration of nuclear energy and coal 
were first in importance with respect to the reorganisation of the energy industries. However, 
the emphasis of developing a gas bridge made them secondary in terms of acceleration. 
(Melentev & Makarov, op cit., p. 6). 
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The Energy Programme was to be implemented in two stages. The first stage 
(until 1990) was to be one of preparation for more vigorous conservation in 
the second phase. Crucially a gas and nuclear bridge would ensure that energy 
provision would not become a bottleneck for industrial growth in the initial 
stage, as measurements of energy consumption would be improved, improved 
coal quality, replacement of obsolete and inefficient equipment, and 
displacement of oil with gas. The second stage (1990-2000) would be a 
further modernisation of the technological processes by which energy was 
extracted, greater use of coal in the energy balance, further electrification of 
industry and reallocation of energy intensive industry. In order to realise these 
strategies the Energy Programme estimated that about 20-22 percent of the 
total investment budget would have to be allocated to the energy industries. 
Crucially the Energy Program illustrated the twofold burden that energy 
provision had become. Firstly, the link between energy and industrial growth 
was acknowledged in the fact that total energy growth was to be maintained so. 
that industrial growth would not be adversely affected by the changes. 
Secondly, that the marginal cost of energy provision was rising steeply. 
Relating this to the earlier discussion of measures of success, it was now clear 
that energy had become both a political burden and an economic burden. The 
massive investments that were allocated to energy cannot have gone down 
well with managers and leaders of other industrial or economic sectors. 
Similarly, the investments needed constituted a great drain on the economy's 
economic potential and development options. Faced with these two 
problems, the Politburo leaders, for all their good intentions, were 
inadvertently restricted in their alternatives by the need to conform first and 
foremost to political aspirations. 134 
The actual investment figures over the last 20 years of the Soviet Union's 
existence illustrate this dilemma. The Energy Programme was confirmed and 
134 With respect to economic criteria as standards of evaluation of the Soviet economy's 
performance Nove argues that '[o]ne might even say that it is a typical 'deformation 
professionelle' of economists to concentrate on "economic" categories like prices and 
calculations of rate of return rather than other and probably more significant matters'. Nove, 
op cit., p. 155. 
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reflected in the Five Year Plan (FYP) of 1986-1990. 135 In 1980 the energy 
sector consumed 50 percent (incl. transmission and exploration) of investment 
in industry and 5.5 percent of the workforce 136. Table 2.1 shows various 
Soviet investment figures for the period 1975-1985. Both in the 10th and 11th 
FYP investments in the oil industry consumed approximately 60 per cent of 
the increase in energy investment. While energy in the 11 th FYP consumed 68 
per cent of the total increase in industrial investment. Over the 15 year 
planning period 1970-85 oil industry investment as a share of total energy 
investment increased from 32 to 46.4 per cent. Energy's share of industry 
investment increased from 28.6 to 36 per cent. 
Table 2.1 - Capital Investment in the Soviet Union 1970-1985. 
Source: Nar. Khoz. V 1985. 
Note: In comparative prices 1.1.1984. First part shows capital investment in billion roubles. 
Second part shows various industry investment percentages and growth as a share of various 
industry investment growths. Later issues of this series do not contain separate entries for the 
oil industry. 
In the first 4 years of the 1 t h FYP these relationships remained relatively 
constant despite Gorbachev's commitment to energy conservation. The first 4 
years of the 1 t h FYP are shown in Table 2.2. In fact in order to combat the 
decline in oil and energy production that had taken place in 1983-84 a massive 
drilling and investment campaign was initiated to increase energy production 
while industry was supposed to be restructured and became more efficient. 
135 'Osnovnye napraleniya ekonomicheskovo i sotsial'novo razvitiya SSSR na 1986-1990 gody 
i na period do 2000 goda [Main direction of economic and social development of the USSR 
1986-1990 and in the period until 2000]" Pravda, 9. Nov. 1985. 
136 Taking into account manpower and capital requirements in supporting industries these 
numbers amount to 80 % and 13-15%. (Gustafson (1989), op cit., p. 37). 
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Table 2.2 - Capital Investment in the Soviet Union 1986-89. 
Source: Stran Chlenov SE V v 1990. 
Note: In comparative prices 1.1.1984. First part shows capital investment in billion roubles. 
Second part shows various industry investment percentages and growth as a share of various 
industry investment growths. Later issues of this series do not contain separate entries for the 
oil industry. 
During these years oil as a share of energy investment abated somewhat, but 
energy as a share of industry increased to 40 per cent. In fact increased 
investment in energy exceeded the total industry investment increase. The 
reasons for this escalation of energy investment was partly due to the 
leaderships commitment to growth (the energy inelastisity of industrial 
production), and rapidly increasing production costs in the energy industries. 
According to Considine & Kerr 'by the mid-1980s, Gosplan had effectively 
planned its way into a quagmire, a vicious cycle of rising targets and 
expenditure, from which there was no escape. First and foremost was the 
absolute requirement for increased energy supplies. The alternative, constant 
or falling domestic supplies, would have resulted in the unthinkable - a 
domestic energy shortage (lower exports and/or increased imports of energy)-
which in turn would have threatened government revenues and the fulfilment 
of annual targets in industries throughout the USSR' .137 In the end an effort to 
maintain domestic production prevailed, between 1988 and 1992 exports fell 
by 55 per cent thus exceeding the decline in production. 138 
The recovery in oil production in the mid-1980s had placed unsustainable 
expectations on government revenues. 139 Coupled with tentative industry 
137 Considine & Kerr, The Russian Oil Economy, Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 200. 
138 Vibe Christensen, The Russian Federation in Transition: External Developments, IMF 
Occasional Paper, 1994, p. 18. 
139 Considine & Kerr, op cit., p. 199. 
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restructuring and lower oil prices III the mid-1980s the government's 
investment ability subsided in the last year of the 12th FYP. Declining oil 
production then further aggravated state finances by reducing state exports. 
'Increasing macroeconomic imbalances and structural problems during the 
second half of the 1980s [] left the U.S.S.R with a rising external debt'.14o Oil 
export earnings dropped from $27.1 billion in 1990 to $11.8 billion in 1991,141 
thereby reducing foreign exchange reserves and the ability of the state to 
finance balance of payments with the proceeds from exports. This again led to 
reduction of imports and a shortage of essential inputs for the oil industry.142 
Supply disruptions and lacking investment funds again aggravated this 
situation. In 1991 only 60-70 per cent of planned supplies were received. 143 
After 1987 the growth rate in oil industry investment declined and was 
negative for 1990. This is illustrated in Table 2.3. In 1991 capital expenditure 
in the oil industry was only 50 per cent of the planned level. 144 Growing 
regional resistance to further oil development and price liberalisation of oil 
industry inputs (but not outputs) further impeded development. 145 
Table 2.3 -Investment Growth in the Soviet Union 1976-1990. 
Source: IMF, Economic Review: The Economy of the Former U.S.S.R. in 1991, IMF, 1992, 
p.52. 
Note: Average annual growth rates in comparable prices. 
Despite increased overall energy investment, the investment level did not 
reach the level recommended in the Energy Programme to achieve its 
implementation. Oil extraction, where investment increase was curtailed 
compared to overall growth in energy investment, failed to reach its target. In 
the final draft of the 1th FYP oil extraction was set to grow to 635 million 
tons by 1990. 146 
140 Vibe Christensen, op cif., p. 10. 
141 Ibid, p. 11. Based on transactions outside the FSU. 
142 Ibid, p. 12. 
143 IMF, Economic Review: The Economy of the Former U.S.S.R. in 1991, IMF, 1992, p. 5. 
144 1bid 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ryzhkov, op cif. 
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However, oil production peaked in 1987/88 and by 1990 only reached 571 
tons. Neither did any of the other carriers reach their planned level, with coal 
and gas respectively ending some 92 million tons and 35 billion cubic meters 
short of the plan. 147 
The Energy Programme was dealt another blow by the Chemobyl disaster of 
April 1986. The program, which had relied heavily on a gas-nuclear bridge 
for the first phase, was now in tatters and with it any plans to switch to a more 
energy efficient mode of production. Although Soviet leaders at the time 
emphasised the human error that had led to the catastrophe and argued that 
nuclear power was still a safe source of energy,148 the construction of new 
nuclear power stations ceased. 149 However, the 12th FYP, which was 
presented after the accident occurred, still planned an increase in nuclear 
electricity capacity of 233 percent and a growing share of nuclear power in the 
energy balance. 150 
The investment figures illustrate the burden of energy to the Soviet economy 
in both respects. Awareness of the growing cost of energy is clearly 
demonstrated by the investment provisions, but likewise the. political 
considerations behind them. Surfacing with the controversy over policy 
choice between Brezhnev and Kosygin it is clear that the voices of moderation 
and balance were present in the Soviet Union before the eventual collapse and 
before the situation became critical. 
147 A note on investment and construction: despite the massive investment cited here, the 
speed with which such investment contributed to real value creation was a factor leading to 
low efficiency of investment. Several analysts comment on the slow development of 
construction exceeding both the official norm and Western construction time. However, 
unfinished construction was still being counted as value creation, thus enabling construction 
crews to reach their targets even though construction was not finished. Nove, op cit., p. 155-6. 
Schroeder, The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of Perestroika, in Dallin & Lapidus, The 
Soviet System in Crisis, Westview Press, 1991, p. 376-382. Schroeder further argues that the 
backlog of unfinished construction reached its highest post-war level during Gorbachev's first 
five years - 1985-89. 
148 Marples, Chernobyl & Nuclear Power in the USSR, Macmillan Press, 1986, p. 175-6. 
1491EA (1995), op cit., p. 220. 
150 Pravda, 19.7.1986, op cit. Nuclear power was to increase from 167 billion kWh in 1985 to 
390 billion kWh in 1990. However, by 1990 nuclear power had only increased to 212 billion 
k Who (Eurostat, Country profile: the Soviet Union /980-/99/, Statistisches Bundesamt 1992). 
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Economic prudence would have suggested a restructuring of the energy sector 
and energy balance as marginal costs began to rise and investments stormed 
ahead. Yet political considerations did not leave room for the negative effects 
that reduced energy growth would have had on the entire economy. Figure 2.4 
shows the relative share of energy investment. Further, systemic factors 
contributed to the difficulty of transforming the economy. 
Figure 2.4 - Proportional energy investment 1970-1989. 
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Note: In order to achieve figures in comparable money, the values of 1970 and 1975 have 
been inflated by a coefficient of 1.131 to bring their relative value in money of 1.1.84. This 
coefficient was obtained by comparing time-series in different money and estimating the 
difference. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a distinct awareness of the 
growing burden of energy supply. One might argue that the shifts in energy 
carriers that did take place were the result of better economic management. 
Likewise one could argue that the shift came about as result of planning from 
the achieved level and that this process inadvertently came about as some 
branches fulfilled (and over fulfilled) their targets while others struggled to 
reach their targets. 
The latter argument does not deny that the shifts then also exhibited some 
economic logic, it does however, question to what extent the planners and 
leaders could have taken a proactive role in reforming the industry. If the 
political sphere dominated the economic sphere, and that political standards of 
measurement again were awaiting economic results, then reforming the Soviet 
energy industries - i.e. a greater emphasis on energy conservation - would 
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have implied reforming the entire economic, societal and political structure. 15 I 
It is the argument of this thesis that the systemic inefficiencies were a result of 
Soviet economic and political institutions. As such a reform of the system 
would have to take into consideration the incentive structure generated by the 
institutional matrix starting with the 1 sI order institutional dimension. As the 
Soviet economy grew a conflict of goals arose. As transactions became more 
idiosyncratic and organisational growth impeded efficient monitoring of the 
economy and agent behaviour a conflict between political control on the one 
hand and economic growth on the other arose. 
This raises serious questions about the ability of the post-Soviet leadership to 
reform the energy industries and shifting to economic criteria of measurement. 
If political criteria have indeed been the standards by which economic policy 
was set and measured, then how is the new leadership and management - that 
to a great extent stems from the old system - to be able to understand and 
employ radically new measures? More importantly, is it plausible to believe 
that a systemic change can occur given a constrained economic and political 
situation? In the following chapters the thesis will therefore examine some of 
the 2nd and 3rd order institutions of the Soviet system and their relationship to 
the I sI order institution. 
151 Rutland on the same note argues that '[I]t is essential to analyse the command economy as 
a political phenomenon" and that "the advantages of political stability, and concentration of 
power outweigh the disadvantages of economic sluggishness and inefficiency'. Rutland 
(1985), op cit., pp. 259-260. 
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Chapter 3 
Organisation of the Soviet Oil Industry. 
'Whenever he has to choose between idea 
and apparatus, he [Stalin] consistently 
stands on the side of the apparatus. Koba 
will not take a programme seriously unless 
it has developed its own bureaucracy. 
Suspicion towards the great mass and 
individuals alike, is the cornerstone of his 
nature.' 152 
Leo Trotsky 
The development of the organisational structure of the Soviet oil industry did 
from its start in the early 1920s reflect many of the principles that were to 
characterise the administered economy. Chief amongst these was the primacy 
of political efficiency contra economic efficiency. In NIE framework 
organisations are instrumental to maximising specific goals. The evolution of 
the organisational structure of the oil industry is in this thesis therefore related 
to the evolution and implementation of the state power. The mode of 
organisation will reflect transaction cost considerations, while changes in the 
organisational structure reflect efforts to strengthen the implementation of 
state power and reducing transaction costs. With respect to late Soviet and 
post-Soviet evolution the closeness between state power and organisational 
form constitute an important factor of path dependency. 
In the Soviet Union industry was an integral part of the state apparatus and 
therefore reflected the structure of state power. Centred upon a patrimonial-
despotic structure of state power the organisation of state and industry was 
instrumental in extending the leadership'S control and ability to monitor the 
system. Political legitimacy and goal maximisation emanated from the ability 
to control and redistribute the flows of resources and rent, both of which 
constituted the necessary means to create an incentive and reward structure to 
support the patrimonial-despotic system of state power. The maximisation of 
state power was the chief dependent variable. 
152 Trotsky, Stalin: ein Bild seines Lebens [Stalin: a portrait of his life], Verlag Rote 
Weissbiicher, 1953, p. 80. 
74 -
However, organisations will also be a function of the existing incentive 
structure. Pre-Gorbachev the formal incentive structure remained highly 
uniform, however, this started to change with the reforms in 1987/88, which 
resulted in the formalisation of the previous informal incentive structures and 
the establishment of new organisations to operate in the altering situation. 
The centre had an ideologically based monopoly on the distribution of 
resources and the collection of rent and income. With the state both acting as 
producer and consumer of resources its organisational structure was geared to 
enable direct mobilisation efficiently. As complexity and spatial distribution 
increased the principal-agent costs, associated with the implementation of state 
power, rose. Simultaneously, the state's weak infrastructural power base 
necessitated strengthening patrimonial structures of implementation. In the 
early years of the Soviet Union ideological zeal arguably was conducive to 
reducing transaction costs, however as the system became institutionalised 
transaction costs associated with principal-agent considerations increased. 
Reorganisations of the industry served as a means to reduce transaction costs 
associated with upholding the state's monopoly in the circulation of resources 
and rent/income. The structure of flow of resources and rent is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. The distribution of resources occurred through Gosplan and the 
branch ministries, while the collection of rent and income occurred through 
the Ministry of Finance USSR. 
Taking for granted the primacy of central planning and other things being 
equal, the main principles of organisation in the USSR alternated between a 
functional and a territorial structure of planning implementation. Functional 
in this respect implied the implementation of plans and the generation of 
information through vertical hierarchies of command from a functional 
approach, i.e. the organisation of a specific activity within a singular ministry 
- vertical communication rather than horizontal communication. A territorial 
structure implied greater reliance on territorial co-ordination in order to further 
the holistic development of an area and/or industry. The latter reflected the 
attempt at greater horizontal communication to increase information accuracy 
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and efficiency. A second element of the territorial approach was the 
organisations of production associations (PA) that functioned as integrated 
social and economic territorial structures. 
Figure 3.1 - Flow of resources and rent in the Soviet oil industry. 
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Both these principles are reflected in the development of the organisational 
structure of the Soviet oil industry. In fact, it has been argued that the 
development of the organisational structure of the oil (and gas) industry in-
many respects served as a testing ground for the development of the entire 
Soviet economic structure. I 53 The oil industry was nationalised by decree of 
V.1. Lenin on the 20th of June 1918, however, the Soviet Union did not 
actually control the vital Balm fields until the end of the civil war in 1920. 
From the early 1920s the organisational structure started to develop the 
characteristics that have been dominant throughout the development of its 
structure - its functional and territorial approach. Although both principles are 
present at all times the relative weight of their significance has varied.154 
1 S3 Kryukov & Moe, (1996), op cif. Kryukov (1998), op cif., pp. 70-71. 
IS4 Kryukov (1998), ibid 
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These principles are reflected both in the organisation of the economy as well 
as in the administrative-territorial division of the state bureaucracy. From its 
nationalisation by Lenin in 1918, the development of the Soviet oil industry in 
many respects served as model for organisational development. 155 
Initially all operations of the oil industry - i.e. production, refining and 
distribution came under the administration of the Oil Syndicate 
(NeJtesindikat). Centralised accounting at the Syndicate level led to a 
centralised system for supply of resources for the operation of its constituent 
operating units. As the geographic position of the industry moved north and 
then east the organisation altered accordingly. The administrative organisation 
was renamed The People's Commissariat of the Fuel Industry in 1939 
(Narkomat), while two independent ministries were created in 1946, these 
were the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry for the Southern and Western 
Regions and the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry for the Eastern Regions. 156 
The two ministries were again amalgamated in 1948. 
At the same time there was added a territorial dimension to the hierarchical 
structure through the establishment of regional main administrations - glavki. 
Both in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan there were established associations that 
administered all production and drilling activity in the respective regions, and 
similarly a separate ministry for the petroleum industry in Azerbaijan was 
created in 1954. After the 1973 reforms only the largest of these remained 
(GlavtyumenneJtegaz) in order to ensure more balanced and long-term 
development of this vital energy regIOn. GlavtyumenneJtegaz initially 
incorporated the production associations: NizhnevartovskneJtegaz, 
Surgutn~ftegaz, and Yuganskn~ftegaz. 
The abolition of the ministerial structure during Krushchev's Sovnarkhoz-
reform (1957-65) continued the trend towards greater territorial emphasis in 
order to increase horizontal communication and thus increase productive 
efficiency. The Brezhnev-Kosygin reforms of 1965 returned the structure to 
155/bid., pp. 70-74. 
156 Ebel, op cif., p. 12. 
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the functional organisational principle. 157 However, several of the territorial 
features and units of the structure prevailed until further reforms in 1973 
extended the functional principle to all levels of the structure. These implied 
removing several organisational units and more tightly integrated the operative 
units into the production associations, establishing the P A as the locus of 
operational co-ordination. 158 The ministries retained most of the important 
transactional and financial functions. The immediate operative structure, from 
the ministries and down, was reduced from a six to a three-layer structure. 
(Apart from Western Siberia where Glavtyumenneftegaz remained). 
The growth in oil production, shift of location after WWII and the subsequent 
shift to fluid hydrocarbon fuel all posed political challenges to the Soviet 
administered system. This resulted in a gradual' fragmentation of the 
organisational structure, along lines of greater specialisation. 
Goskomnefteprodukt took charge of distribution of oil products. Pipelines 
were separated into another directorate Glavtransneft. Refining was separated. 
into a department (and then a ministry), while responsibility for gas production 
was separated into the Ministry of the Gas Industry (Mingazprom) in 1965, 
leaving the Ministry of the Oil Industry (Minnefteprom) with the responsibility 
of oil production. In the early 1970s specialised ministries were set up to 
serve the oil and gas industry, the Ministry of Oil and Petrochemical Machine 
Construction (Minneftekhimmash) and the Ministry for the Construction for 
Enterprises in the Oil and Gas Industry (Minneftegazstroi). Figure 3.2 
presents a stylisation of the main structure of the oil and related industries as it 
appeared after the 1973 reforms until the Gorbachev reforms. An important 
aspect of Soviet industrial organisation was that all organisational units 
constituted integral parts of the state structure. 
157 The Ministry for Oil was one of the ministries to be abolished during the sovnarkhoz 
reforms. Nonetheless, according to Mal'tsev et al a de facto re-centralisation of the industry 
through Gosplan occurred from the early 1960s. (Mal'tsev et ai, op cit., p. 77). 
158 Kryukov ( 1998), op cit., pp. 78-79. 
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Main Structural components. 
The Central Policy Organs. At the top of the hierarchy were the central 
organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the 
government of the Soviet Union (these were the USSR Council of Ministers 
and the USSR Supreme Soviet). Figure 3.2 shows a simplified diagrammatic 
presentation of the hierarchical system and therefore conceals some of the 
overlapping authority and responsibility at central level. This overlap reflects 
what Kelly et al call the 'shadow power structure that underlies and unites the 
formal structure'. 159 Although on a formal basis the government was 
responsible for running the economy, major policy decisions were taken by the 
Politburo. This was particularly evident in the late 1970s in connection with 
the debate around whether to concentrate on coal as the main energy carrier, or 
on oil and gas. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (CC) was the 
apex of power in the Soviet Union, and was responsible for the elaboration of 
economic policy and the allocation of resources to realise that policy. 
However, the individual members of the Politburo relied to a great extent on 
expert assistance and advice. 160 The party's role in the political-administrative 
system of the Soviet Union had four main aspects: decision-making, 
verification, implementation and staffing. 161 
The Secretariat of the CPSU CC (hereafter the Secretariat) had several 
departments that provided the Politburo with advice and policy proposals. The 
production of energy fell under the Department of Heavy Industry. Kelly et al 
note that these departments had some operational control in that they could 
send directives to managers via government officials or Party members at the 
various local, city, oblast' and regional level. On the influence of the Party 
structure Mal'tsev et al note that frequent meddling by party officials was like 
a sword hanging over industry managers. 162 
159 Kelly ef ai, op cif., p. 9. 
160 Ibid., p. 10. 
161 Gill (1994), op cif., p. 4. 
162 Mal'tsev ef ai, op cif., p. 123. 
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Figure 3.2 - Organisational Structure of the Soviet Oil Industry. 
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The Council of Ministers of the USSR (hereafter the Council of Ministers) 
together with the Secretariat was responsible for nearly all technical, scientific 
and economic activity in the Soviet Union. The Council of Ministers 
consisted of ministers, chairmen of state committees, and chairmen of the 
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fifteen Union-Republic Councils of Ministers. The Council of Ministers was 
responsible for the issuing of state plans and for the financing of economic 
activity. Like the Secretariat the Council had its own commissions with 
responsibility for the development and execution of economic programs. For 
the energy sector these were the Presidium Commission for Energy and Fuels, 
and West Siberian oil and gas region development programs. 
The Central Planning Organs. The State Planning Committee of the USSR 
(Gosplan) issued plan directives in the name of the Council and was as such an 
organ of operational command. 163 Gosplan had overall responsibility for the 
formation of plans that complied with the policy directives established by the 
Party. These were the so-called Five Year Plans (FYP) and the year to year 
basic or operational plans. 
Gosplan, like other agencies, was subdivided into several entities that were 
preoccupied with different parts of the economy. Gosplan was divided into 
departments for various economic sectors, which again were grouped together 
in directorates for related departments. Each department contained several 
officials with responsibility for a certain aspect of each industry. The most 
important of these were the chief financial accountant, the chief of the 
planning section and the chief of the purchasing section. Division of labour is 
one of the defining elements of a bureaucracy and modem society. However, 
in the case of the Soviet Union this division of labour was reproduced at all 
levels of the organisation, resulting in an excessively bloated organisation. 
For such a system to work, it is necessary that tasks become more general as 
one moves up in the hierarchy - that the upper echelons of the system are left 
to plan and make strategic decisions, while the lower levels concentrate on 
operation and day-to-day administration. In many respects the organisation of 
the Soviet economy lacked this fundamental principle of industrial and 
bureaucratic organisation. 
163 Based on Nove, Rassweiler argues that most Gosplan economists belonged to a teleological 
school of planning that 'planned resources for economic sectors and derived yearly plans and 
strategies in accordance with an overall development plan [as opposed to the geneticists who] 
extrapolated growth from existing circumstances and shaped their goals accordingly'. 
(Rassweiler, op cit., p. 40). 
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Like the other administrative organs Gosplan had its own advisory organs. 
For the energy-sector the major such organ was the All-Union Scientific 
Research Institute of Comprehensive Fuel and Energy Problems (VNIIKTEP). 
VNIITEKP, created in 1974, was entrusted with the responsibility to make 
energy production and consumption forecasts. In an effort to increase regional 
co-ordination an Interdepartmental Territorial Commission of Gosplan was 
established in Western Siberia. 164 
The Branch Management Organs. Throughout the history of the oil 
industry there has been great fluctuation in the composition of ministries at 
this level and their responsibilities. In an administered economy it is essential 
that plans are implemented and that correct information is passed on to the 
next level. If this does not happen, the central planners lose oversight of the 
condition of the economy, which again will lead to further distort'ion of 
information and policy. 
The task of the ministries was to break down the aggregate plan targets they 
received from the central planning organs and allocate these to the operational 
units in their structure. After 1965 these were predominantly the production 
associations. The ministries functioned as loci for collecting and passing on 
information coming up the system as well. The ministries therefore had a near 
monopoly on controlling information and resources related to their respective 
hierarchies. With increased spatial distribution and complexity of the Soviet 
economy, the fragmentation of the ministerial structure was supposed to 
facilitate the flow of information in order to increase the accuracy and 
relevance of information being presented to the computational centres. Their 
organisation increasingly reflected a Tayloristic approach to organisation - i.e. 
specialisation of functions - in order to ensure maximisation of plan 
fulfilment. 
164 Kryukov & Moe, 1996, op cif., p. 17. 
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Ministries in the Soviet Union had two forms. The more important ministries 
were organised as All-Union Ministries,165 meaning that they were not 
replicated at the regional level. Ministries of lesser importance were organised 
as Union-Republican ministries, which meant that apart from the central 
ministry in Moscow replications of the ministry existed at the republican level. 
After the 1965 reforms the Ministry of the Oil Industry was an All-Union 
ministry. For practical purposes this implied that the firms and production 
associations of the oil industry had one administrative layer less than Union-
Republic ministries, and in effect were more closely integrated. (In Western 
Siberia another administrative layer, GlavtyumenneJtegaz, survived until 
1990). 
Kelly et al identifies some 17 ministries involved in energy sector. 166 In·· 
addition there were other ministries with responsibility for the transportation 
and the military-industrial complex that influenced energy policy. However, 
with respect to the oil industry there were three major ministries to consider .. 
The first was the Ministry of Oil Industry (MNP). This ministry had 
responsibility for the development and production of petroleum. Further it had 
the main responsibility for exploratory drilling in the older oil producing 
regIons. A sub-agency within the MNP was GlavtransneJt, which was 
responsible for the operation of the pipeline system and performed the role of 
buyer and distributor of crude oil. 
The second major ministry was the Ministry of Geology (Mingeo), which had 
the responsibility for geophysical surveying and mapping of prospective areas 
as well as corehole drilling and exploratory drilling in new areas - chiefly 
Western Siberia. As the centre of the industry shifted eastward Mingeo' s 
share of total exploratory drilling increased from 40 percent in 1970 to 61 
percent in 1987. 167 Until 1987 the Ministry of Geology was a Union-
Republican ministry. 168 
165 Berliner, op cit., p. 16. 
166 Kelly et al., op cit., pp. 18-20. 
167 Gustafson (1989), op cit., p. 70. 
168 Ibid, footnote 9, p. 70. 
MinneJtegazstroi had the responsibility of 
83 -
constructing pipelines, housing, infrastructure and development of the 
production sites. 
Like the central planning organs the ministries also had a chief accountant, a 
chief of the planning department, and a chief of the purchasing department. 
Like their counterparts higher up these officials engaged in the planning 
process, but in addition they had a greater stake in the operational side of the 
units within the ministry's jurisdiction. 
The Production Associations. The pre-eminent entity of the Soviet oil 
industry was the Production Association (PA). The PA's were the property of 
the state, in the hierarchical system they were under the authority of their 
respective ministries. The development of PAs signified an attempt to 
increase horizontal communication at the operational level (by combining. the 
operative oil and gas producing units (NGDU) in each territory); and vertical 
integration (by combining several related functions under one administration). 
- fig. 3.2. As such they represent a convergence between the functional and 
territorial approach. After the 1973 reforms they functioned like "mini-
ministries" for the entities under their umbrellas. With respect to production 
and reserves many of the Soviet production associations were of a size equal 
or larger to many Western oil majors. 
Figure 3.2 - Structure of a Production Association 
I Production Association I 
I I I I I I 
NGDU Drilling Machine Repair Transport Social 
Unit Building Unit Unit Functions 
Unit 
Most of the Soviet PAs bore the names of the geographic area where their 
activity took place. Fragmentation of the administrative structure occurred at 
this level as well. As in the remainder of the system the impetus for such 
reorganisations were twofold. Firstly, in the hierarchical logic of the Soviet 
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system, higher levels of administration ensured their pre-emmence by 
controlling the size and economic "muscle" of its subordinates by retaining 
key functions within their own organisation. 169 Secondly, fragmentation 
occurred in order to improve the development of specific tasks. Both elements 
affected the development of the west Siberian oil industry. In order to rectify 
the imbalance in organisational size and economic "muscle" the NGDU 
Var 'yeganneftegaz was split off from the P A Nizhnevartovskneftegaz and 
raised to the status of P A. 170 As production moved north within the Tyumen 
region new PAs were created to operate these areas: the PA Noyabr'skneftegaz 
was separated out from P A Surgutneftegaz in 1981; further north the P A 
Purneftegaz was established in 1987. 171 Both operated in the Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug. Krasnoleninskneftegaz was established in 1982. 172 . 
Additionally the PAs from the Volga-Urals administered field directorates in 
Western Siberia. Langepas, originally part of the Nizhnevartovsknefiegaz 
structure, was administered by Tatneft (Tatarstan), Kogalym, originally of 
Surgutneftegaz, was administered by Bashneft (Bashkortostan). Production in 
these directorates contributed to the plan fulfilment of the Volga-Urals PAs. 
These arrangements were cancelled in 1988, at which time the directorates 
became independent enterprises. 173 
From a producing point of view the NGDU was the pre-eminent unit within 
the P A, and most of the remaining units were performing contract work for the 
NGDU (though the PA administered such transactions). Although 
administering the property of the PA, the NGDU had little financial or 
operative independence, as the PA established these. 174 Most of the NGDUs 
in the oil industry were of a "structural character" as opposed to industrial 
169 Kryukov & Moe (1996), op cit. 17. 
170 Shabad, 'News notes', Soviet Geography, 1986, vol. 27. no. 4, p. 253. At the time 
Nizhnevartovsknejiegaz accounted for 57 per cent of Glavtyumennejiegaz's production. In 
1983 Nizhnevartovsknejiegaz accounted for 210 million tons of oil compared to 
Glavtyumennejiegaz's total of 366 million tons. (Sagers, 'News notes', Soviet Geography, 
1991, vol. 32, no. 4, table 3, p. 257). 
171 Sagers (1991), ibid., pp. 258-59. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid., p. 256. 
174 Kryukov (1998), op cit., pp. 79-80. 
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units of the "state enterprise character", which had the status of independent 
judicial entities. The latter ensured them greater financial and operative 
independence within the entire administered system. In the oil industry such 
units were mostly construction and transportation units. 175 The PA had the 
right to create, reorganise and liquidate structural sub-units within their 
structure. 
Respectively both the PA and the NGDU were only links within the Soviet 
economic structure. Even though the PA extensively affected the NGDU 
operative parameters it was under similar constraints from the ministerial 
level. Their operative parameters were part of state plans and the state's 
structure of power. These ultimately defined and affected their functional 
independence. This was also true for the ministry itself. 
Organisational Reform under Gorbachev. 
The increase of organisational units in the oil industry in the 1960s and 70s 
had led to increasing problems of co-ordination and supply of resources. The 
Soviet economy had increasingly been unable to handle the diverse climatic 
and geographic conditions that oil extraction took place under. Goal conflict 
between the various ministries resulted in a situation where information was 
diffuse and lines of authority were unclear. 
The reforms initiated under Gorbachev aimed at increasing co-ordination and 
transferring greater authority and responsibility towards the associations. To 
this effect a Bureau on the Fuel and Energy Complex was created under the 
Council of Ministers in 1986, and a Department of Comprehensive Planning 
of Fuel and Energy Resources was created within Gosplan in order to increase 
inter-branch planning and co-ordination at the highest level. 
The law 'On the State Enterprise' (1987) extended the rights and 
independence of the associations. 176 This shift towards the PAs resulted in the 
175 Ibid. 
176 Kruykov & Moe (1996), op cit., pp. 17-18. 
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abolition of Glavtyumenneftegaz in early 1990. Moe & Kryukov remark that 
although the law was intended to transfer the 'centre of gravity' from the 
ministries to the PAs, the abolition of Glavtyumenneftegaz resulted in the 
transfer of its administrative functions to MNP thereby strengthening the role 
and influence ofthe ministries. l77 
The reforms furthermore altered the incentive structure at work in the 
economy, enterprises were put on a self-financing basis and a limited use of 
contracting prices came in to use. At a time when the centre's ability to 
maintain the high levels of investment growth of previous years fell, prices 
started to spiral. This led to a conflict of rent division. The enterprises 
gradually began to exert pressure on the centre in order to allow them to retain 
and realise parts of their production outside state channels. Industrial action in 
the oil industry led to concessions whereby the PAs were allowed to realise 
part of their above-plan production for hard currency (exports).178 With the 
altered flow of rent (see Figure 8.1) the organisational structure began to alter 
as well. The PAs under Glavtyumenneftegaz became independent units, 
making it easier to fulfil their respective plans. Likewise, newer or better-
equipped units within the PAs claimed their independence. Both 
Megionneftegaz and Chernogorneft split from Nizhnevartovskneftegaz in 
January 1991. The former became an independent enterprise, while the latter 
became a "lease hold" enterprise. 179 
Splitting up the larger PAs gave the smaller the opportunity to realise a 
"profit" from their production. Thus "good" production units could avoid 
having their surplus production negated by other units' deficit production,180 
leading to the accumulation of legal capital/rent outwith the state structures of 
rent and capital accumulation. 
177 Ibid., p. 18. 
178 Sagers (1991), op cit., p. 255. 
179 Ibid., p. 256. Sagers, 'Russian crude oil production in 1996: conditions and prospects', 
Post-Soviet Geography, 1996, vol. 37, no. 9, p. 544. 
180 Sagers (1991), op cit., p. 256. 
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During the late 1980s and early 1990s the first experimentation with vertical 
integration took place. These originated from all three participating levels in 
the circulation of rent and resources. LUKoil was the first industry initiated 
vertically integrated company (VI C), while Sinko and Rosneftegaz were 
initiated at regional and federal levels respectively. As these events are more 
closely related to the post-Soviet oil industry the subject will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapters 7 and 8. Suffice here to say that the altered 
circumstances in the late Soviet period along with changes to the incentive 
structure profoundly affected the objectives of organisational units. 
In 1989 the Ministry of the Gas Industry was merged with the Ministry of the 
Oil Industry into the new Ministry of Oil and Gas. However, the 
administration and enterprises of the former Ministry of Gas were kept as an 
independent "socialist concern" under the name of Gazprom, effectively 
leaving the Ministry of Oil and Gas control only over the oil industry. 181 
Trend in organisational development. 
Throughout the entire Soviet period of organisational reform there are certain 
trends that stand out. Firstly, there was a constant spatial increase of 
operations, which resulted in the need for territorial co-ordination and a 
growth in organisational units. This affected the structure by the resulting in 
greater fragmentation. Simultaneously however, the fragmentation was 
counterbalanced by integration within administrative units. Thus, the Oil 
Syndicate (then Narkomat and finally the ministry) had initially administered 
the entire oil industry. To this were added Glavki and PAs, which extended 
the hierarchical chain and shifted operational locus. 
Secondly, the latter development resulted in a gradual shift of operative 
responsibility away from the planning and strategic (state) organs towards the 
organs nearer to the actual scene of production. However, the excessive 
organisational structure failed to capitalise on the virtues of bureaucratic 
181 lEA (1995), op cit., p. 97. 
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organisation due to the incentive structure generated by the institutional 
matrix. 
Thirdly, in order to optimise the structure, i.e. enhance the information 
efficiency and operative efficiency there were constant attempts to centralise 
again after a period of decentralisation. This is reflected in the increased 
specialisation of organisation. As spatial distribution grew and complexity of 
operations and transactions increased the number of vertical command chains 
increased. While as the Oil Syndicate had initially concerned itself with all 
aspects of administration, increasingly operative, strategic, and financial 
transactions were separated from each other and organised within their own 
structures. 
Table 3.1 - Main chronology of organisational reforms in the USSR. 
Petroleum 
Industry. 
Ministry of the Petroleum Industry 
for the Southern and Western 
Regions, & Ministry for the Eastern 
Regions. 
SovnarkllOz-reform 
Brezhnev-Kosygin reforms, Main administrations and regional 
PAs 
Integrated territorial PAs 
inant organisational approach, i.e. functional vs. territorial. 
Finally, in order to counter balance departmentalisation and improve the co-
ordination of the economy a gradual convergence between the functional and 
territorial approach developed into the classic Soviet organisational model; the 
functional-territorial approach. 
These trends represent not only the desire to control the economy, through 
maintaining autarky and ensuring that no administrative layer would become 
too powerful, but also the realisation that output growth depended on PAs and 
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NGDUs ability to operate under relative independence. The trends thus 
represented an attempt at gaining economic efficiency without forsaking 
political efficiency (represented by the principles of administration and 
planning). 
Reforms introduced reflect the constant conflict between on the one hand 
macro control and on the other micro efficiency, and a gradual clarification of 
responsibilities and duties pertaining to the different levels. Crucially though, 
the reforms stayed true to the principle of central administration, culminating 
in a central node of (perceived) supreme administration. At the same time 
though reforms failed to create de facto division of responsibilities and duties 
thereby impeding the development of infrastructural power. Reform 
proposals right until the very end of the Soviet Union remained anchored in 
these principles and dilemmas. 182 Repeated reforms were a sign of. the 
awareness of the administrators and the planners that the structure did not 
generate the desired returns on investments necessary to ensure political 
control and legitimacy. As the industry (and this would be true for all 
industries in the USSR) grew, a rising number of goods and services made it 
increasingly important that the central node of strategic planning possessed 
accurate and necessary information. Organisational reforms must therefore be 
regarded as having had two main objectives. 
Firstly, to increase the return on investment. In the Soviet case this implied 
greater production of goods and services which could be administered from a 
central point. The primary return on investment was political rather than 
economic. From this point of view economic efficiency was not the over-
riding goal as initially the system was capable of producing greater physical 
volumes by added manpower investment. Production volume was in itself 
important, and the delivery of such was the scale by which success was 
measured. Greater production was a means to ensure legitimacy of the 
(82 See for example Bugayev, 'Improving the administrative-territorial division of the USSR', 
Soviet Geography, 1991, vo!. 32, pp. 545-51. Also, Makarov et ai, 'Formulating and 
Implementing an Energy Strategy: Economic Estimates', in Rudenko, Energy Reviews, 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 1-33. 
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political regIme. Increased production was a form of investment In the 
political institutions, authority and legitimacy of the USSR. 
The second point is connected to the first. In order to administer production 
from a growing number of industries, reorganisation was necessary in order to 
create information that could be aggregated and, importantly, minimise 
complexity. Specialisation (functionalism) in this respect made it easier to 
control and aggregate information as it passed up the system and disaggregate 
it when it was passed down. This made it easier to devise startdards of 
evaluation that could more easily be verified, thus ensuring greater political 
control with the economic system. Vertical communication and lines of 
responsibilities made it easier to control the economy from a political point of 
view, in that it favoured vertical relationships of loyalty rather then horizontal 
or decentralised loyalty relationships. It also favoured patrimonial 
(personalised relationship) structures of loyalty rather than bureaucratic 
(impersonal relationship) structures of loyalty. 
It is interesting to note that the Soviet bureaucracy portrays many of the same 
qualities that western scholars on bureaucracy have studied in western 
societies. Namely the difficulty in removing organisational layers once they 
have been created, the difficulty in transferring or removing administrative 
powers from an existing unit, and departmentalisation. 183 The Soviet period is 
characterised by a struggle between existing organisational layers to maintain 
their powers and the need for establishing new layers of control in order to 
increase planning/political efficiency and to curtail the potential powers of 
existing organs. Power in the SU was closely linked with the authority to 
create organisational units. 
Although de facto operational control increasingly became concentrated at the 
lower end of the organisational structure (close to operation), the higher layers 
maintained control over the allocation of resources (and thereby having an 
influence on operation), planning of targets, the general framework of 
183 On this topic see Blau & Meyer, op cif. 
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operation and administering the incentive structure. With respect to the PAs 
their growing power was constantly checked by their limited ability to affect 
the flow of resources and access to investment funds. 
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Chapter 4 
Economic institutions of the Soviet economy. 
'As so often the interests of the party 
apparatuses stood in stark contradiction 
to the interests of the classes once these 
had come into motion. In the days after 
the overturn of the monarchy even the 
cadres of the Bolshevik party, that had 
gone through an extraordinary 
revolutionary school, openly showed a 
tendency to remove themselves from the 
mass and to identify the special interests 
ofthe apparatus with that of the working 
class. For what did one not have to 
brace oneself when these cadres became 
an almighty state bureaucracy?' 184 
. Leo Trotsky 
The purpose of this chapter is not to give an extensive analysis of the Soviet 
economy, rather it focuses on the institutional factors that shaped economic 
behaviour in the USSR. Production in any economy can be co-ordinated in at 
least two ways. 185 First, by lateral communication, which implies negotiation 
and mutual accommodation between the different participants of the economy. 
These participants constitute suppliers and demanders in the economy. 
Second, by an administrative approach, which implies formal control and 
orders emanating from the higher end of a hierarchical system with 
responsibilities for the production of a particular variable being allocated from 
the top down. In reality no economy employs either of the systems in its 
extreme form, rather there is a mix of both systems in all economies. 
In its idealised sense economic interaction in the former mode of co-ordination 
is based on non-personalised relationships, horizontal and decentralised 
communication, transparent and stable "rules of the game", and market driven 
demand and supply. The latter mode of co-ordination should in its idealised 
form also be based on non-personal (i.e. bureaucratic) relationships, vertical 
and centralised communication, stable and transparent "rules of the game", 
and a planned allocation of demand and supply. For various reasons the 
Soviet administrative economy failed to develop these idealised qualities. In 
184 Trotsky, op cit., p. 302. 
185 Campbell, op cit., p. 25. 
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part this was due to the effects of the first order path dependency on the lower 
orders. A patrimonial-despotic structure of direct mobilisation of resources 
affected the organisational structure of state and economy. Administrative 
planning as a substitute for demand and supply facilitated the extension of 
state power through a formal monopoly on the distribution of resources and 
collection of rent. Due to resources and time pressure the Soviet political 
structure developed a patrimonial structure of power and authority 
implementation as a substitute for bureaucratic infrastructural power base. 186 
This structure facilitated the implementation of a political monopoly through 
the ministerial structures and administrative planning. The second order 
dimensions were conducive to promoting a verifiable structure of monitoring 
agency. On the other hand crude standardisation of measurements was not 
conducive to promoting a dynamic flow of information and corresponding 
adaptation as complexity and spatial distribution increased. 
It is often argued that the advantage of an administered economy lies in its 
ability to evaluate the performance of the system as a whole and that 
sequential decision making reduces the effect of bounded rationality. This 
makes it easier to achieve economies of scale, which will contribute to higher 
efficiency and lower overall cost. The idea being that there is a central node 
that evaluates and weights information and then issues instructions according 
to an optimal plan for the whole economy. In the Soviet Union this node was 
Gosplan which had the overall responsibility for the creation of state plans. 187 
In addition each ministry and enterprise had its own planning department that 
participated in the establishment of plans. Although the final plan had the 
186 Gill (1990), op cif., pp. 5-6 
187 Although Gosplan was responsible for fewer balances then Gossnab the weight of the 
balances that Gosplan administered was 80% of the total allocated value in the USSR (Nove, 
op cif., p. 26.), and 100% of 'Funded Commodities', which were the most important 
commodities. Central planning was not a new or undisputed approach to managing the 
economy of the Soviet Union. The tsarist government had been debating the virtues of central 
planning as means to overcome Russia's poverty and technological backwardness. Soviet 
planning in many respects reflected continuity with the imperial period. Within the 
Bolshevik leadership there were opposing views on how to govern the economy. The 
Bukharinites were in favour of a controlled market economy, while the Stalinist faction was in 
favour of forced industrialisation and collectivisation through central planning. (Rassweiler, 
op cif., pp. 5-6,20 & 23-24). 
94 -
status of law its formation was the result of a hierarchical bargaining 
process. 188 
Management and motivation. 
The Soviet economy was erected on the foundations of a despotic-patrimonial 
structure of state power. Power and legitimacy in the Soviet system emanated 
from the ability of the party-state to carry out its objectives. For the purpose 
of this thesis whether these objectives were altruistic or not is of less concern. 
As long as the party-state managed (or seemingly so) to fulfil its objectives it 
could remain unaccountable to the vast majority of its constituency. Such 
unaccountability was an important pre-requisite for a system that was based on 
the 'rule by law', rather then the 'rule of law'. By monopolising the right to 
re-negotiate the 'rules of the game' ex post, the state was in a position to 
protect its patrimonial power foundation. Importantly, neither the state 
(economic) bureaucracy nor the party could emerge as vehicles for 
championing state accountability since the two structures themselves were 
integral parts of the state. 189 
The ideologically founded position of the system gave rise to the closeness of 
the political and economic sphere. Kornai argues that the centralised and 
bureaucratic organisation of power was a result of the paternalistic role 
assumed by the party, i.e. its vanguard ideology. 190 
188 Komai uses the term vertical bargaining. For general works on the formation of plans the 
reader is referred to the works of Komai, Nove, and Gregory and Stuart. See bibliography for 
details. 
189 Though both these structures pursued different interests their behaviour as groups served to 
reinforce the patrimonial (and thus unaccountable) structure of the state. Gill argues that the 
General Secretary's power was linked with the executive organs of the palty 'as he sought to 
rule and extend his power through the organisational arms of the party ... []Consequently, the 
party functionaries had their own vested interest in supporting the drift toward 
centralisation[.], By protecting the apparatus from 'attacks made upon it by those outside the 
apparatus' the General Secretary could maintain his position as the appointer of the members 
of these organs. (Gill (1990), op cit., pp. 318-319). Furthermore, there was a lack of 
'organisational coherence and integrity' in the CC and the Politburo. (fbid.) This would again 
have weakened these organs as champions of state accountability. Similarly, the economic 
bureaucracy had little interest in championing reforms that would have endangered their rent 
apppropriating position. (Winiecki, 'Why Economic Reforms failed in the Soviet system: a 
property rights based approach', in Lee et ai, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 75-79). 
190 Komai, op cit., pp. 56-7. 
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The vanguard ideology had two major consequences for the organisation of 
the economy. Firstly, the vanguard knew the objective and true desires of its 
constituency, which represented the justification for elaborate plans. 
Secondly, in order to maintain its power monopoly and generate the necessary 
information in order to evaluate the state of the economy, a centralised and 
controlled mode of organisation was required. Derived from these two 
consequences followed a great many of the system's characteristics designed 
to reduce agency cost. Agency cost in the Soviet system arose from the use of 
economic resources inconsistent with the objectives of the political 
leadership. 191 The organisational overlap and corresponding unclear authority 
distribution along with resource pressure created strategic room for individual 
action where property rights and circulation of rent could be contested. That 
situation gave rise to specific agency costs related to elements of Soviet 
industrial organisation. From a NIE and TeE view these principal-agent costs 
were moral hazard, information asymmetry, non co-operative solutions and 
hierarchical bargaining. Elements of Soviet industrial organisations are 
examined below. 
Hierarchy and division of labour. The creation of additional hierarchical 
layers is a means of promoting division of tasks into a sequential process that 
enables each actor to concentrate on a small part of the task rather than the 
whole. For such an organisation to be effective, however, the division of tasks 
needs to be clear. In the Soviet economy this quality was lacking. The 
overlap of responsibility impeded the efficiency of the bureaucratic structure. 
'Loss of control' as organisations grow is well established in organisational 
and bureaucratic literature,192 however, in the Soviet Union such loss of 
control was aggravated by the overlap of responsibility and performance 
indicators that different agencies work towards. 'Loss of control' implies that 
when an organisation grows, eventually the extended lines of communication 
and distance between operative and strategic agencies incur greater loss of 
information and control, than is gained by the same process. In the Soviet oil 
191 Moore, op cif., p. 200. 
192 Williamson (1985), p. 134. 
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industry both spatial distribution and political (control) factors resulted in a 
growing bureaucratic organisation. 
The strength of bureaucratic organisation partly lies in the division of labour 
through specialisation. Soviet society and economy failed to take advantage 
of this organisational strength, by reproducing within every organisational unit 
the functions and responsibilities of the units that it came in contact with. 
Division of labour therefore, did not so much lead to sequential labour, but 
rather the establishment of an increasing number of agencies that were to serve 
as checks on information. Being geared towards political control the division 
of labour further implied that planning imposed a vertical political hierarchy 
on economlC decision-making, which inhibited horizontal flows of 
information. 193 
Optimisation. The management structure developed in response to 
optimisation efforts. The increasing complexity of the economy led to a 
continuous refinement of the organisational structure by creating a growing 
number of specialised operational and strategic units. These were created with 
the objective in mind that a specialised nucleus would be better equipped to 
promote and exercise a particular function. Economically the rationality for 
this could be twofold. Firstly, optimisation as an attempt to optimise both the 
flow of information and the development of an economic activity. Secondly, 
by creating a separate entity simpler standards of verification could be 
employed thus enhancing the monitoring of the economy's functioning. On 
the one hand such organisational optimisation simplified the monitoring of the 
system. On the other it inhibited the flexibility of the economy by creating an 
information over-load as the co-ordinating capabilities of the system became 
exhausted with increased complexity and spatial distribution. The absence of 
significant horizontal communication aggravated this situation. 
However, politically optimisation could have another objective. As in the case 
of Var 'yegannejtegaz and Nizhnevartovsknejtegaz optimisation of the 
193 Rutland (1985), p. 264. 
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management structure was a means of safeguarding power relationships. As 
the importance of petroleum (and gas) production grew it became increasingly 
important for the official structures of political power - the Communist Party 
- to ensure that no part of the economic structure could develop into a centre 
of independent political power. 194 Although the reorganisations that occurred 
resulted in a clearer division of labour, it also made the various branches of the 
industry increasingly dependent on the co-ordinating ability of the higher 
echelons, which again could more easily be controlled by the Party. The 
monopoly in creating organisations and redefining organisational objectives 
was of great importance to the state. This gave the state the ability to create an 
incentive structure that would ensure a sufficiently large constituency with 
vested interest in maintaining the structure of state power. It would also allow 
the state to ensure that no competing centre of power would arise that could 
challenge the state's position in the circulation of income and resources. 
While hierarchy, division of labour and optimisation eased the monitoring and 
control of the system it also impeded the development of balanced energy 
development, co-ordination between the various branches, and optimisation of 
investments. According to Gustafson 'A chronic problem of Soviet energy 
policy has been weak central management' .195 Instead this task formally 
rested with Gosplan, which had to perform this optimising task - often 
resulting in a competition for resources between the ministries of the different 
energy camers. As the complexity of the economy grew and the state 
bureaucracy became institutionalised the planning organs increasingly came to 
absorb industry people. According to one source the appearance of industry 
people in the planning organs was an important element of ensuring the 
functioning of a sector. 196 The reliance on experts was used to increase 
understanding at all levels of the hierarchy, yet at the same time the 
importance of the personal qualities over office qualities served to deepen 
patrimonial structures of state power. Chung also argues a case of pressure 
194 Kryukov & Moe (1996), pp. 9-10. 
195 Gustafson (1989), op cit., p. 292. 
196 Mal'tsev et ai, op cit., pp. 121-123. 
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groups - in conjunction with the development of the Western Siberian energy 
resources - influencing energy policy. 197 
Gustafson, on the other hand, argues that the development of the energy 
resources reflects 'the difficulties of dealing with a shifting and uncertain 
reality, as well as differences in information available' and that interest groups 
were not the main movers behind policy formulation. 198 This thesis would 
agree with the latter argument in that policy was not interest group driven, but 
rather a function of institutional factors. As such patrimonial structures could 
very well cut across interest groups. 
It should be noted that the inherent deficiencies in this vertically structured 
system were well known to the Soviet leadership, planners and specialists 
themselves. 199 The entire organisational structure of the oil industry reflects 
the constant attempts at optimising the flow of information and production. 
Both the functional and territorial approaches have this in common. Reforms. 
throughout the Soviet period aimed at 'finding the optimum ratio of 
centralization and decentralization of management, as well as on the 
combination and coordination of sectoral and territorial approaches In 
planning and management' .zoo In an expanding economy though, such an 
optimum ratio is difficult to find. For it (in addition) to be efficient it requires 
that the economy remains static, as bureaucracies are slow to pick up 
alterations in the economy, and even slower to adapt to altered circumstances. 
However, in the Soviet system controlling whatever production was created 
was more important than maximising the return on investments in economic 
terms. Indeed, employed technology, crude standards of verification, risk 
aversion and fixed prices all contributed to portraying the economy in terms of 
static indicators. 
197 Chung, Interest Representation in Soviet Policymaking, Westview Press Inc., 1987. 
198 Gustafson, op cit., p. 16. 
199 See for example Trifonov, extensively cited in Kryukov (1998) op cit., pp. 70-74. Mal'tsev 
et af comment on the antagonism between political aspirations and industry considerations. 
(Mal'tsev et af, op cit., pp. 114-124). 
200 Bugayev, op cit., p. 546. 
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Motivation and Incentive structure. Dysfunction and inefficiency 
originated also from the motivation of individuals. While the Soviet 
leadership counteracted system specific flaws by creating additional 
administrative organs, it failed to sufficiently appreciate the importance of 
individual motivation. Admittedly, premiums were geared towards motivating 
the individual, but as practices developed these motivational benefits were 
contrary to economic efficiency goals. Bonuses were established in order to 
motivate actors to fulfil the plan or sub-plan, but wholly artificial incentives 
and the use of the ratchet principle were again counteractive to achieving 
. ffi' 201 economIc e IClency. 
Important in this respect was the distribution of property rights. These were 
on the operational plane quite ambiguous. Formally the central organs 
administered all property for the people. This however, implied that everyone 
owned everything and nothing. Formally there existed no venues for 
accumulating surplus value outside the official state channels (i.e. all 
production/value belonged to the state). A production association 
administered the property entrusted to it, while an NGDU administered that 
part of the property, which had been entrusted to the P A and then again had 
been entrusted to it. Each unit therefore strove to formally prove that the 
entrusted property had been used to fulfil the allocated targets. All resources 
were put to this end and the actual management of the property was only of 
secondary importance. There were few incentives to innovate or economise 
on the input of resources. Firstly, because any surplus created this way would 
be taken from the unit. Secondly, because the ratchet principle would make 
plan fulfilment more difficult in the next period. 
This is not to imply that there was no innovation in production technology. 
On the contrary, innovation occurred both at unit level and at the centralised 
level. However, for the manager it became imperative to conceal the true state 
of his unit's production potential in order to prevent securing output targets 
201 For bonuses and incentives see Berliner op cit. On Motivation see also Komai, op cit., pp. 
\\8-\21. 
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beyond capability.202 The fact that waste did not directly hit anyone's pocket 
as long as plans were formally fulfilled only exaggerated this. 
However, as the system was geared towards plan fulfilment, this raised the 
question what to do with potential surplus production that did not feature in 
the official circulation of income and resources? From a manager's point of 
view over-fulfilling plan targets was as self-defeating as under-fulfilment. In 
return for resources units produced planned output, this was by default a result 
of the responsibilities tied to the state's investments. Ceteris paribus surplus 
that could be concealed from the state was not tied to the same "agreement". 
Through the bargaining process individual enterprises and ministries were at 
times able to reduce the output expected in return for investment. Thereby in 
effect creating a shadow structure of income accumulation and circulation. 
(See below). 
In any organisation incentive structures should be working so that the eventual. 
outcome of separate or individual action(s) deviates as little as possible from 
the overall objective. Bureaucratic organisation functions by dividing the task, 
the function of the incentive structure is to induce individual or separate 
action(s) to fulfil those tasks. If the allocated tasks are too difficult, there is a 
lack of resources or there is not enough time to perform all tasks to the same 
qualitative standard, there is a danger of goal conflict within the subunit in the 
form of selective attention. In the Soviet economy the chief formal incentives 
were bonuses for output fulfilment and by implication political status and 
leverage. 
Selective attention is held to be most prominent where there is a short time 
span, resulting in operational goals being favoured over non-operational 
goals.203 The Soviet economy reflected this dysfunction through its practice of 
202 Furubotn & Pejovich, 'The Soviet Manager and Innovation: A Behavioural Model of the 
Soviet Firm'. In Furubotn & Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights, Ballinger 
Publishing Company, 1974, pp. 203-216. 
203 March & Simon, op cit., pp. 172-179 on selective attention. 'When a means of testing 
actions is perceived to relate a particular goal or criterion with possible courses of action, the 
criterion will be called operational. Otherwise ... non-operational.', (Ibid., p. 177). 
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emphasising particular tasks. Such tasks would receive additional resources 
and sufficient administrative support in order to succeed, and would be 
favoured at the expense of other parts of the overall plan. Selective attention 
resulted from several factors in the Soviet economy. Firstly, plans lacked 
coherence. Plans were evaluated on the basis of how well they conformed to 
ideological and political objectives.204 Thus plans were frequently more 
ambitious than resources would allow.205 This again led to a situation where 
both the systems of verification and time perspective affected which projects 
would be favoured. Secondly, the information overload in the system resulted 
in information and measures of verification becoming increasingly 
unsophisticated, thereby leading to displilcement of real decision taking.206 
Plans were passed down in aggregate form in order to be sub-distributed at 
lower levels of management. However, formal venues for horizontal 
communication were few resulting in a lack of co-ordination. In the Soviet 
system selective attention often took the form of campaigns. During such 
campaigns physical and administrative resources were geared towards its 
successful implementation, while the plan lost coherence due to the diversion 
of resources and the short-term horizon of these campaigns. 
The development of the oil industry reflected this campaign style system. 
Development was unbalanced and favouring short time and operational goals 
over long term solutions in that development was biased towards Tyumen over 
the rest of Siberia, development over exploration, field operation over 
industrial support and autarky over interdependence.207 In fact the last point 
runs contrary to "good bureaucratic" practices in that theoretically higher 
specialisation requires higher co-ordination. Even within the ministries 
selective attention was biased towards operational goals. Mingeo, which had 
the main responsibility for exploration in Siberia, favoured the down-stream 
activities connected with its exploration responsibilities, i.e. the provision of 
information to support development, instead of reserve addition.208 
204 Zaleski, op cif., p. 483. 
205 Komai, op cif., p. 164. 
206 Zaleski, op cif., p. 51 I. 
207 Gustafson (1989), op cif., p. 58. 
208 Ibid, p. 96. 
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Campaign style management characterised the development of western 
Siberia, while structures of incentives and evaluation/verification further 
aggravated this one-sided development by favouring low-risk operational 
goals, i.e. production over reserve addition. Thus, one of Mingeo's 
operational criteria, was not reserve addition, but meters drilled - a criteria 
that is more easily quantifiable and predictable, yet not necessarily well suited 
to ensure reserve addition and long term viability of the oil industry. 
Mingeo's other targets included reserve addition, which led to the "over-
exploration" of areas already known to have favourable conditions, as opposed 
to new frontiers. 
Finally, optimisation and selective attention led to departmental ism. In 
organisational literature the term departmentalism refers to the practice of 
placing higher emphasis on the sub-goal of a unit within an organisation, 
rather than the overall goal of the organisation.209 A subgoal may sometimes 
become the overriding operational goal of the unit. Such dysfunction is not 
particular to the Soviet Union; however, in light of the absence of market type 
indicators of efficiency it may have been more difficult to control as standards 
of evaluation were less transparent. The Ministry of Geology who had the 
responsibility for geophysical surveying and core-hole drilling was also 
evaluated by additions to reserves which they then tended to overstate, while 
oilmen who then had the responsibility of working those reserves would 
understate them in order to achieve lower production targets.2lO One target 
indicator for the MNP was meters drilled. This again led to an emphasis on 
development drilling where commercial drilling speeds were faster than 
exploratory drilling and targets are thus more easily reached.211 A final 
209 March & Simon, op cif., pp. 59-64 & 95-97. Displacement of goals is another term that 
describes the conflict between the various constituent goals of a strategy and the strategy goal 
itself. However, this term seems to be more closely related to individual strategy, while 
departrnentalism refers to a sub-group goal. I will refer to departmental ism as a term that 
spans both approaches. On displacement of goals see Blau & Meyer op cit., pp. 139-161. The 
pursuit of subgoals is also referred to as internal opportunism. Williamson (1975), p. 125. 
210 Gustafson (1989), op cit., p. 72. See also Nove, op cit., pp. 93- \08, on the difficulties with 
Soviet success indicators. 
211 Hewett, op cit., pp. 55-58. Gustafson also attributes this in part to a miscalculation on the 
Soviet planners' behalf that the reserve prospects in Western Siberia were not threatened and 
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example on how departmentalism led to conflicting goals were the 
maintenance crews whose targets were measured in number of well repairs 
and not quality of repair (i.e. did the wells break down again right away?)?12 
Such deficiencies, however, were not unique to the oil or energy industry, 
similar deficiencies could be found in most aspects of the Soviet economy. 
Prices and income extraction. 
In a market economy, prices play an important allocative as well as 
informative role.2\3 Allocative in the respect that price affects consumption 
and establishes a balance (equilibrium) between demand and supply. 
Informative in that they reflect (marginal) cost and scarcity of a given product, 
and thus are important information carriers with respect to allocation 
decisions. 
The assumption that prices reflect marginal cost enables consumers to make a 
trade-off between satisfying competing claims on limited goods or resources. 
The market in this respect by balancing demand and supply also serves as a 
mechanism to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation of resources.214 In a market 
economy efficient allocation of resources reflects optimal allocation of capital 
spending. Taking into considerations foregone benefit of alternative spending 
(opportunity cost), investment will be directed towards maximising utility. In 
a market economy prices also indicate relative scarcity, in that goods and 
inputs in heavy demand can command a higher price and discourage 
"overuse" use of scarce resources. In a competitive market the supply curve 
for any given commodity is also the marginal cost curve of providing that 
commodity. Thus in a competitive market prices perform two main roles. 
Firstly, they ensure equilibrium between quantity supplied and demanded. 
Secondly, "prices are guiding individual consumers and producers, each acting 
therefore the immediate need (despite the geologists warnings from the 1970s onwards) for 
greater investment in exploration not being crucial. (Gustafson (1989), op cif., pp. 123-129). 
212 Gustafson (1989), op cif., p. 117. 
213 The market economy model assumes absence of distortions or market failure, free flow of 
information and cost-less enforcement of contracts and property rights. 
214 The Pareto criterion assumes that actors will have consistent and clearly ordered 
preferences. There is little evidence that these assumptions hold for each individual, but for a 
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only in their self-interest, to an allocation of the economy's resources that is 
Pareto-efficient. Nobody can be made better off without someone else [being] 
worse off,.2IS 
In an administrative economic system these functions rest with the planners.216 
In the Soviet Union the State Committee on Prices (hereafter the Price 
Committee) had the overall responsibility for fixing prices. This had several 
consequences. Firstly, the task of fixing millions of prices was an immensely 
time consuming and resource consuming task (which for the sake of 
"efficiency" meant that once prices had been fixed keeping them stable would 
be timesaving and simplify the planner's job from year to year). Secondly, in 
I 
order to determine prices the Price Committee was dependent of the same flow 
of information that the planners were and thus where held hostages to the 
same deficiencies in the flow of information. 
Rather than marginal cost pricing, which reflects scarcity and opportunity cost, ' 
Soviet prices where based on average costs plus a centrally determined profit 
rate? 17 Average price setting (in an industry at the boundary of its production 
capabilities) is by its very nature lower than marginal. In a market economy 
this would have resulted in excessive demand, and production at a level that in 
the long run would not have been profitable. 
In the Soviet economy the problem was identical, however, excessive demand 
was a cost incurring to the state not the enterprises. This made economising 
polity (the sum of individual preferences) these assumptions may be more appropriate as a 
guiding principle. 
215 Begg et al., 'Economics', McGraw-Hill, 1991, 3rd ed., p. 261. However, TCE questions the 
very idea of the competitive market, particularly so for idiosyncratic transactions and goods. 
(See Introduction and Chapter 5). 
216 Capital allocation and balancing of supply and demand was ideologically and politically 
determined rather then determined by prices. Instead prices in the administrative economy 
primarily performed the roles of: control (since output targets often were defined in value 
prices were used to evaluate and assess performance); measurement (the aggregation of 
dissimilar products for assessment of economic performance; and income distribution (below 
marginal cost prices affected real income). Gregory & Stuart, Soviet and Post-Soviet 
economic Structure and Performance, 5th ed., HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994, pp. 
191-3. 
217 This profit margin lay in the vicinity of 3-5 percent of cost, and was to go towards extra-
budgetary investments. 
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less attractive from an industry point of view. For the state it meant rapidly 
decreasing returns on investments. 
Given the absence of informative prices, shifts in the energy structure was not 
so much a planned development, as a reaction to planning from the achieved 
level. Non-economic indicators influenced strategic decisions and perceptions 
of scarcity. This implied that the shifts in energy carriers could have been 
more efficient if planners had been able or willing to evaluate whether they 
could have produced more energy by redistributing resources differently 
without reducing production of each individual carrier. However, planning 
from the achieved level, did not pass judgement on this form of resource 
allocation which resulted in an overly wasteful and expensive industry.2lS 
In light of the organisational and institutional structure the pricing mechanism 
served its functions. Only after Stalin's death did prices become more 
important as tools of allocation, however, the economic structure as such· 
remained geared towards serving political objectives rather then economic 
efficiency. Not only were prices determinants in the evaluation of the 
production process - i.e. fulfilment of targets which affected enterprise 
behaviour - but, they were also important in the accounting system and 
balancing of budgets through the khozraschet system.219 
Characteristic of the entire use of prices in the Soviet economy is that they 
were bureaucratic tools. They were designed to ease the task of planning and 
facilitate the monitoring of the system - thereby extending the structures of 
control throughout the economy. In order to facilitate this prices needed to 
remain static. They were not expected to be impartial information carriers 
alerting planners to relative scarcity and opportunity costs. 
218 Powell argues that an experienced planner could use other forms of information to decipher 
the true state ofthe economy, such as enterprise behaviour and resource requests. (Gregory & 
Stuart, op cif., p. 194). 
219 On the khozraschef system see Nove, op cif., pp. 14-16. 
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Cost of production had little impact on quantity of production. The economy 
was administered by means of direct bureaucratic control and not by fiscal and 
monetary policies.22o 
The chief results of this pricing structure, was that the oil industry due to its 
huge requirements for capital investments became a growing burden to the 
Soviet economy. The artificially (from a market perspective) low prices 
contributed towards a massive over consumption of oil (and energy) which 
again raised the demand for more energy as plan targets continued to rise. 
Income extraction. The organisational structure set out in Chapter 3, the 
system of management, and the role of prices was geared to extract income 
from the economy. Income extraction in the Soviet economy differed from 
income extraction in capitalist societies. Income extraction by the state in 
capitalist societies is largely based on indirect collection through taxes and 
levies. The Soviet system was based on redistribution of produce that the state 
generated. Income in any economy can consist of two elements, an economic 
and a political component. Economic income is value that is in excess of the 
cost of production. Such income can then be absorbed and reinvested in order 
to generate more income. Political income is "value" that is created as a result 
of state intervention (subsidisation, price ceilings, state ownership etc.) 
resulting in a redistribution of producer surplus in favour of consumer surplus 
or vice versa. Such "value" is not necessarily in the economic sense, but can 
be an ideologically or culturally conditioned goOd.221 The investment of such 
"value" is often non-productive. 
While as the political component has gradually been ideologically overtaken 
by the economic element in Western societies (and thereby partly becoming 
part of it) the inverse was the case of the Soviet economy. In the West less 
state intervention is gradually seen as a means to increase national and global 
220 Komai, op cif., p. 277. 
221 Value is here in inverted commas because all such value come at an additional cost to the 
state that has to be financed from other sources. For instance, in order to pay for a programme 
of industry subsidisation the state can increase taxes or prices in other sectors. Unless such 
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productivity and value. Economic growth for the sake of growth itself is 
gradually becoming a yardstick of political legitimacy. State intervention thus 
contributes to distorting market signals resulting in a suboptimal channelling 
of resources. (However, all Western states still maintain various levels of state 
intervention). For instance, although the welfare state remains an important 
political and ideological ideal, increasingly it is assumed that the provision of 
such should be cost effective and if possible self-financed. These 
considerations, amongst other factors, contributed to the initiation of 
privatisation programmes in Western Europe throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Thus growth is seen as a means for the state to increase its revenue base and 
thereby, possibly, increase its welfare comrnitment.222 
In the Soviet Union the structure of income extraction was tied to the structure 
of state power. Growth in the Soviet system did not necessarily imply greater 
economic surplus. Rather growth was measured primarily in physical terms, 
which again were closely tied to the incentive and monitoring structure 
employed by the patrimonial-despotic state. Growth thus on the one hand 
contributed to giving the system a semblance of legitimacy, while on the other 
hand contributed to the implementation of the patrimonial-despotic state 
(coercion). The difference between economic and political income therefore 
state intervention also leads to greater productivity as a whole, this being one of the rationales 
behind the welfare state, such political income is in fact a cost rather than a value. 
222 While the state has traditionally had a paternalistic character in Russia, Western state 
tradition has to a greater exterit been influenced by the liberal political philosophies that places 
greater emphasis on the accountability ofthe state and its role as a third party enforcer through 
standardised rules - the rule of law. (On the development of the state as a third party enforcer 
see for instance Barzel op cit.). Throughout most of the 19th and 20th centuries liberal 
(political and economic) philosophies dominated the development of states and economies in 
Western Europe. In Western Europe two main strands of liberal states (capitalist) developed 
in this period - enterprise capitalism and social capitalism (or social democracy). For a period 
after WWII Kenyesian policies dominated Western Europe resulting in a shift towards social 
democracy that to a greater extent emphasised political income through the welfare state, more 
state intervention in the economy and the mixed economy. However, the Kenyesian model's 
inability to tackle unemployment and inflation (stagflation) has again resulted in the emphasis 
on a less state intervention (the New Right). (For a brief description of this development in 
Great Britain (GB) see for instance Adams, Ideology and Politics in Britain Today, 
Manchester University Press, 1998, pp. 1-31). The New Right emphasises competitiveness 
(nationally and globally) as a prerequisite for growth - economic income. As such extensive 
welfare commitments are seen as non-productive (debt increasing) and state intervention as 
market distorting - growth inhibiting. This development has perhaps gone furthest in GB and 
the United States of America but is evident in much of Central Europe and Scandinavia as 
well and perhaps best captured in the phrase 'socially right and economically important'. 
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is that economic income can be measured in comparable terms, while political 
income can only be measured by some non-normative yardstick (and therefore 
not necessarily comparable between systems). In the Soviet Union this 
yardstick was closely related to the structure of state power. 
In standard textbook economics the distribution of income from production is 
divided into a consumer and a produce surplus. In Figure 4.1 consumer 
surplus equals the area aek while producer surplus equals the area ked. 
Assuming a downward sloping demand curve as a result of different economic 
circumstances and consumer preferences, and an upward sloping supply curve 
as a result of different production circumstances then both areas represent the 
saved aggregate income/expenditure that buyers/producers would have been 
willing to pay/incur at any given equilibrium price. If production remained 
unchanged a price ceiling on energy - Ps - would imply a transfer of producer 
surplus (profit) kecm to consumers. However, in· a market situation a price 
ceiling would, unless producers are compensated in another way, lead to lower 
supply of energy (Yc). As both supply and demand were "controlled" by the 
state these factors differed in the Soviet Union. 
Let Y indicate production at (*) market equilibrium (world price), (c) at 
competitive level with price ceiling and (s) at Soviet level. Let P indicate 
prices at (*) equilibrium and (s) Soviet level (price ceiling). MC is marginal 
cost and DD is demand. A (') indicates a shift. Figure 4.1 is a model of 
income and division of surpluses in the Soviet economy. In a market economy 
the section of MC exceeding average costs constitutes the aggregate supply 
curve. Since supply in the Soviet Union was administered MC has been used 
rather than a supply curve, since production of oil portrayed rising costs as 
fields matured (see Chapter 2). 
(Blair, Kok, Persson & SchrOder, 'Ein Neues Sozialmodell [A New Social Model]" Die Zeil, 
36/2000. At: http://www.zeit.de). 
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Figure 4.1 - Structure ofincome in tbe Soviet system. 
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In the Soviet Union the area abcd was portrayed as total surplus created by the 
oil industry. However, the area ebc was only a political surplus in that it 
implied a de facto transfer of surplus from other sectors and the public to 
maintain a high level of production?23 Cheap energy was an important 
element of the Soviet industrialisation. Low and stable energy prices was seen 
as a 'good' that the Soviet model enjoyed over the capitalist model. However, 
cheap energy prices resulted in the over consumption of energy (high energy 
intensity), which implied a de facto transfer of investment resources away 
from other industry and a reduction in living standards due to the emphasis of 
investment at the expense of consumption. (The burden of energy has been _ 
described in Chapter 2). By seemingly increasing consumer surplus both 
effects were ideologically presented as necessary and/or positive, thus 
constituting forms of political income. Under market conditions the area ehb 
would constitute a subsidy from the oil industry to other sectors, in the Soviet 
economy this was a "hidden" cost. (Hidden because the sector balance was 
not presented in terms of costs and profits). This hidden cost implied a further 
transfer of resources away from other uses. 
223 Mishan, Economic Efficiency and Social Welfare: Selected Essays on Fundamental Aspects 
of the Economic Theory of Social Welfare, George Alien & Unwin, 1981, p. 84. 
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Political income in the Soviet Union consisted of the components political rent 
and political surplus. Political rent is here used to indicate that part of income 
which in a market economy constitutes producer surplus. Political rent 
increased consumer surplus due to price fixing. In Figure 4.1 this is equal to 
the area kecm. Political surplus was generated by the administrative system 
by "increasing" consumer surplus through maintaining production levels 
higher than market output with a price ceiling (Y s-Y c). Based on its ability to 
extract these two forms of political income the state was able to maintain 
ensure its position in the circulation of rent and resources and create resources 
to maintain the patrimonial-despotic structure of state power and create a 
semblance of ideological legitimacy. 
Political income in the Soviet Union was extracted whenever the economic 
system contributed to reinforce the legitimacy of the power structures. If 
planning was successful and the economy grew the vanguard was fulfilling its 
role. Hence the Soviet practice of cosmetic statistical output. Both the 
structure of resource circulation and structure of management were formed in 
order to maximise this goal. Zaleski writes that '[ t ]he priority of management 
over planning has been the dominant feature of the Soviet economy since 
Stalin's time' ,224 which shifts the attention from problems of planning to 
principal-agent issues concerning the operation of the hierarchical 
management structure.225 This again explains the systemic obsession with 
plan fulfilment, or the seemingly such, and was an important factor behind the 
various 'soft constraints' that existed.226 The means by which political income 
was realised was through centralised control with redistribution of resources 
and income in physical terms. The control over circulation of income that 
figured in the plan was a source of political income. On the other hand there 
also existed a shadow venue for resource and income circulation, which 
comprised a) such income and resources that could be disguised from the 
official system or b) income and resources in excess of that which figured in 
the plan. The former was a result of outright theft and various systemic 
224 Zaleski, op cit., p. 483. 
225 Moore, op cit., p. 192. 
226 See Komai (pp. 140-45) for details on 'soft' constraints. 
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practices. The latter comprised produce in excess of the plan, plus an element 
of over-fulfilling the plan, as a result of more favourable production conditions 
than known to the planners resulting from various systemic practices. (For 
details on systemic practices see below). 
The Soviet solution to minimising transaction costs in the extraction of income 
were the tools of administration described in this chapter and the 
organisational principles described in Chapter 3. These tools were to extend 
patrimonial control and verification throughout the system. However, the 
system was ill suited to accommodate increasing complexity and spatial 
distribution and experienced what Coase termed decreasing returns on 
integration. 
In addition to a political rent an economic rent was extracted. Economic rent 
is defined as the 'extra payment a factor receives over and above the transfer 
earnings required to induce the factor to supply its services in that use' .227 
Given a difference in the cost structure of producer A and B (A produces at a 
lower cost) and a uniform price, economic rent constitutes that part of 
payment that exceeds the minimum price that A would have sold at. This rent 
is equal to the blue area in Figure 4.1 - med. In the oil industry such 
differences could stem from differing geological and geographical conditions. 
Several sources of income of a rent-type character existed in the Soviet 
economy.228 Firstly, the difference established by the system of prices 
between producers and end-users (realised through the turnover tax). 
Secondly, the difference between domestic prices for oil and international 
prices. In effect the state could "buy" oil at domestic prices and sell at 
international prices while extracting the difference.229 Thirdly, by subsidising 
branches of industry, agriculture and construction with relatively cheap 
energy. This constituted the largest rent-type income source. 
227 8egg et ai, op cit., p. 187. 
228 Sagers et al., op cit., pp. 390-7. Kryukov (2000), op cit., pp. 46-53. 
229 The income generated by energy sales were important in trying to overcome bottlenecks in 
the domestic supply system. (Melentev & Makarov, op cit., p. 20 I). 
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Fourthly, by giving industry and agriculture a competitive advantage through 
cheap energy allowing them to compete on world markets and the state to 
absorb the difference between domestic prices and international prices. (This 
was mostly relevant in the bilateral agreements with Eastern European 
countries and developing world countries). Lastly, through the consumer 
market, either in the form of low-cost production or energy in exchange for 
import of consumer goods. 
Sagers et al estimate that oil and gas rent in the Soviet Union alone equalled 
almost 40 per cent of total budget revenues.230 Oil equalled almost 25 per 
cent. In their analysis declining world prices and rising industry cost in the 
1980s severely affected the potential rent base of the USSR and thereby the 
assured functioning of the system.231 The mechanisms for extracting 
economic rent were closely connected with the structure of extracting political 
income and remained largely hidden. This made it possible 'to attribute the 
economic and social success of the country to the "advantages of the socialist. 
structure", and not benefits arising from the exploitation of low-cost, abundant 
natural resources'. 232 
As oil deposits started to become increasingly removed from the main centres 
of consumption and reserves became depleted the hidden nature of income 
extraction became a burden to the Soviet economy. Increasingly large 
investments were required to maintain production (see Chapter 2). This 
burden of oil is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The gradual depletion of oil and 
increased cost of production is represented by the shift in MC to MC'. 
Holding demand, prices and output constant it can be seen that while the 
income generated by the state (the red and blue areas) shrinks (area icd) the 
burden of the Soviet development strategy grew to jbi and gbf This was the 
230 Sagers ef al., op cif. p 395 (and table I, p. 396). According to Melentev & Makarov, 
energy sales constituted the main source of gross income. (Melentev & Makarov, op cif., p. 
201). 
231 Sagers et aI., op cit., p. 397. 
232 Sagers et al., op cit., pp. 391-2. 
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situation experienced by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and 1980s. With 
the onset radical reforms under Gorbachev increased transaction costs shifted 
the MC function even further, implying a continually declining de facto 
income. The crucial question in reforming the oil industry would have to take 
into account how to reduce the burden of oil extraction to the state while at the 
same time ensure sufficient income to maintain the state. Since the raison 
d 'etre of the state was closely connected to the previously described structure 
of income extraction reforming the sector would be more a political than an 
economic issue. 
The displacement of economic mcome by political income had several 
implications for the Soviet economy. It structured the economy in a way 
conducive to extracting the latter. The systemic emphasis on political income 
led to the adaptation of several systemic practices (informal institutions) that 
further impede the coherence of the plan and the functioning of the economy 
from an economic efficiency point of view. 
Economic behaviour - informal responses. 
The lack of planning coherence, constrained resource and time situation, and 
formal incentive structure resulted in the adaptation by economic agents of 
various informal responses. As set out in the introduction the development of 
informal responses are in line with NIE where informal institutions are seen as 
supplements to the formal institutions in order to maximise on a given 
incentive structure. In the Soviet Union the informal institutions responding to 
the incentive structure resulted in defection from the co-operative solution. 
Hierarchical bargaining and informal practice. Since the system relied on 
the lower levels of the economy to produce the information by which the 
upper echelons would make the plans several strategies were present for a 
factory or plant manager to affect target levels. Since all levels in the system 
were both principal and agents at the same time no distinction will be made 
here between behaviour on the different levels. This implies that the 
behavioural traits described in these sections applied at all levels in the 
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hierarchical structure, as the ratchet-principle would be applied at all levels as 
well. 
The safety factor concept implied that each agent would strive to conceal their 
true production potential in order to receive lower targets. Lower targets 
would ensure the relaxation of plan fulfilment both with respect to current 
production and future production and would allow some leeway in case of 
supply constraints or target alterations. Furthermore, safety factors would 
"allow" the diversion of resources to non-regulated activity. 
Safety factors were established through the bargaining process that was plan 
formation .. However, the upper echelons, expecting agents to apply the safety 
factor principle would initially set targets higher then intended in order to 
create bargaining ground for themselves. Several rounds of bargaining led to 
wasteful employment of management and human resources, severely 
increasing transaction costs. 
The establishment of safety factors was not always successful, and 
falsification and blat were used to alleviate supply constraints and achieve 
fulfilment of targets. By falsification is meant the reporting a production or 
quality level different from the actually achieved one.233 Blat was the use of 
personal connections in order to obtain a favour in the form of reduced output 
targets, getting an allocation of resources that one did not have a legal claim to 
or achieving extra allocations of resources.234 Both practices resulted in the 
diversion of resources away from their planned use, in the first case by not 
being available at all, or belated, and in the second case by being diverted 
233 Both falsi fication and blat are described in Berliner (op cit., Chp. \0 & 11). Mostly 
falsification implied the reporting of a production level higher than the one actually achieved. 
However, Berliner, also describes the opposite practice. The reporting of lower output levels 
than actually achieved and holding back production for later time periods. This must again be 
seen in light of the "safety factor". Knowing that the ratchet principle would be applied in the 
following period, the reporting of output levels substantially above plan, would lead to higher 
targets in the following period. Substantially higher is in each case a subjective decision, and 
the outcome would have been a function of the units assessment of the practical achievable 
level in the following period and the premium obtainable for the present over-plan production. 
234 'In previous time, we had so called "telephone rights", a deal could be reached just by a 
telephone call and not through the usual procedure'. (Interviewee # 1). 
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from their intended use. Either way the practices contributed to the sub-
optimal functioning of the planning system, in that they distorted information. 
Presumably blat would unlock bottlenecks at the individual unit's level by 
creating a bottleneck somewhere else in the economy. Kryukov argues that a 
sector's ability to influence and divert the flow of resources was a function of 
its importance.235 In the case of the oil industry this was clearly reflected in 
the investment priority it enjoyed. But also within the sector resources were 
diverted towards productive units (see above on selective attention). 
Both falsification and blat must be understood in light of the operational goal 
- the fulfilment of the plan. Both practices enabled the well-run unit to have 
or establish a "safety factor", both with respect to output target and with 
respect to resources, which would ease the operation of the unit and enable it 
to earn premiums. However, these practices also contributed to increase the 
economy's wastefulness. Not only where resources distorted from their 
intended use, but resources would also end up in storehouses for emergencies 
and thus be non-productive. 
Crucially this system displays the underlying propensity to defect from the co-
operative solution, in that agents would maximise individual rather than 
collective goals, and would "seek self-interest with guile" at the expense of the 
state. The emphasis on political income over economic income facilitated this 
development. Priority projects and plan fulfilment became the "legitimising" 
factors behind these practices. This was again reflected in the incentive 
structure (rewards and penalties) that guided economic behaviour and the 
existence of 'soft budget constraints' .236 The existence of such 'soft 
235 Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 80. 
236 A 'soft budget constraint' implies that the finn can expect systematic financial assistance 
(in various forms) in case of overspending, thus limiting the threat of finn exit due to 
economic grounds. Komai argues that the prevalence of 'soft budget constraints' in state 
owned enterprises contributed to a wasteful and inefficient economy. (Komai, op cit., pp. 
140-5). Fonns of 'soft constraints' were subsidy, taxation, credit, and pricing, having in 
common that their levels could be affected both ex ante and ex post through hierarchical 
bargaining. Importantly though, 'soft budgets' were not a panacea for poor management. 
Managers were still dependent on achieving targets in order to make a career and/or maintain 
a 'good life'. Therefore although a sense of economic 'soft budgets' existed there were no 
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constraint' impeded the restraint of systemic investment hunger and the 
development of a shortage economy.237 Both phenomenon contributed to 
deepening patrimonial structures of state power. 
The lack of planning coherence contributed to the development of these 
practices. Gregory in his study of khozyaistvenniki and apparatchiki shows 
how the different units had different criteria to perform to, and how this again 
led to a tension between the different actors of the information exchange 
process.238 The apparatchiki set the framework (rules, norms and directives) 
under which the khozyaistvenniki had to operate. Gustafson labels this tension 
• 
a "tug-of-war" between planners/technocrats and oilmen.239 This tension had 
its origination in the practice of planning from the achieved level. Planners 
would push for high targets, while oilmen (producers) would argue for low 
targets. The discrepancy that existed once a plan was set could be alleviated 
through the practice of blat, falsification of reports or substandard production. 
(In the oil industry substandard production could relate to well construction, 
maintenance, infrastructure construction etc). Berliner describes the tolkach 
and his role in "alleviating" the strains on the ec()nomy from such 
discrepancy.240 
However, although different in form there was a likeness in substance between 
the various operational goals - plan fulfilment. This point was important 
because it allowed the practices of falsification and blat to penetrate the entire 
system. The fact that all levels of the structure were held to this one standard 
made the different layers mutually dependent on each other, which permitted 
and in deed (informally) encouraged the passing on of imperfect information. 
equivalent political 'soft budgets'. The latter is important since it again emphasises the 
importance of safety factors. 
237 See Komai op cit. for details, pp. 160-5. 
238 Gregory, 'Soviet Bureaucratic Behaviour: Khozyaistvenniki and Apparatchiki " Soviet 
Studies, 1989, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 511-525. 
239 Gustafson (1989). op cit., 133. 
240 Berliner, op cit., pp. 207-230. 
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The informal practices described in this section further spurred the 
development of both vertical and horizontal loyalty networks that served as 
means to hedge against political and economic (logistic, plan fulfilment etc.) 
uncertainties.241 Though "independent" of the main state structure these 
networks further served to extend the patrimonial character of the Soviet 
system. Vertical networks joined lower- and middle-level leaders 'with those 
at higher levels who could afford them assistance and protection', while 
horizontal networks were based in a local area.242 Both these types of 
patrimonial structures became important in the (official) alteration of the 
circulation of income and resources that took place after 1987/88. 
Property rights and informal practice. Property rights in this context 
constitute the right to control both tangible and intangible assets. The right to 
control is represented through the right to decide how assets are employed, 
and the right to utilise value created by property?43 In a capitalist society this 
right in itself constitutes an incentive to maximise production and minimise 
costs, i.e. create a profit (or surplus value). In the absence of a right to utilise 
surplus value created by the means of production an artificial incentive is 
needed to motivate the users of capital to create a surplus?44 In the Soviet 
Union these were the use of bonuses and penalties, while the state had 
'usurped the rights of ownership of natural resources, concentrating in its 
hands all functions related to their use and the disposition of the proceeds' .245 
Although the plans formally allocated targets and resources and monitored 
plan fulfilment activity outside these targets went largely unmonitored. The 
Soviet economy functioned, to some degree, on the symbiosis of formal and 
informal activity. The right to utilise surplus value was even less clear. There 
was no clear owner as each level of the bureaucracy was subordinate to a 
higher level and at the top-level political standards rather than economic 
241 Gill (1994), op cit., p. 9. 
242 Ibid. 
243 The major work on property rights in TeE and NIE is probably Eggertson's Economic 
Behaviour and Institutions, op cit. 
244 Komai, op cit., p. 65. 
245 Sagers et af., op cit., p. 392. 
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standards evaluated the functioning of the system.246 Thus the entire 
bureaucracy was driven by artificial motivators, while those that actually 
operated the system had little or no incentive to make it efficient in economic 
terms. 
Property rights were poorly defined and rested on the acceptance of the 
authority of the Communist Party and the state by each member in the 
principal-agent hierarchy. In this hierarchy principals and agents were 
simultaneously both. Thus the moral hazards represented by bounded 
rationality and opportunism was present at all levels. The acceptance of 
central authority was crucial to the distribution of rights and the functioning 
and enforcing of the structure. A manager in the Soviet Union managed the 
property of the state for the state, his obligations and goals were defined by the 
central authorities, yet leeway existed through his ability to influence the goals 
through hierarchical bargaining and systemic practices. 
The Soviet manager's position was in many ways analogous to the manager in 
a western joint-stock corporation in that he controlled the asset on behalf of 
the owners, thus effectively controlling the property. The difference between 
the western manager and the Soviet manager consisted (amongst others) in 
that in the west a manager would be evaluated through his performance for the 
owners - i.e. through profit and dividend - and would (should) be subject to 
punishment in the case of non-performance. Although a western manager has 
de facto control over the asset, the right to this asset is clearly defined through 
ownership. In the Soviet economy the manager's position was different. A 
Soviet manager was evaluated through fulfilment/non-fulfilment of the plan. 
This gave him to some extent more control over the asset than his western 
counterpart. The fact that there existed no efficiency measurements equivalent 
to share prices and profit in a market economy, meant that the Soviet manager 
could to a greater extent exploit the information asymmetry that exists 
between actors in an economy. This he could do in order to (a) affect target 
levels through bargaining, (b) achieve additional funds due to the existence of 
246 Komai, op cil., p. 124. 
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'soft budget constraints', and (c) divert residual production towards personal 
gains. The state's right to property existed through its members acceptance of 
the states authority. This again was centred on the functioning of the political 
system and the state's ability to deliver economic growth and a better life. 
With the (formal) weakening of the authority of the CPSU in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the right to control assets came to the forefront. 247 This 
struggle was represented both at the individual level, i.e. "spontaneous 
privatisation", as well as on the aggregate levels, i.e. the seizure of all assets 
on Russian soil by president Yeltsin in 1990.248 The shift to self-financing in 
the late 1980s increased the motivation of managers to participate in the 
circulation of rent and income, and drastically reduced the state's authority 
with respect to collecting political income. Gradually a formalisation of 
informal practices took place that altered the incentive structure. These and 
post-Soviet factors will be examined in the following chapters of this thesis. 
247 The existence of widespread corruption, embezzlement and falsification throughout the 
Soviet period demonstrates that such rights were contested at all times of the Soviet Union's 
existence. 
248 This process of weakening central authority and the subsequent "stealing of the state" has 
been characterised by Solnick as a form of "bank run" hastening the disintegration of the 
structure. (Solnick, op cif., Chapter 7). 
Chapter 5 
Reform and Continuity. 
120 -
'If we look at the reforms of various ages, 
everywhere radical reform has been attempted, 
there is a rollback, a sharp backlash. This is 
particularly true of the twentieth century. In 
Russia, not two land reforms, three 
revolutions, Lenin's new economic policy, 
Stalin's industrialisation, Khrushchev's thaw, 
or Kosygin's quiet reforms changed anything 
fundamental in Russia'. 249 
Boris Yeltsin 
One of the great challenges faced by the Russian leadership after the demise of 
the Soviet Union was to form a strategy given the constraints represented by 
inherited political, economic, cultural and geographic conditions and 
institutions. Part I has examined some of these factors relating to the oil 
industry. Geographic conditions have played an important and path forming 
role in the development of Russia. However, for all practical purposes these 
conditions can only be influenced in a limited way. On the other hand 
political, economic and cultural institutions are functions of human motivation 
and incentives. In the development of societies factors of path dependency 
and institutional competition associated with specific institutional matrixes has 
resulted in the great variety of political and economic systems (and societies) 
that exist today. 
Institutions in this respect are defined as '[T]he rules of the game in a society 
or, [] the humanly devised constraints that shape interaction' .250 Institutions 
can be either formal or informal, in the sense that they originate from an 
official source or develop as a response to formal rules and constraints. 
Examples of the former are legislation and organisational structure, examples 
. . 
of the latter are customs and adaptive behaviour. Williamson argues that the 
institutional matrix constitutes the governance structure within which 
transactions take place.251 A transaction is taken to mean human interaction 
with the purpose of entering into a market or bureaucratic relationship of 
249 Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, HarperCollinsPublishers, 1994, p. 145. 
250 North (1990), op cit., p. 3. 
251 Williamson (1990 [1979]), op cit., p. 239. 
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exchange. Both types of interaction can be regarded as contractual and 
associated with agency costs. Agency cost is defined as 'the sum of the 
monitoring expenditure by the principal, the bonding expenditure by the agent 
and the residual loss' .252 
In the Soviet economy organisational structure and administered planning 
were examples of formal institutions, whilst agency costs stemming from 
economic behaviour (blat, tolkach etc) were informal institution. Some 
institutions like rent extraction and hierarchical bargaining functioned due to a 
symbiosis of formal and informal institutions. Institutions serve to reduce the 
uncertainty of everyday life by making behaviour more predictable - thus 
reducing transaction costs. Two considerations arise from this. First, 
institutions are important phenomena in the study of social, economic and 
political change. Second, they provide a conservative element in periods of 
transition. Both personal experience and institutional constraints create path 
dependencies in human behaviour. Hence institutions are key to analysing. 
historical change.253 
In explaining human behaviour Pierre Bourdieu emphasises the influence of 
habitus on individual behaviour. Habitus is the objective pool of knowledge 
within which the individual acts. Individuals' behaviour is not always, but 
often, habitual and habits are a function of the historically accumulated pool of 
knowledge. Habitus 'accounts for the fact that social agents are neither 
particles of matter determined by external causes, nor little monads guided 
solely by internal reason, executing a sort of perfectly rational internal 
program of action. Social agents are the products of history, of the history of 
the whole social field and of the accumulated experience of a path within the. 
specific subfield' .254 Habitus can be both one-dimensional (national, 
252 Jensen & Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and 
Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, no. 3, p. 308. The principal can 
establish incentives in order to limit divergence from his preference (monitoring cost). In 
some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources to guarantee that h will not undertake 
actions contrary to the principal's wishes (bonding cost). The elimination of diverging interest 
can not be fully eliminated, hence a reduction in the principal's welfare (residual loss). (fbid.) 
253 North (1989), op cit., p.3. 
254 Bourdieu & Wacquant, op cit., p. 136. 
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economlc system) and multi-dimensional (class, enterprise, individual). In 
analysing social, political and economic evolution, institutions are a reflection 
of habitus. Institutions reflect historical habits as they have evolved 
throughout the centuries. They are a reflection of the knowledge and 
traditions that constitute the basis of culture and history that shape human 
behaviour. The rewards offered by polity specific economic and political 
institutions reflect the specific incentive structure through which agents in a 
polity have sought to maximise their goals. The mode of economic 
organisation reflect the opportunities afforded by the incentive structure.255 
Organisations are '[E]ntities designed by their creators to maximise wealth, 
income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the 
institutional structure of society' ?56 In other words, organisations are 
designed to structure agency to a specific purpose, based on the opportunities 
and constraints that are inherent in any society. The motivation behind many 
Soviet organisational reforms was to reduce agency cost associated with the. 
implementation of state power by creating specialised organisations to 
structure agency. As the state organisation developed the trend of reforming 
was to optimise fulfilment and control, rather than achieve greater economic 
efficiency.257 
255 According to North and Thomas 'Efficient organization entails the establishment of 
institutional arrangements and property rights that create an incentive to channel individual 
economic effort into activities that bring the private rate of return close to the social rate of 
return'. (North & Thomas, The Rise of the Western World, Cambridge University Press, 1973, 
p. I). Central to the argument in this book is the dynamic relationship between the state's 
fiscal (survival) needs and the development of property rights (an incentive for innovation and 
investment - economic growth). Where these two converge economic and political 
institutions are developed that can result in sustained growth. An important element of this 
argument is that the relative scarcity of input factors (land, labour and capital) determines the 
establishment of exclusive rights. Barzel further links this basic argument to the evolution of 
'rule of law' states. For instance economies of scale in enforcement of rights and obligations 
where the constituency can maintain a constraint of the enforcer is conducive to the 
establishment ofa 'rule of law' system. (Barzel, op cit.). 
256 North (1990), op cit., p. 73. 
257 This consequence was not necessarily an intended result as control and administrative 
planning to some extent went hand in hand. Briefly: It was believed that administrative 
planning could be more efficient than the capitalist production system. However, since 
efficiency in the Soviet Union was measured by different standards, economic waste, as 
understood in a western sense, was a result of the incentive structure and the mode of state 
power. Also valuation in the Marxist sense differs from valuation in the capitalist sense. 
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From this it should be clear that change is a function of the relation between 
organisations and institutions. Both concepts define or influence one another, 
and both concepts evolve in a mutually reinforcing relationship to one another. 
In an effort to maximise the defined objectives, organisations alter institutions, 
and are themselves altered as a response to changes in institutions. Crucially, 
change is not necessarily towards greater economic efficiency, as objectives of 
organisations may not always be economic. This also implies that change can 
be analysed in terms of changes in both the organisational and institutional 
structures and their interaction. 
The study of institutions and the associated organisational arrangements is 
therefore crucial in the analysis of change and reform. If organisations are 
designed to maximise the opportunities represented by institutions and in turn 
also alter them, then organisations can be designed to exploit the institutional 
possibilities that the actors wish to develop. The study of organisations can 
therefore tell us something about what institutions the leaders and leading 
actors have wished to develop, or what institutions have proven to be too 
difficult to change in any significant way. 
Path dependence, is not the same as historical determinism, but emphasises the 
importance of history to the analysis of the present. It implies that the 
probability of understanding economic behaviour in a certain historic period, 
will be greater if such understanding is based on the preceding historic 
periods?58 Historical factors, represented by institutions, pose both 
possibilities and constraints. Possibilities by using the familiar in introducing 
the new. If existing economic institutions can be adapted to achieve other 
goals than the ones currently being pursued - then the probability of obtaining 
desired results increases. 
On the other hand, institutions will constitute a constraint on altering 
behaviour if reforms (implying altered end-goals) do not take into account 
258 An historic period in this sense is a period associated with a specific incentive structure that 
has proved to be evolutionary stable. (On evolutionary stable strategies see Samuelson op cif., 
pp. 47-66). 
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existing practice and incorporating them into the behavioural pattern that will 
achieve the desired end-goal. 
Hedlund uses the term 'revealed institutional preference' to describe a 
situation where: 'an external shock is delivered by radical changes from above 
in the formal rules, and where the informal norm system responds either by 
not moving at all or by budging and then gravitating back to previously well 
known patterns' .259 Several analysts have commented on the Soviet 
economy's institutional resilience, all the more making the study of Soviet 
institutions and organisations imperative for the understanding of Russian 
reforms.26o 
If one accepts this proposition then it becomes clear that reform must either 
incorporate existing institutions or be a gradual evolution of an altered 
symbiosis of formal and informal institutions?61 In either case such evolution 
will require time, as it is unlikely that the collective pool of agents will be able, 
to learn and adapt to the altered rules of the game quickly, as behaviour is a 
result of a lifetime of learning. 
The on gm of reform - i.e. are they a reflection of a change m popular 
consensus, are they brought about due to external pressure (conquest, 
conditional foreign aid) or endogenous pressure (antagonism between formal 
and informal institutions, antagonism between de jure and de facto property 
rights, revolution, coup d'etat, etc)? - is of importance as well. Reforms 
brought about as a result of change in popular consensus are likely to be a 
product of past institutions because people's preferences will be a product of 
experience and environment. External and endogenous pressure on the other 
hand might or might not have taken into account past practice. Indeed such 
pressure is often the result of a minority's dissatisfaction with the existing 
259 Hedlund (2000), op cit. 
260 See for example Ericson, 'The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and 
Implications for Reform', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, vol. 5, no. 4, p. 12. 
Schroeder, op cit. pp. 376-382. 
261 This approach stands in contrast to approaches that claim that reforming the Russian 
economy would entail a complete removal of the old political, economic and social structures 
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structure, envisaging a future that goes quite contrary to its recent historic 
experience. As in the cases of the 1917 Russian revolution and the 1991 
attempted 'shock therapy' ?62 
A major qualifying point is that there seldom is a consensus on what the future 
should look like. Democratic communication is biased toward compromise; 
likewise authoritarian regimes have several cliques of support that may have 
different demands and desires upon the acting leadership. The latter is implied 
in the term state capture. Thus, the process of reform will never be one that 
follows a pre-designed course, but rather one that shifts and turns at irregular 
intervals. Does this then mean that reform design, given these constraints, is 
futile? 
Reform Design & Ten Years of Transition 
With hindsight it is always easy to criticise policy choices that do not quite 
turn out the way one had wished. The appropriate subject of reflection 
however, should rather be what should the policymakers have known in order 
to develop a strategy to get where they wanted to be? What where the 
feasible, knowable options of getting there? There are several difficulties 
with such questions. First and foremost, how do we know that the majority of 
actors in the policy-creating sphere have not reached their goals? This is a 
very subjective matter. The following discussion therefore assumes that the 
demise of the USSR would not have occurred unless there had been a desire 
for change at least within some parts of the public and/or within some parts of 
the ruling establishment. It further assumes that the changes initiated are an 
ongomg process. 
If we assume that change is generally desired (and will continued to be 
desired) if it can reach a more Pareto efficient state, then we can measure the 
success of policy to the extent that it approaches this goal. A policy that only 
(See Ericson op cif. pp. 11-27 for this view). It further holds it unlikely that such a total 
makeover is at all possible. 
262 Hedlund (2000), op cif., p. 393. 
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benefits the few, while making the majority of people worse off is not a Pareto 
efficient policy. On the other hand, a policy where some get extremely 
wealthy, and the majority only slightly or not at all is, by Pareto-standards, a 
successful policy. In Russia the former seems to be the case. The distinction 
between the two approaches further entails that a Pareto efficient change has a 
greater likelihood of creating a state of popular consensus (if it does not spring 
from such), while the other alternative is more likely to be endogenous or 
externally driven.263 This again has important ramifications for the collective 
result of the sum of individual behaviour, as expressed through economic 
behaviour, i.e. the former is more likely to experience less institutional 
resistance. In the absence of popular consensus the ability to implement policy 
is dependent on the state's mode of power implementation.264 
A complicating factor with this measurement is that there is not necessarily 
harmony between a short-term Pareto efficient and a long-term Pareto efficient 
outcome. Reserve management in the oil industry is an example of this. In a 
finite sequences of extraction periods In, predatory extraction in period {I can 
be as Pareto efficient as a more careful approach to extraction in that particular 
period. However, viewing the embedded wealth as a resource to be divided 
between several periods the amount being extracted in {I will be inversely 
263 A caveat with the popular consensus criteria is that information asymmetries in both 
political and economic markets can create a divergence between voters' ex ante assumption 
and ex post perception. Stiglitz argues that 'there are asymmetries of information between 
those governing and those governed'. (Stiglitz, 'Information and the Change in the Paradigm 
in Economics', The American Economic Review, 2002, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 461). 
264 If policy enjoys (active) popular support then monitoring and implementation costs 
(transaction costs) associated with reform will be less. In this situation the state can to a 
greater extent rely on an infrastructural power base. In the absence of popular support the 
state needs to rely on a patrimonial-despotic power structure. In this latter case transaction 
costs associated with the implementation of policy is also lowered but the extensiveness of 
policy penetration is limited to the patrimonial-despotic structure. In such a case it will be in 
the state's interest to limit the bargaining structure to ensure survival (Le. the collection of 
sufficient income and resources), as the transaction costs of bargaining grows with the number 
of bargaining interactions. In the absence ofa market economy it will further be in the state's 
interest to maintain crude standards of evaluation as this again reduces transaction costs. 
Power in a patrimonial-despotic system emanates from the ability to tie and reward the 
bargaining hierarchy to the centre. Bargaining in this respect constitutes a de facto bribe and 
makes the bribe-taker (bureaucrat, nobleman etc.) an integral part of the system with a vested 
interest in ensuring its survival. From the state's point of view diffuse or non-existing 
property rights and the absence of constitutional limitations on its power are conducive to 
ensuring a central role in the circulation of income and resources and thus protecting its 
power. 
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related to the possible extraction of wealth in period t2 .n (and in some cases 
also to the total extractable wealth). 
The time horizon under which extraction occurs is further influenced by the 
producer's ability to appropriate income or rent from production. This ability 
is again affected by the distribution of rights to such income. Studies of raw-
material extraction show that extraction of oil in an environment with poorly 
defined and enforced property rights (a situation corresponding to high 
transaction costS),265 will generate economic behaviour geared towards 
maximising short-term production at the expense of a longer production 
horizon and leaving potential productio~ undeveloped.266 However, in 
situations where investments are sufficiently protected, implying well-defined 
and functioning property rights as well as a financial regime that producers 
find acceptable, individual actors can be expected to maximise total wealth, 
which again is likely to have a longer horizon of generating welfare. 
These are the theoretical parameters within which policy formulation should 
take place. However, in Russia there is no tradition for seeking out a Pareto 
efficient state. Quite the contrary, the Soviet tradition has been to maximise 
short-term gains while unclear property rights resulted in high transaction 
costs. In order to minimise transaction costs and ensure income the Soviet 
state developed a patrimonial-despotic structure of state power that informally 
accepted income loss (diversion of rent) in order to strengthen the power 
structure. 
A separation of interests did not exist in the USSR. Short-term objectives 
dominated the long-term objectives and long-term actors were also short-term 
actors. There are no guarantees that actors will seek a Pareto efficient state 
265 Property rights are here defined as 'the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that 
arise from the existence of goods and pertain to their use. These relations specify the norms of 
behavior with respect to goods that each and every person must observe in his daily 
interactions with other persons, or bear the cost of non-observance'. [Italics in the original]. 
(Furubotn & Pejovich (ed.), The Economics of Property Rights, Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1974, p. 3). The Term 'good' is in this book exchanged for 'asset'. 
266 Bohn & Deacon, 'Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources', The 
American Economic Review, 2000, vol. 90, no. 3, p. 532. 
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whatsoever. Indeed it is more reasonable to assume that individuals are prone 
to pursue alternatives that contribute to the maximising of individual 
wellbeing if the threat of punishment is low?67 The threat of punishment will 
be negatively related to organisational size if organisational growth results in a 
reduced ability to monitor the system. The probability of individuals 
maximising individual wellbeing rather than collective wellbeing will also be 
affected by the institutional setting within which the individual has learned 
economic behaviour. 
Given such a state it might be more appropriate to analyse political and 
economic development and strategic behaviour in the context of Nash 
equilibria rather than Pareto equilibria. Given the low degree. of ex post 
stability it will be assumed that political and economic equilibria in the post-
Soviet period are Nash equilibria rather than Pareto equilibria. Policy 
adjustments will remain Nash adjustments as long as the Soviet institutional 
matrix dominates post-Soviet development. Pareto shifts should only be. 
expected if a 'rule of law' society develops. 
Political and economic bargaining thereby becomes a reflection of self-interest 
and individual assessment of the attractiveness of a policy shift. Ceteris 
paribus, the lower transaction costs are, the more easily an institutional shift 
can be implemented. As highlighted in previous chapters the Soviet economic 
environment rewarded individual rationality at the expense of the collective.268 
By "accepting" informal economic practice, such as blat and falsification, it 
rewarded economic practice that went against the entire philosophy of an 
administered economy. 
In game theoretic terms Hedlund argues that defection was the dominant 
strategy for individual actors and that the Western democratic tradition of 
267 In a 'rule of law' society there are venues for "punishing" the state/rulers, i.e. in 
democracies a government can be "punished" at the polls if the constituency is unsatisfied 
with its performance. The equivalent did not exist in the Soviet Union. 
268 Classic well-fare economics says that in the absence of market failure individual rationality 
will produce collective rational optimal outcome as well. However, such a situation cannot be 
assumed in the FSU. (Nor anywhere else!). On market failure see footnote 311. 
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mutual rights and obligations, that are the basis of the 'rule of law', have no 
counterparts in the Russian tradition?69 By this he means that the prevalent 
notion in Western philosophy of mutual obligations between the rulers and the 
ruled, expressed through rights and laws, is absent as a defining institution, 
throughout Russian history.27o Instead there has been a deep distrust by the 
ruled of the state as an impartial enforcer and guarantor of common rules, and 
the law has traditionally been seen as an instrument of the rulers. 271 The 
state's monopoly to renegotiate the 'rules of the game' ex post further 
contributed to this distrust. 
An example here is the planning process arid planning from the achieved level. 
With evaluation of performance tied to production targets and planning tied to 
achievement; the result was one where actors played a series of end games 
rather than recurrent exchange. Further, the fact that Soviet managers and 
individuals diverted that part of the resources flow that did not go towards 
fulfilling the different plans to personal ends illustrates that a more 
philosophical conflict existed - a conflict about who should have the right to 
appropriate rent or income. The central organs' authority and coercion only 
embraced that part of the resource flow that was connected with fulfilling 
various plans. Outside the official circulation of resources and rent there 
existed an unofficial circulation of the same factors that contributed to plan 
fulfilment yet at the same time facilitated accumulation of capital outside the 
official channels.272 
It thus paid to defect from the co-operative solution in that defection promised 
greater return than co-operation. In fact, perfect co-operation could turn out to 
269 Hedlund (2000), op cif., pp. 400-401. 
270 This argument was developed further by Hedlund in a subsequent article that examines the 
historical and philosophical development of the rights and contract concepts in Russia. 
(Hedlund (2001), op. cif., pp. 213-237). 
271 Komai argues that "the formal system of the law is [was] subordinate to the current 
endeavors of the bureaucracy". (Komai, op cif., p. 47). Based on the results of the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) Hellman & Schankerman show 
that nearly 75 per cent of firms surveyed in Russia 'are not confident' that the state would 
uphold their property and contract rights in business disputes'. (Hellman & Schankerman, 
'Intervention, Corruption and Capture: the Nexus Between Enterprises and the State', EBRD 
Working Paper, 2000, no. 58, p. 7). 
272 Furubotn & Pejovich, op cif., p. 171. 
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be detrimental to personal wellbeing through the application of the ratchet-
principle. If plan fulfilment became more uncertain, personal wellbeing would 
become more uncertain. In post-Soviet Russia, the continuance of defection 
as the behavioural strategy reflects on the low opinion that the international 
investment market holds of Russia. Uncertainty and weak enforcement of 
laws have been among the major worries of Western actors in Russia.273 
Crucially the measurement of market effectiveness is measured against 
idealised functioning industrialised markets, based on an institutional base 
different from the Russian.274 This is not to say that such measures should not 
be employed, but they should be qualified by emphasising the particular 
circumstances that transition takes place in, and the goals that policy is trying 
to achieve. 
Lawrence Summers' statement 'Spread the truth - the laws of economics are 
like the laws of engineering. One set of laws works everywhere' embodies. 
this approach,275 which was operationalized in the so-called 'Washington 
Consensus' ?76 In the course of the 1990s the 'Washington Consensus' has 
come under heavy criticism,277 and policy has changed accordingly with 
institution building receiving more attention.278 The 'Washington Consensus', 
as a panacea for economic development of non-functioning or non-existing 
market-economies, relies on the pre-existence of some market-type economic 
institutions and/or a general familiarity with market type institutional 
framework. Thus this approach seems to have had positive effects in some 
Latin American countries where such a framework existed, but less so in 
273 The EBRD's 1999 transition report measures the legal effectiveness of Russia at 2.0 as 
opposed to the legal extensiveness 3.7 (both company law) on a scale from I to 4+, where "I 
represent little or no change from the previous regime". (EBRD, Transition Report 1999, 
EBRD, 1999, p. 260). 
274 Ibid., p. 22. 
275 Lawrence Summers, former chief economist at the World Bank, August 1991, Bangkok. 
Cited in Hedlund (2000), op cit., p. 399. 
276 The 'Washington Consensus' implied rapid movement towards liberalisation, stabilisation 
and privatisation - or shock therapy. (See for instance Kolodko, Ten Years of Postsocialist 
Transition: the Lessons for Policy Reforms, The World Bank, The World Bank Development 
Economics Research Group, 1998). 
277 / bid. 
278 World Bank, Emerging issues in development economics, 1997, vol. 8, no. 4. At: 
http://www.worldbank.orglhtml/dec/Publications/Bulletins/prb8.4.html[29/ I /2000]. 
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African economies where market institutions are institutionally unfamiliar. 
The institutional settings of the latter are generally characterised by severe 
information imperfections and high transaction costS.279 This characterisation 
also holds true for the Soviet and Russian economies?80 
This is not to say that there are no normative laws in economics, but rather a 
reflection on the circumstances under which such laws may operate. Given 
that no countries are alike, such laws only represent some of the independent 
variables in the evolutionary equation. Parameters of operation differ from 
country to country based on their specific institutional matrix. In order to 
employ the 'laws of economics' one has to take into consideration parameters 
represented by institutions and their functioning through organisations. 
Reform design is therefore not futile, but it is an uncertain undertaking, one 
that is influenced by several factors and considerations. Chief amongst these 
are historical factors carried forward through institutions, which again affect 
behaviour and the pool of knowledge that influence political actors in defining 
goals, means and organisations. 
In considering both the developments of the Soviet oil industry and the oil 
industry in the Russian Federation, reforms have very much been implemented 
by endogenous and external pressure. Organisational inertia or outright 
unwillingness to implement decisions in the Soviet economy can be seen as an 
expression of 'revealed institutional preference' or lack of consensus. 
Institutional preferences in a post-Soviet setting will have to be accommodated 
and at the same time manipulated through organisational design to achieve the 
desired outcome. This leads back to the question of actors' desired 
outcome(s). Several solutions present themselves. First, desired outcome(s) 
may already be in place. Second, change is still an ongoing process with 
279 Stiglitz, op cit., pp. 460-461. See Hayami on the effectiveness of structural adjustment 
golicy. (Hayami, op cit., p. 273). 
80 'The economic problem confronted by Russia at the end of 1991 seemed to combine most 
of the ills of the large Latin American economies of the 1980s [] with many of the problems 
posed by the economic reconstruction following the Second World War in Europe and Japan. 
[] Russia is different from other cases in one critical respect: before 1992, 95 percent of its 
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design. Third, there is at the moment no consistent direction away from or 
towards anything. Each alternative generates its own particular organisational 
and institutional make-up. The first will remain more or less static. The 
second will be fluid, but with a trend. The last will be fluid without a trend. 
In the post-Soviet situation reforms should aim at creating a synergy between 
historical institutions, new (market-type) institutions and organisations. 
Particularly, organisations should be designed to incorporate both the change 
that the leaders wish to achieve, and the constraints that institutions pose. 
Analysis of the post-Soviet oil industry organisation can therefore help us 
evaluate the reforms initiated, and how well they are suited to accommodate a 
market type (Western) development. 
Economic Change. 
According to Douglass North, economic change is the result of change in the. 
quantity and quality of human beings; the state of human knowledge; and the 
incentive structure of society defined through the institutional matrix?81 The 
preceding chapters have already touched upon the subject of the state of 
knowledge in the Soviet economy and a link has been drawn between the 
operational goals and the development of plan formation and existence of 
informal institutions. The organisational and institutional matrix within which 
individuals operated impaired the development of knowledge conducive to a 
market economy. Turning to the development of post-Soviet Russia it is clear 
that reforming the exchange and production of knowledge is a pre-requisite for 
the successful transformation of the oil industry. Successful is here meant to 
mean a transition to a Kuznets pattern of growth, and hence more efficient 
extraction and consumption. 
In order to achieve a shift from a Marx-pattem to a Kuznets pattern of growth 
major structural changes in economy and society are needed. For these 
economy [] did not operate according to market mechanisms at aII'. (Odling-Smee & Lorie, 
The Economic Reform Process in Russia, IMF Working Paper, 1993, WP/93/55, p. I). 
281 North (1999), op cif., p. 9. 
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structural changes to take root, corresponding social and institutional 
adaptations need to take place?82 On the other hand economic change is not a 
uniform process, but dynamic and multidimensiona1.283 It 'suggests that 
economy-building is culture-building (changes in models) and authority-
building (enforcing these models) - a power-culture link of definition, 
re(fication, and selection. Put simply, principles of activity are used to judge 
behaviour; nonconformism is punished (market exit), and conformism 
reproduces "correct" practices' .284 
Institutional modification is a complex process, and the outcome is dictated by 
"rewarded" behaviour rather than desired behaviour. Stifling institutional 
competition can lead to stagnation, while allowing institutional competition 
will not necessarily result in a "better society". With regards to the post-
Soviet experience therefore, the study of organisational arrangements in the 
Russian oil industry can illuminate several questions. What organisational 
changes have there been in the Russian oil industry, and can one deduce from 
these to what extent the industry is becoming more conducive to both 
accommodating institutions of the past, as well as the introduction of new ones 
(market institutions)?285 
It is important to note that political considerations will remam of great 
importance during the transition period, and that the political legacy of the 
USSR will manifest itself in state dominance of policy development and 
parameters of operation.286 If one accepts the proposition that behavioural 
282 Kuznets, op cit., p. 15. 
283 Hass, 'The Great Transition: The Dynamics of Market Transition and the case of Russia 
1991-1995', Theory and Society, 1999, no. 28,p. 384. 
284 {bid. Italics in original.. 
285 Jan Winiecki argues that 'economic reforms in the STEs, even those with strong popular 
backing, do not bring about systemic modifications seriously limiting the ability of the party 
apparatchiks and economic bureaucrats to extract rent'. (Winiecki (1996), op cit., p. 79). The 
oil industry with its highly idiosyncratic needs, sunk capital, and high exposure to a lucrative 
export market constitutes a sector where potential income from rent-seeking is high. One 
would therefore expect high resistance to reform of the structure by which income is 
appropriated from this industry. Examining the changes in one of the industrial branches 
where one would expect a high resistance to reform can tell us something about the 
grobability of change in other less rent conducive branches. 
86 The term state in this respect encapsulates the entire official political structure. Within this 
structure there is an added element of tension between some regions and the centre. Both 
dimensions ofthe structure are heavily engaged in the attempted domination of the extractive 
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learning is an incremental process affected by both formal and informal 
institutions, then one must accept the proposition that the dominant 
behavioural pattern of a previous period is likely to be dominant in the 
following period as well. 287 Especially so if there is a lack in general 
consensus, a lack of suitable incentives to change behaviour, a situation that 
puts additional pressure on scarce resources, or a society in political turmoil. 
Common to these factors is that they increase the level of experienced 
uncertainty and increase the probability of reverting to accustomed patterns of 
behaviour. It is therefore, unreasonable to expect major change overnight yet 
changes that are introduced can give an indication as to intention and direction 
of outcome. Organisational reform can give an indication of which 
institutions are more likely to be dominant and how new institutions are likely 
to fit in to the overall institutional matrix. 
The institutions that affect human behaviour and through which societies are 
governed are not themselves isolated entities within a society, but can be a 
product of political, ideological and religious goals and values that also shape 
the evolution of societies. 'Institutions define and limit the set of choices of 
individuals' thus they reduce uncertainty by providing structure and 
predictability to human behaviour?88 The latter point is of relevance as both 
predictability and stability have been major concerns of foreign investors in 
the transition period. By reducing uncertainty between participants to a 
transaction, institutions promote efficiency. In the post-Soviet experience 
however, there is a discrepancy between the institutions Western actors are 
industries within their boundaries. See Kellison, 'Tiumen, Decentralization, and Center-
Periphery Tension', and Glatter, 'Federalization, Fragmentation, and the West Siberian Oil 
and Gas Province', in Lane, op cif. 
287 However, if defining elements of incentive cohesion breaks down in period A, then lower 
order institutions are likely to modify in period B. Consider the gradual increase in regional 
power in the FSU. With the demise of the incentive structure connected to the CPSU in the 
late 1980s the regions and republics were able to absorb some of the centre's previous 
functions. The lack of a substitute political force to the CPSU has enabled a modification in 
the circulation of resources and rewards in favour of the regions that have left these with 
greater independence. As such the demise of the cohesive powers/authority of the CPSU has 
enabled the development of a different evolutionary strategy to compete with the 'presidential 
vertical' strategy of the federal authorities. 
288 North (1990), op cif., pp. 3-4 
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accustomed (and some of formal institutions established by the Russian 
leadership) and the institutions that Russian actors are accustomed to. Within 
each institutional matrix transactions are facilitated, and thus increase trust and 
predictability. 
Reduction of uncertainty can promote efficiency of transactions by reducing 
the time period within which negotiations take place; by allowing greater 
resources to be delegated to investments (as opposed to monitoring 
investments and contracts), and; by increasing the amount of potential risk 
capital when return on investments can be calculated on a more stable basis. 
In short, by making an environment more predictable, which is exactly what 
economic institutions do. 
With respect to the development of the post-Soviet oil industry this posed an 
acute dilemma. Not only has there been political and ideological turmoil, 
(which have increased uncertainty) but also the leading actors in the reform. 
process have come from different institutional backgrounds, thus having 
different expectations as to how this sub-economy should work. With regards 
to the entire economy Jeffrey Sachs phrased this situation accordingly: 'in the 
case of Russia he had felt like a surgeon who sliced open a patient only to 
discover nothing that was supposed to be there' .289 Yet Russia had its own 
institutional make-up, one which Russians themselves were accustomed to, 
but of which non-Russians had little or no experience. While actors from a 
Western industrialised background would expect certain economic institutions 
to be created and function, Russians would maintain the same with respect to 
their own institutions. 
Problems of reform were therefore exacerbated by actors from differing 
institutional backgrounds trying to advise and operate changes within an 
unfamiliar institutional setting. This worked both ways. The disparity 
between the "Western paradigm" and the "Soviet paradigm" exemplifies the 
institutional gap between the Russian despotic-patrimonial structure of state 
289 Hedlund (2000), op cit., p. 391. 
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power and the Western European infrastructural-bureaucratic structure of state 
power. Due to increased information asymmetry this gap is an important 
source of continued high transaction costs. 
As already mentioned, institutions are not necessarily geared towards 
economic efficiency. Institutions can represent an impediment to economic 
efficiency. This was the case in the USSR, where the institutional matrix 
operating through the organisational structure was geared primarily towards 
political control. According to North: 'Institutions provide the structure for 
exchange that (together with the technology employed) determines the cost of 
transacting and the cost of transformation. How well institutions solve the 
problems of co-ordination and production is determined by the motivation of 
the players (their utility function), the complexity of the environment, and the 
ability of the players to decipher and order the environment (measurement and 
enforcement)' .290 
As the Soviet economy evolved these factors became more complex. All three 
factors - motivation, environment and evaluation - have been examined in the 
preceding chapters, and together they form the analytical make-up that the 
majority of actors in Russia will possess. A society's ability to revolutionise 
itself is limited, and since few political theories believe in a continuous 
process of revolution, institutions from one regime tend to be carried forward 
to the next.29I This again reflects the importance of institutions in shaping 
everyday life. In the Soviet Union the Bolsheviks soon lost their capability for 
innovation, entrenching the institutions of Soviet style socialism, while Soviet 
institutions themselves carried forward elements of the old tsarist institutions. 
(For instance a patrimonial-despotic structure of state power). 
With the expanslOn of the economy, the bureaucratic organisation that 
accompanied it grew as well, reflecting both a political and economic 
environment becoming more complex. The political environment grew more 
complex as the Soviet state became more entrenched and informal institutions 
290 North (1990), op cit., p. 34 
291 Ibid., p. 6. 
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materialised (or resurfaced) to make up for allocative inefficiency through 
adaptive efficiency. For instance the Soviet administrative economy was not 
able to adjust to the dissimilarity of transactions that arose from the increased 
spatial distribution in the oil industry ?92 Organisational reform in the Soviet 
Union aimed to reduce the transaction costs associated with the maintenance 
of the mode of state power and the state's position in the circulation of income 
and resources. 
A Transaction Cost Economics View. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) aims at JOInIng economic with 
organisational theory. The approach is based on the Coasian view of the 
purpose of organisation.293 Human beings are regarded in the neo-classical 
tradition as maximising individual satisfaction. To these behavioural 
assumptions TCE has added the concepts of "bounded rationality" and 
"opportunism".294 As with the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that 
emerged in the 1970s, TCE view institutions as having an economising role. 
NIE shifted the focal point of analysing economic organisation from the firm, 
reduced to the production function in which the state of technology represents 
the boundary between the firm and the market, to an analysis incorporating 
ownership and control.295 This again shifts the focus of analysis from rational 
choice models to contracting implications embodied in the organisational and 
institutional matrix. 
292 '[I]t would appear that the cost of organising and the losses through mistakes will increase 
with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transaction[.]' (Ronald Coase, op cif., p. 
397). 
293 Coase argued that transactions will be organised within firms or across markets according 
to which exhibits the least cost. (Coase, op cif., pp. 390-2). 
294 Bounded rationality does in itself not explain economic behaviour, but rather provides 'ex 
post rationalization for suboptimal behaviour and has not been very successful in generating 
new theory [regarding economic behaviour] or anticipating anomalies'. (Coheri & Dickens, 
'A foundation for behavioral economics', The American Economic Review, 2002, vo\. 92, no. 
2, p. 335). Its contribution in this thesis is therefore not to explain economic motivation, but 
rather its implication for transaction costs, i.e. monitoring and enforcement, in economic 
s~stems. 
25 Kochevrin ef ai, 'Institutional transformation in Russia: a transaction costs approach', 
Economics o/Transition, 1994, Vo\. 2, no. 3, 374. 
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Within this framework the relationship between the members of an 
organisation is viewed as one of contractual obligations in a hierarchical 
manner. The contractual obligation between an employer and an employee is 
agam a principal-agent relationship. Thus the mentioned behavioural 
assumptions and the institutional environment in which economic behaviour 
was learned impose the constraints that shape the parameters of interaction 
and limitations to contracts. In TeE and institutional economics a firm (or an 
organisation) is viewed as a "nexus of contracts where several input makers 
make bilateral contracts with a central agent,,296. Principal-agent relationships 
and organisational structure will therefore be affected by transaction cost 
considerations. In order to create an efficient organisation contracts regulating 
principal-agent relationships should aim to minimise the effects of 
opportunism and bounded rationality. 
These two latter factors will be positively related to organisational size, degree 
of specialisation, geographic dispersion, time horizon, economic incentives, 
and the ability to direct the relationship between the employer and his 
employees in an ordered and consistent manner through a clear specification 
of rights and obligations. The latter point implies that property rights and the 
enforcement of such rights should be clearly specified, lest in a destabilised 
situation such rights become contested and the organisational integrity breaks 
down. In the Soviet Union the principal-agent relationship was characterised 
by a propensity to defect, and as far as the principal in most cases would have 
functioned as an agent as well, this propensity to defect extended all the way 
from the lowest levels to the higher levels. As the economy grew transactions 
became more idiosyncratic as a result of spatial distribution and industrial 
complexity. The structure of incentives was such as to reward short-termism, 
which again was related to resources pressure and the patrimonial structure of 
state power. 
On a more general level, uncertainty is aggravated by opportunistic behaviour. 
Williamson argues that the assumption that human agents are given to 
296 Eggertson, op cif., p. 112. 
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opportunism is justified in all interactions between agents.297 This does not 
mean that all behaviour is opportunistic, but that the hazard posed by 
opportunistic behaviour increases transaction costs. Uncertainty, the number 
of organisational levels and institutions are factors affecting the cost of 
transacting, which again is a variable in the production function of a firm. 
The neo-classical production function is dependent on the factor inputs land, 
labour and capital. To these TCE adds the cost of transacting, a variable 
which is positively correlated to uncertainty, non-functioning market 
institutions, and weak legal enforcement. In the post-Soviet economic 
environment such uncertainty will be high until an adequate legal framework 
has been implemented and is functioning. This implies that the cost of 
transactions will remain high, reducing both the volume and frequency of 
transactions and affecting the organisational arrangements that will emerge in 
order to minimise such uncertainty. 
Opportunistic behaviour is assumed to be a hazard in all interaction, but 
particularly so when transactions involve transaction-specific investments in 
human or physical capita1.298 Transaction-specific investments are held to be 
investments of an idiosyncratic nature where second best use is of a 
substantially lower value, and the difference constitutes an 'appropriable 
quasi-rent' ?99 
Consider the development of a new oil field. Upfront investment in 
infrastructure and fixed capital are considerable. Consider now a licensing 
dispute for the same field. (The licensee falling afoul with local authorities for 
instance). Having already committed resources the investor will want to 
recoup his losses in case of abandonment of the project or resolve the dispute. 
In the first case a second investor can offer to buy-out the original investor for 
a price substantially below the invested value. Knowing that the already 
297 '[O]pportunism [] is a deep condition of self-interest seeking that contemplates guile'. 
(Williamson (1991), op cif. p. 92). 
298 Williamson (1990 [1979]), op cif., p. 224. 
299 Klein ef aI., op cif., p. 298. 
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committed resources cannot easily be converted to other uses and that the 
licensing dispute serves as a deterrent to other potential buyers the investor 
may be forced to sell his investment for less than he paid for it. The difference 
between the original investment and sell-out price constitutes an 'appropriable 
quasi-rent'. In this case the second investor extracts the 'appropriable quasi-
rent'. In the second case the licensing authorities may be willing to resolve 
the dispute in return for a bribe. Knowing that the investor stands to lose a 
considerable sum of money if he has to sell-out the licensing authorities can 
agree to resolve the licensing dispute for part of the differential between the 
original investment and the potential sell-out price. In this case the licensing 
authorities extracts the 'appropriable quasi-rent'. The probability of either 
case occurring will strongly affect the original investor's decision to commit 
any resources in the first place. 
Further, TeE examines the 'comparative cost of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures' .300 
Governance structures are the formal and informal arrangements that facilitate 
transactions, 'induce conflict resolution, and is embedded in transaction 
patterns' .301 Inherent in the approach is that the integration oftransactions can 
lead to a reduction in monitoring costs, by economising on the mentioned 
behavioural traits. Such costs, however, will be the function of level of 
uncertainty, and size of the organisation. This implies that there is a point 
where the marginal benefit of increased integration will be less than the 
marginal cost of monitoring the organisation. 
Using this approach allows one to analyse the reorganisation of the Russian oil 
industry through the conceptual approach of path dependency and institutional 
competition. If institutions develop to reduce uncertainty and organisations 
affect the institutional matrix and try to maximise on the constraints and 
possibilities posed by such, then persistent uncertainty can signal several 
phenomenon. Firstly, the organisational structure does not maximise 
economic objectives. Secondly, there is a conflict between institutions and the 
300 Williamson (1985), p. 2. 
301 Kochevrin et al., op cit. p. 374. 
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organisational structure does not manage to create a synergy. Thirdly, actors 
in the economy have not yet managed to capitalise on the given institutional 
and organisational structure. Or, finally, uncertainty and high transaction 
costs generate a "strategic space" that allows for the prevalence of a specific 
structure of state power (which in itself may be a goal). 
From a Russian point of view the late 1980s and the transition period can be 
viewed as period in which the authority of the central organising authority was 
weakened thus, in the light of a situation where property rights had been 
poorly defined, unleashing the full strength of opportunist behaviour.302 In 
addition to the breakdown of the previous structure, there is an added element 
of uncertainty introduced by the attempted realignment to a different economic 
structure. Taken together this has increased the cost of transacting in the post-
Soviet setting. 
Transacting has three dimensions in TeE (1) frequency, (2) subjection to· 
type and degree of uncertainty, and (3) condition of asset specificity.303 
Frequency refers to whether transactions are of a reoccurring type while being 
of an idiosyncratic nature. With respect to the Russian oil industry the 
frequency dimension has already been incorporated into the operational 
structure through the creation of vertically integrated oil companies. This 
reflects both the need for greater co-operation between upstream and 
downstream activities for efficiency purposes, and the danger of 'hostage 
taking' in asset specific industries. The first point refers to the standardisation 
of transactions which can be more efficiently organised in-house than across 
non-existing markets. The second point refers to the legacy of Soviet 
industrial organisation. With an expected drop in industrial output as a result 
of the transition, several entities of the Russian upstream sector could have 
been exposed to hostage taking through the existence of de facto monopsony 
power by the down-stream sector, (i.e. the oversupply of oil could have left the 
downstream sector with undue market power (and vice versa), affecting 
macro-political and economic goals. 
302 Solnick, op cif., pp. 33-38. 
303 Williamson (1990 [1979]), op cif., p. 239. 
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Institutional uncertainty will be greater if organisational reform cannot create a 
synergy between Soviet institutions and market type institutions. The degree 
of uncertainty in the post-Soviet oil industry will be a function of both type of 
uncertainty and government ownership. If one assumes that government 
owned oil industry actors are more likely to have a political as well as an 
economic function, then less government ownership should theoretically 
imply greater emphasis on economic retums.304 Further, if asset value is 
influenced by numbers of agencies that affect the flow of income,305 then we 
can expect less government ownership and control to attract greater foreign 
investment and higher asset (stock market) valuation. Ownership, however, is 
not the only variable in this case, as the general legislative framework and 
protection of investments plays a vital role in the resultant expected outcomes. 
Asset specificity means that capital employed in the production phase is 
specialised to a particular procedure, or that assets once installed or acquired 
(sunk costs) cannot be removed without considerable cost and the value of its 
second best use is substantially less then its first best use.306 In the oil industry 
this condition applies to production capital and to infrastructure,307 production 
fields and processing equipment.308 Common to these assets is that there is a 
threat of hostage taking in order to extract a 'quasi-rent'. Asset specific 
investments will further constitute investments such as obtaining licences 
(drilling, exploration, construction or export) and special up-front payments. 
Although licences do not need to be owner or site specific, the transfer of 
ownership right or alteration of site is often difficult. The initial investment 
for such licences are therefore hard to recoup if needed to transfer or the 
304 Jensen & Meckling have analysed the agency cost stemming from a divergence between 
the interest of management and owners. (Jensen & Meckling, op cit.) Given the Soviet 
contestation of property rights it must be assumed that state ownership in the post-Soviet 
setting would decrease the return on investment from oil assets. 
305 North (1990), op cit., p. 31. 
306 'Asset specificity has reference to the degree which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of the productive value'. 
(Williamson (1991), op cit., p. 95). 
307 Bohn & Deacon, op cit., p. 531. 
308 Klein et ai., op cit., pp. 310-311. 
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operational environment alters. Where the 'rule of law' is a firmly established 
institution, venues exist that allow for ex-post arbitration or settlement; 
frequently such provisions are also made in the original contract.309 However, 
in Russia this is not yet the case. If one assumes the correctness of Hedlund's 
observation, then we can expect idiosyncratic exchange relations that are 
based on personal trust to survive greater stress and adaptability than 
idiosyncratic exchange relations that do not,310 particularly so under 
circumstances of high transaction costs. 
Integration of Transactions. 
Market failures are never absent, and certainly not in societies that have had 
little experience with markets.311 In the post-Soviet economy this has 
particular significance. The existence of market failure is in itself an argument 
for government intervention, however, governments as organisations and as 
individuals are also prone to misallocating resources by sacrificing economic. 
growth for political ends. This was particularly so in the Soviet economy, 
where government policy (from a market economy view) in itself resulted in 
the misallocation of resources. 
TeE operates with two definitions of organisational integration. The first is 
the straightforward combination of transactions that were formerly organised 
by two or more independent units of operations into one.312 The second 
relates both to control over assets and control over actions. It holds that 
organisational integration is the 'purchase of the assets of a supplier (or of a 
309 Not withstanding that monitoring or ex-post arbitration may be too costly or difficult to 
satisfy the parties to a contract. 
310 Williamson (1990 [1979]), op cit., pp. 240-241. The situation will be different for non-
idiosyncratic exchange relationships since the quasi-rent appropriable under such 
circumstances will be low or non- existent. This is because under these circumstances either 
party to the exchange can return to the market and find the same good or service at a price 
identical to the initial contract. (Alternatively there will be additional buyers). 
311 I am using, in this context, Hayami's definition of market failure as the 'divergence of 
market equilibrium from the point of Marshallian net utility or Pareto optimality'. Maximum 
societal utility in a free competitive market is therefore, represented by the demand-supply 
equilibrium, and no transaction can be undertaken that will not reduce the welfare of others. 
(Hayami, op cit., p. 201). Textbook types of market failure are: asymmetric information and 
uncertainty, poorly defined property rights, externalities, monopoly power, and public goods. 
312 Coase, op cit., pp. 397-8. 
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purchaser) for the purpose of acquiring the residual rights of control'. 313 This 
definition sees organisational integration as a process of incomplete 
contracting which bestows all residual control and rights to action not 
specified in the contract to one of the parties. 
If one accepts the proposition that the purpose of organisation is to minimise 
the cost of transacting, then an organisational structure that integrates all 
transactions which are more effectively performed in-house then across 
markets can be used as a model of comparison. By their very nature some 
transaction costs are difficult to measure, i.e. the cost of obtaining licences and 
protecting investments in an environment that has no functioning normative 
framework for the regulation of such transactions. Thus measurement of this 
variable cannot so much be a quantitative exercise. Rather, the mode of 
organising particular transactions must be seen as an expression of the implicit 
cost of any such transaction. This implies that if transactions are not clearly 
defined and functioning according to law or regulation, integration of 
transactions are likely to have either a lower or equal cost to the equivalent 
market transaction. 
This is a very wide definition of integration in that it theoretically may 
incorporate both public and private spheres of responsibility. However, given 
the circumstance that Russia is experiencing such a broad definition is 
justified due to the poorly defined and functioning market institutional 
arrangements and the Soviet institutional legacy. If one accepts the 
proposition that institutions only change incrementally and that human 
behaviour is affected by history (habitus), then in an attempted separation of a 
formerly unified structure of operations such institutions are likely to remain 
operative in both spheres. As the state and the economy develop there will in 
the foreseeable future be a continued overlap of these spheres. 
Further, if in an immature market economy and poorly defined legislative 
framework it pays to devote resources to affect the 'rules of the game', then by 
313 Grossman & Hart, 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration', Journal o/Political Economy, 1986, vol. 94, no. 4, p. 716. 
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implication we can expect a high degree of non-market transaction taking 
place between the public and the private sphere.314 Given its institutional and 
organisational history the Russian economy has a well-developed structure of 
such non-market exchange. Such a broad definition of integration therefore, 
incorporates the fact that much economic activity in Russia will remain 
politically influenced and motivated, especially so in the reorganisation period 
but also later. Such integration will be noticeable through a high degree of 
state capture. 
Integration will be used in two different contexts. Vertical and horizontal 
(organisational) integration will refer to organisational structures, while 
integration will refer to a process of conducting transactions outside a 
transparent market. Such markets can be either political or economic. The 
former case implies formal and informal ties between government or state 
bureaucratic representatives with private or corporatised organisations as a 
means of expediting and protecting transactions. The latter case implies· 
transactions taking place not across impartial and competitive factor markets, 
but relying on former modes of economic exchange, such as barter and arrears, 
through direct contact. 
Vertical Integration. 
Coase's argument that firms integrate or trade via markets according to which 
structure exhibits the least cost of transaction, has had great influence on TCE 
where firms (hierarchy), markets and hybrid modes are seen as alternative 
forms of govemance.315 In this respect a productive organisation is seen as a 
governance structure that aims to minimise the total cost of production. 316 
314 North (1990), op cif., p. 87. Also North, (ibid, p. 79) argues that 'Organisations with 
sufficient bargaining strength will use the polity to achieve objectives when the payoff from 
maximising in that direction exceeds the pay of from investing within the existing constraints'. 
315 Williamson (1991), op cit., p. 96. 
316 The production function in this respect consists of the usual physical and human capital 
inputs plus the cost of transaction. The latter is important in optimising the governance 
structure. Transaction cost economics further argues that '[V]iewing the firm as a production 
function is seriously delimiting. It encourages the view that technology is determinative of 
economic organisation, whence the allocation of economic activity as between firm and 
market is unproblematic'. Williamson, Industrial Organization, Edward Edgar Publishing 
Limited, 1990, p. x. 
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The level of transaction costs will have an organisational impact on the post-
Soviet Russian oil industry. An organisational structure should be achieved 
that ensures separation of the political and the economic spheres, yet integrates 
the various stages of upstream and downstream operations into a number of 
vertically integrated companies. Such a structure should be desirable both for 
a political purpose as well as an economic purpose. 
Politically, vertically integrated companies could be large enough, by 
international comparison, to ensure that they are not being "lost" to foreign 
investors. Further, keeping the oil industry in Russian hands would facilitate 
public control over this sector, which again would contribute to satisfy 
political and security concerns. 
Economically, vertical integration promises greater control and co-ordination 
between the various stages of up and down stream activities, particularly so in' 
Russia where economic institutions of the Western type are new and largely 
unknown. Under these circumstances vertical integration can reduce 
uncertainty, the scope for rent seeking and promote efficiency. 
Although uncertainty prevails in the Russian oil industry, vertical integration 
should not be seen as a quick fix for correcting the dysfunctions of the Soviet 
oil industry. Theoretically the Russian oil industry could have been organised 
into a giant monopoly (combining several of the former Soviet ministries in a 
vertically integrated structure). However, the challenge of reforming the oil 
industry does not only lie in creating a more co-ordinated structure. It also lies 
in changing the economic structure from one of administrative planning to one 
of market competition, such that the emphasis on economic criteria will 
improve the efficiency and long-term social benefits of this industry. Given 
the historic institutional matrix it is unlikely that the dysfunctions described in 
the Soviet oil industry would be remedied by creating such a vast structure. In 
order to encourage institutional competition a number of independent 
companies of different sizes and specialisation are needed to facilitate 
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competition between different business approaches and to encourage cost 
savmgs. 
With regards to situations where uncertainty due to opportunism prevails and 
there is only the possibility of a limited number of participants to an exchange, 
vertical integration enjoys several advantages over the market: '[T]he parties 
to an internal exchange are less able to appropriate subgroup gains, [], as a 
result of opportunistic representations; internal organisation can be more 
effectively audited; and internal organisation realises advantages in [] dispute 
settling respects' .317 Bearing in mind diminishing returns on organisational 
integration, vertical integration may, in conditions of high transaction costs, 
reduce monitoring and enforcement costs and protect investments. 
Organisational Reform. 
Having argued that the interaction between organisations and institutions are 
the basis for structural development, the question arises what organisational 
reform will look like? If organisational reform can reduce transaction costs 
associated with the implementation of state power then we can expect a 
number of results. 
Firstly, organisational change will be a result of and reflect the institutional 
framework. However, such a framework is not necessarily designed to 
promote economic efficiency, hence the organisational changes will not 
necessarily be devised to promote economic efficiency. 
Secondly, organisational reform and economic behaviour will reflect the forms 
of communication and investment that give the higher return. This relates to 
both formal and informal economic behaviour. In the case of the oil industry, 
if organisational and institutional arrangements improve, in favour of the 
balance between short-term and long-term economic efficiency, then we 
would expect increased investment in exploration drilling and/or reserve 
acquisitions. If institutional arrangements like property rights and regulation 
317 Williamson (1975), op cit., p. 29. 
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on the use of the subsoil were improved we would expect both increased 
investment and a greater inflow of foreign capital (equity or aid).318 
In the absence of institutional reform with continued uncertainty we would 
expect the following; a) falling production if unclear property rights and 
unaltered structure of state power, and; b) rapid draining of reserves and 
continued short-term strategies if property rights are settled, but structure of 
state power remains unchanged. This is because distrust of the state and the 
state's unaccountability will increase transaction costs and therefore not be 
conducive to investment. 
A clearer separation of the public from the private sphere would lead one to 
expect a reduction in the number and responsibilities of government agencies 
involved in the regulation of the oil industry. If reforms in the post-Soviet era 
are aimed at structural change, reforms should aim at separating the political 
sphere from the economic sphere in order to establish clearer lines of 
responsibility, authority and accountability. This might reduce uncertainty 
and possibly lead to long-term economic growth. The essence of such reform 
should be to reduce the cost of transaction. The higher the cost of monitoring 
contracts, protecting property, and uncertainty, the higher will be the cost of 
operating in such a market. On a domestic basis this implies that transactions 
- trade, investment, etc. - will be smaller than they could be, and on an 
international basis it means that non-Russian governments, firms and 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) will allocate capital to areas of 
comparatively lower cost. Levels of employment, production, investments, 
types of drilling (and the ratios between these), reserve additions, modes of 
organisation, and government control will tell us something about the 
direction of the development of post-Soviet Russia. 
The considerations mentioned so far have to a great extent been conditions 
that are open to manipulation and influence from a Russian point of view. 
However, as the Russian economy becomes increasingly tied in with the 
318 Research on investment in capital-intensive industry show that resources may remain 
unexplored if ownership of such is insecure or contested. (80hn & Deacon, op cit., p. 532). 
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global economy, it is clear that external considerations will have a greater 
effect than in the Soviet past. Of particular importance are the price of oil and 
the economic conjunctures of the global economy, and geopolitical stability, 
variables that that Russians only partly can influence. Further, there are 
geological conditions and well characteristics that are beyond influence 
(though not without solution). Clearly these considerations will in addition to 
the above mentioned have important effects on both the institutional and 
organisational structures. However, the structure of the Russian oil industry 
can be either more or less suited to meet these external challenges. 
Soviet Legacy and the Challenge of Reform. 
The organisational and administrative structure of implementing state power 
and the mobilisation of resources in the Soviet Union were related to 
transaction costs associated with ensuring the "efficiency" of the structure and 
the mode of state power. Agency cost related to economic behaviour were. 
again a function of the principal-agent considerations stemming from an 
intricate incentive structure. The contesting of property rights and a tendency 
for rule evasion were informal responses to the formal incentive structure and 
transaction costs arising from a weak infrastructural power base and an 
ideologically based distribution of rights. Despotic implementation of state 
power was not conducive to the formation of a normative rule based society. 
This again strengthened patrimonial structures of state power as a formalised 
bureaucracy failed to develop in the absence of "law based" society. 
Assuming that human beings are "economic men", then the evolution of 
societies and economies can be manipulated. However, transaction costs 
during transition will be inversely related to the institutional equilibrium. 
Thus unless there is, at least in part, harmony between the formal and informal 
incentive structure spiralling transaction costs will contribute to a drastic 
reduction of value creation and potential rent. Any transition will experience 
great uncertainty as individuals strive to adjust to "new ways of behaviour" 
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while still under the influence of the "old framework".319 Such a situation 
must necessarily give rise to uncertainty and confusion. As transformation 
proceeds individuals will find different ways of adapting each based on their 
former experience. Depending on individuals' background, concepts such as 
markets, competition, democracy, property rights, contracts, and rule of law 
will invariably have different meanings and contribute to greater 
uncertainty. 320 
Regardless of the individual's understanding of these concepts there is an 
important added dimension of individuals motivation, manifesting itself at a 
more aggregate level, i.e. in the centre-region conflict, and in a more 
philosophical dimension, the role of the state and the distribution of rights and 
obligations. This latter implies culturally based perceptions of who has a right 
to what, for example the notion of collective property in government 
enterprises.32I The discrepancy between historic institutions and attempted (or 
necessary) market institutions will result in an institutional deficit at the 
individual level. The sum of such institutional deficits will have a great 
impact on the transition period - i.e. in the elaboration and implementation of 
a legislative framework, the privatisation process, and the investment climate. 
From a structural point of view the lack of appreciation for necessary reforms 
and the struggle to define reforms that are being initiated exemplify this. On 
319 According to Interviewee # 6, 'For 70 years we lived under Soviet power, I have lived all 
my life under this regime. Is it possible to change myself within 2 or 5 years? No it isn't. 1 
was brought up in the Soviet era and I was proud of being a Soviet citizen. Now they say new 
Russians, I am not a conservative, but I don't respect people who left Russia, I understand 
well that some people left Russia, but I cannot respect this person - he's not a patriot. Maybe 
I am not right, but this is my opinion and there are many of us'. 
320 Diskin argues that '[in 1992] we practically did not realize that the desired changes in the 
foundations of economic life were related to cardinal changes in the life models of practically 
each family ... broad masses of people still had ideas about the immutability of paternalistic 
obligations of the state which was called upon to guarantee acceptable social conditions of life 
to everyone'. (Diskin, op cit., p. 35). 
321 Yavlinsky argues that the rejection of the communist ideology did not necessarily imply a 
de facto acceptance of the market ideology. (Yavlinsky, Reforms from below: Russia's 
future, EPIcenter, 1994, p. 31). On the public's perception of the transition period, and 
particularly the privatisation programme, see White, who reports that the majority of people in 
a survey were sceptical towards the privatisation process, thinking it would lead to increased 
prices and unemployment - phenomena that the Soviet citizen had been accustomed to live 
without. (White, Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 128). 
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one hand the Russian government and presidency is eager to accommodate the 
new institutional paradigm (at least rethorically), on the other hand, the quality 
of reforms initiated often reflects the continued reliance on a despotic-
patrimonial structure of state power and policy implementation. Both the 
1992 'Law on Underground Mineral Resources' (hereafter Subsoil Law) and 
the 1995 'Law on Production Sharing' (hereafter PSA Law) were intended to 
clarify ownership rights and promote a better investment climate. Both laws 
were seen as imperative for the attraction of substantial foreign investment. 
Although taking steps towards achieving these ends, they failed to adequately 
specify ownership right to the subsoil (i.e. division of the claim between 
federal, regional and local authorities) and of the ownership of production. 
These factors will be examined in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7 suffice 
here to say that besides the influence of the centrifugal/centripetal forces in 
Russian politics there also is a deeper post-Soviet ideological conflict that has 
its roots in Soviet institutions. Specifically this conflict comes to the fore in a) 
the conflicting views of what should be the role of the state and what type of 
state power; and b) who should own what. 322 
On a behavioural level the practices of barter as a means of exchange of goods 
demonstrate both unwillingness and unfamiliarity with a monetary and credit 
economy, and a continuation of past practices regulating the flow of goods.323 
Both examples demonstrate the conflict between the institutional legacy of the 
USSR and the institutions necessary for a market economy, and how the 
collective institutional deficit affects both the formal structure and individual 
behaviour. 
322 Bames argues that the question of property represented the most fundamental political and 
economic issue during the 1990s. (Bames, 'Property, Power, and the Presidency: Ownership 
Policy Reform and Russian Executive-Legislative Relations \990-1999', Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, 2001, vol. 34, p. 40). 
323 Treisman argues that the barter, tax and payment arrears economy involving the energy 
sectors constitutes a hidden subsidising of remaining Russian industry and agriculture. As has 
been argued previously the energy industries were a means by which to achieve economic 
growth and industrialisation through access to cheap energy. (See Treisman, 'Inter-Enterprise 
Arrears and Barter in the Russian Economy', Post-Soviet Affairs, 2000, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 225-
256). Barter, tax and payment arrears can therefore be interpreted as a continuation -
although on a more informal basis - of previous energy policies. On this issue see also 
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The idea of reforming organisations is often based on the perception that 
leaders, owners or constituencies of organisations can affect the development 
and nature of an organisation through free and rational choice. Even in such 
cases where the lack of the latter seems to be the cause of a need for reform. 
However, Brunnsson and Olsen argue that 'the origins, contents and effects of 
reform can be explained by other factors than leaders' rational choice'. In 
their study of reforms of public administration in the Scandinavian countries 
they identify institutional factors as affecting behaviour and the 
institutionalisation of organisations (when the behaviour of organisations is 
determined by 'culturally conditioned rules [] which give meaning to those 
actions '). 324 Further they argue that '[ c ]omprehensive reforms in public 
administration are likely to succeed only if there are significant inefficiencies 
in the historical development of those organizations; that is, if the authority 
and power exercised by policymakers deviate markedly from the levels they 
would have held in a state of equilibrium' .325 
With regards to reform design and implementation this has considerable 
consequences. It reinforces the argument of this thesis in that evolution of 
transition will be a result of interplay between institutional and organisational 
factors. It also means that organisational developments can expose the 
motivation behind such changes that have occurred (or not occurred), by 
allowing an evaluation of the process of transition against the historic structure 
of the oil industry. The analysis of past organisations and institutions and the 
state power equilibrium they aimed to achieve will therefore enable the 
determination in which direction transition is heading. Will it create a new 
state power equilibrium or will it try to recreate the old state power 
equilibrium? 
Yavlinsky, who argues that inter-industry debt represents 'an inclination to hold on to old 
structures [of transacting), and not a shift towards new ones'. (Yavlinsky, op cif., p. 31). 
324 Brunsson & Olsen, op cif., pp. vii -7. 
325 Ibid., p. 25. 
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In the following chapters this analysis will examine the designs envisaged for 
the Russian oil industry, and measure them against the developments of the 
1990s and against the institutional and organisational legacy of the Soviet 
Union. To evaluate if the 1990s have been yet another round on the 'treadmill 
of reform' or if there has been a significant change towards a different path of 
evolution. The challenge of reform is therefore a challenge that permeates all 
levels of the institutional matrix. Unless adjustments are implemented at all 
levels the likelihood of an institutional reversal is at least plausible. 
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Part 11 
Post-Soviet Organisational and Institutional 
Transformation. 
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Chapter 6 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
- Strategies and advice for Russian Oil. 
'Rapid stabilization of the overall economy is 
unlikely to occur unless macroeconomic 
reforms are paralleled by energy sector reform 
and recovery'. 
'Wo h' h'l b ... I' 326 It m energy, t e 01 su sector IS cntlca . 
World Bank 
'The Power and might of economic progress 
must be synchronized with the enormous 
political changes. Then we will be 
unstoppable' .327 
Boris Yeltsin 
The evolution and development of the Soviet oil industry, as has been shown 
in the preceding chapters, was constrained by the reliance of the Soviet regime 
on a despotic-patrimonial type of state power, and its failure to develop 
autonomous infrastructural capacity. As shown in Chapter 3 and 4 political 
considerations outweighed economic considerations during the development 
and expansion of the Soviet economic system. This created a very specific 
incentive structure that came to be the chief factor affecting formal and 
informal economic institutions. Several attempts at reforming the oil industry 
(along with the economy at large) did not manage to alter substantially the 
way in which the system worked. 
The focus of these reforms shifted back and forth between a functional and 
territorial strategy, with a gradual convergence of the two in order to minimise 
transaction costs related to the implementation of state power. There was a 
discernible trend towards fragmentation of the system on one hand and partial 
vertical integration on the other. The former was represented through 
specialisation of the organisational structure in the form of separate ministries, 
while the latter was evident in the increasing administrative integration of the 
lower (operative) parts of the system - the creation of regional production 
associations. 
326 WB (1994), op cif., p. I. 
327 Yeltsin, op cit., p. 146. 
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Constraints on the formation of Russian oil policy. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union (1989-1991) the oil industry became 
entangled in the struggle for sovereignty between the political entities of the 
Soviet Union and the economic and organisational effects of the crumbling 
administrative system. Both these forces for change affected the subsequent 
development of the oil sector in that they introduced institutional elements that 
differed from the Soviet system. As such their presence represented the basis 
for institutional competition and evolution as opposed to Soviet inertia. In 
November 1991 the government of the RSFSR seized control over the export 
and transport of oil and oil products beyond the borders of the republic for the 
purpose of implementation of economic sovereignty. 328 The control of energy 
supplies was regarded as a crucial element for the 'stabilisation of the 
economy of the RSFSR and protection of the internal market of the republic in 
the autumn-winter period of 1991192'. The supply of oil products to the 
domestic market - petrol, diesel and mazut for heating - has been an important 
factor in obtaining social stability. Sovereignty in this respect implied a 
detachment from reliance on the all-union structure, a strategy that later was to 
be replicated by several of the constituent entities within the Russian 
Federation itself. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia entered another round of 
political and economic reform. The task for the new regime was no small one. 
'Survival meant coping with economic collapse and developing social support; 
coping with economic collapse and developing social support required 
building effective administration; building effective administration meant 
taking some of the resources under the control of former elites and using them 
to build up the Russian state into a machine that could support the market and 
cope with the diversity of a society stratified by the market and expressed 
through democracy' .329 
328 RSFSR Government Decision NQ 7 (15.11.1991), '0 regulirovanii postavok nefti i 
produktov ee pererabotki za predely RSFSR' [On the regulation of supplies of oil and refined 
oil products beyond the border of the RSFSR], http://www.referent.ru .. 
329 Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty, RoutJedge, 2002, p. 64. 
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In short, where the USSR had failed, the new Russia had to succeed - to build 
a modem state, expressed through a higher degree of state autonomy and 
infrastructural power. In doing this, the new state had far less resources 
available than the preceding regime had had. Whereas the Soviet Union had at 
its disposal a vast reserve of manpower and the mobilising capacity of the 
Communist Party, the new Russia did not. In the long term this can still prove 
a blessing (the new Russia may still develop a more efficient economy due to 
the lack of the options that both the Tsarist and Soviet economy had), yet in 
the short term this dramatically reduced the development options of the state. 
In fact with industrial output and social living standards declining and bailout 
by the international community unlikely, Russia had few opportunities to raise 
the necessary resources to see the task through. Much hope was therefore 
pinned on the ability of a few raw-material sectors to deliver the vital means. 
One of these sectors was the oil industry. 
However, the oil industry itself was in a difficult situation. The gradual 
disintegration of the All-Union structure further aggravated the poor 
technological and capital situation along with the constraints of geographically 
and geophysically complex conditions. Thus the industry was in dire need of 
investment and access to capital. As with the individual industries, the 
disintegration of the Union affected the role and position of the regions, which 
now increasingly became dependent on generating their own revenues. 
The energy concept developed by the government of the Russian Federation in 
the fall of 1992 clearly reflects the magnitude of the reform task and its 
reliance on the energy industries to deliver.33o It tried to combine the demands 
of the three principal actors in the post-Soviet period: the state, the regions and 
industry. 
330 RF Government Decision N!! 26 (10.09.1992), 'Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi politiki rossii 
v novykh ekonomicheskikh usloviyakh' [Russian energy political concepts under new 
economic conditions], reprinted in RF Energy Ministry, Energeticheskaya politika Rossii na 
rubezhe vekov [Russian energy policy at the turn of the century], 200 I, vol. I pp. 5-67. All 
references in the following section to the Energy Concept are to this document unless 
otherwise stated. 
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Exogenous factors and foreign advice. 
An important factor in the understanding of economic development and path 
dependency in this thesis is dedicated to the ability of agents within an 
economic framework to internalise exogenously induced institutions. The 
understanding being that exogenously induced institutions have a greater 
propensity to fail than domestic or endogenously based institutions do. 
The relevant exogenous factors with respect to the oil industry can be divided 
into two categories. Firstly the overall macro economic climate that the 
industry operated in. Secondly, specific industry related advice and 
assistance. Although somewhat different in form from the first category the 
advice given related to this second category nonetheless functioned to 
reinforce the former. Whereas the former category clearly broke with Soviet 
and Russian traditions, the latter advice was, from a Soviet institutional 
viewpoint, more familiar. 
The first category of advice was the "Washington Consensus". Russia's 
economic crisis was seen chiefly as a fiscal crisis.331 A strict monetary policy 
was to ensure low levels of inflation once the monetary overhang had been 
eliminated by a one-time jump in prices, so that price liberalisation would not 
lead to continuously high levels of inflation.332 This course of reform was the 
mainstay of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank's (WB) 
advice in the early 1990s.333 Financial assistance under the auspices of these 
organisations was tied to compliance with IFI developed programmes. In the 
period 1990-1992 Russia's negative balance-of-payments development was 
regarded as the greatest threat to reversing its falling production.334 The 
negative trend in balance-of-payments accounts was largely due to rapidly 
falling energy exports. Thus a programme was developed in order to prevent 
331 Sachs, 'Western financial assistance and Russia's reforms', in Islam & Mandelbaum, 
'Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states', 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 160. 
332 Hernandes-Cata, Russia and the IMF: The Political Economy of Macro-Stabilization, IMF 
Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment, 1994, PPAA/94/20, pp. 3-4. 
333 Collectively these organisations, along with other international financial organisations will 
be referred to as international financial institutions (IFls). 
334 Sachs (1993), op cit., p. 164. 
159 -
decline in production due to the absence of means to finance inputs and 
improve the foreign currency reserves.335 
Macro economic stabilisation implied fiscal consolidation and a strict 
monetary policy. The two being complementary in that fiscal consolidation 
would reduce the government spending and subsidisation of the economy, this 
would impose "hard budget" constraints on enterprises and remove the need 
for inflation driving government borrowing or the printing of credits.336 
Similarly, privatisation would reduce government spending and induce "hard 
budget" constraints.337 In a transition period a number of holding companies, 
at various levels of authority, were to hold state owned shares.338 
Improvements in state revenues were furthermore necessary for fiscal 
adjustment to be successfu1.339 
In 1990 'nothing [was] more important' than price liberalisation for a 
'successful transition to a market economy' in order to 'guide the allocation of 
resources' .340 However, in a transition period the IFls accepted a need for 
direct state intervention in the pricing of public utilities and housing, while 
border taxes (for 2-3 years) should be used to drive a wedge between domestic 
and international energy prices.341 In terms of Soviet economic institutions the 
freeing of energy prices implied a massive break with the entire system of 
revenue and rent collection. While as the IFIs advocated higher energy prices 
to increase government revenues, low energy prices had been a backbone of 
Soviet rent collection. 
335 In a scathing critique of this policy former Minister of the oil industry USSR, Mal'tsev, 
blamed the subsequent decline of oil support industries and unemployment in this sector on 
these policies. According to Mal'tsev 80% of credits set aside for equipment upgrade and 
Eurchase remained in the USA. (Mal'tsev et ai, op cit., pp. 299-300). 
36 Sachs, 'Stabilization issues facing economies in transition', in Woo, Parker & Sachs (ed.), 
'Economies in transition: comparing Asia and Eastern Europe', MIT Press, 1997, pp. 245-46 
&249. 
337 Sachs (1997), op cit., p. 247. The World Bank, 'Russian economic reform: crossing the 
threshold of structural change', WB, 1992, p. xv-xxv. 
338 IWOE, 'The economy of the USSR - summary and recommendation', The World Bank, 
1990, p. 27. 
339 WB (1992), op cit., p. xix. 
340 IWOE (1990), op cit., p. 24. 
341 IWOE (1990), ibid., p. 25. WB (1992), op cit., p. 180. 
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The second category of advice was closely tied to the first. Energy exports 
were seen as key to reverse trends in both the balance-of-payments accounts 
and currency reserves?42 Once again immediate fiscal considerations replaced 
plans for reforms in the oil industry. The IFIs advocated the development of 
comprehensive petroleum legislation (by the end of 1992), the clarification of 
property relations, commercialisation and restructuring of enterprises, reform 
of petroleum taxation and the introduction of world prices for energy.343 The 
WB concluded that 'an acceptable macro-stabilization package for 1992-93 
cannot be constructed without early implementation of the recommended 
energy policy reforms' .344 What was regarded as the result of the reform 
package was to stabilise oil production, make the economy more energy 
efficient thus freeing up energy resources for export, and effect a further 
replacement of oil by gas in domestic consumption which again would result 
in more exports. 
Non implementation of the energy recommendations would have severe· 
implications for balance-of-payments and currency reserves, both of which 
would jeopardise macro-economic stabilisation. The key word here was 
exports, or stated in a different way -'- government revenue. The IFI's advice 
was based on considerable foreign investment to alleviate the scarcity of 
domestic resources. To compensate for such investment, foreign companies 
were to be given access to prime fields and attractive resources on an equal 
footing with domestic companies. 
In one of history's ironies the IFIs' advice perpetuated the dilemma that 
successive Soviet leaderships had confronted. How to reform the economy 
without forfeiting revenues? The Soviet answer was "temporarily" to forego 
energy reforms. The fundamental flaw in the IFIs' approach lay in its lack of 
appreciation for the institutions by which rent and revenues were collected in 
the Soviet economy and the relationship between income circulation and the 
structure of state power. Put bluntly, what the IFIs were saying was: 'You 
342 IWOE (1990), op cif., p. 30. 
343 WB (1992), op cit., Chapter 11. 
344 Ibid., p. 186. 
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need to reform the economy and the relationships of economic interaction, in 
the mean time you also need revenues ... where will these revenues come 
from? From the energy industries!' This perpetuated the Soviet dilemma of 
short-term versus long-term objectives. The WB stated that any improvement 
in the system of prices and taxes 'must provide an immediate increase in 
government tax revenue' .345 
IFI financial assistance to the oil industry was tailored to promote the supply-
side objectives of the reform package. Two 'Oil Rehabilitation Loans', under 
the auspice of the World Bank, have been implemented. The 'First Oil 
Rehabilitation Loan' (1993) was designed to contribute to improve drilling 
and production practices along with replacement of leaking oil pipelines346. 
The 'Second Oil Rehabilitation Loan' (1994) was to contribute to the 
rehabilitation of idle wells; reconstruction of field infrastructure; in-fill 
drilling; technical assistance and field optimisation; and equipment and 
services.347 The rationale for these projects was that by slowing the rate of 
production decline and the transfer of international technical and managerial 
expertise one could expect positive impacts on oil production, the fiscal deficit 
and foreign exchange earnings.348 
This thesis does not disagree with the projects or the reform recommendations 
per se, but rather the idea that they would have been sufficient to alter the 
Russian economic development path. Out of a total project cost of $587 
million $450 million were intended for well restoration and in-fill drilling.349 
Revenue considerations were at the front, whi~h did little to de-politicise the 
sector. Without such de-politicisation reforming property relationships and 
the structure of rent extraction would become difficult. Although the capital 
made available to the Russian oil industry from the IFIs was far less than the 
sectors needs it nonetheless sent the wrong signal. 350 The importance attached 
345 Ibid., p. 188. 
346 WB (1994), op cif., p. 19. 
347 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
348 Ibid., p. ii. 
349 Ibid., p. 32. 
350 According to Konoplyanik, the oil industry's (production and refining) external financing 
needs (1992-1997) amounted to US$ 30 billion. (Konoplyanik, 'Russia's Oil Industry and 
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to reversing the decline in oil production, even at the expense of sectoral 
reform, could only serve to strengthen the bargaining position of the oil 
industry managers. 
At the heart of the IFI package lay the idea of an economy that had a strong 
infrastructural system of state power with a considerable degree of state 
autonomy. Russia on the other hand has over the centuries developed a 
structure of state power based on a despotic-patrimonial system, with a 
considerable degree of state capture. The IFI package assumed that this 
institutional gap could be bridged in a short period of time. 
By contrast, a strategy developed for the Rosneftegaz Corporation in 1992 by 
two western advisors - Bankers Trust and Daiwa Europe - analysed necessary 
reform measures from an industry perspective. The analysis concentrated on 
two major areas.351 Firstly, investment policy: legislation, taxation, 
contractual arrangements and pricing. Secondly, industry structure: private. 
ownership, market structures, and demarcation of responsibilities. It deviated 
from the 'Washington Consensus' in important questions. The report 
concluded that state ownership can coexist with price liberalisation, and that 
the oil industry is not dependent on foreign investment.352 The report tied the 
restructuring process of the industry in with the struggle for "sovereignty over 
hydrocarbons and the distribution of political and economic power among the 
claimants".353 Two triangular struggles, politicians-bureaucrats-oilmen and 
centre-regions-Iocal entities defined the claimants. The outcome of these 
struggles was regarded as having a profound affect on the commitment to 
reform. 
Foreign Investments: Legal Aspects and the Problem of Business Risk', Journal of Energy 
and Natural Resources Law, 1993, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 251). 
351 Bankers Trust & Daiwa Europe, 'Blueprintfor Reform: New Policies and Structures for the 
Russian Oi/lndustry, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1993, p. 7. 
352 Ibid., p. 11. 
353 Ibid., p. 12. 
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In brief, the first area of advice commits the same error as the IFI's - assuming 
that the institutional gap between a despotic-patrimonial structure of state 
power and an infrastructural structure of state power could be bridged in a 
short time. With respect to legislation it was again assumed that a 
comprehensive legislative framework could be in place within 1-2 years. The 
key element in this area was ownership rights. The report makes little 
allusions to where ownership should reside, but concluded that 'Until the key 
issues of ownership, operating control and profit distribution are resolved, it 
will be difficult to rebuild the industry'S severely damaged organizational 
structure' .354 This is implicitly a new institutional economics and TeE 
argument; organisations are seen as entities for goal maximisation and 
transaction costs have a non-negligible effect on organisation and operation. 
With respect to organisational measures the report advised 'a diversity of 
structures, including integrated and independent firms and small exploration-
oriented companies' .355 The emphasis in the report was put on competition at 
all levels involved in the oil business in order to realise efficiency gains, It 
therefore warned against a one-sided reliance on vertically integrated 
companies (VIes) that would dominate the industry. It advised that: 
combinations (of VIes) should be based on commercial or operational logic; 
benefits of specialisation should not be ignored; VIes might lead to 
0ligopoly.356 Furthermore, it recommended that in order to overcome the 
rigidity of the Soviet oil industry and unpredictability of the early post-Soviet 
years operational authority should be devolved to the NGDUs.357 On 
governmental level it advised the participation of regional and local authorities 
in the shaping of policy, and the creation of a National Oil and Gas Agency to 
absorb some of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and Ministry of Ecology and 
Natural Resource's authorities.358 
354 Ibid., p.12. 
355 Ibid., p. 50. 
356 Ibid. p. 50. 
357 Ibid., p. 80. 
358 Ibid., p. 30 & 10. The advice in this report to a large extent follows the general trends of 
globalisation in the energy industries during the 1990s. These trends are characterised by less 
state intervention, privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation and demonopolisation in order to 
strengthen competition. (Steeg, 'Energiesicherheit im Globalen Wettbewerb [Energy security 
and Global Competition)" Internationale Politik, 1996, no. 8, p. 53). 
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The report is different from IFI advice in that its objective is to give advice 
that might result in an "efficient" oil industry, the IFI advice on the other hand 
had to accommodate an "efficient" macro policy as well. However, both 
contain significant elements of institutional factors that were alien to Russian 
traditions. Both envisage a structure of rent appropriation akin to western 
traditions and a higher degree of infrastructural power than present at any time 
in Russian history. As such they represent the exogenous institutional factors 
that would have to compete with endogenous institutional factors. 
A strategy for developing Russian oil. 
The 1992 Energy Concept placed the need for reform in the fuel and energy 
complex (TEK) squarely within the need for general economic and structural 
reform. Based on a realistic assessment of the state of the energy industries 
and their future investment and technological requirements the Energy 
Concept recognised the need for denationalisation of the energy industries and 
the relationships between the separate components of the economy. The 
dynamic aspect of inter-branch reforms was recognised as a vital component 
of a successful transformation of the industry. The reliance on market forces 
to shape interaction, structural change (privatisation) as an instigator of more 
efficient utilisation of resources, and a convertible rouble and world market 
prices for energy in order to motivate the realisation of energy saving 
measures. 
As with the 1984 Energy Programme energy saving was a crucial element in 
the realisation of a new and more efficient structure of energy consumption. 
The 1992 Energy Concept envisaged this to be the basis for improving the 
competitiveness of Russian industry on world markets through the reduction 
of energy related input intensity of Russian industrial production. Reduced 
industrial and social energy intensity was further to release resources for 
export and long-term growth. 
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Table 6. 1 - Oil production & export 1993-2010 (forecast). 
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These measures were seen as key elements to overcome the administrative, 
operational and corporate behavioural legacy set out in earlier chapters. In the 
transition period the Energy Concept forecast of Russian oil production was 
influenced by the need to rectify the field mismanagement of past generations 
and improve the technological level of oil extraction, therefore a period of 
continued decline in production was expected (see Table 6.1). It assumed that 
technological advances could only be sped upby access to foreign investment, 
capital and technology. Such investment would only be forthcoming under 
conditions where the foreign investor would be allowed to retain a sufficient 
profit to make its participation worthwhile and be allowed operational control. 
The Energy Concept therefore, anticipated a continued slump in extraction of 
oil until such time when the laws and legislative enactments had been accepted 
by the legislative and executive organs and become functional. 
The Energy Concept envisaged this transition to be accomplished in three 
phases. The first period (1992-1993) was to provide financial stabilisation, 
reduce energy intensity and arrest the development of an energy crisis (i.e. 
insufficient domestic energy supply), while at the same time protecting the 
consumer from the adverse effects of any price changes. The objectives of the 
anti-crisis period was to 'develop and urgently realise a set of interconnected 
measures in production (extraction) and utilisation of fuel and energy, 
allowing in the course of 10-15 months to stop or at least radically slow down 
the development of an energy crisis' .359 Measures envisaged by the Energy 
Concept were: 
359 RF Government Decision N2 26 (10.09.1992), ibid., p. 14. 
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• the creation of economic stimulation of the extractive industries through 
reduced state control over prices - commercialisation. (On the one hand 
allowing energy prices (in non-natural monopoly industries - oil and oil 
products) to approach world levels, yet on the other hand maintain state 
regulation of prices (but ensuring self-sufficiency and self-financing) until 
a fully convertible rouble could be established); 
• the creation of a state budget fund for the development of inter-branch and 
interregional technological re-equipment and the development of the TEK 
to the amount of20-30 per cent of total investment; 
• introduction of payment for subsoil use (royalty charges) and 
(excessive/windfall - more than 30-35 per cent) profit tax, which would 
ensure state income; 
• to compensate socially vulnerable groups, the agricultural sector, transport 
sector and different enterprises of the energy intensive sectors through 
budgetary allocation (compensation) or tax breaks (in other words, almost 
the entire society and economy); 
• the creation of vertically integrated companies (VIC). 
The second phase would be a transition period (1993-1997), securing energy 
supplies to domestic consumers. In this period an energy market was to be 
created, structural transformation through the introduction of market forces, 
the passing of basic legislation to support a market economy and the 
adaptation of the TEK to the global market. 'Important tasks for the transition 
period will be the formation of subjects of regulation for an energy market, for 
the necessary de-monopolisation of the fuel and energy branches and the 
creation within them of enterprises with different property forms through the 
privatisation of the state sector, and the encouragement of private enterprise 
and foreign investment' .360 Measures envisaged by the Energy Concept were: 
• legislation that provided unambiguous regulation of the division of 
property between the subjects of the federation, economic activity and 
energy provision in the TEK, form and order of privatisation, labour 
protection, the state role in the sector and protection of energy consumers; 
360 RF Government Decision N!! 26, op cif., p. 20. 
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• increasing use of price policy as a regulating tool; 
• increasing use of indirect means of regulation - tax and credit policy. 
In the final period (1998 -) the creation of a stable socially oriented structure 
of the TEK was to provide an environmentally safe industry based on up to 
date technology. 
According to the new-institutional approach the dynamic relationship between 
formal and informal institutions constitute the institutional matrix within 
which behaviour and expectation shape economic development. In previous 
chapters the politicisation of the oil industry has been shown to affect 
constraints under which the industry developed. The development of a new 
matrix of constraints was therefore crucial in order to effect an alteration of 
the existing institutional dynamic.361 However, in order to generate a different 
development path, there would have to be a corresponding repositioning of the 
role of the state as an economic actor. There would have to be a shift away 
from direct mobilisation of resources and the use of the state's despotic power 
potential towards indirect mobilisation of resources. This in turn would 
necessitate the development of both state autonomy and infrastructural 
capabilities. 
For this shift to be carried out successfully denationalisation was but one part 
of the puzzle. Equally important for denationalisation to bring results would 
be the altered behaviour of economic agents, which according to new-
institutional and transaction cost economic theory is a function of the incentive 
structure. A characteristic of infrastructural systems of resource mobilisation 
is a higher degree of non-personalised trust relationships. The Soviet system 
on the other hand was in many respects developed as a substitute for a lack in 
non-personalised trust relationship.362 Similarly the Soviet incentive structure 
was designed to complement the Soviet Union's despotic-patrimonial system 
of state power. The transition from a Soviet system to an infrastructural 
361 Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 25. Locatelli, 'The Reorganization of the Russian 
Hydrocarbons Industry', Energy and Policy, 1995, vol. 23, no. 9, p. 809. 
362 Gill (1990), op cit., p. 6. 
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system would hence require significant changes in the way people behaved 
and were expected to behave. 
The realistic assessment of the condition of the energy sectors 
notwithstanding, the 1992 Energy Concept nonetheless portrays the qualities 
that came to derail the denationalisation process. While envisaging a more 
moderate approach than the shock therapy approach, the Energy Concept 
failed to tackle the issue of the TEK' s position within the larger issue of the 
state's raison d'etre. Even though the Energy Concept makes indications as to 
what the industry should look like, it fails to consider how such a structure 
would affect the subsequent functioning of the industry and the state and to 
what extent the envisaged structure would enable the state to fulfil the 
functions attributed to it in the Energy Concept. According to Kryukov the 
period 1992-1996 was marked by a gradual shift of state attention from direct 
participation to indirect participation.363 However, throughout the 1990s the 
state's role and participation in the oil industry has also remained 
undetermined due to contradictory elements in both organisation and functions 
of the industry. Suffice here to say that this element of uncertainty had a 
marked effect on the development of both the organisational structure and the 
formal and informal institutional structure. 
The state furthermore, failed to make realistic assumptions about the potential 
of the TEK's contribution to the maintenance of the state and the state's ability 
to secure the potential contribution. While on the one hand making frequent 
references to structural reform through privatisation/denationalisation, these 
are seen not as ends in themselves, but rather as means to overcoming the 
potential threat of a supply crisis. The underlying conflict of interest lies in 
the attached importance of the TEK for providing the necessary resources to 
implement the state's commitments and simultaneously relinquish control over 
the diminishing flow of rent and revenue generated by the sector. Importantly 
the very nature of rent and revenues extraction would have to change along 
363 Kryukov (1998), op cif., p. 128. 
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side a transition towards an infrastructural form of state power. The Energy 
Concept makes no allusions to this vital point. 
If one views the Energy Concept as a statement of objectives the deficiency of 
the Energy Concept (and thus a constraint on the development of Russian oil 
(energy) policy) is its conflicting operational (short term) and strategic (long-
term) objectives. On the one hand the operational objectives consisted in 
halting declining energy production and the maintenance of social and 
industrial stability through sufficient energy supplies and securing necessary 
foreign currency to finance both the budget and service foreign debts. On the 
other hand the strategic objectives consisted in energy conservation, structural 
change and the establishment of new economic relations. The latter objectives 
were also a means to provide long term stability and consistency of the former. 
However, the objectives of the Energy Concept were in the short-term 
incompatible, thus making the choice of development strategy more a function. 
of political efficiency rather than economic efficiency. The short-term goals 
set out in the Energy Concept are tied to the state's ability to carry out its 
functions and maintain a functioning state. The strategic objectives are tied to 
the industry needs if it was to function in a political and economic system 
different from the Soviet environment. If one views the state as an 
organisation whose objective it is to maximise state power then we know from 
organisational literature that, experiencing resource pressure, organisations are 
likely to focus on short-term operational objectives rather than long-term 
strategic objectives. Hierarchical bargaining in the Soviet Union demonstrates 
the state's lack of autonomy. Post-Soviet Russia, like its predecessor, was 
reliant on a bargaining structure of income generation. Maintaining the state 
(immediate revenue concerns) were from the point of verification more easily 
obtainable than long-term objectives. The deficiency of the Energy Concept, 
as a statement of objectives, is that it fails to find a realistic balance between 
securing short-term objectives and achieving long-term objectives. This again 
was a result of the legacy of the state's raison d 'etre in the Soviet structure of 
state power. 
170 -
Speaking at a government conference in October 1992 then Minister of Fuel 
and Energy - Chemomyrdin - pointed out the particular importance of the fuel 
and energy sector for the Russian economy, and hence the need for continued 
state control over particular aspects of the sector. 364 In relation to the oil 
industry this was to be achieved by means of state control over the pipeline 
system (a natural monopoly) and the creation of (state or partly state 
controlled) 4-5 vertically integrated companies (VIC). Several measures were 
being considered to maintain some form of control over prices. 
Further reasons for continued state control are given in the Energy Concept. 
These stress the integrating importance of the TEK and particularly the need 
for a unified energy market to counteract the centrifugal forces of regionalism. 
These are state preserving (building) arguments, and while they made sense 
from Russian experience, they at the same time obfuscated the ability to carry 
through a proper de-politicization of the sector. The loss of government 
revenue and reduction in living standards as an extension of reduced industrial. 
production during the transition period were to be compensated through 
redistribution of new funds available through royalty payments and customs 
duties. In effect the government was hoping to maintain its previous re-
distributional commitment through revenues generated by the TEK. 
In a government project memorandum of November 1993 the goal of Russian 
energy policy was described as follows: 'The government of the Russian 
Federation [] strives for the most efficient realisation of existing [energy 
potential] and to provide the necessary additional Russian energy potential for 
the increase of citizens' living standards, taking into account the importance of 
364 Chernomyrdin, Osnovnye kontseptual 'nye polozheniya energeticheskoi politiki rossii v 
novykh ekonomicheskikh usloviyakh [Main conceptual position of Russian energy policy under 
new economic conditions], p. 71, reprinted in RF Energy Ministry, Energeticheskaya politika 
rossii na rubezhe vekov [Russian energy policy at the turn ofthe century], 2001, vo\. 1 p. 67-
72. This goal was later restated by the Russian Energy Strategy 1995-20 I O. 
'Energeticheskaya strategiya rossii - osnovnye polozheniya [The Russian energy strategy -
main provision]', p. 221, reprinted in Minenergo, op cit., pp. 214-286. 
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the fuel and energy complex (TEK) for the [economic] integration and 
economic revival of Russia' .365 
In order to regulate the functioning of the oil industry within the Russian 
economy as a whole and the relationship between separate parts and 
companies of the sector, the Energy Concept envisaged a rapid elaboration of 
a legislative framework that would serve as the basis of regulation and dispute 
settlement. The most pressing in the case of Russian oil were: a general law 
on energy policy; a law on safe and clean energy; a law on oil and gas; a law 
on the principles of energy saving; a licensing law, a law on the development 
of the continental shelf; and finally a law for the protection of energy 
consumers. Together these legislative acts were to regulate the relationship 
between Russia and the subjects of the federation, create the conditions for 
energy saving, a strategic energy reserve for the redistribution between the 
subjects of the federation, the financing of exploitation and modernisation, and 
environmental protection. The enactment and functioning of such legislative. 
acts clearly rest on an assumption that the state would be able to develop its 
infrastructural power and willingly rescind its despotic system of power. 
Two more strategies have been developed throughout the 1990s.366 These are 
the 'Energy Strategy 1995-2010' and the 'Energy Strategy 2000-2020'. Both 
clearly reflect the altered role of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (or the 
Ministry) and the functions it was to perform. During the development of the 
Energy Concept the Ministry was still an active participant in the development 
of both organisation and strategy. 
During the 1990s this role changed and the Ministry has gradually become a 
policy advisor and strategic planning organisation, rather than an operative 
organisation. As such both these strategies reflect the altered circumstances. 
365 Osnovnye prioritety i printsipy gosydarstvennoi energeticheskoi politiki - proekt 
memorandum a pravitel'stva rossii [Main priorities and principles of state's energy policy -
Russian government project memoranda], reprinted in Minenergo, op cit., pp. 90-102. 
366 Government decision N!! 1006 (13.10.1995), 'Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii -
osnovnye polozheniya [Russian energy strategy - main provisions], op cif. 'Osnovnye 
polozheniya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2020 goda [Main provisions of the 
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Both strategies, more so than the Energy Concept, are analytical in the sense 
that they are more descriptive than prescriptive. The euphoria of the Energy 
Concept is all but absent, and both strategies forecast prolonged periods of re-
building. Although similar in content, the last strategy incorporates Putin' s 
"strong state" rhetoric. This is perhaps most evident in the combination of 
legislative acts by parliament and separate normative enactment by the 
president and the government to develop the legislative framework, which has 
been a main feature of the Russian political system. 
Both strategies envIsage a proper division of powers and responsibilities 
between the federal and regional/local authorities. The need for such a 
division is appreciable, yet the strategies make little contribution to clarifying 
what this division should be like. As will be seen in later chapters, the 
division of rights and responsibilities has been intertwined with the circulation 
of rent and resources, and its undetermined character has had great impact on 
the development of the industry. 
More so than the Energy Concept they reflect the need for integration of the 
Russian economy into the world economy in order to reverse the operative 
trends of the early 1990s. In this respect the separation of the Ministry from 
direct participation in the industry seems to have strengthened its strategic and 
co-ordinating role. As such the Ministry of Fuel and Energy is a participant to 
the discussion of how to develop the industry, but its scope for affecting the 
developments is far less then previous. One expert told the author that these 
strategies were: 'theoretical ideals of where they would like to be', however 
that 'the guys at the top [of the Ministry] have the right ideas, but they do not 
have enough staff beneath them and they don't have enough backup to either 
push through the ideas, or ifthe ideas get through, then implement them,367. 
Russian energy strategy for the period until 2020], reprinted in Minenergo, op cif. Also 
http://www.mte.gov.ru [April 200 I]. 
367 Interviewee # 8. According to a senior Ministry official, 'The main priority of this strategy 
is the improvement of energy efficiency. We have enormous potential in energy 
savings ... some 400 million tons of coal equivalent per year. Of course this is a very capital-
intensive field, so we need a lot of investment and new legislation. We should explain to the 
opposition why it is very important, because it is closely connected with the prices for energy 
resources - domestic prices. Because if we have very low prices there is no incentive to 
improve energy efficiency, if it is very cheap there are no reasons to improve. On the other 
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A parliamentary hearing at the Federation Council in October 2002 concluded 
that the two energy strategies developed during the 1990s had proved to be 
'nonviable and inadequate to the contemporary development of energy-
complex' and had failed to provide the 'levers and mechanisms, capable of 
carrying out stated tasks [zadachi], .368 
On the other hand, both strategies continue to suggest policies that, if 
implemented, would make it hard to de-politicise the industry. Both indirect 
means (price and tax policy) and direct means (state ownership and natural 
monopoly control) are envisaged, but the strategies fail to find the right 
balance. This is also the case with industry goals and state goals. Protecting 
the population from adverse effects of energy reform, ensuring economic 
growth and ensuring state revenues are laudable responsibilities. However, 
these short-term objectives are at odds with the long-term objectives of capital 
re-equipment, technological advances, development of green-field projects, 
attracting foreign investment and establishing a competitive environment in 
that they overly politicise the industry and reduce the credibility of the state's 
ex ante position. In turn, this strongly affected the perceived levels of risk and 
incentive structures. 
This criticism of the Ministry's strategic role is reflected in the development of 
the new energy strategy (due 2003). Again political objectives (protectionism) 
are important parts of the strategy, but to a greater extent the Ministry has 
relied on the creation of an energy spot market, a less discriminatory 
relationship between the state and the subjects of the federation, and regulation 
through state tax, price and investment policy. The strategy was promptly 
criticised by presidential advisor Andrey Illarionov as confusing the 
side if we rise prices we should do it very gradually, because we can meet big social 
problems'. (Interviewee # 4). The latter part of the statement demonstrates the conflicting 
strategic and operative goals connected with elaborating an energy strategy for Russia. 
368 Yegorov, 'Energostrategiya ne proshla [The energy strategy did not pass]', Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, (22.10.2002). At: http://www.rg.ru. 
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development of the fuel and energy complex with the energy development of 
the country.369 
The listing of achievement in the energy strategy of 2000 clearly reflects how 
political objectives have dominated throughout the 1990s. 
achievements in this period are: 
Positive 
• preserving energy independence of the country and domestic demand; 
• the relative high level of rent extraction from the industry in terms of 
budget and currency earnings; 
• preserving state levers of regulation; 
• corporatisation and partial/full privatisation of enterprises; 
• stabilising of output; . 
• the passing of a number of legislative acts. 
The objectives that could not be achieved were: 
• increase exploration activity and increasing the reserve base; 
• creation of a favourable investment climate; 
• reducing energy intensity of the economy; 
• the creation of the necessary preconditions for full self-financing and 
higher levels of investment activities; 
• overcoming the de-monetization of the economy; 
• the establishment of an integral system of legislative acts in the form of an 
energy code for Russia; 
• the implementation of a legislative framework through and infrastructural 
base of state power. 
As can be seen from the two lists the positive achievements are connected 
with the factors highlighted in the discussion on the Energy Concept that 
would be non-conducive to a sound long-term development of the industry, 
i.e. the politicising of the strategy. The list that could not be implemented are 
connected with the failure to create a system of state power that would 
369 Yegorov, op cit. 
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promote infrastructural power and thereby create a transparent and predictable 
economic climate. 
At the time of writing (January 2003), the new energy strategy has not been 
passed. Nonetheless, the development of strategies throughout the 1990s 
demonstrates the Ministry's removal from its previous role to a more strategic 
role. This can only be good thing. The possible threat to the Ministry in this 
development is that unless the state develops a system of power akin to the 
infrastructural power base that the Ministry gradually is advocating, it might 
sideline itself.37o 
One of the arguments being advanced in this thesis is that institutional 
hangovers create path-dependency. The following chapter will therefore 
examine the strategy and foundation implemented in the Russian oil industry 
and how these were affected by the institutional matrix. 
370 During the parliamentary hearing (above) the Federation Council called upon the president 
to create a new organisation that would be responsible for the strategic development of the 
TEK. (Yegorov, op cif.). 
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Chapter 7 
A Path Forward? 
- The foundations of Russian oil policy. 
'The state is a very complex phenomenon [.] 
As an economic executive, I have no doubt 
that the powerful mechanism we had 
developed was easy to control both 
strategically and operationally. It could 
change in any sense if we wanted it to. This 
means that we should have changed it, not 
broken it up. We really created a powerful 
mechanism in our country and are now looking 
sadly on as it falls apart' . 371 
A. Kuzmin, Chief Engineer, Megionneft 
The development of Russian oil policy clearly demonstrates the conflict 
between balancing short tenn and long tenn objectives. The Energy Concept 
states, and the general opinion at the time of launching the refonns was, that 
structural change was another attempt at providing a higher standard of living 
for Russian citizens and not the end in itself. With the precipitous 
development of Russian industry and its implications for social stability and 
leadership legitimacy the course of refonns was soon altered. In 1992 the fall 
in real gross domestic product (GDP) was 14.5 per cent, in the same period 
primary energy consumption only fell by 4.8 per cent. 
Figure 7.1 - Consumption patterns and GDP cbange 1992-1999. 
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371 In 1992 a roundtable discussion was held in Siberia to discuss the future of the Siberian oil 
industry. Proceedings along with commentaries are reported in a special issue of International 
Affairs (November 1992). This quote p. 16. 
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Indeed primary energy consumption continued to fall at a slower rate than 
GDP during the first half of the 1990s (see Figure 7.1).372 
This clearly put at risk the aspiration of the Energy Concept in terms of energy 
saving and the related benefits stemming from freed-up resources. Relatively 
slower decline of energy consumption further implied that energy intensity of 
production was rising. Falling GDP meant that potential state revenues were 
declining, and discrediting the leadership's strong commitment to reforms.373 
Table 7.1.- Primary energy production forecast until 2010. 
Source: Kontseptsiya ... 
The situation for oil was different. As was shown in Chapter 1, oil hac\ 
already been declining in the Soviet energy balance. The 1992 Energy 
Concept, like the 1984 Energy Strategy, envisaged a continued shift to gas and 
an increase in nuclear and hydropower (Table 7.1). Energy saving measures 
were to reduce the energy intensity of production by 20-25 per cent over the 
long term. Such savings would then free up resources for increased 
production and for additional currency earnings through exports. Even though 
the role of oil has to some extent been replaced by gas the reliance on 
petroleum exports to provide much needed foreign currency and revenue 
372 An important element of primary energy consumption in Russia is the production of heat 
and hot water (in industry 40-45%; in residential consumption 2/3). (Martinot, 'Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy in Russia: Transaction Barriers, Market Intermediation and 
Capacity Building', Energy Policy, 1998, vo\. 26, no. 11, p. 906). These elements are less 
elastic and will contribute to decreasing energy efficiency. 
373 For a more detailed discussion of post-Soviet production see Aslund, Building Capitalism: 
The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 113-
153. Aslund argues that the dramatic decline in GDP coincided with a sharp increase in 
unregistered output as part of output shifted out of the "official" economy. Further, Russian 
statistical measurement sophistication and practice was not able to record changes in 
productive/output structure. As data on the unofficial economy remain speculative GDP as 
reported by the IFI's will be used throughout this thesis. The Norwegian journalist Steinfeld 
also argues that since industrial production was to serve as tool of evaluation of property in the 
privatisation process defacto owners had a vested interest in driving down production in order 
to reduce the cost of property. (Steinfeld, Fremover mot Fortiden: Russland og det tapte 
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increased. Simultaneously the drop in consumption had adverse effects on 
company behaviour and inter-branch dynamics. 
From a state perspective access to oil resources became increasingly 
important. A reduction in GDP and increasing intensity implied that state 
subsidies de facto increased while its ability to do so decreased. In order to 
perform its role the state therefore needed a secure source of income. This 
source was found in the oil exports. 
In terms of reform strategy, the energy industries and particularly the oil 
industry, differ from the initial shock therapy approach. In many respects the 
reform processes in the oil industry became a compromise between the Soviet 
style monopoly based approach, which was maintained in the natural 
monopolies (pipelines, gas and electricity), and the mass privatisation 
programme. The crucial issues to be dealt with at the start of the transition 
period were: 
• what kind of organisational structure would be the most efficient? 
• what role would the state play in the regulation of the industry? 
• how would the state ensure access to the revenue flow generated by the 
industry? 
The three issues are interconnected and are all part of the larger issue of what 
kind of state power the new Russian state would be built on, and how to 
achieve both operational and strategic objectives? Together these elements 
form the first and second order institutions in Russian oil policy that constitute 
the constraint of path dependency but also the basis for potential evolution 
through institutional competition. The response to these issues would 
furthermore be a demonstration of the government's ability to commit ex ante 
to a specific course of reform and its ability to commit ex post to the 
formulated course.374 
arhundre [Forwards towards the Past: Russia and the lost century], J.W Cappelen's Forlag a.s, 
1993, p. 274). 
374 This latter factor has been shown to have important practical implications with respect to 
privatisation and evaluation of state assets. A failure on behalf of the government to 
sufficiently demonstrated its precommitment to a policy increases uncertainty and the threat 
of moral hazard, both result in a discounting of value. Vickers, 'Privatization and the risk of 
expropriation', in Baldasarri, Paganetto & Phelps, Privatization Processes in Eastern Europe, 
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Commercialisation and corporatisation. 
There are a variety of approaches to the organisation of the oil business 
throughout the world. Organisational structure is influenced by the degree of 
control that the state wishes (or is able) to exercise and the levers and means 
that it has to do so. The basic organisational component of the oil industry is 
the firm, and world practice can be divided into the following categories:375 
I) completely state owned companies, to which the national oil companies 
(NOC) belong, integrating the company as an integral part of state 
administration and finances; 
2) companies with controlling share packets managed by the state; 
3) companies with state participation but without state majority control; 
4) private companies in their various ownership forms. 
The approach envisaged by Chemomyrdin in 1992 was in many respects a fall 
back to a more traditional path of development than the late Soviet strategy. 
In the uncertain and turbulent environment of the late 1980s a diversity of 
organisational units had emerged in response to the changing economic 
environment. The Russian approach to reforming the industry re-instituted 
greater central control over organisational development. The reason for this 
was the constraint imposed by the institutional matrix associated with the 
Soviet mode of state power. In the Russian situation constituency building, 
time and resource pressure and state survival meant that the former mode of 
state power became the dominant means of policy implementation. 
The 1987 'Law on State Enterprise' increased the rights and independence of 
the production associations and state enterprises, while introducing total profit 
and loss accounting and self-financing for the enterprises. However, for the 
oil industry prices remained fixed (while input prices rose) and not until 1991 
were companies allowed to trade a modest 5 per cent of production, which was 
later increased to 10 per cent. Over the same period the state, for all practical 
purposes, ceased to fulfil its previous functions in day to day management, 
The MacmiIIan Press, 1993, pp. 115-150. See also footnote 5 on political institutions as ex 
ante agreements on "political rules". 
375 Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 27. 
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long-term strategic operations and as a source of financial and investment 
resources. 3 76 
The result of these developments was a gradual decline in the state's ability to 
control its assets and exert its influence. The collapse of such control 
aggravated a conflict of a more fundamental nature - the rights and status of 
the constituent units of economic activity.377 '[O]ne of the problems was 
identifying the exact status of oil production management organisations 
(NGDUs). Coupled to this was the problem of establishing the optimal 
combination of centralised management and independence of structural units 
in a system of 'internal' profit and loss accounting. These two problems led to 
a third: identifying the functions of management in the association'. 378 
With the passing of the 1991 'RP Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial 
Activity' this situation was aggravated, by the omission of any reference to the 
P A, thus taking away its legal foundation. The leadership of the now· 
"independent" entities failed to capitalise on the alteration in the legislative 
framework and the law was subsequently amended due to pressure from the 
better connected managers of the PAs and their more consolidated position as 
a group.379 However, several economic entities were established as a result of 
exploiting the undefined status and rights of state property and the 
opportunities arising from the 1987 -1991 reforms. Both led to an 
accumulation of resources and rent outside the formal state channels. 
The uncertainty of status and property rights, the decline of state control and 
functions, and finally the partial access to trade in oil resulted in the transfer of 
assets from the state sector to the developing private sector. According to 
Kryukov, two parallel trends were manifest during this time. Firstly, 'the 
defining and choice of direction of the restructuring and consequently the 
376 Kryukov (1998), op cit. p. 95. 
377 Kryukov & Moe (1996), op cit., pp. 18-19. For a discussion on property rights and 
operational control see also Whitefield, op cit. 
378 Yabukova, Improving profit and loss accounting in oil and gas production enterprises 
(associations) in Western Siberia, Cand. Econ. Sci. thesis, Moscow, VNIIOENG, cited in 
Kryukov & Moe (1996), op cit. p. 19. 
379 Kryukov (1998), op cit .. p. 100. 
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commercialisation of state oil-extracting, oil-refining and refined product-
supply enterprises'. Secondly 'the formation of a wide network of small 
commercial structures and enterprises, connected with state enterprises and, as 
a rule, representing the interests of their founders (primarily from the number 
of enterprise managers, but also different service and subdivisions), .380 For 
instance the NGDU Chemogomeftegaz (one of the more productive in the PA 
Nizhnevartovkskneftegaz) established itself as a leased company. 
The development of VICs illustrates the formal organisational response. 
LUKoil became the USSR's first vertically integrated oil company in 
December 1990.381 On 1 February 1991, LUKoil was established as an USSR 
State kontsern - a voluntary economic complex formed by its constituent 
entities.382 The RSFSR government later reconfirmed this entity.383 The 
Decision allowed the kontsern to realise several technologically related stages 
of the oil business under one structure, assuming the strategic and 
administrative functions previously performed by the respective ministries of 
each branch. Furthermore, the granting of the right of determining the price of 
in-house transactions strengthened its financial position vis-a-vis non-
integrated producers. The establishment of Rosneftegaz, under the auspice of 
the RSFSR, was equally to be a voluntary association of its constituent parts 
(the remaining units within the RSFSR). Its objective was to realise 
extraction, transportation, machinery construction and scientific work within 
the RSFSR and on its continental shelf.384 
380 Ibid, p. 98. 
381 Ibid, p. 97. Sagers, 'The Energy Industries of the Former USSR: A Mid-Year Survey', 
Post-Soviet Geography, 1993, vo\. 34, no 6. p. 353. 
382 Alekperov, Vertikal'no integrirovannye neftyanye kompanii rossii: metodologiya 
formirovaniya i realizatsiya [Russian vertically integrated oil companies: methods of 
formation and realisation], AUTOPAN, 1996, p. 126. The entity consisted of3 oil production 
associations (Langepasneftegaz, Uraineftegaz & Kogalymneftegaz) and 2 refineries 
(Permnefteorgsintez &Volgogradneftepererabotka, later were added Novoufimskii and 
Mazhekyaickii). 
383 RSFSR Government Decision N!! 18 (25.11.1991), Ob obrazovanii neftyanovo kontserna . 
LangepasuraikogalymneJt' (LUKoil) ' [On the formation of oil concern 
'Langepasuraikogalymneft (LUKoil),. http://law.optima.ru. LUKoil remained the only state 
concern in the oil sector during the existence of the USSR, its foundation was in many respect 
the work of Vagit Alekperov, Deputy USSR Minister for the oil and gas industry. Gasprom 
was established as a state kontsern for the gas industry in 1989, and an equipment and supply 
kontsern - Neftegazmash - was established in 1989. 
384 Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 97. Rosneftegaz was established by RSFSR Government 
decision N!! 555 (18.10.1991). Despite its wide-ranging objectives it had very little powers 
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State kontserns were created in order to provide supply and operative 
(contractual) stability during the rapidly disintegrating economic relations of 
the administrative-command economy.385 Integrating services and functions 
that were important to the fulfilment of an organisation's goal was a common 
practice in the Soviet Union. As shown in Chapter 4, the establishment of in-
house workshops to relieve supply and service constraints along with informal 
connections were widespread means of ensuring "predictability" in day to day 
managing of the industry. The creation of kontserns and VICs performed a 
similar function. They were administrative measures to maintain production 
potential. Such organisational developments are in line with TCE in that 
transactions that cannot be carried out cost effectively across markets (or in 
the case of the USSR via the administrative system) are often integrated. The 
disintegration of the Soviet economy increased transaction costs. Transaction 
costs could be thus be minimised by the integration of related production 
stages of an idiosyncratic nature. Surpassing the market by administratively 
regulating the flow of resources and information within VICs also more 
closely resembles Soviet management traditions.386 At the time though the 
kontserns did not (necessarily) provide a more efficient use of resources and 
technical integration it only served to preserve the previous level of these 
indicators. The retention of the administrative structure was dependent on the 
TEK's unique position as an accumulator of financial resources.387 
The creation of independent commercial structures and the move towards 
creation of vertically integrated oil companies (kontserns and corporations) 
were responses to the dire situation that had arisen in the state oil sector. The 
creation of new organisational structures, both state (kontserns) and non-state 
and influence. (Sagers (1993), op cit., p. 352.) Rosneftegaz did not have the status ofa state 
kontsern. 
385 Alekperov, op cit., p. 123. 
386 In addition Simon argues that when 'markets must compete with organizations as means 
for securing the benefits of progressive change by rapid adaptation, the former are likely to 
succeed in this competition only in highly stable environments'. Italics not in original. (From 
paper presented by Simon to the American Political Science Association in 2000. Simon, 
Public Administration in Today's World of Organizations and Markets. At [accessed Feb. 
2001]: http://www.apsanet.org/ps/decOO/simon.cfin. 
387 Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 94. 
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(independent commercial/regional structures), in order to maximise the 
interests of their creators due to alterations in the formal incentive structure is 
essentially in line with new-institutional theory. Under conditions of unclear 
property rights and status of state property agents possessing de facto control 
over assets moved to ascertain their claim to such property and the income 
generated by these through the creation of various forms of organisations 
maximising this end. 
The passing of RSFSR Government Instruction NQ 182-r in December 1991 
was an attempt to clarify the situation and consolidate state control over sector 
property.388 It established that the existing production associations would 
continue to function as industrial and economic complexes, the state would 
retain 100% ownership in the holding companies, and any further property 
transactions and organisational changes were forbidden until the holding 
companies were established. The state in this way not only tried to halt the 
"spontaneous" transfer of state property and asserted its ownership rights but. 
also ascribed to itself the exclusive right of establishing the (legal) economic 
entities within the oil industry. 
In June 1992 the president of the RP decreed that associations of the TEK 
remained special state enterprises fulfilling the role of administration and co-
ordination of productive and investment activity of the enterprises in their 
respective compositions until their conversion into joint stock companies 
(JSC).389 This decree confirmed the status of the PAs vis-a-vis the NGDUs. It 
decreed that the relationship between the associations and the RP Committee 
for the administration of state property (GKI) and the RP Committee for 
antimonopoly policy and support of new economic structure (GKAP) was to 
be on a contractual basis. 
388 RSFSR Government Instruction x!! 182-r (23.12.1991 ),0 preobrazovanii ob 'edinenii i 
predpriyatii toplivno-energeticheskogo kompleksa v kholdingovye kompanii [About the 
transformation of associations and enterprises of the fuel and energy complex into holding 
companies]. http://law.optima.ru. 
389 RF Presidential Decree (RFPD) X!! 542 (1.6.1992), 0 statuse proizvodstvennykh i naychno-
proizvodstvennykh ob 'edinenii toplivno-energeticheskogo kompleksa [On the status of 
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In August 1992 the president of the RF decreed that entities of the TEK were 
exempted from the July 1992 decree converting state enterprises into JSCs, 
and that entities of the TEK were to be turned into JSCs and privatised by 
special presidential decrees.39o These decrees cemented the basis for the 
subsequent approach to transforming the TEK by maintaining the production 
associations as the main entities of administration (RFPD N!! 542) in order to 
preserve the rational use of the subsoil and the technological-productive unity 
during the transition period. The special characteristics of the TEK and its 
importance for the Russian economy and population were the reasons for 
exempting its transformation from the general approach (RFPD N!! 922). From 
the beginning of the transformation process the TEK again served as a 
precedent for the subsequent development of state power and channels of 
operation - maintaining a despotic-patrimonial structure of power in industries 
vital for revenue accumulation. 
The initial structure of the oil industry was laid out in a presidential decree in, 
November 1992.391 This decree established that existing production 
associations, state enterprises, production and production-scientific 
associations (extracting, refining, transportation and marketing) would be 
turned into open joint stock companies. For the purpose of managing these 
entities four oil companies were created - Rosneft, LUKoil (which 
reconfirmed the earlier decision), Yukos and Surgutneftegaz. In accordance 
with RFPD N!! 721 workers in the JSC were allocated 25 per cent of shares 
production and scientific-productive associations of the fuel and energy complex]. 
http://www.referent.ru. 
390 RF Presidential Decree NQ 922 (14.8.1992), Ob osobennostyakh preobrazovaniya 
gosydarstvennykh predpriyatii, ob 'edinenii, organisatsii toplivno-energeticheskogo kompleksa 
v aktsionernye obshchestva [About the special transformation of state enterprises, association 
and organisations ofthe fuel and energy complex into joint stock companies]. RF Presidential 
Decree NQ 721 (1.7.1992), Ob organizatsionnykh merakh po preobrazovanyu 
gosydarstvennykh predpriyatii, dobrovol'nykh ob 'edinenii gosudarstvennykh predpriyatii v 
aktsionernye obshchestva [About the organisational measures for transformation of state 
enterprises and voluntary associations of state enterprises into joint stock companies]. Both 
at: http://www.referent.ru .. 
391 RF Presidential Decree NQ 1403 (17.11.1992), Ob osobennostyakh privatisatsii i 
preobrazovaniya v aktsionernye obshchestva gosydarstvennykh predpriyatii, 
proizvodstvennykh i naycho-proizvodstvennykh ob 'edinenii neftyanoi, 
nefiepererabatyvayushchei promyshlennosti i nefieproduktoobespecheniya [About the 
particular privatisation and transformation into joint stock companies of government 
enterprises and production and scientific-production associations of the oil, oil-refining and oil 
marketing industries]. http://www.referent.ru .. 
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free of charge. These were preferred shares (non-voting), thus the 38 per cent 
share allocated to the holding companies (common shares) left the holding 
companies with a voting share of no less than 51 per cent. 
The new oil companies were vertically integrated companies along the line 
extraction-refining-marketing.392 However, the status of the companies was 
different. LUKoil, Yukos and Surgutneftegaz were established as "finished" 
commercial structures, while Rosneft (which supplanted the former state 
corporation Rosneftegaz) was envisaged as a transitory structure out of which 
other VICs would be carved in time, with the state retaining 100 per cent of its 
shares. Rosneft retained the status of a state enterprise and was to administer 
the state share of its constituent entities in trusteeship, and direct the 
commercial administration of its constituent parts. 
The state retained 45 per cent of the shares in each of the three "finished" 
structures, whereas 40 per cent was to be sold through investment tenders over 
the next two years (out of which half (20%) was to be sold through 1993). In 
addition 15 per cent was to be sold for investment vouchers. The state share in 
these companies was to be retained for no less than 3 years, during which time 
the state had the right to appoint the managers. Shares held by foreign 
investors were not to exceed 15 per cent. The state was to be represented 
through the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, GKI and GKAP, each of which was 
charged with administering state property in the oil sector. 
In addition to these production companies the decree established the two 
transport companies - Transneft' and Transnefteprodukt. These companies 
remained state controlled and controlled no less than 51 per cent of their 
constituent entities. Subsequently (1993-1996) several other VICs (and 
partially integrated companies) were carved out of Rosneft. The state retained 
shares in these varies to some extent compared to those initially created by 
RFPD N!! 1403. However, the structure of corporatisation is the same: the 
creation of oil companies by government decisions and presidential decree; 
392 The actual founding of these companies was done subsequently by government decisions. 
See Chapter 8 and Appendix B. 
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controlling stakes in a series of daughter companies; and the retention of a 
state share for a number of years. 
Thus by the end of 1992 a strategy for developing the organisational 
framework had been developed. This was to retain the previous administrative 
structure (PAs) and supplant the former strategic functions of the branch 
ministerial structure by the creation of partly privatised oil holding majors. It 
retained the former state monopoly in transportation, which gave the state 
control over oil exports. The state remained represented in the newly formed 
oil companies through a number of ministries and commissions, and retained 
considerable authority to affect incentive structures. 
Legislative development. 
The development of a legislative base that was to provide a system of stable 
and predictable regulation was regarded in the 1992 Energy Concept to be one 
of the crucial elements of successful transition from the administrative-
command economy. The development of and functioning of such a legislative· 
base would constitute a break with the previous system of state power. 
Assuming that such legislation was binding on all parts to a transaction, the 
legislative base as envisaged by the Energy Concept, would represent a shift 
from the 'rule by law' to the 'rule of law', or a shift towards a constitutional-
bureaucratic structure of infrastructural state power. Such a shift would not 
only be conducive to a more transparent and predictable investment climate, 
but also allow the state to develop a higher degree of state autonomy. 
The 'Subsoil Law' was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
Federation in February 1992 (coming into effect in May 1992).393 The law 
aimed to regulate the exploration, use and protection of the subsoil within the 
territory and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation. The law 
governed the establishment of a State Subsoil Fund, regulation of federal and 
republican authorities in matters concerning the subsoil, types of use, granting 
393 RF Federal Law 0 nedrakh [On the depths]. The 'Subsoil Law' (and subsequent 
amendments) can be found at http://www.referent.ru .. 
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of licenses, duration, terms and conditions, rights and obligations of the user, 
revocation, payment of fees and dispute settlement. 
However, the law made no clear definition of minerals, nor did it clearly 
establish a division of property rights - ownership of in situ and produced 
petroleum was not dealt with.394 The law distinguished between the status of 
the subsoil and any natural resources contained within the subsoil, continuing 
the practice of regarding the subsoil as a part of the natural environment and 
therefore exempted from transactions.395 The law stated that all mineral 
resources belonged to the state, but did not specify a level of authority 
division. Instead the law established the principle of joint decision making 
between agencies of state power of the RF and its constituent republics. 
Royalty payments were to be divided between the federal budget, republican 
budgets and local budgets (40%_30%_30%).396 Crucially, the law did not 
establish a set of normative rules for the utilisation of the subsoil. The 
allocation of rights to use the subsoil continued to be regulated by, 
administrative procedures (granting of licenses). Representatives from both 
federal and regional authorities were partaking in the establishment of each 
license - the so-called 'two key approach' .397 
The law was intended to facilitate foreign investment in the natural resources 
industries and clarify the 'rules of the game'. However, the absence of clear 
property definitions, the administrative approach and restrictions on the 
transfer of property and licences meant that the uncertainty surrounding the oil 
394 Cameron, 'Minerals - Subsoil Law and decree on the procedure for implementation -
extensive licensing regime established', Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 1993, 
vo\. 11, no. 1, p. 55. 
395 Makhlina, 'Russian legislation governing investor's rights and the ownership of natural 
resources', in The Oil and Gas Guide to the Former Soviet Union, CIS Technical Publishing 
Institute, 1995, p. 49. 
396 A new tax code became effective on 1.1.2002. Under the new tax code the structure of 
royalty payment and distribution was altered. See below, pp. 208-209. 
397 According to Interviewee # 12 the 'two-key' approach was a political concession to the 
regions that serves to impede the transparency of the regulative system an~ increased the 
scope for bureaucratic discretion. However, by accepting the regions' right to participate in 
the regulation of the oil industry, some of the regions were able to significantly soften the 
negative impacts of 'shock therapy'. (Shafranik & Kryukov, Zapadno-Sibirskii Fenomen 
[The West Siberian Phenomenon/Miracle], Polteks, 2000, p. 219). 
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business continued. The law was amended in 1994, but the new provisions if 
anything only confused matters further. 398 
Work on a comprehensive 'Oil and Gas Law' began in 1991. This law was to 
supplement the 'Subsoil Law' .399 It was to provide a comprehensive 
framework for petroleum licensing and operations; provide a level playing 
field for domestic and international investors alike; provide necessary 
conditions for the development of a market economy; and to clarify the 
division of responsibility between the federal and regional levels. 
Three versions of this law were developed: the Tishchenko version; the Gas 
version proposing a separate law for the oil and gas industries; and Gazeev-
Hardy version assisted by oil legislative experts from the University of 
Houston.4oo In order to facilitate the passage of the law a uniform trade off 
version was developed under the auspices of Prof. Perchik (Gubkin Institute of 
Oil and Gas). This latter version was later presented to the Duma. The 
Perchik version differed from the more liberal Gazeev-Hardy version, by 
providing for greater administrative discretion in the development of 
individual licenses and ownership rights with respect to produce.401 
Nonetheless the draft law provided a measure of stability and predictability. 
One analyst described it as providing 'legislative rules in place of 
governmental regulations', when it was passed by the Lower House in July 
1995.402 However, the law failed to be endorsed by the Federation Council 
and the president. Subsequently, improvements of the Subsoil Law and 
development of a production-sharing regime (PSA) has been the preferred 
venue for improving the legislative and regulatory base in the oil industry,403 
hence work on the Oil and Gas Law has never been completed. 
398 Makhlina, op cit. p.49. 
399 A draft version of the 'Oil and Gas Law' can be found in lEA, International energy 
conference on natural resource management: crude oil sector. Moscow, 23-25 Nov. 1992, 
OECD/IEA,1993. 
400 Konoplyanik, 'Russia struggling to revive production, rebuild oil industry', GGJ, vol. 91, 
no. 31 (Aug. 2, 1993). 
401 Watson, 'Foreign investment in Russia: The case of the oil industry', Europe-Asia Studies, 
1996, vol. 48, no. 3, p. 436. 
402 Heinsohn, 'Duma adapts draft oil and gas law', MT, 13.7.1995. 
403 Sagers, 'Developments in Russian crude oil production in 2000', Post-Soviet Geography 
and Economics, 200 I, vol. 42, no. 3, p. 171. 
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The development of a PSA legislation that is acceptable to hydrocarbon 
producers and the various levels of administration has been underway for most 
of the 1990s. Due to the absence of normative legislation that would govern 
extractive production, investors (especially foreign investors) have lobbied for 
the establishment of a PSA law. 
A PSA agreement represents a contract between the owner of the resources 
(the State) and investors to share costs and revenues in the development of 
resources.404 It provides a tax framework for each agreement, division of 
rights of produce, and regulates export rights.405 According to a former Soviet 
Ministry of Oil official and specialist on the protection of property rights in 
Russia a PSA framework should 'protected four main rights. Firstly, to have 
stability - stable terms. Secondly, to have full control over operation, so that 
the state does not interfere with day to day operation. Thirdly, that the 
investor can do what he wants with his part of production - for instance to. 
export 100% of oil production and not be limited to 30%. Fourthly, he must 
have the right to go to arbitrage, foreign arbitrage and court. If these four 
main rights are protected, then the investor has quite good possibility to work 
here, to have good economics, and to have good results' .406 
Important in the Russian case was that it would also guarantee tax and 
operative stability ex post in that agreements (ideally) could be grandfathered 
in new legislation.407 Each agreement thus regulates the relationship between 
404 Under a PSA regime the state gives up sovereign immunity. Contractual disputes become 
a matter for civil law rather than administrative law. (Kirillova, Legal Aspects of Foreign 
Investment in the Region: Into the next Millennium Oil and Gas Opportunities in the Former 
Soviet Union, Mitre House (McKenna & Co), 1998, p. 5). 
405 A conference on natural resource management in the crude oil sector was held in Moscow 
in November 1992 under the auspices of the International Energy Agency (lEA). For a 
detailed description of the virtues ofa PSA agreement see the conference proceedings. (lEA 
(1993), op cit.). 
406 Interviewee # 1. 
407 A grandfather clause means that previous agreements will not be affected by new 
legislation. Talking about PSA Interviewee # I referred to the need for stability with the 
following example. '[The] legal system can always change. I favoured [that] the agreement 
should be stable for the whole period ofproduction ... [F]or example, Shtokman project, should 
last not less than 50 years. If you count back 50 years from now, there was Stalin, Khrushov, 
Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and now Putin - and three constitutions 
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the company and the authorities on a contractual basis. The PSA law was 
passed in December 1995.408 Throughout the legislative process several 
compromises had to be reached due to demands from the Duma and the 
Federation Council, thus the law that was passed in 1995 from the start drew 
heavy criticism - especially from Western investors. The legislative process 
had made the compromise law contain 'more taxes, more politics and fewer 
guarantees' .409 Furthermore the law was incompatible with existing 
legislation and internally contradictory, which made the implementation of the 
law dependent on the passing of an enabling law.410 Such legislation was not 
passed until 1999. 
The PSA law enforced that all fields eligible for PSA development had to be 
approved by the Duma. The Duma was entrusted with the responsibility of 
establishing a list of fields that would be eligible for development under PSA 
terms. These lists themselves have the status of a federal law.411 From a 
foreign investor's point of view issues related to tax responsibilities, cost 
recovery principles and calculations, transfer of licenses, and the absence of 
taking contract disputes to international arbitration made the 1995 PSA less 
attractive.412 The law enabled the Russian government to unilaterally 
renegotiate the terms of the contract in light of substantial changes in 
circumstances. However, such circumstances are not specified, leading 
were active!' According to Interviewee # 6, 'PSA has two advantages. Firstly, the law 
guarantees stability. Secondly, it guarantees the accompanying tax regime'. 
408 RF Federal Law 0 soglasheniyakh 0 razdele produktsii [On the agreements on the division 
of production]. The PSA Law can be found at http://www.referent.ru.. Also the author has 
had access to Ger Vandenberg's (of the Leiden University Institute of East European Law) 
database on Russian legislation (with comments). 
409 Comerford & Lukianov, 'Oil Law Clumsily Drafted', MT, \.5.1996. 
410 Sagers, 200 I, op cit. p. 174. According to Interviewee # 6, 'The constitution says that the 
subsoil can be in any form of possession. The law on the subsoil however says that it can only 
be state owned'. 
411 According to one of the academics involved in the drafting of the Oil and Gas Law, 'An 
agreement is a commercial document, how can it be approved by law? Then the deputies will 
discuss it. If we came to an agreement and the government signed it and there subsequently 
should be disagreement, you are in a poor position because you do not have the right to 
change a law. It is rubbish that a law should approve a commercial document'. (Interviewee 
# 6). 
412 Prior to the 1995 PSA law three agreements had been concluded, which have been 
grandfathered. Since 1995 not a single agreement has been concluded. (Subbotin, 'Time to 
make a decision', Oil o/Russia, 2002, No. I, p. 37). 
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investors to wonder if fluctuations m oil prices would constitute such a 
change.413 
Criticism of the PSA law has not only been confined to foreign investors, it 
has drawn opposition from several other participants in the regulation of the 
oil industry. Domestic producers regard it as creating an uneven playing field, 
in terms of giving foreign investors preferential treatment, particularly with 
respect to access to export.414 Another argument is that there are sufficient 
resources available at the present in order for the companies (and the 
government) to wait for technological advances to reduce the cost of 
developing new and hard-to-recover reserves, making Western investors and 
PSA of less long-term importance.415 Finally Khodorkovsky claims that total 
Russian tax receipt will be less under PSA than under the present system.416 
While these are arguments that from a populist point of view no doubt go 
down well with Duma representatives and government officials, there are 
other, less politically attractive reasons for the Russian companies not to 
support PSA:417 
1. Receiving rights to subsurface usage under PSA requires more resources 
(financial and administrative) than compared with the licensing system; 
2. Under a PSA the pricing mechanism is fixed under the agreement. Until 
the establishment of a severance tax (effective as of 1 January 2002) VICs 
could make extensive use of transfer prices that underestimated the 
remittance for subsurface usage rights for crude produced under the 
licensing system; 
3. A PSA regime would require higher standards of transparency in the 
activities of both the companies and the state. Such transparency would 
reduce the companies ability to an aggressive tax policy, since much of the 
413 Comerford & Lukianov, op cit. 
414 This opinion was frequently expressed to the author while conducting interviews with 
Russian oil company executives (Moscow, March/April2002). Interviewees # 7 & 11. 
415 Interview with Khodorkovsky (President of Yukos). Sivakov, 'The Power of Big Oil', 
Ekspert, no. 4 , Feb. 2003. At: http://www.ekspert.ru. 
416 Cited in Fletcher, 'CERA: Yukos CEO claims BP deal proves PSAs not necessary for 
Russian investments', OGJ Online, 11.2.2003. At: http://ogLpennnet.com/home.cfm. 
417 The following information is based on Konoplyanik, 'Would Russian oil companies really 
like to have a PSA regime in Russia?' OGJ, vo!. 100, no. 52 (Dec. 23, 2002), pp. 20-26. 
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tax optimisation was achieved due to the lack of transparency m the 
system of taxation; 
4. Finally, the overly bureaucratic and time-consuming nature of finalising a 
PSA along with the absence of judicial practice related to PSA dispute 
settlement, makes the system less desirable. 
A frequent argument in favour of PSA is that it will generate higher levels of 
budgetary income, output and investment.418 However, points 1,3 & 4 above 
point to the relationship between transaction costs and structure of state power. 
Increased transaction costs reduce potential profit. In the light of a continued 
patrimonial-despotic structure of state power, uncertainty with respect to the 
state's (at all levels) ex-post commitment and the absence of a credible 
(impartial) venue of conflict resolution, a PSA regime can increase transaction 
costs. Opposition to PSA amongst the Russian companies is not across the 
board. For instance Rosneft and LUKoil are both in favour of PSA, while 
Yukos, ·Sibneft and TNK are against.419 PSA may rationally imply greater 
benefits. However, unless the incentive structure that the companies operate 
in is altered, and thereby the structure of state power, distrust of the state will 
lessen the attractiveness and investment willingness among several of the 
companies. While appropriation of rent and resources remains linked to a 
patrimonial-despotic (hierarchical bargaining) structure transaction cost 
outside a normative framework of regulation may turn out to be less (and more 
predictable ).420 
Western analysts have often interpreted Duma opposition in terms of anti-
reform/anti-foreign investment sentiments.42I While such sentiments cannot 
be denied among some Duma deputies,422 the debate is more fundamental than 
pro or anti reform. It encapsulates the establishment of state power, and 
418 Ziener, 'The Russian Oil Sector: Finally Ready for Investors?', Russian Economic Trends, 
200 I, vot. 10, no. 3/4, p. 42. 
419 Interviewee # 11. 
420 Diskin finds that well informed owners of big saving regard financial institutions and the 
state as the main obstacles to organised use of savings. (Diskin, op cif., p. 32). 
421 Executive Briefing: Russian Oi/lndustry Analysis, Russian Petroleum Investor (RP!), 1999, 
p.23. 
422 Gulyayev, 'Deputies: Oil Law Negotiations Stuck' MT, 28.11.1995. Further, there has 
been a gradual shift in the Duma's attitude towards legislation and PSA. (See below). 
193 -
should therefore rather be seen as a means of exerting influence on the 
circulation of revenues and rent generated in the oil industry by the various 
participants that may legally claim a right of appropriation. Several regions 
for instance passed their own PSA legislation in an attempt to implement their 
own projects, laws that often contradicted Federallegislation.423 Tatarstan has 
passed its own Oil Law and operates its own oil taxation framework. 424 
Furthermore, one has to ask what role the legislative is supposed to play. With 
the opposition of some Russian companies to PSA, the Duma's composition, 
the question becomes more 'what kind of reform?' rather then 'yea or nay' to 
reform. 
The development of PSA has been a re-active rather then pro-active process, 
enshrining in law obtained rights ex post. Foreign investors and proponents of 
PSA in Russia on the other hand want PSA to represent ex ante rules of the 
game that will create the necessary predictability and stability for investment 
in the Russian oil industry, particularly in light of the worsening reserve· 
situation.425 
In December 1998 a PSA amendment law was passed which dealt with some 
of the concerns expressed by foreign investors.426 Fields with reserves less 
than 25 million tons no longer required Duma approval. This constituted both 
a concession to the regions (they could implement their own projects only 
subjected to Federal government approval) and the re-establishment of Federal 
pre-eminence in PSA legislation. For foreign investors the amendments 
created further barriers by limiting the proportion of reserves eligible for PSA 
to 30 per cent, and establishing norms for the required utilisation of Russian 
equipment and workforce. The law maintained the 'two key' principle in 
423 Sagers, 200 I, op cit., p. 174. 
424 The Tatar Oil Law is available at: http://www.nefte.rulzakon/4.htm. For Tatar taxation see 
Tokarev, 'Nalogovoe Regulirovanie NeJtegazovogo Sektora: Regiona/'nye Aspekty [Tax 
regulation ofthe oil and gas sector: regional aspects], IEiOPP SO RAN, 2000, p. 140-15\. 
425 These sentiments were expressed to the author in talks with executives of non-Russian oil 
majors and an advisor to the Duma commission on PSA. According to one oil executive after 
some initially disappointing test driIIings his company had 'like most of the other international 
companies sat on the fence and awaited the arrival of the PSA legislation'. (Interviewee # 10). 
426 RF Federal Law 0 vnesnii izmenenii i dopolnenii v federal 'nyi zakon '0 soglasheniyakh 0 
razdele produktsii [On the introduction of changes and additions to federal law 'on the 
agreements on the division of production]. At: http://www.referent.ru. 
194 -
issuing licenses for agreements, in concluding agreements, and participating in 
the controlling committee of an agreement. In 2002 a further two amendment 
to PSA were under elaboration. The Ministry of Finance was preparing a 
fiscally oriented version that would make PSA more akin to the present tax 
framework.427 A second version was being developed by the Duma that too a 
greater extent takes into account the wishes of industry.428 These pending 
amendments to PSA again demonstrate a fundamental dilemma in reforming 
the Russian economy and the legislative process. In Russia the structure of 
state power is based upon the state's position in the circulation of income and 
resources and its ability to ex post redefine the rules of the game. A (proper) 
PSA framework would challenge this· position by imposing ex post 
accountability on the state. The opportunity cost of such a regime may 
therefore, be too great for the state. According to one specialist on PSA, the 
great benefit of PSA to the Russian economy was not its fiscal properties but 
its investment related multiplier effect that could serve as an engine for more 
diversified economic growth.429 
The work on these three laws has represented the main legislative thrust 
towards establishing a normative framework for the regulation of oil 
production, ownership, and rights. In addition a number of laws regulating 
specific parts of the industry have been enacted/under development. The Law 
on the Continental Shelf was enacted at the end of 1995.430 This law 
establishes exclusive rights for the federal authorities to regulate and grant 
rights of exploration and development of the Russian continental shelf. The 
law establishes that both foreign and domestic investors may participate in the 
tenders and auctions for such rights. 
427 Interviewee # 9. 
428 According to Interviewee # 9, 'The main difference lies in the psychology. The 
government version is about a prisoner, who is freed before time, and is constantly under the 
surveillance of the police so that their behaviour should be absolutely correct. The version of 
the Duma is about the free person, which should behave normally in society. On the street 
these two persons are equal, but their position in society is very different'. 
429 [bid 
430 RF Federal Law 0 kontinental'nom shelYe rossiiskoi Jederatsii [On the continental shelf of 
the Russian Federation). At: http://www.referent.ru. 
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The Law on Natural Monopolies regulates the functioning of the two main 
transportation organisations - Transneft and Transnefteprodukt - defining 
them as natural monopolies.431 The law established the creation of state 
organs of regulation - Federal Energy Commission (FEK) - to regulate the 
pipeline systems together with the GKAP. Furthermore, the laws specify the 
methods of regulation available to these organs, their responsibility and 
authori ty. 432 
Finally, a Law on Trunk Pipelines has been under development since 1994. 
As with the Oil and Gas Law several competing versions of this law have been 
discussed. Issues of contention have been the degree of state ownership and 
access regulation to various pipeline systems. No compromise version has so 
far been accepted by the Duma. 
The legislation enacted so far diverges considerably from the intention of the 
Energy Concept. Whereas the Energy Concept envisaged the establishment of 
a normative framework that would provide a transparent, competitive and fair 
system of regulation, the enacted legislation has failed to create clear lines.of 
rights and duties. The authority of federal and regional/local organs of power 
in several instances remain unclear. As with the development of the PSA law 
legislation has been predominately re-active rather than pro-active leading to 
frequent changes in legislation as the struggle for control has superseded 
previous positions. This is demonstrated, and implied in the above, by the 
chronic failure of the participants to the legislative process to agree on 
legislation ex ante that would be honoured ex post, a situation that bears more 
resemblance to a 'rule by law' rather than a 'rule of law'. Nonetheless 
progress in this respect has been achieved throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, with responsibilities and rights gradually crystallising as a result of the 
bargaining process that still is state power. 
431 RF Federal Law 0 estestvennykh monopo/iyakh [On natural monopolies]. At: 
http://www.referent.ru. 
432 The specific authority of the FEK was later established by Government Decision N!! 560 
(8.5.1996). 0 reorganizatsii organov gosudarstvennovo energeticheskovo nadzora v rossiiskoi 
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The legislative process has been a vehicle for attempting to redistribute 
authorities previously commanded by the USSR organisations to the various 
actors and organisations that developed in the aftermath of the 1987 'radical 
reforms' and subsequent dissolution of the USSR. The struggle for where 
these former authorities should rest has been intimately linked with the 
development of the state and state structure,433 i.e. the structure of state 
power.434 Competition between the various actors for the previous authorities 
has been one of the reasons for the protracted negotiations surrounding 
legislative development and the slow implementation of a coherent legislative 
framework. A major concession of the Subsoil Law is that it recognises the 
right of non-state entities to work the subsoil and legitimises the right of the 
regions of operation to parts of the potential rent. It thus opened the 
possibility of detaching the state as owner of resources from the role of 
operator. 435 On the other hand neither this law nor subsequent laws have 
succeeded in establishing ex post stability that would be a pre-requisite for the 
emergence of bureaucratic infrastructural mode of state power. While the 
rights of different organisational entities to appropriate rent has been agreed in 
principle, the specific mandate that accrues to each organisation and how to 
achieve independent arbitration in case of conflict has remained undefined. 
Even where procedures for such matters have been established, there has been 
frequent ex post disagreement, followed by alterations, leading to uncertainty 
and instability. 
Parallel to the above-mentioned struggle for control, there is an underlying 
conceptual dilemma. In the case of the Russian oil industry there is an 
Jederatsii [on the reorganisation of state organs of energy supervision]. At: 
http://www.referent.ru. 
433 Moe & Kryukov, 'Joint Management of oil and gas resources in Russia', Post-Soviet 
Geography and Economics, 1998, vol. 39, no. 7, p. 595. 
434 Commenting on the development of the legislative framework one of the interviewees said: 
'1 have the opinion that mainly lawyers should be writing laws, but in our case it is dictated by 
the political and by different lobbying interests. That's why sometimes, if two or three groups 
are struggling for different wording of the article ... sometimes they trade - trade their votes in 
exchange for something ... other political privileges'. (Interviewee # 1). 
435 Moe & Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 596. The authors of this article further state that: 
'Control over the exploitation of mineral resources, an activity that tended to be concentrated 
in more peripheral areas within the Federation, became a test for the willingness of the central 
authorities to yield control over crucial spheres of governmental operations to the regions'. 
(ibid. ). 
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inherent contradiction in the tenns 'competitive environment' and retention of 
the benefits of a 'single production-technological complex' .436 The creation of 
VICs and their subsequent control over regional infrastructure was unlikely to 
be conducive to the development of a regional competitive environment and 
likely to raise barriers to entry for independent producers.437 
On the other hand, the legislative "vacuum" that existed and the struggle 
between federal and regional authorities was instrumental in the growth of the 
oil industry's economic power, allowing the companies to become involved in 
the exercise of state power and circulation of rent and resources. This 
argument is not only true for the oil industry, but rather reflects how the 
development of the economy has remained closely linked to political 
legitimacy, and thus impeded the development of autonomous state power. 
Throughout the 1990s the operative framework in Russia has remained one of 
despotic-patrimonial state structure with a high degree of state capture. The 
establishment of various administrative units to oversee and regulate the 
industry is one example of this, their overlapping authority, the licensing 
approach and the implementation of tenders and auctions are others. 
Rent extraction and securing state revenues.438 
As shown in Chapter 4, throughout the Soviet period the extraction of rent 
from the oil industry was closely intertwined with the state's redistributive 
role. The state's monopoly and monopsony position were fundamental means 
of controlling prices and the circulation of resources. Both mechanisms 
served as a means to extract rent from the economy. With the introduction of 
self-financing, refonns in the structure of interaction between economic units, 
and the gradual appropriation of authority by the regions the flows of 
circulation started to change. (See Figure 8.1). 
436 Moe & Kryukov, 'Observations on the reorganization of the Russian oil industry', Post-
Soviet Geography, 1994, vol. 35, no. 2, p. 92. 
437 Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 119. 
438 On the decrees and decisions in this section see also Sagers et al., 'Resource rent from the 
oil and gas sector and the Russian economy', Post-Soviet Geography, 1995, vol. 36, no. 7, pp. 
389-425. Hober, A Game Called Russian Oil: Trading Oil in the FSU - Recent 
Developments, Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 1995, vol. 13, no. 2. 
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The Energy Concept envisaged a shift from direct state control over prices and 
the flow of resources to a market-based situation where the state would 
appropriate rent through indirect means - taxes, levies and charges. As with 
the development of a legislative framework however, disagreement between 
the fundamental actors of the oil industry (how much to whom) resulted in an 
unstable and unclear framework of operation. The subsoil law for instance 
enabled regions and local authorities to levy taxes on top of taxes established 
by the federal authorities, but there was no uniform system of how much such 
taxes should be or how they should be used, rendering the process of tax 
collection open to misappropriation. With respect to rent extraction the main 
achievement of the legislative framework in the 1990s has been the state's 
acceptance of sharing potential rent income however, the specific proportions 
of division were less clear.439 
Prices. The pricing mechanism was one of the main institutions of rent 
extraction in the USSR, and the pros and cons of liberalising prices has been 
fiercely debated in Russia since 1992. Price liberalisation was one of the 
pillars of the reform initiatives that were advocated by the international 
financial institutions (lFI). The proponents of price liberalisation argued that 
this would: allow proper industrial self-financing; increase and simplify the 
collection of taxes; create a transparent system of rent extraction; and 
stimulate energy conservation. Opponents argued that price liberalisation 
would result in inflation and subsequent bankruptcy and unemployment due to 
industry'S loss of competitive advantage (cheap energy).440 With respect to 
energy prices a compromise was instituted at the beginning of 1992. 
Unlike the general price liberalisation that was enacted on 1 January 1992 the 
price of oil was one of the essential goods that remained controlled along with 
439 An exemption here is royalty payment, which was regulated by the Subsoil law. However, 
even in this case the division of this rent has in recent years been altered in favour of the 
federal authorities. 
440 Kryukov (1998), op cif., p. 129. 
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approximately 20 per cent of industrial goods.44I These pnces were 
administratively hiked on 1 January as well. However, a two-tier price system 
was already in operation due to production associations having the right to 
dispose of 20 per cent of their production outside the state order system.442 
Such oil was sold at exchanges at prices considerably above the state order 
price. In February 1992 the share that could be realised at free prices was 
increased. In accordance with Presidential Decree NQ 151 the regions obtained 
the right to purchase 10 per cent of production on their territory at state prices 
and resell up to 40 per cent of this production at free prices.443 Production 
associations had the portion of their production that could be realised at free 
prices increased to 40 per cent in accordance with Government Decision NQ 
93.444 Although the initial price hike at the beginning of 1992 had increased 
oil prices approximately 5 times,445 the rapid inflation at the beginning of the 
year soon worsened oil's relative price vis-a-vis other industrial inputs. 
In an attempt to improve the situation in the industry a more flexible pricing 
structure was introduced in May 1992 with Government Decision NQ 318.446 
The decision aimed to improve both the relative price of oil and curb the 
unjustified (in the view ofthe government) high price of "free" oil. 
441 President RSFSR Decree N!! 297 (3.12.1991),0 merakh po liberalizatsii tsen [on measures 
for the liberalisation of prices]. At: http://www.referent.ru. Sagers et al., 1995, op cit., p. 401. 
442 This share had been increased from the previous \0% by Government Decision N!! 12 
(4.1.1992), Ob osobennostyakh regulirovaniya tsen na produktsiyu toplivno-energeticheskovo 
kompleksa [On the particularities of regualtion of price on production of the fuel and energy 
complex]. At: http://www.referent.ru. . 
443 RFPD N!! 151 (17.2.1992), 0 poryadke ispol 'zovaniya nefii, gasa i produktov ikh 
pererabotki, postupayushchikh v rasporyazhenie organov ispolnitel 'noi vlasti respublik v 
sostave rossiiskoi federatsii, kraev, oblastei i avtonomnykh obrazovanii [On the order of the 
use of oil, gas and refined products entering into the disposal of the organs of executive power 
of the republics of the Russian federation, krais, regions and autonomous formations]. At: 
http://www.referent.ru. 
444 Government decision N!! 93 (17.2.1992), 0 neotlozhnukh merakh po normalizatsii 
polozheniya v neftyanoi i gasovoi promyshlennosti respubliki [On the urgent measures for 
normalising the situation in the oil and gas industry of the republics]. At: 
http://www.referent.ru.This decision allowed the scientific production associations Termneft, 
Nefteotdacha, Tyumenneftegaz and the PA Sakhalinmorneftegaz to realise their entire 
production at free prices for the stimulation of use of new methods of extraction. This right 
was also obtained by geological prospecting organisations. 
445 Government Decision N!! 55 (19.12.1991), 0 merakh po Iiberalizatsii tsen [On measures 
for the liberalisation of prices]'. At: http://law.optima.ru. 
446 Government Decision N!!318 (18.5.1992), 0 gosudarstvennom regulirovanii tsen na 
energoresursy, drugie vidy produktsii i yslugi [On state regulation of prices on energy 
resources, and other forms of products and services]. At: http://law.optima.ru. 
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Therefore, oil prices were to lie in a corridor between 1800-2200 Roubles. 
However, for each 100 Rouble increment above the minimum 1800 a penalty 
would be deducted to the 'price regulation fund' under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Finance.447 A further 10 per cent of the realised wholesale price 
was to be deducted to a fund for financing geological prospecting. A price 
above the 2200 Rouble limit was by definition illegal. 
The base price for oil was increased to 4000 Roubles in September 1992.448 
Along with this increase a change in the structure of price formation was 
introduced. Crude oil producers had profitability capped at 50 per cent of their 
production cost (sebestoimost). Although a similar deduction system (to the 
above) for prices above the base price was in function, the price setting 
mechanism for the first time became a partly dynamic function, i.e. prices 
could be altered by the producers as a function of their own cost function, and 
had thereby reached a semi-liberalised stage. The base price was subsequently 
increased in February 1993.449 
Table 7.2 - Growth of Russian domestic crude prices 1992-95 in Rou bles 
(current prices). 
Source: Sagers et al. 1995 p. 403-404. 
With the abolition ofthe 'price regulation fund' and the base price system on 1 
July 1993 the deterrent to further price increases was again reduced.45o Table 
7.2 shows the development of prices 1992-95. The price cap still remained in 
place and therefore no market price developed as production costs varied 
447 Within each increment: 60, then 70 ... 80 ... 90 Roubles. 
448 RFPD N!! 1089, 0 gosudarstvennom regulirovanii tsen na otdel 'nye vidy energoresursov 
[on the state regulation of prices on different forms of energy resources]. Sob. Zak., 1992, no. 
12, st. 929. Penalties for above minimum price were set at 30 Roubles for each lOO Roubles 
within the next 500 roubles, then for the following lOO within next 500 40 ... and 50 above 
5000 Roubles. 
449 Sagers et al., 1995, op cit., p. 403. 
450 RFPD N!! 979 (1.7.1993), 0 priznanii utrativshim situ punkta 1 ukaza prezidenta rossiiskoi 
federatsii ot 17 sentyabrya 1992 g. n 1089 "0 gosudarstvennom regulirovanii tsen na 
oldel 'nye vidy energoresursov" [On the acknowledgement that point I of decree no. I 089 of 
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greatly. In the following period the state' s direct control over price formation 
consisted of limiting the legal level of profitability. 
According to Kryukov, the basic parameters that influenced increases in oil 
prices in this period were costs, profitability limitation, inflation expectation 
and government tax policy.451 Compared to world prices downward pressure 
was exerted by limited export access and the export quota system.452 
Nonetheless, between 1992 and 1993 the price increase for oil exceeded the 
industrial wholesale index, with the inflation expectation in industrial goods 
being a major factor behind this development.453 In February 1995 prices on 
oil were liberalised fully with the abolition of the price cap.454 
Figure 7. 2 - Oil prices pr ton in current Dollars 1992-2000. 
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Note: All prices are end of year prices. There has been 
considerable movement of prices within each year. Series should 
therefore be regarded as trend lines. World price is Brent price. 
Series are calculated by author using 1992 end of year as base 
price. Rouble prices have been converted into dollars using 
exchange rate reported in EBRD transition reports 1999 & 200 I. 
Despite these measures domestic crude oil prIces continued to lag behind 
world prices (see Figure 7.2). This has been partly due to the natural export 
the president of the Russian Federation on 17 September 1992 "on the state regulation of 
prices on different forms of energy resources" has lost its force] . At: http://www.referent.ru. 
45 1 Kryukov (1998), op cit., pp. 132-133. 
452 Sagers, et aI. , 1995. pp. 403-404. 
453 Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 132. 
454 RFPD N!! 221 (28.2.1995), 0 merakh po uporyadocheniyu gosudarstvennovo 
regulirovaniya tsen (tari/ov) [On the measures for the regulation of state regulation of prices 
(tariffs)]. Sob. Zak. 1995, no. 10, st. 859, pp. 1656-1657. 
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constraints in the fonn of a lack of export infrastructure and the government's 
use of duties and excises to function as a wedge between domestic and 
international prices. A frequent argument in the west has been that the 
government has used its control over the pipeline system to artificially ensure 
an oversupply of oil on the domestic market. However, at least one Russian 
oil industry executive the author spoke to regards this proposition as a Western 
misconception that overestimates the power and interests of the Russian 
state.455 Along with the fall in domestic oil demand these measures resulted in 
an oversupply of crude oil on the domestic market. This oversupply not only 
resulted in downward pressure on domestic crude prices, but also compelled 
producers to shut-in production.456 Other factors, such as non-payment 
problems and transfer pricing added downward pressure in the form of 
reducing solvent demand. According to Sagers, only about 3 per cent of 
produced crude oil was traded domestically on commercial terms.457 
Export. Appropriating the differential between "domestic prices" and world· 
prices was one of the several means by which the USSR extracted rent from 
the oil industry. Besides the price differential export of oil and gas constituted 
the USSR's main source of foreign currency. The state had enjoyed virtually 
complete control over exports until the end of the Soviet period. Only with 
the introduction of producer's right to sell parts of their production was the 
state forced to share some of the income from more profitable export sales.458 
This function was seized by Russia even before the demise of the Soviet 
Union through RSFSR Government Decision N!! 7 (Nov. 1991). This decision 
established the framework for export regulation that was dominant during the 
1990s. Previous export licenses were subjected to re-registration and were 
cancelled unless successfully reconfirmed by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy 
and Commission of Foreign Economic Relations. 
455 Interviewee # 7. According to Interviewee # 3, 'In principle Russian companies cannot 
export 100% of their production even if they were allowed to do so, because there are 
limitations on the export outlet capacity'. 
456 Sagers et al. 1995, p. 404. 
457 Sagers (200 I), op cit., p. 170. 
458 Chadwick et al argues that Soviet exports were essentially functional rather than 
mercantilist. (Chadwick et ai, Soviet Oil Exports: Trade Adjustments, Refining Constraints 
and Market Behaviour, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 68-69). 
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Furthennore, a system of export quotas was established and a system of 
deliveries of oil to the state - so called orders for state needs. A system of 
special exporters became operative on 1 September 1992 in order to monitor 
the flow of resources and foreign currency.459 The majority of such special 
exporters were the fonner foreign trade organisations (FTO). In addition 
several producers along with private trading companies were registered as 
special exporters.460 Until their abolition in 1995 the special exporters served 
as intennediaries between oil producers and foreign importers. In 1994 
LUKoil was the only VIe that had a competitive trading finn, while the total 
share of Russian oil producers in Russian exports only amounted to roughly 25 
per cent. 461 
The abolition of the quota system was one of several demands on the Russian 
government made by the IFIs. Throughout 1994 attempts were made at 
changing the export framework. Through RFPD N!! 1007 the quota system 
and all export privileges were to be abolished in July 1994.462 However, due 
to pressure from organisations and regional authorities profiting from the 
system it was extended until 1 January 1995.463 In the end the system was not 
abolished until March 1995 when a presidential decree abolished the system of 
special exporters and the quota system.464 
With the liberalisation of exports the government's ability to influence exports 
has been through its use of regulating access to the pipeline system and by a 
continued policy of state orders. With the abolition of the special exporters a 
459 RFPD N!! 628 (14.6.1992), 0 poryadke eksporta strategicheski vazhnykh syr 'evykh tovarov 
[On the procedure of export of strategically important raw materials]. At: 
http://www.referent.ru. 
460 Sagers et al., 1995, op cit., p. 406. 
461 Kabalinsky, 'Russia's Vertically Integrated Oil Companies', Russian Business Monitor, 
1995, no. 3, p. 24. 
462 RFPD N!! 1007 (23.5.1994), Ob otmene kvotirovaniya i Iitsenzirovaniya postavok tovarov i 
uslug na eksport [About the cancellation of quotas and licences of deliveries of goods and 
services for export]. At: http://www.referent.ru. 
463 Sagers et al., 1995, op cit., p. 407-409. RFPD N!! 1385 (1.7.1994), 0 postavkakh nefti i 
nefteproduktov na eksport v 1994 godu [on the deliveries of oil and refined products for export 
in 1994). At: http://www.referent.ru. 
464 RFPD N!! 245 (6.3.1995), Ob osnovnykh printsipakh osushchestvleniya bneshnetorgovnoi 
deyatel'nosti v rossiiskoi Jederatsii [on the main principles of implementation of foreign trade 
activity in the Russian Federation). At: http://www.referent.ru. 
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system of mandatory registration of export contracts with the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and "transaction passports", certificates to verify 
that due export revenues (hard currency) were transferred to the state on time, 
was being introduced.465 However, these tools were less powerful than the 
state's previous hold over delegation of quotas and licences. 
Access to the pipeline systems is regulated by two enactments - government 
decision NQ 209 (1995) and presidential decree NQ 220 (1995).466 The former 
established access to the pipeline system on an equal basis. Provided there 
was capacity, the producer would be allowed to ship the requested amount. In 
the case of higher scheduling requests than capacity, shipping volumes would 
be allocated proportional to production in the previous quarter. Priority access 
would be given to fulfilment of Russian international obligations and to joint 
ventures having received such assurances. In order to administer pipeline 
regulation an Interdepartmental Commission for pipeline regulation (shipping 
supervision - headed by a deputy minister of Fuel and Energy) and a Federal 
Energy Commission (FEK) for the regulation oftariffs were created.467 
The system of export for special purpose state programmes was abolished in 
September 1997,468 freeing up additional export capacity for Russian 
465 Kabalinsky, 'Oil Exports From Russia: Legal Regulations and Common Practices', Russian 
Business Monitor, 1995, no. 4, p. 24. The companies are still required to sell 50% of their 
hard currency revenues to the state. (Interviewee # 4). 
466 Government Decision X!! 209 (28.2.1995), 0 regulirovanii dostupa k sisteme 
magistral'nykh nefteprovodov, nefteproduktoprovodov i terminalov v morskikh portakh dlya 
vyvoza nefti, neftproduktov za predely tamozhennoi territorii rossiiskoi federatsii [On the 
regulation of access to the main pipeline system, refined products pipelines and terminals in 
ports for the export of oil, refined products beyond the borders of the customs territory of the 
Russian Federation]. RFPD X!! 220 (28.2.1995), 0 nekotorykh merakh po gosudarstvennomu 
regulirovaniyu estestvennykh monopolii v rossiiskoi federatsii [On measures for state 
regulation of natural monopolies in the Russian Federation]. Both at: http://www.referent.ru. 
467 Government Decision X!! 94 (30.1.1995),0 mezhvedomstvennoi komissii po regulirovaniyu 
voprosov svyazannykh s ispol'zovaniem sistemy magistral'nykh nefteprovodov 
nefteproduktoprovodov i terminalov v morskikh portakh dlya vyvoza nefti, nefteproduktov za 
predely tamoshennoi territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On the Interdepartmental Commission 
for regulation questions connected with the utilisation of the pipeline systems for oil, oil 
products and oil terminals in sea ports for sending of oil and oil products beyond the custom 
territory of the Russian Federation], Sob.Zak., 1995, no. 6, st. 492. RFPD X!! 1194 
(29.11.1995),0 federal'noi energeticheskoi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On the Russian 
Federation Energy Commission]. At: http://law.optima.ru. 
468 Government Decision X!! 1130 (2.9.1997), 0 raspredelenii dopolnite/'nykh ob 'emov 
transportirovki nefti na eksport [On the distribution of additional volumes of transport of oil 
for export]. At: http://www.referent.ru. 
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producers. By this time non-payment, both to oil producers and from oil 
producers to the state budget, had become almost chronic. Freeing up more 
export capacity was seen as a means of improving the cash-flow situation in 
the oil producing enterprises. The Primakov government again introduced 
exportsfor state needs.469 
Taxes. In market economies, taxes (direct and indirect) constitute a main 
source of state income. One of the main challenges of the reform period in 
Russia has been to shift the structure of state income. This shift implied a 
switch from being "universal producer" to gradually appropriate tax on the 
revenue stream generated by state and private enterprise, while leaving 
enterprises with sufficient means to cover investment needs and 
profit/shareholder requirements. 
This constituted a massive break, both ideologically and practically, with 
Soviet traditions where all revenue "belonged" to the state. In post-Soviet 
Russia this shift in tax structure has perhaps been one of the more telling signs 
of not only the Russian state's dependency on the hydrocarbon industries, but 
also the challenge of reform, and the trappings of the past. In Chapters 2 it 
was argued that part of the reason for declining oil extraction in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s was low investment levels and declining return on investment. 
The development of a tax structure that would allow the industry to renew 
upstream investment balanced with the state's need to cover budgetary means, 
required not only corporate responsibility (tax responsibility), but also 
concessions on the state's side allowing the industry to retain parts of their 
profit. However, throughout the 1990s the question has been more related to 
allowing the industry to create any (legal) profits at all. For most of this 
period the industry has operated with a deficit, contributing to non-
investment,470 payment arrears on part of the industry, and excessive 
administrative leverage in the form of granting dispensations from rules and 
norms. However, deficits were also the results of a) hiding/diverting revenues 
and b) extracting bargaining concessions from various levels of authority. 
469 Sagers (2001), op cit., p. 170. 
470 Ziener, op cit., p. 38. 
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Throughout the 1990s tax take on operating margins in many cases exceeded 
100 per cent.47I The oil and gas industries have been a main pillar of 
government revenues throughout this period contributing some 40 per cent of 
federal government revenues (of which half come from oil) and 40-50 per cent 
of foreign currency earnings.472 
In addition to the regular tax burden - primarily V A T and corporate profit tax 
- the subsoil law stipulates a number of taxes that are particular to the oil and 
gas industries and were subsequently established by government decisions. 
These included payments for the use of the subsoil (royalty); reproduction of 
the mineral reserves; for the issuing of licences; excises; use of land; geologic 
information.473 Due to the excessive tax burden piled on the oil industry 
during the 1990s corporate profit tax, being the only one levied on profits 
rather then revenues, has (de facto) not been applicable to the oil industry for 
much of this period. 
Regions and local authorities have had the right to issue their own taxes. 
These taxes numbered on average 30 in the first half of the 1990s.474 A 
number of the taxes have had a differentiated take depending on the cost 
situation of each particular field. For existing fields (and as part of the auction 
process for new fields) the determination of these rates was a result of 
negotiations between the operator and the respective authorities. 
The excise tax constitutes the most important of the special taxes levied on the 
oil industry and was introduced by presidential decree after the enactment of 
471 Sagers et al., op cit., p. 414. 'Osnovnye kontseptual'nye polozheniya razvitiya neJtegazogo 
kompleksa Rossii [main conceptual condition of development of the Russian oil and gas 
complex)', Minfopenergo, 2000. At: http://www.enippf.ru [Last consulted 13 February 2002]. 
Sagers, 200 I, op cit., pp. 178-180. 
472 Mintopenergo (2000), op cif. For reference, the oil and gas industry generate some 12% of 
industrial production and employ about 3% of the work force. (Ibid.). 
473 Subsoil law, op cif. article 39. For elaboration on the individual points see Subsoil law 
articles 40-47. Also see Sagers et al., 1995, op cif., p. 412, table 2. 
474 lEA (1995), op cit., p. 134. See also Sagers et al. for an elaboration of the different 
regional and local taxes, p. 415. 
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the Subsoil law and became operative on I November 1991.475 The tax has a 
variable profit sensitive character that differentiates between different 
production conditions. Initially it was levied as a percentage on all production 
(including JV production) at Russian domestic prices. The manner of 
administering the tax was changed from a percentage ad valorem tax to a 
Rouble per ton (indexed to the Rouble-Dollar exchange rate) on 1 May 
1994.476 Proceeds from the tax accrue to the federal budget. However, 
through agreements between some regional/local authorities and the federal 
authority parts ofthe proceeds from this tax have been redistributed.477 
Royalty payment was first introduced by the Tyunien oblast Soviet in 1990 
and was subsequently incorporated into the work on the Subsoil law.478 
Government Decision NQ 318 (1992) elaborated on the specific rates of the tax, 
which was levied as a percentage of the wholesale price. This decision also 
established the rates to be deducted for exploration work carried out by the 
previous Ministry of Geology. The royalty income was divided between 
federal (40%), republicanlkrais (30%), and city/raions authorities (30%).479 
Finally, the export tax served to maintain a disparity between domestic prices 
and world market prices. The export tax was introduced by Government 
Decisions NQ 90 and NQ 91(1991).480 The export tax was levied as a fixed 
475 RFPD N!! 893 (14.8.1992), 0 vvedenii aktsiznovo sbora s pol'zovatelei nedr territorii 
rossiiskoi federatsii [On the introduction of excise collection from subsoil users on the 
territory of the Russian Federation]. At: http://www.referent.ru. 
476 Government Decision N!! 320 (14.4.1994), Ob aktsize na nefl', dobyvaemuyu na terrilorii 
rossiiskoi federatsii [About the excise on oil extracted on the territory of the Russian 
Federation]. At: http://www.referent.ru. Differentiation (reflecting production situation 
specificity ) was introduced by Government Decision N!! 534 (24.5.1994), Ob ustanovlenii 
differentsirovannykh stavok aktsiza na nefl', dobyvaemuyu na territorii rossiiskoi federatsii 
[About the establishment of differentiated excise rates on oil extracted on the territory of the 
Russian Federation]. At: http://www.referent.ru. 
477 See Sagers et aI., 1995, op cit., p. 417. MT, 'President Hails 'Federalism' In Bashkortostan 
Oil Deal', 4.8.1994. 
478 Moe & Kryukov (1998), op cit., p. 592. 
479 The oil-extracting sector is by far the greatest "subsoil-payer" to the different budgets. In 
1999 total payment for the use of the subsoil by industry was 30388, I million Rubles. Of this 
the oil extractive industry paid 22686,4 million Rubles (74.7%). For comparison, the gas 
sector paid 4756.4 million Rubles (15.7%). (Babina, 'Rentnyi dokhod pri ispol'zovanii 
prirodnykh resursov [Rent income from the utilisation of natural resources)', Ekonomist, No. 
6,2001, p. 18. 
480 Government Decision N!! 90 (31.12.1991), 0 litsenzirovanii i kvotirovanii eksporta i 
importa tovarov (rabot, uslug) na territorii Rossiskoi Federatsii [On the licences and quotas 
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charge per ton of oil. Income from the tax accrued to the federal budget but 
could be redistributed to subjects of the federation. After a prolonged period 
of gradually reducing the rate of the tax, in accordance with commitments 
made to the IFIs, the tax was finally abolished in 1996.481 The tax was again 
introduced under the Primakov government in January 1999 in order to boost 
state revenues in the wake of the 1998 financial collapse.482 
One industry analyst described the oil industry'S taxation system developed 
during the 1990s as being 'inflexible, basically revenue-based rather than 
profit motivated, over complicated and fiscally oriented' .483 A new tax 
structure became effective on 1 January 2002 containing three main 
components: a profit tax; a severance tax (NDPI); and an incremental revenue 
tax (windfall profits). The NDPI tax incorporates the former royalty payment 
and a number of other payments. The NDPI is divided 80:20 between the 
federal authorities and the corresponding subject of the federation. If the 
production takes place within an autonomous area within a subject of the 
federation the distribution is 74.5:20:5.5. From the continental shelf the entire 
NDPI accrues to the federalbudget.484 
However, this tax reform has continued the government's commitment to 
satisfying its fiscal needs, slightly increased the overall tax burden, favoured 
VIes over independent and non-integrated producers, and will lead to a 
of export and import of goods (labour, service) on the territory of the Russian Federation]. 
Government Decision NQ 91 (31.12.1991), 0 vvedenii eksportnogo tarifa na otdel'nye tovary, 
vyvoznmye s territorii rossiiskoi Jederatsii [On the introduction of tariff on different goods 
exported fTom the territory of the Russian Federation]. Both at: http://law.optima.ru. 
481 Government Decision NQ 479 (1.4.1996), Ob otmene vyvoznykh tamozhennykh poshlin 
izmenenii stavok aktsiza na neft' i dopolnitel'nykh merakh po obespecheniyu postypleniya 
dokhodov v Jederal'nyi byudzhet [About the cancellation of export customs duties, change in 
the rates of excise on oil and additional measures for providing income into the federal 
budget]. At: http://law.optima.ru. 
482 Government Decision NQ 17 (4.1.1999), ob utverzhdenii stavok vyvoznykh tamozhennykh 
poshlin na tovary vyvozimye s territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii [About the establishment of rates 
of export duties on goods exported fTom the territory of the Russian Federation]. At: 
http://law.optima.ru. The tax remained a fixed per ton charge until I January 2002, when a 
35% charge was introduced on oil prices above US$ 15 per barrel - rising to 40% for prices 
above US$ 25 per barrel. Konoplyanik, 'S novymi nalogami, gospodaJ [Happy new taxes 
gentlemen!]" Neft' i kapital, January 2002, no. I, http://www.enippf.ru [13 February 2002]. 
483 Konoplyanik, 'What tax reform in Russian oil industry really means for investors', OGJ, 
vol. 100, no. 25 (June 24, 2002), p. 22-30. 
484 Konoplyanik (Jan. 2002), op cit. 
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minimising of long-term investment activity. What is positive is its creation 
of a more dynamic relationship between world prices and export tariffs and the 
fixing of export tariffs by law.485 
The development of Russian oil policy foundations has demonstrated a 
reactive rather than proactive policy. At the same time a trend towards greater 
flexibility is discernible and has become more pronounced as the industry has 
consolidated. Regulation and operation have increasingly been separated. 
The appearance of regional/local authorities and companies as legitimate 
centres of resource and rent accumulation has increasingly led to a refinement 
in the former structure of state power. However, this refinement has not 
necessarily brought about a substantial shift in the structure of state power, nor 
in the traditional role of the state.486 The process has been conditioned by a 
widening of the formal bargaining participants in order to retain continuity in 
the institutional matrix. The following chapters therefore turn to the 
consolidation of the industry, industry-state relations and industry-industry 
relations. 
485 Ibid. Konoplyanik (Jan. 2002), op cit. 
486 Jones Loung argues that the Russian government has adopted policies that amount to a 
'wholesale shift away from the traditional state role of using its vast energy wealth to maintain 
a bloated social welfare system'. (Jones Loung, 'The "Use and Abuse" of Russia's Energy 
Resources', in Sperling, Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for 
Democratic Governance, Westview Press, 2000, p. 31). The argument of this paper on the 
other hand is that the welfare state itself was but one element of the institutional matrix of the 
Soviet Union and that the use of the energy resources was linked to the maintenance of state 
power through the circulation of rent and resources. 
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Chapter 8 
Privatising the Russian Oil Industry. 
'I went to Moscow and spent two weeks there in 
the corridors of power. .. [t]inally a protocol was 
drawn up. It was signed by senior officials of the 
Fuel Ministry and says that the Ministry can't 
solve our problems because they belong to the 
government's domain. I contrived to see Vice-
Premier Victor Chernomyrdin about that. He 
read the protocol and said "All that is written 
here is correct, and I can ~ut my signature to it. 
But I cannot help either".48 
V. Fumberg, Deputy General Director, Nizhne-
vartovskneJtegaz 
According to new-institutional theory organisations develop In response to 
incentive structures, created to realise specific ends. As has been argued in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis the organisational structure of the Soviet oil industry 
was developed in order to allow "efficient" control over the flow of resources 
and to achieve a set of goals. As such relative economic inefficiency was part 
of the price paid for greater political efficiency. 
Beginning with the 'radical reform' period under Gorbachev, alterations were 
made to the structure of economic interaction, yet the basic mode of 
organisation remained largely unaltered, likewise the aims the leadership 
wished to achieve.488 However, altering the structure of economic interaction 
led to alterations in the structure of incentives, and without simultaneously 
altering the mode of organisation this resulted in organisational adaptations 
that in many respects were beyond the control of the political leadership. The 
introduction of self-financing, limited free sales, the political ascent of the 
regions and profit retention outside the former channels of income circulation 
altered the former incentive structure and led to organisational adaptations in 
order to advantage of the altered circumstances. 
487 In 1992 a roundtable discussion was held in Siberia to discuss the future ofthe Siberian oil 
industry. Proceedings and comments are reported in a special issue of International Affairs 
(op cit.). This quote p. 17. 
488 Gorbachev, 'Memoirs', Bantam Books, 1997, Chp. 11. 
211 -
Whereas the previous structure had been geared towards channelling revenues 
to the centre for redistribution, the new organisations aimed at redirecting 
revenues towards other ends. (Figure 8.1). As analysed in Chapter 7, the 
formal recognition of the organisational alterations in the period 1987-1992, 
were largely reactive in outlook and did therefore not provide guidance for 
how the industry was to develop. Nonetheless, the centre eventually came to 
accept the "two-key" principle and rent/income retention at several levels. 
Figure 8.1 - The flow ofincome (rent)/resources & information/incentives in the oil 
industry 1987-1992. 
Centre 
ExportlImport 
--IiJ"~ Official flow of resources. rent 
PA 
"B" 
__ ~). Official flow of inforrnationlincentives 
The chart illustrates the altered flow of resource, income, information, and 
incentives that developed post 1987. Compared to the flow of these factors in 
the Soviet Union (see Figure 3.1) the centre no longer maintained a monopoly 
in the distribution or retention of resource and income. The unofficial 
diversions of flows in the Soviet Union now took on a legal character. Both 
intra industry and regional/local-industry relations became a part of the 
circulation process. These flows in many instances built on and further 
developed previously existing informal relations, often constituting a very 
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considerable contra-weight to the ambitions of the federal authorities. The 
gradual acceptance by Moscow to allow the regions and the industry to 
participate in the division of income made these additional players into centres 
of legitimate self-interest (as opposed to previous centres of illegal self-
interest). 
This gave rise to organisations that were adept at taking advantage of the new 
circumstances. The legislative and taxation powers obtained by the regions 
made them a crucial factor in the development of the oil industry. Similarly, 
the beginning of free trade, inter industry communication, self-financing and 
profit retention significantly altered the industry's relationship with both the 
federal and regional authorities. Although income in the Soviet Union often 
was redirected from its original intent through self-interest, the legitimacy that 
such self-interest now took on was a crucial difference. The dissipation of 
income in the USSR was partly the consequence of a conflict between de jure 
and de facto property rights. The conflict that arose, as a result of the radical· 
reform process, became a struggle over to whom de jure rights actually fell. 
As shown in Chapter 3, from its origin as a vertically integrated monopoly the 
Soviet oil industry was organisationally fragmented as the industry's spatial 
distribution increased. In line with Soviet tradition the administration of the 
oil industry became increasingly "taylorised" and administratively fragmented 
as pressure to fulfil industry output was cranked up. In the logic of the Soviet 
economy the creation of territorially based production associations further 
increased the fragmented nature of the industry. 
With the beginning of formal reorganisation of the industry in late 1992 the 
aspects of spatial distribution, territorially based operative units and disruption 
of former supply links were factors that had to be incorporated into the new 
organisational structure. The infrastructure on which the industry was based 
was already there, so was the location of reserves and supporting industry. 
Vertically integrated companies represented a solution to allow the new 
companies to tackle these issues along with the challenges of operating in a 
shifting and unstable economic situation. 
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Sunken up-front up-stream investments, the capital-intensive nature of the 
industry and the risks linked to reserve addition are all factors that make 
investment in up-stream oil ventures very costly. In addition the uncertainty 
of investment returns due to the instability and political nature of oil prices has 
made vertical integration a favoured approach by both private oil companies 
and NOes. The approach allows up-stream ventures to participate in the more 
secure down-stream side of the oil business, where profits/expenditures are 
more predictable. Furthermore, vertical integration serves as a safeguard 
against seasonal and conjunctural fluctuation of oil prices. Vertical integration 
represents a form of risk dispersion in addition to the transaction 
cost/efficiency benefits of vertical industrial integration. On the other hand 
vertical integration can have anti-competitive effects by restricting 
competition at the various production stages and reduce the number of 
suppliers (market foreclosure).489 
The first approach to vertical integration - LUKoil - only incorporated some 
of these factors. Its business was to encompass production and refining. 
Exploration and marketing on the other hand were to remain outside the 
sphere of the VICs. Along with the state's monopoly in transportation and 
price setting authority this would have significantly reduced the new 
company's ability to carry out independent strategic operations. Moreover, it 
would have rendered the industry vulnerable to both price instability and 
possible monopsony power. In short such a reorganisation would have 
constituted little more than another round of pseudo-reorganisation. 
An attempt at a clear strategy for the organisational development of the oil 
industry did not develop until late 1992. The first Russian Minister of Fuel 
and Energy, Lopukhin, was in favour of VICs, yet he also favoured greater 
independence for the oil enterprises and price liberalisation. Lopukhin had 
been a former deputy economy minister. Under his leadership operative 
489 Foreclosure 'is to deny buyers access to one's goods or prevent your rivals from supplying 
goods to your buyers'. (Lipczynski & Wilson, Industrial Organisation: An Analysis ~r 
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control was to rest with the enterprises. The initial constitution of Rosneftegaz 
envisaged a voluntary association of the oil industry enterprises. However, its 
role and authorities remained unclear and the oil generals quickly made 
themselves independent of this structure. During this period the industry 
functioned mostly through inertia.49o The role of the Ministry of Fuel and 
Energy was to create an indirect system of administration. This system was to 
maintain state interests by creating the necessary economic and regulative 
incentives. Chemomyrdin, who replaced Lopukhin at the end of May 1992, 
on the other hand favoured a more centralised structure and greater state 
influence on price formation. 491 RFPD NQ 1403 (1992) formalised the 
organisational strategy endorsed by Chemomyrdin in September 1992, which 
was to create a number of state controlled vertically integrated companies. 
Even so the relative independence of the VICs planned in 1992/93 must be 
questioned. In January 1993 the government decided to appoint the president 
of LUKoil as head of Rosneft.492 Putilov replaced Alekperov later in the 
spring of 1993.493 Unlike the idea of voluntary amalgamation of PAs into 
VICs - the late Soviet strategy :- the Russian leadership favoured a more 
centrally directed process. In opposition the Russian leadership had endorsed 
enterprise independence, but when they came to power towards the end of 
1991 the new Russian leadership was forced to address the need for a system 
of revenue collection that could maintain the state. While Yeltsin previously 
had advised the republics to take all the independence they could get, 
independence now meant independence from Russia, a prospect threatening 
Russian integration in the same way independence prior to 1992 had 
threatened Soviet integration. The same applied to the economy, and the shift 
in outlook was signalled by the replacement of Lopukhin by Viktor 
Chemomyrdin. 
Competitive Markets, Financial Times Prentice Hall, 200 I, p. 296). Foreclosure effects were 
behind some of the advice given regarding the oil industry. See Chapter 6. 
490 Arild Moe, Private correspondence. 
491 The two ministers also disagreed significantly on the future structure ofthe gas industry. 
492 Government 1 nstruction X!l 137 -r (29.1.1993). At: http://law.optima.ru. 
493 Sagers (1993), op cit., p. 352. 
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Corporatisation to some extent altered the formal relationship between state 
and industry, however it did not significantly alter property relationships or 
"enterprise behaviour". Formally the VICs now had greater independence, but 
they remained state property and their management was appointed by the state. 
Under the functioning regulatory framework the state had divested itself of its 
investment burden, but did not create the pre-requisites for an independent 
industry. Continued price control, export control, and tax and regulatory 
interference implied that principal-agent problems and characteristics 
associated with the Soviet economy remained dominant, i.e. patrimonial and 
bargaining based structure of income circulation. 
Figure 8.2 - Reorganisation into VIes. 
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The organisational structure and logic behind the reorganisation of the oil 
industry into vertically integrated companies is illustrated in Figure 8.2. The 
figure shows the operations eventually assumed by the VICs and the 
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organisations historically responsible for the specific tasks. The state has 
maintained some responsibility for exploration by operating exploration 
compames. 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, RFPD NQ 1403 (1992) created the basis for the 
first vertically integrated companies LUKoil, Surgutneftegas and Yukos, while 
establishing Rosneft as the governing body for the remaining oil PAs. These 3 
VICs were subsequently established through government decisions in 1993, 
the government in a separate decision in April 1993 elaborated upon the role 
of Rosneft.494 The role of Rosneft has remained indeterminate and its 
constitution as a VIC in 1995 has not completely settled its future. This 
however, only occurred after a series of assets had been removed to newly 
established entities in the course of 1994-95. Throughout this period 
Shafranik, who replaced Chernomyrdin as Ministry of Fuel and Energy, when 
the latter became Prime Minister in late 1992, tried to establish Rosneft as a 
NOC.495 The status of Rosneft and discussions around the creation of a 
Russian national oil company has been closely linked throughout the 1990s.496 
In 1994 the establishment of 4 new vertically integrated companies reduced 
the composition of Rosneft. These were Siberian Far East Oil Company 
(Sidanko), Slavneft, Eastern Oil Company (VNK), Orenburg Oil Company 
(ONAKO). The remaining composition of Rosneft was again reduced in 1995 
through the creation of Tyumen Oil Company (TNK) and Siberian Oil 
Company (Sibneft). Finally, two non-integrated structures based on refineries 
and marketing organisations were established, Norsi Oil Company (1995) and 
Moscow/Central Fuel Company (1997) which further reduced the asset base of 
Rosneft. The ownership structure of these entities followed the structure set 
out under RFPD NQ 1403 (1992). 
494 For the full list of establishing presidential decrees and government decisions and the initial 
composition of the VIes see Appendix B. 
495 In 1999 the Ministry of Fuel and Energy's name was changed to the Ministry of Energy. 
496 For this discussion see Kryukov, 'Zachem nuzhna Rossii natsional'naya neftyanaya 
kompaniya? [For what does Russia need a national oil company?]', EKO, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 2-
10. 
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In addition to these state-based entities several regionally based initiatives 
were formed during 1994-95. The regions had taken an active role in 
organising and establishing organisations that would serve as instruments for 
regional policy since the radical reform period under Gorbachev. However, 
several of these entities were too small and too economically vulnerable to 
compete for income and investment capital after the federal authorities 
committed to a development strategy based on vertically integrated 
companies. The major such regionally based holding companies were Tatneft, 
Bashneft and KomiTEK. Apart from Bashneft the federal authorities have 
retained an equity stake in these companies, however, representatives of the 
regional authorities have dominated them. In addition to these regional 
companies, several of the state-initiated companies initially had a regional 
character, i.e. Onako, TNK and VNK. From a regional point of view the main 
motivation behind the establishment of these companies was to secure a stable 
source of financial resources (taxation) and to provide the regional markets 
with fuel and energy resources.497 These organisations were therefore created 
in order for the regional actors to participate in the circulation of income and 
resources as depicted in Figure 8.1. 
As with reorganisation, privatisation was of a more gradual nature as well. 
One of the reasons for this was the gradual nature by which maximising actors 
respond to alterations in the incentive structure. Economic behaviour is a 
function of rewards and penalties afforded by the institutional incentive 
structure. Federal and regional authorities initially tried to assume a position 
in the circulation of income and resources similar to that of the Soviet central 
authorities. However, alterations in the official incentive structure made this 
position less "efficient" than previously, i.e. rising cost and widening of the 
constituency of legal participants in the circulation of income and resources 
reduced the potential income. A gradual shift in the position of each actor 
occurred as each came to learn from the altered circumstances and 
accommodated their position accordingly. For instance, the entities carved out 
497 Kryukov (1998), op cif., pp. 194-197. The lack of sufficient/available regional financial 
resources to develop these companies eventually led to the transfer of ownership from the 
regions to national investors and/or foreign investors. 
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of the previous state monopoly were to be kept in state hands for a limited 
period. This was to ensure that in a transition period the government would be 
able to exercise sufficient influence over the industry to fulfil its social 
commitments and retain access to revenues. The break-up of the former MNP, 
its corporatisation and commercialisation were seen as necessary elements in 
order to establish the right conditions for ensuring a more efficient industry.498 
Privatisation of the oil industry. 
Privatisation implies the transfer of ownership from the public sector to the 
private sector. While such a proposition seems simple enough, the process 
really encompasses two interrelated processes, which affect the result of the 
process. Firstly, privatisation transfers the entitlements to residual profit 
generated by assets from the public sector to the private sector.499 Secondly, 
'When a firm is privatized, the power to make decisions affecting its well-
being is transferred more or less from agents working for the government to 
agents working for the private sector' .500 In the case of Russia a complicating 
factor was the nature of state property in the Soviet Union. The oil industry, 
as the economy in general, was not only state owned and managed - it was the 
state, or rather one part of the state. The previous enterprises and PAs had 
been an integral part of the ministerial structure. Thus the reorganisation, 
corporatisation and privatisation of the oil industry were not only questions of 
transferring assets to private ownership, but it was also a questions of what 
was the state? Furthermore, how was the state was to function and exercise 
power? 
In the literature reasons for privatisation are often linked to a presumed 
inefficiency of public administration when compared to private ownership. 50 I 
However, the term efficiency is troublesome when evaluating the performance 
498 'The reason behind this restructuring [privatisation] of course, was claimed to be the 
reduction of the bureaucratic staff, but in reality it was a struggle between the new oil 
companies appearing and the authorities for the power'. (Interviewee # I). 
499 Vickers & Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, MIT Press, 1988, p. 7. 
500 Vickers, op cit., p. 115. 
501 For this argument in relation to the Russian oil industry see Dorian. (Dorian, Oil and Gas 
in Russia and the Former Soviet Union, Financial Times Energy Publishing, 1997, pp. 13-15). 
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of public and private administration.502 Efficient administration is by its very 
nature that which reaches a stated objective with less consumption of 
resources and/or generating greater income. However, the objectives of public 
and private administration will differ. In this respect a rough division can be 
made between economic efficiency and allocative efficiency. While private 
administration is more concerned with the former, public administration needs 
to take into consideration the latter as well. This implies that for public 
administration the means to an end can be as important as the end in itself -
employment and welfare provision are two examples. 
Traditional arguments in favour of private administration (ownership) often 
ignore this dilemma. Thus finding that public administration leads to 
'displacement of social objectives by political objectives; a preference for 
direct political intervention in managerial decisions over an "arm's length" 
relationship that would restrict government departments to the task of setting 
appropriate managerial incentive structures; internal inefficiencies In 
bureaucracies; and inefficient levels of bureaucratic activity' .503 These are the 
arguments having been advanced with respect to the Soviet oil industry in this 
thesis. For the architects behind Russia's privatisation programme 
depoliticization was a major factor. 504 
In the Energy Concept the efficiency argument is central to the reasoning 
behind privatisation. The Energy Concept envisaged that under private 
ownership competition - market forces - would increase the economic 
efficiency of the industry. On a more ideological level it was argued that 
privatisation (throughout the Russian economy) would create a layer within 
the population that would have "a stake" in the transformation and 
502 Bromley, op cif., Chp. 10. 
503 Vickers & Yarrow, op cit., p. 34. 
504 Boycko et al., Privatizing Russia, MIT Press, 1995, pp. 10-11. Other factors were: 1) 
Russians were economic men and reacted to incentives, i.e. wealth maximisation; and 2) the 
government did not 'really own the assets' that were to be privatised (p. 13), hence dispersing 
property would create public support for privatisation and reform. In effect though, giving 
people an economic stake does not lead to depoliticization. It widens the constituency that can 
be expected to take an interest in the distribution of political power by giving them an 
economic incentive to participate in the political regulation and functioning of the polity. In 
this way a significant shift in the structure of income and resource circulation can occur. In 
effect this policy is not a depoliticization but a widening of economic politicization. 
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democratisation process.505 Thus, although not a central argument in the 
Energy Concept, privatisation was seen as a means of constituency building. 506 
With respect to the second element of privatisation it should be noted that 
privatisation and liberalisation are two distinct processes, and that privatisation 
in itself does not necessarily imply competitive markets.507 In fact a major 
finding by Vickers and Yarrow when analysing the British privatisation 
process (1979-87) was that 'when market power is significant, and particularly 
when company behavior is subjected to detailed regulation, there is little 
empirical justification for a general presumption in favor of either type of 
ownership' . And 'unless effective competition and/or regulation are 
introduced, the privatization of firms with market power brings about private 
ownership in precisely the circumstances where it has least to offer'. 508 If 
income appropriation is desirable then replacing a public monopoly with a 
private monopoly will reduce the state's access to income. 
In the immediate post-Soviet period market power would remain a 
characteristic trait of the newly created oil holding companies. Spatial 
distribution and the maintenance of the regionally based PA structure would 
ensure that there would be little immediate competitive gains. 509 The social 
commitment made by the new government, its realistic means of revenue 
access and dominant equity position in the new companies meant that the 
industry would remain heavily regulated. This latter issue is referred to as the 
ex post risk of expropriation.51O From this theoretical perspective one might 
5051bid 
506 In the subsequent development of the political landscape in Russia this argument became 
more central during the "Ioans-for-shares" privatisation of the oil industry. When 
commenting on the "Ioans-for-shares" deals one oil industry executive said: 'It was a political 
deal and not an economic deal. The Russian democracy survived, and stopped the 
Communists from getting into power and Zyganov to win the election. That was the deal!' 
(Interviewee # 7). According to Interviewee # 3, 'Yes, we probably sold the state assets to 
cheap, but we had to do it as quick as possible to prevent any revert or come-back of the 
communist system, central planning and state ownership'. 
507 Vickers & Yarrow, op cif., p. 45. 
508 Vickers & Yarrow, op cif., pAO &427. 
509 In addition the restraining forces of international competition were likely to be absent until 
a sufficiently transparent and "standardised" regulatory regime had been enacted. 
510 Vickers, op cif. pp. 115-116. 
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question the fundamentals of the idea of privatisation of the oil industry, the 
strategy and organisational mode eventually selected. 
On the other hand, one also needs to question to what extent the privatisation 
process that began in the oil industry in 1992 actually conforms to the 
theoretical idea of privatisation. If privatisation entailed the transfer of 
decision making power then privatisation was not a process that began in late 
1992. In this respect, privatisation had officially been underway since the 
radical reform period begun under Gorbachev. Yet, as shown in previous 
chapters, even before 1985 formal and informal practices had to some extent 
decentralised decision-making power. Continued state ownership of the 
holding companies, albeit be it as passive owners,S I I did not significantly alter 
the principal-agent problems associated with the previous economic system. 
Regarding the first element of privatisation, the argument in the preceding 
chapters has been precisely that even in the Soviet economy the state's claim 
to income was challenged at every level of the industrial hierarchy. One has 
here to imagine the following: firstly, the organisation of the oil industry was 
not primarily geared towards economic efficiency, but rather towards 
allocative efficiency creating "political income"; secondly, this "political 
income" had a twofold character (Figure 4.1). By its very nature "political 
income" as opposed to economic income (i.e. calculated in profit and losses) is 
more difficult to quantify and verify. This allowed both parts of the "political 
income" to be challenged by the participants in the circulation of rent and 
resources (see Figures 3.1 and 8.1). With corporatisation of the industry and 
economic reforms these participants also increasingly tried to appropriate the 
economic income (rent) generated by the industry. In this respect the 
distinction between de jure and de facto owners had great importance both in 
Soviet times and in the present Russian economic climate. 
511 Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style, Cambridge university Press, 1999, p. 47. Kryukov & 
Moe, 'The changing role of banks in the Russian oil sector', The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998, pp. 42-43. 
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Income extracted by the de facto owners was channelled back into both the 
official and unofficial economy, with the onset of radical reforms in the late 
1980s these informal channels of income circulation became legitimate 
allowing economic rent to be transformed into political capital. This division 
of income into two forms of income maximisation is reminiscent of Tokarev's 
identification of objectives of the different participants in the circulation of 
taxes.512 Broadly speaking the regions now increasingly tried to appropriate 
what in the Soviet Union had been the political income through regulation and 
economic rent through taxation, while the industry increasingly appropriated 
(defendedlhid) economic rent and value. 
With this view of privatisation in mind it becomes clear that privatisation was 
not a process beginning in 1992. The privatisation process was part of a 
longer process in which de facto owners increasingly had absorbed the ability 
of the de jure owners to extract income, thus being a continuation of a longer 
process of property rights contestation.513 Although the term privatisation 
fitted well with IFI terminology one cannot differentiate the process from the 
previous historic contestation. This will be examined in more detail below, 
suffice here to make the point that although the terminology was new in 1992 
this does not mean that the processes it described were. 514 
From this it follows that for privatisation to have achieved the desired 
efficiency gains the transfer of property would have to result not only in an 
acceptance on behalf of the state to share generated income, but exactly how 
this division of income was to be implemented. This in effect meant that the 
state would have to give up its historic claim to direct appropriation of either 
512 Tokarev, op cit., pp. 10-14. 
513 Asked about continuity in managers' de/acto rights and their attitude surrendering income 
interviewee # 3 answered: 'Of course they have learned a very good lesson when they were in 
charge of these production units in Soviet times, and when this reform period came they were 
fit for fight so to say - they were in a very strong position in their dialog with the state. Then 
also the financial situation of the government was also very weak, their revenues were very 
low and the government was very much dependent on the revenues from oil companies'. 
514 Thus there is nothing inherently contradictory between new terminology and that great 
tradition of Soviet reform - pseudo reorganisation. 
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form of income, and settle for an indirect method of income appropriation. It 
would imply a shift from a despotic-patrimonial to an infrastructural-
bureaucratic structure of state power. 
In 1991/92 the state was in no position both to appropriate all income and to 
ensure continued investment in the industry. 5 I 5 The latter is important in that 
potential income in future periods would be a function of the investment level, 
but also that the right to income appropriation is linked to investment 
responsibility. As has been shown in previous chapters, the cost of running 
the oil industry had increasingly become a burden on Soviet expenses. With 
the demise of the Soviet economy and political system the government's 
problem was twofold. On the one hand declining production meant overall 
reduction in the potential income. The cost of sharing this income would 
additionally reduce it. On the other hand, the very nature of the "political 
income" was changing as the Soviet system collapsed. 
Whereas previously control and redistribution in itself had been a major 
source of political power and. legitimacy, this now became coupled with 
developing an economy that could deliver sustained growth. Thus elements of 
generating "political income" were at a danger of being inherently 
contradictory to the development of an economic framework that would 
improve industry development and secure long-term development stability. In 
addition, with the onset of radical reform under Gorbachev, the possibilities of 
converting economic rent and de facto ownership into political capital 
increasingly modified the form of rent and income circulation (though not 
necessarily its substance). 
The first phase of privatisation 1992-1995. 
The first phase of privatisation must be seen as an attempt to bridge this 
dilemma. Corporatisation and commercialisation clearly fitted well with IF! 
rhetoric. However, the framework of regulation that was developed was 
515 'Being in a very weak financial situation the government was not in a position to control 
the oil industry or to continue to control the oil industry'. (Interviewee # 3). 
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prohibitive to the development of competitive markets. On the other hand the 
framework catered well to attempts by the government to appropriate both 
forms of income. 
This first phase of privatisation IS often been characterised as "insider 
privatisation",516 and the nomenklatura's ability to appropriate state property 
for their own.517 While these are both valid points, the processes and 
mechanisms at work during this period do not necessarily distinguish 
themselves from previous Soviet economic process and mechanisms. In the 
first phase of so-called privatisation, to what extent was property actually 
transferred? A major conclusion of the "insider privatisation" story is 
precisely that managers with previous de facto control in the course of 1992-
1996 retained such control.518 The separation of de jure property rights from 
de facto property rights leads to the logical questioning of the Soviet state's 
actual ownership of its resources and assets. The principal-agent implications 
that such a conceptual division of property rights had have been shown to fit 
well with the Soviet economy. 
What did this mean for the privatisation of the Russian oil industry? Again, 
one has to take a longer-term view on this issue. The first phase of 
privatisation was a continuation of forces that had been latent within the 
Stalinist economy and that progressively weighed more heavily as the 
economy became more complex. The response during these years was 
likewise a continuation of previous economic management. The state tried to 
continue its practice of appropriating both political income and economic rent, 
while the reorganisation of productive units into joint stock companies under 
state controlled holding companies catered to the needs of "private" rent 
extraction, i.e. maintaining the de jure - de facto split. 
516 See for instance Gustafson (1999), op cit., pp. 39-43. 
517 See for instance Kryshtanovskaya & White, 'From Soviet nomenklatura to Russian elite', 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, no 5, 1996, pp. 711-731. Also Dienes, Corporate Russia: 
Privatization and prospects in the oil and gas sector, Donald W. Treadgold Papers, University 
of Washington, Paper No 5,1996, p. 16. 
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The oil generals obtained shares in the newly established joint stock 
companies at preferential terms. Additionally they exercised considerable 
control over employee stocks by means of restricting stock transfers. 519 One 
former Duma representative from Tatarstan told the author that rumour has it 
that several of the better yielding oil pumps in the republic are considered to 
be the private property of president Shaimiev's son. Another specialist in 
Siberia told the author that Soviet managers liked to be in control of their own 
enterprises. After corporatisation and privatisation it therefore was not 
uncommon that pumps and service units were the private enterprise of a 
manager while being partly financed and treated at preferential terms by the 
company in which the manager/enterprise owner worked.520 
The operative trends in this period are quite clear. This first phase of 
privatisation did not ensure access to investment capital since the insiders had 
little financial means. Such means they had were cleverly hidden or sent 
abroad since the state did not relinquish its right to appropriate potential 
political income and economic rent, and failed to establish an acceptable 
system of division. 
Thus production fell and with it the state's ability to extract either form of 
income from the sector. On the other hand the industry did continue to 
provide the state with income, which made it possible for the state to maintain 
some of its social and industrial commitments. These trends will be examined 
in further detail in Chapter 9, suffice here to say that the regulatory framework 
and privatisation of the oil industry in this period provided either side with 
access to the forms of income that it had enjoyed during the Soviet era. 
However, the size and nature of this income was changing. 
518 Gustafson (1999), op cif., p. 46. This was also the case for the oil industry: 'in the initial 
years after the Soviet collapse, the oil sector seemed the ultimate example of state-managed 
insider privatization'. Ibid. p. 52. 
519 Gustafson (1999), op cif., p. 47. 
520 Both these stories were related to the author during informal talks while doing research in 
Russia (March-April 2002). Similar accounts can be found in Gustafson (1999), op cif., p. 50. 
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As in the remainder of Russia industry, the first phase of privatisation resulted 
in a lack of investment capital, unstable ownership, and a flourishing of non-
payment and non-monetized forms of transactions. 521 It allowed for the 
continuation of the previous structure of income circulation. The major 
achievement of this period is therefore not so much the transfer of property or 
property rights, but the mechanisms, by which property is owned, distributed 
and potentially controlled.m The re-allocation of the property of the former 
MNP into several holding companies altered the lines along which property 
and rent was contested. The holding companies remained state controlled, but 
the re-allocation shifted the contestation of property from a centre-ministry-
P A-enterprise line to a centre-holding company-enterprise line. 
The first phase of privatisation represents a continuation of the previous 
contestation of resource flow, albeit with two important differences:· the 
emergence of the holding companies and the regional authorities as legitimate 
participants in the redistributive circle and thus centres of property· 
consolidation, and the absence of a pivotal role for the Russian Ministry of 
Fuel and Energy in the process of redistribution. While as previously the flow 
of resources had been contested in an illegal form - falsification, blat, and 
hoarding - the character of this contest changed as a consequence of the 
radical reform period and the first privatisation period. In these latter periods 
the size and separation of political rent and surplus from economic rent 
became the focus of attention. 
One can only hypothesise what would have happened to privatisation in the oil 
industry if the changes introduced in 1992 had resulted in a turn around of 
production within 18 months? What seems unlikely though, is that the state 
would have sold its controlling stake in the holding companies should this 
scenario have materialised. 
521 Gustafson (1999), op cif., p. 49. 
522 This assertion is supported by recent studies on the development of the securities market in 
Russia. Radygin argues that the main function of the corporate securities market in the 1990s 
was to serve as a mechanism for the redistribution of ownership leaving the monitoring and 
restraining functions of the market ineffectual - such as financial markets control, raising 
capital, take-overs and bankruptcies. (Radygin, 'The corporate securities market: Bridgehead 
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Second phase of privatisation 1995-1997. 
It was precisely the dire financial position of the government that was the 
impetus behind the much-maligned "loans-for-shares" deals that emerged in 
the course of 1995. The previous re-organisation of the oil industry had had 
little positive impact on state finances, nor on investment levels in the 
industry, both in terms of capital investment or exploration. It had divested its 
responsibility to finance the sector but much of the state's profit from 
controlling the sector consisted in providing consumers with cheap energy, 
which often was not paid for. In other words the state's appropriation of rent 
consisted in the extraction of political income, while that extracted as 
economic rent was quickly sent out of Russia. Production continued to 
decline as a result of insufficient investment, and finally the nominal 
transformation of state enterprises into joint stock companies had done little to 
alter management behaviour.523 
There are two distinctive arguments (though not necessarily contradictory) 
that characterise the "loans-for-shares" deals as either a necessity for the 
continuation of the reform and democratisation process in Russia,524 or a 
scheme devised by politically well connected individuals to appropriate major 
or barrier for globalization?' in Segbers, Explaining post-Soviet patchworks vo/. 2: Pathways 
from the past to the global, Ashgate, 200 I, pp. 219-220). 
523 Gumpel, 'Energiepolitische Zwiinge und Perspektiven in Ruf3land [Energy political 
constraints and perspectives in Russia]" Osteuropa-Wirtschajt, 1997, vol. 42, no. 2, p. 156. 
Koen & Marrese, Stabilization and Structural Change in Russia 1992-1994, IMF Working 
Paper, WP/95/13, 1995, p. 20. Commenting on the functioning ofTNK prior to consolidation 
Interviewee # 2 said; 'The main assets were Nizhnevartovskneftegas, Tyumenneftgas and the 
Ryzan refinery. They all continued to operate pretty much independently of each other, and 
not necessarily for the benefit of the owner who was the Russian government at the time'. 
524 By this time opposition to privatisation was growing and liberals in the government were 
searching for ways to soften opposition to outright privatisation. Kryukov & Moe (1998), op 
cit., p. 22. Chubais, who was present at the March meeting (see below) commented '[llet 
them steal and take their property. They will then become owners and decent administrators 
of this property'. Freeland, 'Get-rich-quick is now the Big Idea shaping Russia', Financial 
Times, weekend issue 27/28 May 2000, p. 9. 
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state assets for "a song". 525 Vladimir Potanin, presented the scheme to the 
cabinet on behalf of a group of commercial banks, on 30 March 1995.526 
The government was offered loans to cover the budget deficit with collateral 
in major state assets. These assets, which would be held in trust by the 
respective banks, would become lender's property if the state was unable to 
repay the loan within a specified period. The shares were supposed to be 
tendered on a competitive basis with additional share packets placed under 
trust in return for investment guarantees, however, the winning banks in the 
individual cases were banks that were previously connected to the oil 
enterprises.527 Both arguments can be explained by a desire to maintain the 
patrimonial structure of state power. 
According to Pleines three factors contributed to the manipulation of the 
process. Firstly, all offers were received by one bank that was allowed to 
participate in the tender itself, giving the organising bank the ability to assess 
all offers prior to giving its own. Secondly, only a limited number of Russian 
banks had the financial capacity to participate and foreigners were excluded. 
Finally, the low threshold bids made it possible for the banks to obtain share 
packets at a substantial discount compared to their worth.528 
Table 8.1 shows the change in the state's share in the major Russian oil 
companies for the period 1994-2003. The reduction of state ownership 
eventually led to a shift and clarification of control of the oil industry. While 
the first phase had altered the lines of income and property contestation along 
with the means by which property was claimed, the second phase altered the 
principal-agent relationships pertaining to the industry. In the cases where the 
state gave up its majority control the new owners started to re-organise and 
525 Freeland, op cit. 'Auctions were loans for buddies', Moscow Times, 30 December 1995. 
Ledeneva, 'The subversion of democracy in Russia: an informal practice perspective', in 
Harter & Easter, Shaping the economic space in Russia: decision making processes, 
institutions and adjustment to change in the El'tsin era, Ashgate, 2000, p. 325. 
526 Freeland op cit. 
527 For a detailed account and analysis of the interpenetration of oil assets and the financial 
sector see Kryukov & Moe, op cit. pp. 11-46. 
528 Pleines, Der palitische EinfluJ3 van Wirtschaftseliten in RuJ3land: die 01- und Gasindustrie 
in der Ara Jeltzin [The political influence of economic elites in Russia: the oil and gas 
industry in the Yeltsin era], Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Bremen Arbeitspapiere und 
Materialien, nr. 41, November 2002, p. 21. 
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consolidate their property. Throughout this period four different groups of oil 
majors emerged: privately controlled; combined (i.e. both private and state); 
state controlled; and regionally controlled. The first group can again be 
subdivided between manager controlled and bank controlled companies.529 
The "loans-for-shares" deals represented the start of the actual transfer of 
property to new owners. After the initial period of trust management expired 
the state was unable (or unwilling) to buy back the shares and the banks 
quickly resold their share packets through tenders to third party organisation. 
The price of the assets was roughly the same as that the banks had paid for 
them,530 and the new owners were organisations in turn controlled by the 
banks again. 
Table 8.1 - Government stake on 1 January (respective year) in per cent. 
In its present legal status. 
1999), by Yukos since February 200 I. 3 Controlled by Yukos since December 
1997. 4 De facto controlled by TNK since mid 2001. 5 10.85% owned by the 
government of Belarus until December 2002, then controlled by Sibneft? 6 Controlled 
by TNK since September 2000. 7 Controlled by LUKoil since mid-I999. 
Note: In addition stakes in Sidanko, Sibneft, Surgutneftegaz, LUKoil & 
Yukos were held partly or wholly by pledge-holders in 1996/97. 
Source: Khartukov, 'Russian oil privatization proved an unprecedented 
clearance sale', OGJ, Week of May 27, 2002, p. 22. For 2003; MT, various issues. 
529 This division is a result of the strategy taken by the respective banks towards their assets. 
Kryukov & Moe divide these strategies into either "passive" or "active". The choice of 
strategy was a function of the relationship between the founder of the respective bank and the 
oil enterprise. For details see Kryukov & Moe (1998), pp. 5-41. 
530 Moser & Oppenheimer, 'The Oil Industry: Structural Transformation and Corporate 
Governance', in GranviIle & Oppenheimer, Russia's Post-Communist Economy, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, Figure 10.2, p. 310. 
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A major criticism of the "loans-for-shares" deals has been the lack of state 
revenue that it generated. 53] Aside from accusations of "sweetheart-deals" 
(which no doubt were part of the landscape) there are economic and political 
explanatory variables in operation as well. 
• The tenders that were held at the end of 1995 were explicitly closed to 
foreigners. 532 In the economic situation of Russia at the time no bank or 
individual had the means to pay their potential worth. Shares were 
therefore, discounted due to a lack of Russian capital. 
• At the time of the tenders there was strong and growing opposition to the 
entire privatisation process. Therefore the threat of ex post expropriation -
. i.e. subsequent re-nationalisation or changes in the regulatory system -
further discounted the value of the assets. (The resale of these assets after 
the initial trust period should be seen as a means of hedging against 
possible expropriation). The privatisation processes in this period have 
remained controversial. 533 
• The actual control of the holding companies over their subsidiaries was 
still contested, which would require subsequent re-structuring costs. 
While a holding company type organisation reflects ownership integration 
there is no co-ordination integration and it allows subsidiaries to behave in 
an independent manner. With property rights being poorly developed, 
implemented and contested, obtaining access to the revenue stream that 
share ownership technically should ensure would be fraught with 
uncertainty.534 A further element at this stage was the composition of the 
companIes. 
531 Moser & Oppenheimer, op cit., p. 312. 
532 Kryukov & Moe (1998), op cit., p. 23. 
533 For instance, in December 1998 the Duma unanimously voted to ask the government to 
reverse the "loans-for shares" deals. Moscow Times, 'Duma Asks for Sell-Off Reversal', 
5.12.1998. In July 2003 the Prosecutor-General's office started investigation into several 
charges of economic fraud (connected to the investment tenders of the 'loans-for shares' 
period) and criminal actions against persons affiliated with Yukos. While the outcome of 
these proceedings are as yet unforeseeable, it is noteworthy that the state commenced action 
against the largest company in the country just a short period before the "litigation delay" -
the 10-year period for challenging the outcome of the privatization tender - expires. What is 
clear though that by opening proceedings against "Yukos" the state is signalling that the state-
oligarch truce agreed between president Putin and the oligarchs in 2000 might be coming to an 
end. One of the foundations for the "stability" that has been part of Putin's first term might be 
disappearing. This situation will be analysed more extensively in the postscript. 
534 See for instance Hedlund (2001) for en exposition of rights in Russia. 
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Having been created on the basis of political efficiency rather than 
economic efficiency, the transfer of state control to private control could 
be expected to lead to changes in organisational composition.535 The value 
of the assets was therefore discounted by the potential costs of ex post 
monitoring costs and establishing de facto property rights in addition to de 
jure rights. 536 
These factors fit well with the transaction costs framework explored in this 
thesis, in that ex post monitoring and enforcement costs are transaction costs. 
In the regulatory system established in the first half of the 1990s and the 
general economic environment, such costs could be expected to remain 
significant. Furthermore, the threat of moral hazard (in connection with 
information asymmetry with respect to the establishment of de facto rights and 
outright corruption) and uncertainty linked with the threat of expropriation 
were positive transaction costs as well. In many respects the "loans-for-
shares" investors extracted a sizeable quasi-rent from the government through 
these deals. While the assets in their first-best-use were worth substantially 
more than what was paid, specific circumstances surrounding both political 
and economic aspects of the early transition years meant that these assets were 
not put to their first-best-use, and probably would not be. 
While as the first phase of privatisation in most cases reaffirmed the split 
property rights of the Soviet period, the second phase of privatisation 
represents the beginning of actual transfer of property. State ownership of the 
holding companies remained an obstacle to further restructuring in that the 
state preserving objectives set out in the Energy Concept dominated the 
organisational development of the industry. The initial organisational 
structure reflected the state's intention to maintain a structure of income and 
resource circulation reminiscent of the equivalent Soviet structure. With the 
535 Tatneft for instance does not have its own refining capacity. KomiTEK's refinery is not 
well suited to process the quality of oil being produced in the Komi republic. Sidanko lacked 
a natural entity that could serve as the base unit around which to establish an efficient 
integrated structure. 
536 Jensen & Meckling argue that share prices will be discounted as a reflection of the 
expected monitoring costs arising from a divergence between managers' and owners' 
interests. (Jensen & Meckling, op cit., pp. 312-313). 
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transfer of de jure property· rights the composition of the holding companies 
started to change as the new de jure owners had other objectives. 
Increasingly the companies started to remedy the operational, economic and 
political deficiencies of the original companies.537 
From a state point of view the 'loans-for-share' deals made long-term sense. 
The immediate revenue generated by the sale of the state's oil assets was 
negligible, however, the Russian state was in no position to finance the sector. 
Output fell continuously in all enterprises until a change in ownership. (See 
Chapter 10). According to former Minister of Fuel and Energy, Pyotr 
Rodionov (1996-1997), the financial situation of the sector was the main 
obstacle to its stabilisation. 'The absence of financial resources disturbs 
production and investment activity of the complex's enterprises, and increases 
the arrears of tax payments and payment of wages' .538 As long as the industry 
remained state property there existed no incentive for de facto owners to 
generate income for the state or invest (see Chapter 5). Therefore, before the 
transfer of de jure rights in addition to de facto rights the industry functioned 
mostly through inertia and by exhausting those resources that were already 
available. At the same time the strategic role of the industry allowed for a 
continuation of soft-budget constraints in the form of arrears. The sale of state 
assets transferred the financial burden from the public sector to the private 
sector. In doing so the government created for itself a new position from 
where to negotiate and bargain for access to the flows of revenue and 
resources created by the sector. This was already evident in the 'loans-for-
shares' themselves and the subsequent further transfer of state property - first 
into "trust ownership" and then re-sales. The deals were conditional upon 
settlement of tax arrears.539 
537 'Political, regional and personal interests played a more important role than commercial 
and economic considerations when elements of the old state oil industry were regrouped as 
vertically integrated oil companies and internal cohesion in the new companies varied 
significantly'. Kryukov & Moe, 1998, op cit. p. 13. 
538 Rodionov, 'Rol' toplivno-energeticheskogo kompleksa v stabilizatsii i pod'eme ekonomiki 
strany [The role of the fuel and energy complex in stabilising and raising the economy of the 
country], Energeticheskaya Politika, 1997, no. 3, reprinted in Minenergo (2001), op cit., p. 
404. 
539 Khartukov, 'Bankers Becoming New Masters of Oil Companies', Petroleum Economist, 
Feb. 1997, p. 6. 
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The fall in output and the accumulation of arrears implied that the industry 
would gradually disintegrate unless the state altered the incentive structure at 
work in the industry. F or instance, the 1996 federal budget incorporated 
investment means equivalent to 2 per cent of expenditure. However, due to 
the lack of revenue only roughly 1/3 of these means were actually available. 540 
The 'loans-for-shares' deals therefore, represented the proper beginning of 
property transfer and created a basis for possible reforms in that they allowed 
a greater part of potential rent to be retained at industry level. Simultaneously, 
industry accumulation began to shift from enterprise level to holding company 
level thereby additionally altering the relative weight of participants to the 
circulation of rent and resources. 
The third phase of privatisation 1997-2002. 
With the process of transfer of de jure property rights having been initiated, 
the companies and the new owners began to embark on a process of 
consolidating their de facto rights as well. This process was less uniform in 
appearance than the previous two processes of privatisation. 
Firstly, as the companies were privatised at different times, this left some of 
the companies with first move advantages. Secondly, the aspirations of the 
new owners differed, which had a significant impact on the corporate strategy 
of the companies. For instance, LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz were both 
dominated by Soviet type managers. Both Alekperov and Bogdanov quickly 
seized the opportunities that the privatisation process provided to establish de 
facto control over the subsidiaries within their companies. They swiftly 
established a unified corporate strategy and took control over cash flow and 
resource flow within the company. Both companies took a proactive role in 
relation to their respective financial partners retaining control over issues 
related to the management and restructuring of the companies. Thus the oil 
holding dominated the bank and not the other way around.541 
540 Rodionov, op cit., p. 405. 
541 Kryukov & Moe (1998), op cit., pp. 22-23. 
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Although not uniform III development Yukos and Sidanko represent the 
opposite development. In these cases the banks and financial-industrial 
groups (FIG) that purchased the state's share and/or held it in trust took the 
proactive role in the management and restructuring of the companies.542 The 
consolidation of these enterprises has been a protracted process, often 
resulting in disputes with other minority shareholders. In the cases of Sibneft 
and TNK both companies were privatised with the assistance of banks. 
However, the banks in these cases did not take an active part in the 
management and restructuring of the companies, although they clearly stood 
to benefit from the closeness of their financial allies within government 
circles.543 
A major delaying factor in the consolidation of the bank related companies, 
has been the establishment of de facto control over their subsidiaries. Thus 
Yukos, Sidanko, and TNK have all gone through protracted struggles with 
their main production units in order to establish a unified corporate strategy 
and gain control over cash flows and resource flows. 544 The favoured strategy 
for consolidating subsidiaries was to swap shares in the holding company for 
shares in the subsidiary creating a single share structure. Shares in the 
subsidiary companies had been available since the corporatisation, and 
voucher privatisation, of these entities in the early 1990s. For the shareholders 
in the subsidiaries such swaps diluted their relative equity stake and influence 
in the operations of the respective companies.545 
542 Kryukov & Moe (1998), op cif., pp. 23-24. For the relationship of FIGs and the oil 
companies see Kryukov & Moe, 1998, op cit., pp. 16-39. For a general analysis on the 
development of FIGs see Johnson, 'Russia's Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups', Post-
Soviet Affairs, 1997, vo\. 13, no. 4, pp. 333-365. 
543 GismatuIlin, 'New Minister Hands Sibneft Tasty Oil Deal', Moscow Times, 28.5.1999. 
544 In the case of Yukos: Kryukov & Moe, 1998, op cit., p. 28. In the case of TNK: Gary 
Peach, 'Paly Plays Defense, Offense In Battle for Nizhnevartovsk, Moscow Times, 2.12.1997. 
Sidanko never really managed to gain control over its subsidiaries leading to the loss of two of 
its production associations (Gismatullin, 'BP Reconsiders as Prime Asset Sold', Moscow 
Times, 27.1 1.1999). 
545 Peach, 'In Push for Consolidation, Oil Shareholders Forgotten', Moscow Times, 23.9.1997. 
For a general study on the corporate securities market and the abuse of minority share holder's 
rights see Radygin op cit. 
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It is interesting to note in this respect that companies with a clear development 
strategy, from the time of their creation, struggled less to consolidate their grip 
on their company's assets. For instance, both Alekperov and Bogdanov had 
clear plans for the development of their companies even before these were 
slated for privatisation. 546 Alekperov had been one of the developers of the 
entire vertically integrated oil company strategy in the period 1990/91. Both 
men were former oil generals with a detailed knowledge of the oil business, 
and both men saw control as the crucial factor in utilising their assets. 
However, conditions behind the creation of LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz differ 
from some of the other companies. LUKoil was initially an amalgamation of 
PAs formed on a "comeradely" basis at the initiative of Alekperov, thus 
reducing the probability of antagonism between the constituent parts and the 
holding company. Surgutneftegaz on the other hand is geographically 
concentrated in and around the city of Surgut. Nonetheless, even with such a 
"preferable start" bo~h leaders quickly tried to ensure de facto control over the 
subsidiaries in addition to de jure rights. 
Yukos and Sidanko on the other hand were both companies with less internal 
cohesion and dispersed assets, making the consolidation process more 
protracted. A significant role in their eventual development was played by 
their relationship with financial institutions that carried the political clout that 
they themselves lacked. This latter factor was important in the creation and 
consolidation of TNK and Sibneft as well. In all these cases the dominant 
players in each company were involved in disputes with minority 
shareholders. 
Kryukov distinguishes between an "advanced group" of insiders and a 
"backward group" of insiders. The former was characterised by the transfer of 
company assets to 'organizations fully under their control, in order to attain 
complete autonomy from the state and develop their own assets' (e.g. LUKoil 
and Surgutneftegaz). The latter group was characterised by 'a group of 
insiders [that] could not (or would not) direct the financial resources [] toward 
546 Interviewee # 12, on Alekperov. 
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generating and developing the oil business' (e.g. Yukos and Sidanko).547 The 
crucial factor in his analysis is the establishment of control over financial 
flows in the company - in other words, the control over rent and resource 
flows. In the former group this control falls to the company management 
itself. In the latter group however, this control, in the first place, falls to 
outside financial allies. Eventual consolidation of these companies was 
effected on the instigation of these external organisations, often through the 
replacement of incumbent management by bank or FIG related management.548 
In the cases of Yukos, Sibneft and TNK a different "breed" of oil companies 
has emerged that (at least momentarily) give the impression of operating along 
corporate philosophies more akin to those found in developed market 
economies.549 These are companies that aim at improving share value, 
through more efficient management and utilisation of assets, in order to satisfy 
investor's expectations. The distinction between a "western styled company" 
(WSC) and a more traditional Soviet styled company (SSC) should not be 
taken too far at the present stage. Although operating under different 
corporate philosophies the investors that stand to benefit in either case are still 
limited. Importantly Kryukov argues that the Russian oil companies still 
differ from "ordinary" companies in that they exhibit characteristics that are 
more akin to productive-financial concerns. Market and contractual co-
ordination has been supplanted by an administrative approach. Head office 
performs not only strategic and administration but also financial and 
productive management. 550 Furthermore direct relation/communication with 
the executive is an important element for the functioning of the companies and 
547 Kryukov, 'Ownership rights, hierarchical bargaining and globalization in the oil sector', in 
Segbers, Explaining post-Soviet patchworks vo!. 2: Pathways from the past to the global, 
Ashgate, 200 I, p. 178. 
548 For details on this development is Kryukov (200 I), ibid., p. 175-183. 
549 'There are some companies which already almost have a foreign style of management and 
there are Russian ones which still follow former bureaucratic style - Gasprom, 
Surgutneftegas, Rosneft. Companies like Sibneft, TNK, Yukos, are more western, while 
LUKoil is more on the bureaucratic side, they still have this pyramid'. (Interviewee # I). 
550 Kryukov (2000), op cit., p. 65. 
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vOIcmg interests.551 The structure of such communication again serves to 
strengthen patrimonial ties of state power and income circulation.552 
Ownership of the WSC is highly concentrated and shares are still relatively 
illiquid. Thus share manipulation is a very real possibility,553 making it more 
difficult to use share market indicators as a yardstick. Since the freefloat share 
of WSC shares is limited demand for these shares can drive the shareprice 
higher than would have been the case if supply had been less restricted. In 
other words there remains a possibility for shareholders (management) to trade 
up the share value. Nonetheless the two styles differ enough to allow for an 
element of institutional competition, which would be a first in the history of 
the Russian oil industry. As one industry executive replied when asked about 
the corporate philosophy of the two company styles: '[T]hey have different 
-
ways of measuring efficiency. You may say that transparency, US GAAP, 
market capitalisation is the key system of operation - share dividend etc. - but 
perhaps the placing of $50 million in your own pocket without anyone 
noticing in the budget is just as rational, if your system of values is 
different' .554 
Neither group is entirely uniform. LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz are very 
efficient Soviet styled organisations. Particularly the management of LUKoil 
has shown a highly adaptable and innovative approach. These companies 
should therefore, not be seen as caricatures of the former Soviet business 
model. For the state (and regionally) controlled companies that fall into this 
group the story is different. This will be examined in further detail in Chapter 
10. Suffice here to say that the privatisation process of the 1990s has given 
rise to different organisational and institutional responses to the changing 
551 Interviewee # 7. 
552 Bagirov argues that without state support the VICs cannot successfully compete on world 
markets. (Bagirov, 'Russian Oil and Gas Companies: International Cooperation', 
International Affairs, 1999, vol. 45, no. 6, p. 186). Though no doubt a valid point, the 
interests of the companies to expand outside Russia differs. 
553 Interview # 8. 
554 Interview # 7. It should be kept in mind that the proposed division of corporate styles is 
still very short term. It remains to be seen how viable either model is in the long term 
(institutional competition) and in the absence of needed reforms (path dependency). 
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environment, and different forms of establishing control over both political 
and economic income generated by the industry.555 
Acquisition and expansion - protecting investments. 
Parallel to the consolidation processes of the holding companies, the 
companies have sought to expand their operational and reserve basis by 
participating m the subsequent privatisation of state assets and 
obtaining/poaching assets of other companies. Thus in 1997 Yukos acquired a 
stake in VNK and finally took complete control over the company in the late 
spring of 2002.556 LUKoil acquired KomiTEK through a share swap in 
1999.557 TNK purchased Onako in 2000.558 In a protracted struggle (1998-
2001) for several Sidanko assets TNK has obtained de facto control over 
Sidanko itself.559 Sibneft and TNK jointly won the government privatisation 
auction for Slavneft in December 2002. 
The acquisition of smaller oil holdings by larger oil holdings must be seen as a 
natural process of expansion and rationalisation of the industry within the 
framework of vertically integrated companies. Such expansions have allowed 
the companies to overcome the operative restrictions placed on them during 
the initial formation of VI Cs and it will allow the companies to take advantage 
of economies of scale in already existing fields. 
For instance, this was the case with TNK' s purchase of Chernogorneft. 
Chernogorneft had been part of TNK' s main production association -
Nizhnevartovskneftegaz - during Soviet times but had separated itself from 
the PA as a leased company after Gorbachev's initial reforms. TNK claimed 
that bringing Chernogorneft back to Nizhnevartovskneftegaz would reduce the 
555 This consolidation process is by no means over. All the companies are still involved with 
expanding control - and efficiency - over their business. The redistribution and accumulation 
of property is still ongoing, as owners attempt to shape the companies according to their own 
visions and overcome the deficiencies created by the initial structure set up in 1992. 
556 Raff, 'Anatomy of an Oil Company Sell-Off', Moscow Times, 30.5.2002. 
557 Semenenko, 'KomiTEK Approval For LUKoil Share Swap', Moscow Times, 16.9.1999. 
558 Startseva, 'Onako Tender Won by Yevrotek', Moscow Times, 20.9.2000. 
559 See table 7.1. 
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cost of production at the Samotlor field by 60 per cent.560 The company that 
controlled Chemogomeft, Sidanko, had been operating Chemogomeft as a 
pure cost unit. A small creditor brought a bankruptcy suit against the oil firm. 
Part of Chemogomeft's debt was to Nizhnevartovskneftegaz ($1.9 mn.), and 
TNK managed to purchase voting rights in the bankruptcy proceeding by 
purchasing parts of Chemogomeft's remaining debt on the market.561 After a 
protracted struggle with Sidanko and BP TNK assumed control over the unit. 
However, the struggle had repercussions for TNK's international reputation,562 
and an agreement between the Alfa group (which controls TNK) and the 
Interros group (which controls Sidanko) promised to return Chemogomeft to 
Sidanko in exchange for giving TNK a 25 per cent stake in Sidanko.563 
Unhappy with the exchange terms and for fear of their stake eventually being 
watered down by share expansions and contested by Sidanko shareholders' 
action,564 TNK stalled the process and instead opted to buy Interros' and 
Kantupan's stake in Sidanko (46.1 and 40.3 per cent respectively).565 
This case illustrates some of the reasoning behind the drive by Russian oil 
majors to consolidate their assets into a single share structure. Complete 
control is crucial for the company if it is to develop its assets and to ensure 
post-investment security. Not only did share unification give the companies 
control over cash flows and corporate strategies but it also protected their 
assets from possible hostile take-overs.566 
According to Moser and Oppenheimer growing regional intervention 
beginning in the wake of the 1998 financial collapse served as a further 
560 Gismatullin, 'News Analysis: TNK Boss Set to Torpedo Amicable Sidanko Deal', Moscow 
Times, 25.8.1999. 
561 Whalen & Korchagina, '2 Investors Snubbed as Oil Firm Sinks', Moscow Times, 
17.12.1998. 
562 It is widely believed that BP Amoco pressure resulted in a freezing of a $500 million loan 
guarantee from the US Export-Import Bank. (Gismatullin, 'TNK Blames BP Amoco for 
Delaying $500M Loan', Moscow Times, 13.10.1999). 
563 Gismatullin, 'BP, TNK End Feud And Split Sidanko', Moscow Times, 23.12.1999. 
564 Pronina, 'TNK 'Dumbfounded' by Chemogomeft Suit', Moscow Times, 28.11.2000. 
565 'Chemogomeft deal', Moscow Times, 27.11.2001. Kantupan is a Cyprus based offshore 
~roup. In the agreement Sidanko would be governed by BP. 
66 Asserting control over cash-flow allowed the companies to follow a more aggressive -
minimising - tax policy. 
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impetus for consolidation and share unification.567 In November 1998 
regional authorities commenced bankruptcy proceedings against two Sidanko 
subsidiaries (Angarsk refinery and Kondpetroleum) as a result of which the 
latter was taken over by TNK. Tax arrears were behind the regional 
authorities' motivation. 
Control is at issue in the acquisition cases as well. After its purchase of 
Onako, TNK has been through protracted negotiations with Sibneft and Onako 
minority shareholders to ensure consolidation of the assets by effecting a share 
swap. While agreement with Sibneft was reached over the summer 2002, 
minority shareholders are still waiting to be satisfied.568 Both Yukos and TNK 
have sought to eliminate the companies they bought as legal entities, by 
effecting a share swap.569 As with the consolidation of original subsidiaries, 
the consolidation of acquisitions is important from the point of view of control 
over the assets. Control enhances the company's ability to carry out its 
corporate strategy, optimise tax payments and improves their standing in the 
financial and securities market. 
De facto control over assets shields the assets from possible take over threats 
or competing calls for control and rent. This strategy was used in both the oil 
privatisations during 2002. In the first case Yukos had effected a share swap 
and consolidated the assets of VNK into its own structure before the 
privatisation early in 2002. In the second, Sibneft had moved throughout 2002 
to buy up shares in Slavneft's subsidiaries before the December 2002 
privatisation. 
In either case, the nominal value of the assets being privatised was reduced by 
uncertainty about "what was being bought". Worst case scenario, the holding 
567 Moser & Oppenheimer, op cit., pp. 318-319. 
568 'Threat to disgrace TNK on world stock markets', Oil & Capital, No. 12,2002. Sibneft 
held a 40 per cent stake in Onako's producing unit Orenburgneft. The deal was not finalised 
until early 2003 though. 
569 Bushueva, 'VNK likvidiruyut [VNK is liquidated)" Vedomosli, 19.7.2002. Bushueva, 
'TNK poluchil upravlyayushuyu kompaniyu [TNK gets a managing company)', Vedomosli, 
24.10.2002. 
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compames would be no more than empty administrative shells, best case 
scenario "alternative" winners would have to expend considerable financial 
and administrative resources on ensuring de facto control over their assets. In 
either case, the policy of the Russian oil major contributed to discourage 
competition for the remaining state assets. 
On the other hand, struggles with minority investors in the course of 
consolidation can become an obstacle to the company's attractiveness In 
corporate securities markets and hamper their ability to access international 
capital. It should be noted that there does not have to be anything implicitly 
illegal in the strategy followed by the oil major to ensure control over 
subsidiari~s in these privatisations. In the case of Yukos for instance, the 
equity transactions had been conducted in line with decisions made by the 
subsidiaries' shareholders meetings and boards of directors.57o Nonetheless, 
Yukos had to return assets to VNK before the privatisation of the state's share 
finally could go ahead.57I 
Other companies have used lack of control to poach desired assets - as in the 
case between Sidanko and TNK. Part control of another company's assets has 
further been used by companies as a means to reduce the investment 
attractiveness of the company in question to other companies. This has 
particularly been the case during the purchase of state assets. During 2002 
both the stakes in VNK and Slavneft went to oil companies that already had 
considerable stakes in subsidiaries of the companies. In the case of Slavneft, 
Sibneft and TNK had a joint stake and Sibneft controlled another 10.85 per 
cent independently.572 In addition Sibneft had a large stake in Slavneft's main 
oil producing subsidiary Megionneftegaz. Analysts estimated that the cost of 
obtaining the necessary control over Slavneft would add an additional $1 
billion to the purchase price, if the winner of the tender would be a company 
570 'Last minute cancellation ofYostochnaya shares' sale', O&C, no. 1,2000. 
571 Bushueva, 'Yukos vernul aktivy VNK [Yukos returned YNK's assets]" Vedomosti, 
20.5.2002. 
572 Sibneft purchased the Belarussian government's 10.85% stake in Slavneft in early 
December 2002. 'Sibneft Buys Belarus' Stake in Slavneft', Moscow Times, 9.12.2002. 
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other than Sibneft.573 In the case of VNK, Yukos had de facto control prior to 
the final privatisation. 
The privatisation of Slavneft was to be a break with the past pattern of murky 
privatisation procedures but although different in form to previous 
privatisations it showed many of the characteristics associated with the past 
sell-offs. Over the summer Sibneft had managed to install its own 
management team at the company.574 This gave Sibneft an insider advantage. 
In the run up to the auction on 18 December 2002 competition for the assets 
was effectively eliminated. Due diligence during the proceedings raised 
concerns about disappearing assets,m Duma interference discouraged the only 
foreign contender for the assets - the Chinese National Oil Corporation,576 and 
court orders disqualified a list of contenders the evening before. 
Together with Sibneft's already considerable stake in Slavneft and its 
subsidiaries, competitors for the stake faced an uncertain future with respect to· 
achieving control over the assets and putting an adequate price this risk. In the 
end the bidding, which started at $ 1.7 billion, was conducted between two 
contenders, Sibneft CEO Shvidler (on behalf of Invest-oil) and two women 
representing Optifor.577 TNK the only other Russian oil major to voice an 
active interest never made an offer. The government's 75 per cent stake went 
to Invest-oil for $1.86 billion.578 After the auction it became clear that Sibneft 
and TNK jointly control Invest-oil. In colluding in this manner the two oil 
majors avoided increasing the price substantially beyond the reserve price 
(some estimates had put the selling price as high as $2.5-3 billion) and are 
573 Bushueva, 'Konkurentsiya slabeet [Competition weakens]', Vedomosti, 16.12.2002. 
574 Bushueva, Osetinskaya, & Chertkov, 'Sukhanov vernulsya v Slavneft' [Sukhanov returns to 
Slavneft]', Vedomosti,3.7.2002. 
575 Jack, 'Sale of Russian oil group leaves question over fairness', Financial Times, 
19. 12.2002. 
576 Bushueva, 16.12.2002., op cit. 
577 When asked afterwards who they represented one ofthe women answered 'Invest-oil', then 
quickly changed her story when realising the blunder. Belton, 'Sibneft, TNK Snap Up 
Slavneft for $1.8Bln', Moscow Times, 19.12.2002. According to Russian legislation an 
auction is only valid if there is more than one bidder. In the past several assets were sold in 
auctions where only two bidders participated representing the same interests. 
578 'Sibneft' i TNK ob 'edinilis ' v bor 'be za Slavneft' [Sibneft and TNK unite themselves in the 
fight for Slavneft]', RIA Novosti, 18.12.2002. At: http://www.rian.ru. 
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now left to split the spoils.579 For comparison, a 5.9 per cent government stake 
in LUKoil was sold in early December 2002 for $775 million.580 
Related to the issue of consolidation of assets is the question of organisational 
form. As long as property remained state owned there remained little 
incentive to alter the organisational form of the companies. With the transfer 
to private ownership changes in organisational form have begun to take place. 
In TeE the holding company form (H-form) of organisation remains an 
intermediate structure of control. It is an organisational form that is ill suited 
to economise on bounded rationality and moral hazard.581 Within this type of 
organisation the relationship between units is such that principal-agent 
problems connected with incomplete contracting may lead to 
departmentalisation and intra-company goal conflicts.582 From an investor's 
579 How this will be done is unclear, as both parties have expressed an interest in consolidating 
Slavneft's'assets into their own structure. (Reinik & Overchenko, 'Teper' oSla/os' podelit' 
[Now it remains to divide [Slavneft]]', Vedomosli,. 20. 12.2002). Although Sibneft and TNK 
now jointly control Slavneft, Sibneft still holds a large stake in Megionneftegaz. In terms of 
expansion possibilities this is one of the last possible brown-field investments open to Sibneft. 
TNK already has increased its reserve and production potential through previous acquisitions. 
The two companies were in a similar situation after TNK purchased Onako. Sibneft at that 
time agreed to exchanged its stake in Orenburgneft for an 8.6 per cent stake in TNK 
International (an offshore group that controls TNK's assets). (Bushueva, 'Aktsionery Onako 
khotyat spravedlivosti [Onako's shareholders want fairness]" Vedomosli, 5.11.2002). A 
similar arrangement is possible with the exchange of TNK's shares in Slavneft in return for a 
stake in Sibneft. Industry analysts' speculate whether such a deal could lead the way to an 
eventual merger between Sibneft and TNK. (Reznik & Overchenko, 20.12.2002, op cit.). On 
a more speculative note it was rumoured that TNK would give up its claim in the privatisation 
of Slavneft in return for a deal with Sibneft over Orenburgneft. (Pronina, 'TNK Installs Its 
Team on Onako Board', Moscow Times, 18.1 1.2000). At that time though the privatisation of 
Slavneft was postponed. However, with the need still to finalise the Orenburgneft-TNK 
international deal a combined solution to both Onako and Slavneft is not out of the question. 
(Reznik & Overchenko, 20.12.2002, ibid). 
580 Belton, '6% Stake in LUKoil Sold for $775M', Moscow Times, 5.12.2002. The 
privatisation of 5.9% of the state's share in LUKoil again demonstrates the reactive nature of 
Russian legislation. The floatation of this package took the form of American Depository 
Receipts (ADR) on international financial markets. However, the law on privatisation did not 
provide for such circumstances. In order therefore to proceed with the floatation, the shares in 
LUKoil were transferred from GKI to a newly created agency - KPP (Kompaniya proeklnoi 
privatizalsii). KPP cannot transfer any proceeds directly into the budget. Under current rules 
KPP is allowed to deduct 10% of the sale price in an administrative fee and is obliged to pay 
profit tax on the proceeds. By the time the proceeds from the sale of LUKoil finally reaches 
the budget (possibly early spring 2003) the size of the sum will have shrunk considerably. 
Legislation has since been amended to avoid similar future situations. (Bushueva,' Den 'gi za 
LUKOIL zavisli [Money for LUKoil depended]', Vedomosti, 16.1.2003). 
581 Williamson (1985), op cil., pp. 273-298. 
582 In 1997/98 a Rosneft subsidiary - Purneftegaz - supplied Omsk refinery (part of Sibneft) 
with oil at preferential terms, in effect transferring profit from its own organisation and the 
state to Sibneft. (Moser & Oppenheimer, op cil., p. 3 I 8). 
244 -
point of view such organisational structures present a higher risk group which 
again leads to higher cost of capital for the company in question. For the 
Russian companies access to foreign capital is an important part of their long-
term strategies, since the capital required for financing the long-term operation 
and expansion of the company is in short supply in Russia. 
Alongside the consolidation of assets therefore, the leading oil companies 
have begun to restructure their organisational structure. LUKoil for instance 
has restructured their operative units into regional divisions, while Yukos has 
developed a structure more akin to the western oil major with a separate 
exploration and production division and a refining and marketing division. 
Such reorganisations, akin to the development of the M-form (Multidivisional 
organisational structure) -in the West, have allowed these companies to 
develop strategic planning and resource allocation capabilities that surpass the 
previous H-form. (In the case of LUKoil it still maintains a strategic planning 
unit independently of the regional divisions). 
Additionally, these reorganisations facilitate the development of monitoring 
and control apparatuses to economise on bounded rationality and moral 
hazard. Yukos today enjoys the highest long-term credit rating of any Russian 
company.583 One industry executive, when asked about the benefits of 
consolidation answered: "The consolidation has primarily resulted in making 
operations more efficient. It has made it possible to identify what expenses 
you have, what your strengths and weaknesses are, it has increased control and 
decreased corruption and outright theft - which were problems in the Soviet 
Union. It has resulted in control with the capital flow and you know what 
your investments are resulting in. On an operational level, the best companies 
are able to control what is happening and make adjustments on a daily basis. 
This obviously creates clear comparative advantages contra companies that 
have less sophisticated systems of control".584 
583 Company news (24.12.2002) at: http://www.yukos.com/main.asp [12.1.2003] 
584 Interviewee #7. 
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Russian companIes not undertaking such consolidation and reorganisation 
have the potential for principal-agent problems associated with the H-forrn, 
which would result in higher cost of capital on international capital markets 
and greater risk of value dissipation. Until its privatisation Slavneft's main 
producer Megionneftegaz was listed independently from its holding parent. 
Ownership of Megionneftegaz partly belonged to Sibneft, who had virtually 
assumed control over the unit.585 From an investment point of view this 
reduced Slavneft's attractiveness in that its main productive and income-
generating asset possibly could have a corporate strategy that was at odds with 
the holding company's strategy.586 Both Yukos and TNK for instance went 
through prolonged battles of ensuring control over their operative units, giving 
them the added benefit of higher investment attractiveness. 
At the end of 2002 Rosneft remains the state's final (domestic) oil producing 
holding company. What will become of Rosneft is still unclear. It has been 
slated for privatisation several times but has also figured in plans to create a 
national oil company. This latter strategy tended to incorporate other state oil 
assets making it difficult to see how it would become large enough to compete 
with the private oil majors now that these have been sold off. One possibility 
remains the amalgamation of Rosneft with the pipeline monopolies creating a 
single state oil-management entity. Plans remain highly speculative though, 
and are likely to be met with strong opposition from the private companies. 
A frequent argument against the privatisation procedure in the Russian oil 
industry has been to blame its present governance problems on the nature of 
the industry's privatisation.587 This thesis disagrees with such a proposition. 
The governance problems in the Russian oil industry (past and present) are 
closely linked to principal-agent problems and the perception of property in 
the Soviet economy. As such the governance problems were present before 
585 Pletnev, 'Mnenie analitikov: "Sibneft .. · sumela sdelat' "Slavneft· .. neprivlekatel'noi d/ya 
konkurentov [The opinion of the analysts: Sibneft knew how to make Slavneft unattractive for 
competitors]. At http://www.strana.ru. 
586 As seen above, this was used by Sibneft to curtail possible competition for the unit's 
Erivatisation. 
87 EBRD, Transition Report 2001: Energy in Transition, EBRD, 2001, p. 84. 
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privatisation. The nature of privatisation reflected these institutional factors in 
that they became fundamental issues in its progress. The EBRD attributes 
lack of investment and good corporate governance to insider privatisation and 
management control. The argument of this thesis however, is that these 
shortcomings reflect that Russian state power remains inadequate to create and 
enforce incentive structures that would be conducive to the industry's long-
term development and residual institutional problems related to the Soviet 
economy. The latter is particularly related to the Soviet conflict between de 
jure and de facto property rights and the relationship between the industry and 
the state. 
It is de facto rights that matter, and this is only ensured by complete control. 
Such control reduces ex post transaction costs and increases ex ante political 
capital, either factor is necessary for company survival and profit. Principal-
, 
agent cost in the Soviet Union had partly been the result of the economy's 
organisational structure. The separation of de jure and de facto rights resulted' 
in increased transaction costs as strategic units bureaucratically became 
increasingly removed from the value creating units. The holding type 
structure that was set out at the beginning of the 1990s inherited this 
antagonistic organisational nature. 
The holding companies themselves could only create value if they controlled 
the revenue stream of their subsidiaries. Although the corporatisation of the 
industry could, in a functioning market economy, have created a basis for 
revenue through share dividends and share voting power, these venues of 
corporate control and rent appropriation remained ineffective in post-Soviet 
Russia. It is the extraction of oil that creates value (at the up-stream end) in 
the industry. As long as the holding company could control the flow of 
revenue to such an extent that it satisfied the owners of the holding companies 
(1993-1998) share unification was a less pressing issue for some of the 
companies (see Chapter 10). 
Moser and Oppenheimer argue that minority shareholder abuse in the late 
1990s was partly a result of the antagonistic relationship between subsidiary 
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and holding company and the change in circumstances after privatisation.588 
As long as the producing units remained "independent" companies their share 
value in many cases surpassed that of the holding company. In order to 
arrange better consolidation terms the holding companies systematically 
pursued a strategy that reduced the value of their subsidiaries. Transfer 
pricing, share dilution and asset stripping, all contributed to reduce the share 
value of the value generating units. (Similar accusations tainted the Slavneft 
auction and reduced its attractiveness). While these practices have been going 
on all throughout the 1990s after privatisation the threat of losing control over 
the wealth generating units prompted the necessity of share unification. As 
the holding company controlled at least 51 per cent of the voting stock of its 
subsidiaries these in turn complied with the value reducing strategy. 
With privatisation the ability of de facto owners to retain control over the 
value creating units began to be threatened. Both regional and intra industry 
pressure increasingly made it necessary to alter the organisational structure of 
the companies in order to protect the revenue generating ability and thus rent 
appropriation ability of the owners. As long as the industry was state owned 
(then partly state owned) economic and political inertia implicitly protected de 
facto owners' ability to generate income. In the course of the 1990s this 
situation has changed. Appropriable political income shrank as production 
declined, prices began to be liberalised, costs increased and the industry was 
reorganised. Increasingly all participants to the revenue circulation process 
have come to rely on economic rent as the income generating element. 
This structural shift has brought to the fore an important element of the 
modem state. While still under state ownership the industry was expected to 
serve the goals ofthe state. In a modem state with a market economy however, 
it is not the responsibility of private owners to pursue a polity welfare 
enhancing strategy. Rather, the responsibility that rests on private owners is to 
comply with such laws and regulations that exists in the polity. It is the 
responsibility of the state to structure laws and regulations in such a way that 
588 Moser & Oppenheimer, op cif., pp. 314-317. 
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they are welfare enhancing and they create a platform for sustainable 
development. These elements of post-Soviet development will be examined in 
the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 9 
Institutional competition at macro level? 
'I am coming to a country where four years 
ago a revolution finally took place. Alas, this 
was a revolution without revolutionaries -
and this again is giving rise to a democracy 
without democrats' .589 
Wolf Biermann 
'Although it's very hard to create anything in 
Russia, it's even harder to destroy it'.590 
A new framework of management for the industry. 
With liberalisation, corporatisation and privatisation of the industry its 
operative level has been transformed. The major operative and strategic 
decisions are now a function of individual corporate strategies with the 
companies employing different strategies to adapt to economic circumstances. 
Such micro level organisational alterations have b.een accompanied by 
reorganisation at the macro level. Although the companies today are more 
independent than during previous years, the state still has considerable rights 
and powers to affect and form the incentive structure. Also, residual Soviet 
institutions, bureaucratic and economic behaviour constitutes important 
elements of path dependency. In order to realise a shift in the development 
path market type institutions will have to successfully compete with these 
elements of path dependency. 
At macro level the reorganisation has implied a repositioning of the role of the 
two major institutions of the previous Soviet system. These are the state, as 
represented by the political leadership, and the state apparatus, represented by 
the ministerial bureaucracies. Both of these institutions have seen their 
previous rights and duties challenged during the years of reforms. 
Specifically, the state has transferred its de jure ownership rights to micro 
level organisations and regional authorities, and has gradually accepted a 
"wider" distribution of rent income. The state apparatus had been obliged to 
transfer its de facto ownership rights and much of its strategic and operative 
589 From a talk Biermann held at the Friedrich-Schiller University, Jena, 16.2.1994. A copy of 
the talk was given to the author by Biermann March 1994. 
590 Yeltsin, op cit., p. 158. 
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functions to the oil companies. If one views the historic development of oil 
industry organisation in the USSR neither of these trends relating to the state 
apparatus drastically break with previous trends. Throughout its history the 
organisational framework of the industry has undergone several changes and 
adaptations as the spatial distribution and geophysical characteristics of the 
industry widened. 
However, throughout the Soviet period the formal and theoretical position of 
the state remained largely unchanged. 59 1 The changes that have appeared at 
this level represent the major changes brought about by the demise of the 
Soviet Union. On the other hand, the evolution that has taken place since 
1987 has mainly contributed to formalise previously existing informal 
practices and as such has not had the desired "revolutionising" effects on 
economic behaviour that many had hoped for. 
Furthermore, these reorganisations have not passed uncontested. Both the 
state and the state apparatus have tried to defend the interests of their 
constituency (i.e. their members) by lobbying and pressuring other actors and 
trying to preserve their previous fields of influence.592 Such results from 
organisational reform are not uncommon occurrences in organisational 
literature. The response in Soviet practice was to create a specialised entity 
with the responsibility of attaining the specified goal. The assumption being 
that newly created entities would not be hampered by the departmental ism of 
the previous entity and thus display a more "progressive" outlook.593 
591 In Leninist philosophy private property in a society trying to develop communism would 
serve as a counter-revolutionary force. 
592 This situation has led to competition and conflict between several of the agencies and 
ministries involved in the regulation of the industry. For instance, in October 2002 the FEK, 
in a letter to the president, complained that the creation of the Khristenko Commission (see 
below) and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade had eroded its responsibilities. 
(Startseva, 'FEC Complains About Lack of Power', Moscow Times, 22.10.2002). While the 
FEK had pursued a policy of increasing tarriffs in order to better the economic foundation of 
the power producers the MEDT has pursued a policy of low inflation. Since the former (in the 
view ofthe MEDT) is at odds with the latter and the latter being an important goal of the Putin 
administration, tarriff setting power has been shifted to the Khristenko Commission and the 
MEDT. According to one analyst 'the FEC totally discredited itself as an analytical body last 
year when it proposed unrealistic tariff increases, so it is not surprising that no one is listening 
to it'. (Moiseyev, Renaissance Capital, ibid.) 
593 Progressive is here used in a very subjective form and meant to imply the creation of new 
organisations with goals tied to the new policy (perceived greater loyalty). This approach, as 
251 -
MNP and Mingeo were the two ministerial hierarchies that primarily 
controlled Soviet oil development, operations and exploration. In the post-
Soviet era these two organisations have been supplemented by several new 
entities (see Figure 9.1). In terms of access and control over information and 
resource flows the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (compared to the former 
MNP) has been the largest loser of the reform period.594 The Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy was created on the basis of the Soviet Ministry of Power and 
Electrification.595 It has branch departments for all the previous branch 
ministries.596 Mingeo became the Russian Committee on Geology under the 
Ministry of Natural Resources. The structures and organisations of the former 
MNP became Rosneftegaz and subsequently Rosneft. These . latter 
organisations inherited both the offices and much of the scientific 
responsibilities of MNP. While the Ministry of Fuel and Energy was to retain 
a strategic role Rosneftegaz assumed the technical and operative control of the 
country's oil assets - prior to the industry's restructuring. 
With the demise of the Soviet economy and the following period of reform, 
the number of governmental organisations with an influence on the collection 
of rent and resources in the oil industry has increased. Before a substantial 
number of ministries and committees influenced the Soviet oil industry, yet 
the major point of bureaucratic interaction took place at ministerial level. At 
this level the MNP represented the "interest" of the oil industry. With the 
has been shown ·in part one, was not uncommon in the Soviet Union. However, as with 
experiences in the Soviet Union the residual organisations will in many instances be 
entrenched in the system and continue to exercise their previous functions, resulting in a non-
transparent organisational structure with overlapping areas of responsibility. See also footnote 
above, on FEK and MEDT. This case illustrates two important elements of the state's power 
base. Firstly, the importance of reorganisation to further policy specific ends. Secondly, the 
patrimonial nature of organisational development. Organisations that do not remain loyal to 
their "creator" will see their responsibilities reduced. 
594 The Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy was created in February 1991. Council of 
Ministers RSFSR (28.2.1991), 'Ob obrazovanii Ministerstva topliva i energetiki RSFSR [On 
the formation on the RSFSR Ministry of Fuel and Energy)', Sob. Akt. no. 13, st. 163. 
According to a former Soviet Ministry of Oil official 'Now I would say that they [Ministry of 
Fuel and Energy] do not have any power over the oil and gas companies'. (Interviewee # I). 
During Soviet times the MNP's ability to control is constituent parts was closely related to its 
control over the incentive and reward structure. Physical and financial resources were 
controlled by Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance. 
595 Interviewee # 5. 
596 Interviewee # 4. 
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demise of the former system the loci of bureaucratic interactions has 
increased, with the companies interacting separately and collectively with a 
greater number of agencies. 
With respect to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy its role and position has been 
curtailed and altered. With the creation of VIes its operative responsibilities 
has been transferred to the companies. 'The interrelationship between the 
ministry and these companies is only co-ordination - more political co-
ordination then technical and commercial. The ministry has no right to 
instruct the companies ... this is not the responsibility of the ministry'. 597 
Similarly, the increased reliance on self-financing and eventual cessation of 
government funding removed one of its chief instruments of administration -
resource redistribution. Even so, its responsibilities at the start of the Russian 
period were important, and its bureaucratic and branch expertise was 
invaluable. However, throughout the 1990s the Ministry of Fuel and Energy 
has seen several of its responsibilities reduced and transferred to other "more 
progressive" government agencies. There has been a sustained draining of the 
best personnel from this ministry to the newly created oil companies, which 
has severely reduced the Ministry'S intangiblecapital.598 Figure 9.1 shows the 
organisational/administrative framework that the oil industry operated in at the 
end of the 1990s. 
597 Interviewee # 4. 
598 Interviewee #1. According to Interviewee # 3, 'I think that the government's influence on 
the companies was always limited since the early 1990s, I think it was just weak staff who 
were working in the state bodies who were controlling the companies. They do not have 
enough influence, they do not have enough authority to rule these oil companies'. 
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Figure 9.1- Organisational framework Russian oil industry end 1990s.599 
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599 In the course of the Putin administration some changes have occurred. The Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade has been created The Interdepartemental Commission has 
been replaced by the Khristenko Commission, and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy has 
changed its name to Ministry of Energy. 
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Along with the Ministry of Fuel and Energy's basic task of creating the 
necessary organisational and economic conditions for a more efficient fuel and 
energy sector the role of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, starting in 1992, 
comprised:60o 
• the formation and delegation of export quotas III conjunction with the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy;601 
• the regulation of exports and the registration and export licenses III 
conjunction with the Committee of Foreign Economic Relations;602 
• the regulation of industry imports; 
• the development of state programmes for the development of the industry, 
calculation of energy balances, and the development of long term strategic 
forecasts. (These include the 1992 Energy Concept and the Energy 
Strategies of 1995, 2000, and 2003); 
• the realisation of measures to facilitate the de-monopolisation and 
privatisation of the industry; 
• to guarantee reliable and safe operations, the observance of norms and 
rules and the developing mechanism for social protection; 
• the creation of funds for the financing of investments, purchase of 
equipment, and compensation of enterprises' income loss; 
• the organisation of a secondary, industry related, equity and securities 
market. 
These responsibilities were soon superseded by later reorganisation, 
particularly the creation of vertically integrated companies. The increased 
reliance on industry self-financing of investment even before the creation of 
600 Unless otherwise stated the source of the following information is RF Government 
Decision Xl! 6 (4.1.1992), 'Voprosy Ministerstva topliva i energetiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[Concerning the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation),. At: 
http://law .optima.ru. 
601 RSFSR Government Decision Xl! 7 (15.11.1991). 
602 Ibid. The Committee on Foreign Economic Relations later became the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and had the added responsibility of appointing "special exporters" 
(' Institutions and companies authorized by the state to conduct export operations'. 
Kabalinsky (1995a), op cit., p. 22). 
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VIes clearly reduced the Ministry's ability to affect the industry.603 The 
Ministry has retained a department for the governance of state property, a 
responsibility that it has shared with the government property fund (GKI). 
Importantly, the MNP's structure of incentives had been closely linked to its 
control over information and incentive flows throughout the industry. With 
the establishment of contractual relations - business to business and business 
to ministries - another of the Ministry's administrative tools was weakened. 
The Ministry's influence was weakened by a gradual monetization of industry 
relations. Before income generated by the industry had been measured in 
physical terms and the Ministry could more easily control the information 
pertaining to such a form of measurement. Monetization of the economy also 
implied that the bureaucratic centre of income related flows shifted from the 
Ministry to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and the State Tax Service (later the Ministry of 
Taxes).604 
The Ministry continued to influence the companies as long as these remained 
state owned. For instance the Ministry (and GKI) appointed a state 
representative to be present at the board meetings of each of the companies 
and manage the state's share in the companies. However, as pointed out 
above, their influence in matters operational remained weak. On the other 
hand, their political connections might have played a considerable role. Yurii 
Shafranik, former Minster for Fuel and Energy (1993-1996), was the state's 
representative on the board ofTNK.605 He remained closely connected to TNK 
603 RF Government Decision N!:! 28 (29.1.1992), '0 vnebyudzhetnykh fondakh jinansovogo 
regulirovaniya Ministerstvatopliva i energetiki Rossiiskoi [On the extra-budgetary funds of 
financial regulation of the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy]'. At: http://law.optima.ru. 
604 Monetization is here used in an idealised sense. The fact that large parts of the economic 
relations in post 1992 remained non-monetized will be dealt with below. However, even 
given the non-monetization of the economy, the structure and quality of resources and rent 
flow changed after 1992. Since 2000 this applies to the Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade as well. 
605 RF Government Decision N!:! 777 (1.7.1996), '0 naznachenii predstavitelei Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii po upravleniyu zakreplennymi v federal 'noi sobstvennosti paketami aktsii 
aktsionernykh obshchestv toplivno-energeticheskovo kompleksa [On the appointment of 
representatives of the Russian Federation for the administration of concentrated in federal 
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after his period as minister, before becoming head of newly created Central 
Fuel Company in 1997.606 
After the creation of the vertically integrated companies, the state's primary 
means of influencing the industry has been through the regulation of pipelines, 
taxes and legislation. In all these fields the Ministry of Fuel and Energy has 
gradually lost its influence. The creation of Transneft and Transnefteprodukt 
reduced its control over pipeline operation. With the creation of the 
Interdepartmental Commission in January 1995 the role of the Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
the State Customs Committee were increased regarding matters of pipeline 
access and export.607 
The Interdepartmental Commission was charged with the responsibility of 
regulating access to the pipeline systems and supervise the Ministry's shipping 
schedules, and co-ordination of exports. 60S This commission, which was led 
by a representative of the Ministry, was abolished in November 2000 and 
replaced by a government commission charged with the same 
property shares in joint stock companies of the fuel and energy complex]'. Sob. Zak., 1996, 
no. 28, st. 3393. 
606 'Shafranik Lands Top Job With Tyumen Oil', Moscow Times, 27.8.1996. 
607 RF Government Decision N!! 1446 (31.12.1994), '0 vyvoze nefii i nefieproduktov za 
predely tamozhennoi territori Rossiiskoi Federatsii s 1 yanvarya /995 goda [About the export 
of oil and oil products beyond the customs territory of the Russian Federation from I January 
1995]'. At: http://law.optima.m. 
608 RF Government Decision N!! 94 (30.1.1995),0 mezhvedomstvennoi komissii po 
regulirovaniyu voprosov svyazannykh s ispol'zovaniem sistemy magistral'nykh nefieprovodov 
nefieproduktoprovodov i terminalov v morskikh portakh dlya vyvoza nefii, nefieproduktov za 
predely tamoshennoi territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On the Interdepartmental Commission 
for regulation questions connected with the utilisation of the pipeline systems for oil, oil 
products and oil terminals in sea ports for sending of oil and oil products beyond the custom 
territory of the Russian Federation], Sob.Zak., 1995, no. 6, st. 492. Government Decision N!! 
248 (6.3.1996), 0 vnesenii dopolnenii v Polozhenie 0 mezhvedomstvennoi komissii po 
regulirovaniyu voprosov, svyazannykh s ispol'zovaniem sistemy magistral'nykh nefieprovodov 
nefieproduktoprovodov i terminalov v morskikh portakh dlya vyvoza nefii, nefieproduktov za 
predely tamoshennoi territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, utverzhdennoe postanovleniem 
Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 30 yanvarya 1995 g. M 94, i izmenenii ee sostava [On 
the introduction of additions to the statute on the Interdepartmental Commission for the 
regulation of questions connected with the utilisation of the pipeline systems for oil, oil 
products and oil terminals in sea ports for sending of oil and oil products beyond the custom 
territory of the Russian Federation, ratified by the Government of the Russian Federation on 
30 January 1995 N!! 94, and alterations in its composition], Sob.Zak. 1996, no. 12, st. 1128. 
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responsibilities.609 A government representative and not a representative of 
the Ministry leads this new commission (sometimes referred to as the 
'Khristenko Commission' after its chairman). 
With respect to the oil industry these commissions primarily influenced the 
transportation of crude oil where Transneft enjoys a near monopoly. 
However, with growing investment in Russia's downstream sector and the 
prospect for greater demand of the Transnefteprodukt's pipeline system, the 
Ministry of Energy has expressed a desire for greater influence on product 
transportation and export, and submitted shipping schedules for oil products to 
the Khristenko Commission.6lo Although this commission, like the 
Interdepartmental Commission before it, has the authority to regulate oil 
product transportation such shipping has remained an issue between 
Transnefteprodukt and the oil companies. One industry analyst characterised 
the Ministry's proposal as an attempt to create a reason for its own 
existence.611 
In accordance with the 'Law on Natural Monopolies' a Federal Energy 
Commission was created in order to regulate pipeline tariffs.612 This 
commission, which is housed in the same building as the Ministry of Fuel and 
Energy, is a more independent body that sets tariffs for all the natural 
monopolies. However, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy is still involved in the 
preparation of shipping schedules. The FEK also has regional departments. 
609 Government Decision· Xl! 843 (2.11.2000), 0 komissii Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
po voprosam ispol 'zovaniya sistem magistral 'nykh nejtegazoprovodov i 
nejteproduktoprovodov [On the commission of the government of the Russian Federation for 
questions of regulation of the main oil and gas pipelines and oil product pipelines]. At: 
http://law.optima.ru. 
610 Khrennikov, 'Minenergo vspomnilo 0 Transnejteprodukte [Ministry of Energy remembers 
about Transnefteprodukt]', Vedomosti,7.4.2003. 
611 Khrennikov citing Yalery Nesterov, op cit. Representatives of Transnefteprodukt fear that 
the proposal will make it uncompetitive. About 80% of oil products are transported by 
railroad and Transnefieprodukt representatives worry that increased government regulation 
will increase the share of railroad transportation. Industry representatives on the other hand 
worry about increased costs and administrative expenses. 
612 RFPD Xl! 1194 (29.11.1995), '0 federal 'noi energeticheskoi komissii [On the Federal 
Energy Commission]'. At: http://law.optima.ru. 
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Legislative power rests with the state Duma and the president, while regional 
and local authorities have some powers in this respect. In accordance with the 
'Subsoil Law' the Ministry of Natural Resources regulates the licenses for the 
working of the subsoil. This agency also supervises and develops standards 
for environmental protection. 
Throughout the privatisation of the industry three agencies affecting market 
relations have been important. These are the anti-monopoly agency (GKAP) 
which regulates mergers and acquisitions; the Federal Securities Commission 
(FSC) which has to approve share expansions and consolidations; and the 
Federal Bankruptcy Commission (FBC), which, in conjugation with the 
judiciary, regulates bankruptcy proceedings and appoints external 
management. 
In 2001 the Ministry of Energy's department on PSA was transferred to the 
newly created "super" Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.613 
However, the state's appointed negotiator remains, as before, Rosneft and 
Zarubezneft,614 while the state Duma and local authorities decide which fields 
are eligible for PSA. 
Finally, although some oil industry-interest organisations (like the Moscow 
International Petroleum Club, the Union of Oil Industrialists and the Energy of 
Russia faction under Medvedev in the Duma) have been established, these are 
not formal lobbying organs similar to the ones one would find in most western 
economies. The reason for this has been attributed to the relative 
613 RF Government Decision N!! 86 (2.2.2001), '0 merakh po sovershenstvovannyu 
deyatel'nosti federal'nykh organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti po podgotovke, zaklocheniyu i 
realizatsii soglashenii 0 razdele produktsii, a takzhe po kontrolyu za ikh realizatsiei [On 
measures to imporve the Federal executives agencies responsible for the drawing up, 
conclusion and implementation of production sharing agreements, as well as for the 
monitoring of their implementation],. Sob.Zak. no. 7 (200 I), st. 653. The decision sought to 
make PSA more effective by combining some of the functions previously held by the Ministry 
of Energy and the Ministry of Natural Resources. In 1998 the PSA portfolio in the Duma had 
been moved from the reform-minded Natural Resources Committee to committees of a more 
conservative nature - the Economic Policy Committee and the Committee on Industry, 
Transportation, Energy and Construction. (AMCHAMIUSRBC Issue Brief, American 
Chamber of Commerce in Russia, September 1998. Prepared for the Clinton-Yeltsin 
Presidential Summit Moscow, Russia, September 1-2, 1998). 
614 Interviewee # 9. 
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insignificance of the legislative, the oil industry's divergence of interest from 
the conservative majority of the Duma, and the lack of common interests 
between the VIes.6i5 However, the oil industry, like the remainder of big 
business in Russia, work through the influential Russian Union of Industrialist 
and Entrepreneures (RSpp).616 
The role of the Ministry as a vehicle for purveying industry interest has been 
reduced by the companies' more direct contact with the government, 
parliament and presidential administration. Such contact lS both 
individualistic and in groups.617 The Russian oil companies are also 
represented on an advisory forum to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. For the 
international companies the Petroleum Advisory Forum (PAF) acts as a co-
ordinating organ (though with very low influence). The IFIs in many respects 
also advance the interests of the international oil companies, by advocating 
economic and political reforms akin to those in which these companies are 
used to operate. 
Thus at the end of the 1990s the Ministry's chief role is:618 
• the development of strategic programmes and advising the government; 
• preparing legislation on investment policy, an advisory role in taxation 
development, and co-ordinating the interests of the industry; 
• to develop short and long-term energy balances; 
• finally the Ministry has limited operative influence through the approval of 
field development plans,619 and participation in transport regulation. 
According to former Minister of Fuel and Energy (1997-1998) Kiriyenko: 
'The Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation has to tackle two 
615 Pleines, op cit., p. 24. According to Interviewee # 12, 'there is [only] the interest of oil 
companies concerning more easy access to export pipe [and concerning] [ ... ] lower export 
tariffs or some other tax advantage, but otherwise the interest of the oil companies divert 
because they are competitors' . 
616 Interviewee # 3. 'They [Russian oil companies under the leadership of the RSPP] have 
regular meetings with the leadership of the country and the president where they are 
expressing their views. It seems that very often they are heard by the leadership'. (/bid.) 
617 Interviewee # 7. 
618 Unless otherwise stated the following information is based on interviewee # 4. 
619 Interviewee #1. 
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tasks at a time - to provide the national economy with fuel and energy and 
carry out reforms' .620 Herein also lies the Ministry's dilemma. While the 
former is an operative goal the latter is a strategic goal. Given the importance 
of energy to political legitimacy the operative goal is likely to dominate the 
strategic goal. The former Minister admitted that 'the fuel and energy sector is 
of too great political and social importance for Russia' to let market relations 
be the sole guiding principle.621 If the Ministry is seen as pursuing its 
operative goal rather than its strategic goal it will be seen as an obstacle to 
reform by parts of the industry. Conversely, if the Ministry is seen as pursuing 
reforms too vigorously it might lose its political significance to other state 
organisations.622 
The Ministry is now a far cry from its former dominant position, however the 
question remains whether these reorganisations have truly altered the 
functioning of the economy to such an extent that one really can speak of new 
economic relations. 
The Soviet economy was co-ordinated by use of a rigid ministerial framework 
of governance that served as the executive institution in terms of conveying 
620 Kiriyenko in Ministry pamphlet' Ministerstvo Top/iva i Energetiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation]" Ministry of Fuel and Energy, no 
printing details. Given to the author at a meeting in the Ministry in March 2002. 
621 [bid. An example of the importance of oil is the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade's latest estimate for GDP growth in 2004. It estimates that given an oil price of $18.5 
per barrel the economy will grow 3.8%, while a price of $22 per barrel will fuel a growth of 
4.7%. (,GDP Growth Scenarios', Moscow Times, 20.3.2003). 
622 According to one report this might already be a very near possibility. After the 
government's announcement of an open-tap policy on Transneft exports in 200 I the Ministry 
of Fuel and Energy has gradually lost its political influence. The government has even gone 
so far as denouncing it as an 'bureaucratic lobbying device for the oil industry' and 
contemplating its disbanding. (Mazalov, Oil Sector Report, Troika Dialog, 200 I, p. 50). 
During the author's visit to the Ministry in 2002 extensive reconstruction and refurbishment 
was undertaken. According to one senior ministry official the oil companies collectively 
footed the bill. (Interviewee # 5). Commenting on the relationship between the Ministry and 
the oil industry, one industry executive said: 'I think that you find them having less and less 
power. The other process that has gone on is a general loosening of government control, and 
an ending of regulation that was set up for the sake of regulation. We find ourselves less and 
less dependent on the ministries. In the past it was always 'how can we minimise the control 
they have over us and maximally get around it', now we are more thinking 'how can they 
actually serve us well, effectively as a regulator and actually help the industry to grow?' I 
think you will find that over the past couple of years the relationship has really been 
normalising. They have a lot less power of the day to day things over which they shouldn't 
have power, and the start to gain power of things that they should have power ... such as 
working to create a more stable pricing environment in Russia'. (Interviewee # 2). 
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formal political goals to operative levels and channelling information from the 
operative levels to the strategic organisations. Performance was evaluated and 
monitored through the system of plan formation and incentives (bonuses) that 
were closely connected to the system of rent extraction. With the demise of 
the Soviet Union this system of co-ordination started to unravel. In the late 
Soviet period several factors affected the state's ability to monitor the system. 
Firstly, an adverse structure of incentives that promoted self-interest. 
Secondly, diminishing returns to investment (monitoring) as a result of an 
excessive organisational structure. Finally, at the very end, the lack of 
credible threat of coercion.623 The Soviet economic structure had been geared 
to promote the political interest of a discredited leadership through an 
institutional matrix emanating from the structure of state power. 
In this respect the overlap of authorities and responsibilities served to maintain 
the structure in a state of competition that enhanced the centre's patrimonial-
despotic power. In the post-Soviet era the development of the Ministry's role" 
in the regulation of the oil industry illustrates a similar approach. Gradually 
however, the responsibilities of the different administrative parts have begun 
to crystallise. In this respect there has been a general shift away from the 
previous branch oriented structure to a structure where more strategic 
ministries (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Taxes and Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade) have seen their participation in the oil industry 
. d 624 Increase. While this on the one hand has "freed" the Ministry to 
concentrate on strategic rather than operative issues, it has also reduced its 
relevance. From a state point of view, economising on transaction costs can 
now better be done through the non-branch ministries. At the same time 
623 Harrison, 'Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy', 
Economic His/ory Review, 2002, vol. 55, no. 3. 
624 'All the energy sectors here, and all the trade and state organisations - the Ministry of 
Economic Development [& Trade] [MEDT]- we have a lot of things that overlap. The MEDT 
has some departments specifically acting in the energy sector, and of course we have in our 
ministry a department that determines the economic policy in the energy sector and is very 
close with this ministry [MEDT]. We have very close contact with the Ministry of Natural 
Resources - nuclear is not our responsibility. After Chemobyl it was divided into two 
ministries and is now a separate matter. Of course in a lot of political issues we have contacts 
and relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the Ministry of Finance it is 
necessary because a lot of problems need financing and MinFin is responsible for making 
decisions on these issues'. (Interviewee # 4). 
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maintaining an element of overlap is desirable (for the state) as this reduces 
the threat of upsetting the relative bargaining strength of the respective 
structures of policy implementation. All the main administrative organisations 
involved in the regulation of the oil industry (Minenergo, Minprirody, MinFin 
and METD) in addition to regulating their aspect of the oil industry purse their 
own ends as well. This leads to situation where there is a constant element of 
"bureaucratic competition" that the state can utilise in order to restrain the 
bargaining power of each organisation. 
Thus, although the Ministry has lost much of its "former" authority this does 
not necessarily imply that the present mode of interaction (transacting) has 
changed significantly. For instance in the case of the oil industry spatial 
distribution had aggravated dysfunctions of the Soviet economic model, 
however in the post-Soviet era spatial distribution is set to increase. Although 
economising will be possible the reserves and deposits remain put after the 
Soviet Union as well. The state would in the immediate post-Soviet period be 
more reliant on oil and gas revenues than at any time before as the industry in 
a competitive market was expected to alter its product mix. Thus there would 
be a lag before state's revenues could be based on renewed growth in 
industrial production. 
A similar situation was present with respect to state power. The Soviet Union 
had been based on a system of despotic-patrimonial structures of state power. 
There had been a high degree of state capture. Personal connections had 
pervaded politics as well as industry. In order to achieve a shift to a 
competitive market environment these institutions would have to change, as 
bureaucratic non-personal trust relationships replaced the old institutions. 
However, Russia has had no experience of this type of state power in its 
history. There was no historic institutions or social capital on which to base 
these new institutions.625 In other words Russia faced a reform situation 
similar in complexity to that experienced in the 18th century (Peter the Great) 
and the Bolshevik coup d'efaf early in the 20th century, how to change a 
625 A different viewpoint can be found in Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: an 
Interpretation of Political Culture, Harvard University Press, 1995. 
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development path and avoid the restitution of traditional institutions? Implied 
in the above is not that Russians have an ingrained inclination towards 
authoritarian regimes, but rather that authoritarian regimes and power 
structures have been dominant throughout Russia's history. As such the 
institutions fostered by this experience will constitute the foundation of path 
dependency in state power through the historic weight of political, economic 
and social traditions. 
In the case of the oil industry its operative framework has changed 
considerably. There is no longer a single ministry responsible for operational 
decisions, there are more places of interaction with the state apparatus than 
previously, and there is horizontal as well as vertical communication, which 
may increase the speed and accuracy of information. All these factors create a 
formal setting that could ideally generate a development shift. However, it is 
not only the form but also the substance of this framework that will determine 
to what extent a shift is possible. In this respect the reforms in the 
organisational framework illustrate the state's search for methods of reducing 
transaction costs associated with the appropriation of income and resources. 
State-industry and inter-industry relations. 
With privatisation and later consolidation of the oil industry the loci of 
interaction between industry and state and inter-industry changed. Previously 
interaction between industry and state was regulated through the ministerial 
structure with separate channels of interaction existing through the party's 
structure or by direct contact with the authorities in Moscow. Inter-industry 
interaction was similarly regulated through the ministerial structure. 
However, informal practices existed that served to enhance intra industry 
interaction. 
Common for either structure of interaction was its non-monetized character. 
Orders and allocation of resources governed state-industry relations, while 
informal inter-industry relations took the form of favours and barter. 
Personalised networks and trust relationships under such circumstances were 
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conducive to the reduction of transaction costs. In a situation where the state 
was unable to satisfy all demand for goods and services, personalised trust 
relationships (networks) served to ensure stability of supply and reduce the 
threat of punishment. 
Market economies, on the other hand, are to a great extent dependent on non-
personalised exchange relationships with prices serving as means to monitor 
and control demand. Property rights and the enforcement of such create the 
basis upon· which revenues are created. These are in many respects the 
foundations of market economies, instrumental in creating a competitive 
environment and reducing the costs of transaction. 
Barter, non-payment and rent extraction. The radical reform process under 
Gorbachev was supposed to shift the economy from an administrative 
economy to contractual based forms of interaction. However, even prior to the 
collapse of economic output and political stability in the early 1990s the 
circumstances under which the reforms were introduced were less than 
favourable. Shortage was already pervasive, property rights had been 
contested for a long time (a process of clarification was just beginning) and 
rapid inflation beginning with price liberalisation made money a less efficient 
medium of exchange. Given these circumstances the Russian structure of 
economic interaction was stuck in a halfway house. The structure of old was 
being built down, while the expected new institutions could only function 
under the given circumstances at a prohibitive premium. 
Instead of shifting to market based institutions of interaction the informal and 
residual Soviet economic institutions came to fill the institutional gap. 
Integration of industry, finance, and politics became a means to overcome 
supply side constraints. The establishment of financial-industrial groups (FIG) 
was a response to the transaction cost premium represented by market 
economy institutions. These organisations enabled the continued functioning 
of individual units by ensuring lower transaction costs between their members 
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and enabling continued operation.626 The FIGs represent a continuation of 
reliance of personalised exchange relationships in order to reduce transaction 
cost, and secure supply side stability.627 Ledeneva argues that such 
personalised exchange relationships characterised the relationship between 
industrial firms and the local/regional authorities as well. 628 
Non-monetization of the economy and non-payment likewise find their 
antecedents in Soviet informal economic institutions. A lack of credible threat 
of hard budget constraints resulted in continued over demand by enterprise 
managers that resulted in arrears. This was especially so in company towns 
where a single (or few) firm(s) was the employer,629 as is often the case in the 
oil industry. The state's commitment to maintaining an "acceptable" standard 
of living resulted in it condoning enterprise behaviour in exchange for political 
income.63o 
The absence of a capital market made the evaluation of a firm's 
creditworthiness fraught with uncertainty as the data necessary to evaluate the 
firm's performance was missing. Thus both missing capital-markets and soft 
budget constraints contributed to the continuation of personalised exchange 
relationships. Costliness of information was less in personalised exchange 
relationships as the network would have better access to information 
concerning a firm's bottom line than agents of non-personal exchange. Soft 
budget constraints contributed to the integration of industry-politics relations, 
particularly at regional level where the transaction cost of such exchange was 
626 On FIGs in general see johnson, op cit., pp. 333-365. On relations between the oil industry 
and financial groups see Kryukov & Moe (1998). 
627 Vasiliev's argument is similar: 'Administrative effectiveness in the economy rapidly 
vanished as traditional distribution systems disintegrated ... Enterprises belonging to 
associations began to build horizontal links, and to establish informal industrial-financial 
groups. The official creation of such groups today merely recognises and formalises their de 
facto existence'. (Vasiliev, 'The Political Economy of Russia's Reform', Working Paper of 
the Stockholm Institute of East European Economies, 1994, No. 100, reprinted in Vasiliev, 
Ten Years of Russian Economic Reform: A Collection of Papers, Centre for Research into 
Post-Communist Economies (CRCE), 1999, p. 88). 
628 Ledeneva, op cit., p. 326. 
629 Ickes & Ryterman, 'The Interenterprise Arrears Crisis in Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 1992, 
vol. 8, no. 4, p. 334 and footnote 7. 
630 Treisman (2000), op cit., p. 238. 
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less than at federal leve1.631 The state in reality condoned the development of 
barter exchanges and non-monetary means of settlement by a continuous 
infusion of net credits into the economy through its de facto acceptance of tax 
arrears and non-monetary forms of tax settlement.632 
However, as Ickes and Ryterman observe: 'payments that appear to be 
formally identical to those prior to January 1992 have very different systemic 
effects because of two factors: the end of the guarantee of solvency and the 
inadequacy of reserves held in the system to smooth payments. These two 
factors raised the demand for financial information about the enterprises 
precisely at the moment when the amount available decreased dramatically' .633 
While as the informal economic institutions of the Soviet economy had 
contributed to the "successful" functioning of the Soviet system, these 
informal practices were not conducive to supporting the growth of market 
based institutions. As opposed to the Soviet economy where they reduced 
transaction costs, in the post-Soviet setting they contributed to increased intra 
economy transaction cost (excluding networks). 
Arrears and barter where means for enterprise managers to continue the 
contestation of property rights before the clarification and redistribution of 
these had been initiated/completed.634 Barter allowed the firm to trade at 
"market clearing prices" rather than cost prices. Selling at below cost price 
was prohibited. However, the purchasing power of industry in many cases 
remained below cost. Thus barter allowed the firms to report inflated 
contractual prices. Tax on profits in these cases would be calculated at 
reported price, while in reality no "taxable" profit had been made. Offsetting 
taxes against produce would again reduce net taxes. Tax evasion was also a 
motive in barter arrangements where solvent customers existed. 
631 Treisman (2000), op cif., p. 239. 
632 Commander & Mumssen, 'Understanding Barter in Russia', EBRD Working Paper, 1998, 
no. 37, pp. 9-11, 16. 
633 Ickes &Ryterman, op cif., p. 343. 
634 This paragraph is based on Treisman (2000), op cif., pp. 230-240. 
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Finally the gradual liberalisation of trade and prices extended the opportunities 
of rent seeking. Whereas previously "manager rent" had been extracted by 
means of diversion of cash flow and resource flows to private ends, 
liberalisation of prices and trade allowed managers to extract the differentials 
between various official prices and market prices.635 Both form and substance 
of this method of rent seeking can be interpreted as an extension of the 
previous struggle over property rights. The Soviet state had used the 
difference in domestic prices and world prices to appropriate a rent that was 
unassailable from the plant directors' point of view. With gradual 
liberalisation of trade and prices, this mechanism of extracting rent became 
available to the de facto owners as well. 
Several regional exchanges were established in order to participate in this 
form of rent extraction. These regional exchanges appropriated part of the 
former state monopoly on economic and political rent extraction in that they 
excluded the federal authorities from the redistributive process.636 With the 
consolidation of the industry and the eventual liberalisation of prices and trade 
these mechanisms of rent extraction lost their appeal. The loci of rent 
extraction again shifted towards the federal authorities, through its control of 
export licenses, taxation and the transport infrastructure, and the holding 
companies once these had consolidated ownership and controlled internal cash 
flow. 
Although oil prices theoretically have only been restricted by export capacity, 
quotas and export duties, the lack of solvent demand remains a problem. Only 
5-10 per cent Russian domestic oil is traded at open markets,637 with the 
majority of "trade" taking place in house, i.e. between producers and refiners 
within the same group. Again the consolidation of the companies and the 
establishment of a single revenue and cost centre has reduced the problems of 
635 Aslund, op cit., pp. 109-112. 
636 Sagers, 'Soviet Commodity Exchanges Trading in Oil', Soviet Geography, 1991, vol. 32, 
no. 7, pp. 513-515. See also the interview with Sergei Denisov (President of the Tyumen 
Commodity Exchange), 'Neft': Valyuta ili tovar? [Oil: Currency or commodity?)', Ekonomika 
izhizn', December 1991, no. 51, pp. 8-9. 
637 A lien & Henderson, Valuations Overstate the Risk, Renaissance Capital, Feb. 200 I, p. 36. 
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industry non-payment and altered the structure of rent extraction (payment 
agreements still exist with the federal authorities).638 
Patrimonial structures of state power. The protracted process of 
implementing a new administrative framework, its lack of coherence and the 
constraints placed on the development of the oil policy contributed to a 
situation where the reform process became stuck in its tracks. The overly 
political nature of the industry made economic considerations secondary to 
short-term political objectives. This was exaggerated by the departure of 
several reform-oriented politicians from the government in 1993/1994.639 In 
the absence of clearly defined 'rules of the game' the industry continued to 
rely on previously established patterns of behaviour.64o This is in line with 
new institutional thinking in that in a situation of uncertainty, with respect to 
return on investment in "new economic behaviour" and institutions, agents are 
more likely to act in accordance with previous patterns of economic behaviour 
since returns remain calculable. 
This simple conclusion worked both ways. From an industry point of view 
continued lobbying of the executive remained the preferred course of action in 
that the probability of protecting their mechanisms of wealth maximisation in 
the short run would be more assured. A new structure of economic interaction 
would at the outset of reform seem less likely to protect the active parties from 
unwanted interference in the redistribution of property. 
Similarly from an executive point of view the reliance of previous patterns of 
income establishment would allow the government to have a guaranteed level 
of income, both in terms of political and economic rent. Furthermore, 
expanding the patrimonial network also served as a means to tie a greater part 
of the constituency to the political and economic structure. Thus until such 
638 Interviewee # 11. 
639 Aslund, op cit., p. xiii. 
640 In a study of the wholesale trade sector in Moscow Treisman argues that 'in the loosely 
institutionalised, rapidly evolving Russian economy, connections matter. Furthermore, they 
continue to matter even after a year and a half of liberalised price setting and repeated 
attempts to impose financial discipline on enterprises. Markets appear not to be replacing but 
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time that a coherent framework of administration and management had been 
established, its implementation guaranteed and "player" adherence to the 
'rules of the game' the previous structure of state power and state-industry 
interaction (hierarchical bargaining) would promise greater ex post stability in 
terms of rent extraction. Hence, a patrimonial structure of state power and 
industry relations continued to dominate Russian economic behaviour.641 This 
again led to a situation that was non-conducive to the emergence of a 'rule of 
law' based economy and society. The situation conforms to Aslund's 
description of Russia as a rent seeking state or an intermediary reformer.642 . 
In a despotic-patrimonial system the 'rule of law' (or ex post stability) would 
give the state less strategic room for action. It is precisely the state's 
monopoly in generating and interpreting the rules at any given time that 
empowers the state vis-a-vis industry. Such ex post uncertainty is, for 
instance, reflected in the state's attitude to forward contracting and industry 
long-term strategy. An important element of an internal energy market would 
be the ability for industry to engage in forward contracting, which would 
generate greater income stability and a lower cost of capital. However, both 
the Central Bank and the courts refuse to honour forward contracting 
describing it as a form of gambling.643 The result has been the increasing need 
for forward integration and less room for small independent producers that 
will find it harder to generate a profit at the present low internal prices. 
Secondly, the state seems to lack a long-term sell-off/development strategy, 
i.e. when, where and what volume of reserves will be available to industry. 
Such plans are made on a short-term basis, making it less attractive for the 
fusing with systems of personalised political redistribution'. (Treisman, 'The Politics of Soft 
Credit in Post-Soviet Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 1995, vol. 47, no. 6, p. 967). 
641 A foundation of the Soviet system ofpatrimonial power had been the state's monopoly on 
creating organisations that "Iega\ly" could participate in the circulation of rent and resources. 
Kounov and Sitnikov argue that 'the constitutional origins of government corruption and 
inefficiency [in post-Soviet Russia] can also be traced to the unrestricted power of the 
President to expand his administrative apparatus or even create new decision-making 
structures that were not spelt out in the Constitution'. (Kounov & Sitnikov, 'The 
'Constitutional Economy' of Russia: Political Roots of Economic Problems', Russian 
Economic Trends, 1999, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 10). 
642 Aslund, op cit., p. 3. 
643 Interviewee # 11. 
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industry to pledge investments in greenfield-development and opening up new 
areas of production.644 Finally, the continued uncertainty surrounding the tax 
regime, makes long-term investment in Russia less attractive and discounts the 
revenue the state will be able to make from the sale of assets. According to 
Khodorkovsky examination of Russia's tax regime has been discussed more 
than 50 times over the last decade. 
A despotic-patrimonial structure of state power has been evident in the 
processes redistributing property rights, the development of an administrative 
framework, the collection of rent and the interaction between industry and 
state representatives. In her study Ledeneva analyses the continuance of the 
Soviet practice of blat in the modem Russian setting. 'Blat is often used to 
invest.. . [in] business, blat is most necessary for access to bureaucratic 
decision making and information, especially where bribery IS 
impossible ... [the] licence will be issued not to the one who provides the 
biggest bribe, but to the one who has the most blat, who is the friend of the' 
son of the head of the regional administration' .645 
According to Tatur blat relations contribute to an obfuscation of the public and 
private sphere by eliminating the distinction between private interest and 
public functions, thus negating the 'idea of the public good, the public ethic 
and universal norms', which blocks the development of social 
modemisation.646 These institutions are more conducive to the continuance of 
a despotic patrimonial structure of state power than the development of a 
bureaucratic infrastructural state power. As such the present patrimonial 
structure of state power has been shaped by the regimes institutional 
inheritance. The Bolshevik leadership had come to rely on a patrimonial 
system of state power in order to channel sufficient rent towards the centre in 
order to maintain its existence. Modem Russia faced a similar situation where 
de facto control over rent was exercised outwith the state's control due to the 
644 Interview with Khodorkovsky. Sivakov, Vlasl' bol'shoi nefti [The power of big oil], 
Eksperl, 2003, no. 4 (3.2.2003). At: http://www.expert.ru. 
645 Ledeneva, op cil. pp. 320-336. 
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contestation of the state's right to property appropriation. A large share of 
revenue claimed by the state could only be accessed through bargaining with 
regional governors, private financiers and corporate heads.647 
An example of patrimonial state power (though not a proof of illegality) is the 
recent disputes surrounding Northern Oil. In the spring of 2001 the company 
won the development license to the Val Gamburtsev field in the Nenets 
Autonomous Region for which it paid $7 million, while its competitors claim 
they offered $100 million.648 The Ministry of Natural Resources subsequently 
annulled the license, but Northern Oil has nonetheless proceeded with the 
development of the field. Upon the sale of the company to Rosneft in 2003 
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade sent a letter to the Supreme 
Arbitration Court asking it not to annul the license as this would reduce the 
valuation of Rosneft.649 The regulation of the dispute in the Supreme 
Arbitration Court had been stalled repeatedly.65o Separate from the license 
dispute LUKoil has been entangled with Northern Oil in an ownership dispute. 
LUKoil's subsidiary Komineft held a 25 per cent stake in the venture, but 
following a share expansion its share dropped to nothing.651 At the same time 
LUKoil has been embroiled in a longer dispute with the governor of Nenets 
Autonomous Region Vladimir Butov, whom the company accuses of 
hampering the development of the industry, while the governor accused 
LUKoil of trying to obtain a monopoly position in the region.652 
It is unlikely that Northern Oil would have been in a position to fend of both 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and LUKoil without its actions being 
646 Tatur, op cit., pp. 280-8\. ElIman argues that post-Soviet Russia lacked a state that 'could 
reasonably be seen as the defender of the public interest'. (Ell man, 'The Russian Economy 
under EI'tsin', Europe-Asia Studies, 2000, vol. 52, no. 8, p. 1418). 
647 Easter, 'Institutional Legacy of the Old Regime as a Constraint to Reform: The Case of 
Fiscal Policy', in Harter & Easter, op cit., p. 303. 
648 Tutushkin & Becker, 'Vavilov stal bogach na $600 mln [Vavilov became $600 million 
richer]" Vedomosti, 13.2.2003. 
649 Bushueva & Becker, 'Passivnaya zashchita [Passive protection]" Vedomosti,6.2.2003. 
650 Tutushkin & Becker, 13.2.2003, op cit. 
651 Ibid. 
652 Tutushkin, 'LUKoil i Butov podruzhilis' [LUKoil and Butov made friends]', Vedomosti, 
25.10.2002. In July 2003 an arrest warrant was issued for Butov based on the alleged striking 
of a traffic police officer. Butov denied the charges and claims that LUKoil is behind the 
allegation. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 145, Part I, I August 2003). 
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condoned at both regional and federal levels in the form of regional authority 
and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. 653 The disputes 
surrounding Northern Oil demonstrates the strategic space available for 
patrimonial structures of state power generated by the lack of a clearly defined 
and implemented legislative framework. Firstly, tenders themselves remain 
non-transparent. Secondly, the venues for conflict solving ex post are 
dominated by the respective agents' ability to draw upon political support 
and/or influence the judiciary.654 Neither is conducive to the establishment of 
the 'rule of law' that is a necessary condition for the establishment of a 
constitutional-bureaucratic infrastructural structure of state power. 
A different aspect of the patrimonial structure of state power has been the 
collection of rent. Although in theory taxation and collection of such was 
regulated by various parliamentary enactments the inability of the state to 
collect income has been another example of continued contestation of what 
really belonged to the state. In the Soviet period ministry officials and· 
enterprise directors bargained with state officials over levels of output and use 
of resources.655 Kryukov describes this process as one of 'institutional 
bargaining' .656 Throughout the 1990s good political connections were 
important in order to receive larger-than-average access to the pipeline 
system.657 In terms of rent payment final product accounted for and delivered 
to the state represented income. The diversion of resources, false reporting 
and theft represented the part of income being claimed by non-state officials. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the beginning of reforms in Russia 
653 According to Interviewee # 12, 'BP's failure in 1990s in Russia, is also attributed to 
neglecting [the] role regional authorities are playing'. 
654 Reciprocity remains an important form of economic relations. (Ellman, 2000, op cif., 
1419). Asked about the importance of personal connections Interviewee # I answered 'Yes! 
It is one of the elements of the business-culture. I don't think it is always bad, because in 
some cases it is useful. It is not necessarily connected with corruption, if the people know 
each other it is much easier to get into business - contra two strangers talking where there 
always will be some suspicions'. 
655 The use of the word state officials is somewhat tenuous here since all industry, ministry, 
party and government officials as such were state officials. 
656 Kryukov (2001), op cif., p. 173. 
657 According to Mazalov (op cif., p. 53) political connections in this respect may become less 
important since the change in government attitude to Transneft export access and improved 
informal understanding between the companies. However, in the case of a change in export 
prices leading to fall in profit margins, or reaching the export ceiling it remains to be seen 
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this bargaining process altered in fonn but not substance. In light of a 
regulatory framework still under elaboration and a lack of refonn coherence 
industry representatives were able to continue the bargaining process. 
Hierarchical bargaining now occurred with respect to 'fiscal benefits, licenses 
for oil exports, and other privileges for the oil sector'. 658 In return the State 
was able to secure state order deliveries and later taxes and levies.659 
Kryukov argues that a modification of the hierarchical bargaining process was 
motivated by the declining return on investment in the oil sector. Having 
based its economic policy on the revenue fonning role of the oil and gas 
industry the decline in relative rent during the late 1970s and 1980s brought 
about a need for direct globalisation of the industry. The industry would thus 
be able to independently access international financial and equipment markets 
lowering the burden on the state. 'Thus the process of initial horizontal (or 
'direct') globalization and vertical integration were supposed to transfonn the 
institutional framework of the oil sector in such a way as to preserve its 
substantial income-fonning role and provide for the maintenance and 
development of its economic potential, without changing the fonn of 
ownership' .660 
As a result the previous contest of property and Income was part of the 
motivation behind state-industry relations. The clarification of de jure 
ownership rights through the privatisation process altered the structure of the 
contest. As property became defined and the structure of ownership (shares) 
become settled the state increasingly came to rely on taxation and levies in 
order to generate rent. From an industry point of view minimisation of tax 
whether the 'gentlemen's agreement' between the companies with respect to export access 
survives. 
658 Kryukov (200 I), op cit. 173. According to interviewee # 3, '[When] Rosshelf was awarded 
production licences offshore in the Barents Sea they were obliged to keep the former military-
industrial enterprises in a working mode so to say, and to employ people and to make orders 
with these enterprises in exchange for licences' . 
659 Kryukov (2001), op cit. 173. According to one of the interviewees 'Unfortunately due to 
the non-payment of taxes, which we now are about to overcome, made the oil companies' 
position a little bit special. In some cases the government negotiated with Gasprom or LUKoil 
or other big companies that they will pay taxes in the fu\1 size, and in return they get 
something'. (Interviewee # 1). 
660 Kryukov (2001), ibid. 
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payment IS not a Russian phenomenon. However, in addition to legal 
minimisation of tax, by means of the many loopholes provided for in the tax 
legislation,66I bargaining with tax officials over dispensations and withholding 
tax payments extended the previous hierarchical bargaining process to the 
"new" environment. According to one source, tax arrears to the state formed 
part of the previous redistribution pattern in that energy companies delivered 
resources to insolvent customers, these losses were then "offset" against tax 
arrears. 662 
In effect this was a continuation of the previous mechanisms of subsidisation . 
. With the clarification of the property rights and consolidation in the oil 
industry the level of barter and offsets in the oil industry declined 
substantially.663 Industry executives the author has spoken to have also 
confirmed this. These claim that once ownership of the companies were 
concentrated in private hands debts to the state and workers began being paid 
off.664 Thus, the shift of de jure rights from the state to private investors has 
altered the ability of the state to use the sector as a strategic medium. While 
still in state hands the hierarchical bargaining process and collection of income 
had similarities to the Soviet system both in form and substance, with the 
privatisation and consolidation of property this process has changed - at least 
in form, if not entirely in substance. 
661 For instance Sibneft minimised its tax payments by use of invalids in Kalmyk and 
Chukotsk women trading firms. These regional organisations enjoy tax privileges, in addition 
a further reduction of tax was obtained if half the staff was made up of invalids. This 
mechanism of tax reduction was eliminated with the new tax framework that came into 
operation on I. 1.2002. (Neimysheva, 'Neftetreidery-invalidy [Oil trading invalids]', 
Vedomosti, 18.12.2002.) It is unlikely that Sibneft was the only company taking advantage of 
the many loopholes that existed in the old tax framework. All the oil majors have reported 
reduced profits in 2002 due to changes in the tax framework. (See individual financial 
statements at company websites: LUKoil; Yukos: Surgutneftegaz; TNK; Sibneft). LUKoil 
until 2002 leased two of its refineries (LUKoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka and LUKoil-
Ukhtaneftepererabotka) to Polikon, a firm registered in Baikonur. According to a Russian-
Kazakh bilateral agreement firms registered in this city are exempted from excise payments on 
petroleum. Although not strictly illegal LUKoil agreed to pay extra taxes in order to maintain 
a good working relationship with the authorities. (Neimysheva,' Il/yuziya I 'got [Illusion of 
privilege]" Vedomosti,6.2.2003). 
662 Treisman (2000), op cif., p. 234. 
663 Ibid, table 5, p. 232 and footnote 9. 
664 Interviewees # 7 & I I. 
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The government's best tool in this bargaining process has been its control over 
the pipeline infrastructure and export rights. On several occasions the 
government has stopped pipeline and export access in order to force the oil 
companies to pay tax arrears.665 However, the state's control over the pipeline 
and export infrastructure has been used to pressure the oil companies to fulfil 
political goals too. For instance, in 1998 several oil companies lost their 
export rights due to their preference for selling crude oil abroad rather than 
delivering crude to domestic refineries.666 In the spring of 1999 the 
government threatened to reduce export access in order to ensure sufficient 
deliveries to the agro-complex.667 While tax evasion and arrears were frequent 
and costly in all sectors in the early to mid 1990s,668 the level of tax collection 
in the oil industry has been significantly improved. Tax collection in the 
late1990s-2000 was on average 80-85 per cent in the oil industry compared 
with 40-50 per cent for the economy as a whole.669 
In light of the state's ability to utilise the pipeline system for non-economic as 
well as economic purposes it is perhaps understandable that the state is 
unwilling to give up its transport monopoly. In 2002 LUKoil, Yukos, TNK 
and Sibneft proposed to build a pipeline outside Transneft's network shipping 
oil from Western Siberia to Murmansk with the construction of a deep sea 
port. However, Prime Minister Kas'yanov in January 2003 replied that any 
pipeline system outwith state control, and thus its tariff setting authority, was 
inconceivable.67o With rising oil production in the past four years export 
capacity has become an important issue and the majors have increasingly 
665 '6 Oil Firms Pay $1.1 BIn in Tax Debts', Moscow Times, 21.11.1997. 
666 Borisova, 'Oil Firms Sent Scrambling After Losing Export Rights', Moscow Times, 
24.11.1998. The companies were Rosneft, Sidanko, Slavneft, Tatneft, Sibneft and Onako . 
667 Semenenko, 'Farmers' Needs Threaten Oil Exports', Moscow Times, 21.4.1999. 
668 Treisman (2000), op cit., table 5, p. 232. 
669 Konoplyanik et ai, 'Glava 9 - Rossiiskaya energeticheskaya politika i razvitie 
neJtegazovago kompleksa [Chapter 9 - Russian Energy Politics and Development of the Oil 
and Gas Sector]" 2000, Part 10. At: http://www.enippf.ru. 
670 Bushueva & Becker, 'Truba - ne chastnoe delo [Pipelines are not a private business], 
Vedomosti, 13.1.2003. However, the outcome of the issue is not yet settled as the oil 
companies have begun to exert pressure on the government. (Belton, 'Kremlin, Big Oil on 
Collision Course', Moscow Times, 28.1.2003). In April 2003 the government came with some 
concession to the oil companies. According to Energy Minister Yusufov 'the government has 
for the first time made public its position that the state is not trying to fully own new pipelines, 
but it reserves itself the right to monitor and regulate the transport infrastructure'. (Yenukov, 
'Private Pipelines Get State's Backing', Moscow Times, 18.4.2003). 
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sought to participate in the construction of new pipeline capacity. Yukos and 
TNK have, in co-operation with Transneft, long championed the building of a 
pipeline to eastern markets China and Japan. Increasingly oil is leaving the 
country via rail and small ports as wel1.671 
State capture. One of the greatest (if not the greatest) challenge for the 
successful transition to a new development path will be the state's ability to 
create a level of autonomy. Such state autonomy would be the basis upon 
which to build a bureaucratic structure of infrastructural power. 'State capture 
commonly refers to the extent to which government policy-making is unduly 
influenced by a narrow set of interest groups in the economy who provide 
private benefits to politicians' .672 
In the Soviet Union resource shortage and the high level of political income 
extracted through the structure of state power made state autonomy difficult. 
This was reflected in the "planning" process and the proliferation of informal 
institutions based on personalised exchange relationships - the patrimonial 
structure of state power. The Communist Party in this respect served as the 
integrating force between state and industry interests.673 The effort of the 
party and ministerial structures enabled a dialogue between de jure owners 
and de facto owners, a dialogue that was essential for the state to collect the 
life sustaining level of revenue. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union the new Russian leadership found itself 
in a similar situation. However, during the last decade of Soviet power the 
institutions maintaining the flow of resources and rent had gradually been 
671 Zhdannikov, 'Oil Exports Fall Despite Record Output', Moscow Times, 5.11.2002. While 
the official level of export via Transneft's pipeline system stood at 2.65 million bpd (Russian 
only), oil traders estimate that the real level of oil leaving the country is about 4 million bpd 
(including some 430 000 bpd in transit). The official level of shipping outside Transneft (rail 
and small ports) is some 120000 bpd. At the same time it is estimated that capital flight in 
2002 remained at a level stable since 1996 ranging from $12.5 billion (Central Bank) to $25 
(Troika Dialog). (Lavrentieva, 'Capital Flight Soared in 2002, Most Economists Say', 
Moscow Times, 15.1.2003). 
672EBRD(1999),opcit.,p.117. 
673 Yasin, 'How the Chinese Path of Reform Failed in the USSR', in Ellman & Kontorovich, 
The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: an Insiders' History, M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp. 
168-169. 
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eroded. Firstly, through the state's diminished ability to monitor the economy, 
secondly its ability (willingness) to enforce contracts ex post and finally 
through the economic and political reforms enacted in the 1980s. These three 
factors implied that the Russian leadership would have to enter into a similar 
bargaining situation in order to appropriate sufficient revenue for its survival. 
With the settlement of the constitutional conflict in 1993 a "new" structure of 
institutional bargaining was institutionalised, one which favoured industrial 
lobbying and state capture rather than impersonal bureaucratic structures of 
state power.674 This has been apparent in the development of the legislative 
foundations for the oil industry as well, particularly discussions surrounding 
the implementation of a PSA regime. The licensing and tax framework 
operative during the 1990s favoured the utilisation of personalised exchange 
relationships. According to the BEEPS survey 'high capture states tend to tax 
and regulate more heavily, extract more bribes, mIsmanage the 
macroeconomic environment, and prove less effective at preserving law and 
order' .675 
As much was conceded by Yeltsin in 1997 when he declared that the new 
Russia 'had not been 'equipped with new tools of government' and that 
legislation and state bodies too often served particular interests' .676 A high 
degree of state capture is reflective of the reliance of the state on entering into 
a bargaining dialogue with sectors of industry in order to receive necessary 
revenues for its survival. 677 The' loans-for-shares' affair in the mid-1990s is 
only one of many examples of such bargaining. The state entering into 
negotiations over tax collection and the implementation of the legislative 
framework are others. This relationship works both ways - i.e. the letter of 
the law does protect neither the state nor industry completely, but is a result of 
674 Aslund, op cif., p. xiii. According to Robinson: 'The 1993 Constitution provided a 
structure for legislative activity and governance, but the content of that structure was generally 
not in keeping with the spirit of liberal democratic principles'. (Robinson, op cif., p. 162. See 
also Vasiliev, op cif., p. 85-90, on lobbying and state capture. Bames argues that a breakdown 
of "negotiated policy-making" occurred during 1991-1993 with an eventual consolidation of 
executive dominance. (Barnes, op cif., pp. 45-54). 
675 EBRD (1999), op cif., p. 118. 
676 Yeltsin, cited in Robinson op cif., p. 159. 
677 Based on the BEEPS survey Hellman & Schankerman classify Russia as a high-capture 
state. (Hellman & Schankerman, op cif., p. 12). 
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bargaining.678 Since the law does not have a normative character the state can 
utilise its "monopoly" in establishing laws to create a strategic space in which 
it can try to dominate the bargaining process. However, in addition to its 
monopoly in establishing laws the state enjoys a monopoly in re-negotiating 
agreements and laws ex post. This creates the incentive for industry to 
capture the state for two reasons. Firstly, capture can provide ex post property 
protection, i.e. the reduction of transaction costs. Secondly, once capture has 
been achieved, industry can ex ante attempt to generate rules that are 
conducive to goal maximisation. 
In case of the oil industry representatives friendly to it are abundant in both the 
State Duma and the Federation Council. One oil executive described it as 
follows: 'If the industry has well-formulated and unified opinions, then its 
ability to convince the Duma is good,.679 This is however not an exclusive 
situation to Russia, the same is the case in many oil producing countries. The 
difference lies in the relative low level of authority and power vested in these 
institutions and the "opinions" that the oil industry agrees on. For the time 
being some of the oil companies i;lgree that a PSA regime is not necessary for 
the development of the oil industry. 680 
However, a PSA regime, especially for western investors, embodies a 
commitment to a stable, predictable and impersonal regulatory framework.68 1 
The low level of authority and power vested in the legislative has resulted in 
678 On 1.1.2002 a new tax framework became operative in Russia, however the potential 
importance of bargaining and patrimonial structures of state power is contained in the 
following statement by an industry executive: 'Because 4% regional tax and 20% federal, 
there are certain parts in there that can be reduced or offset against depreciation and 
amortisation. The 4% we are confident that we will get reduced almost completely, and of the 
20% - there are a couple of per cent that we think that we can get around, through aggressive 
tax management'. (Interviewee # 11). The LUKoil experience as well demonstrates that the 
letter of the law is not always the benchmark by which behaviour and returns are measured or 
secured. 
679 Interviewee # 7. 
680 Interviewee # 2, 7 & 11. See also interview with Khodorkovsky in Fletcher, 'CERA: 
Yukos CEO claims BP deal proves PSAs not necessary for Russian investments', OC) 
Online, 11.2.2003. At: http://ogLpennnet.comlhome.cfm. According to Interviewee # 2, 'I 
think the real solution for Russia is not to have PSA. The real solution for Russia is to have 
stable predicable and western standard tax and regulatory environment'. That however, would 
embody a significant shift in the state's structure of state power. 
681 Interviewee # 10. 
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the industry directly lobbying the executive (president and government). 
During the 1990s several tax breaks and other regulatory dispensations were 
instituted by presidential or governmental decree. This situation has 
contributed to a strengthening of the patrimonial structure of state power. 
One industry analyst summed up the present optimistic climate in the Russian 
oil industry by saying that at present there is a "Kremlin-Capitalist" 
alliance.682 This alliance is indicative of the present favourable rent situation. 
High oil prices have enabled both industry and the political leadership to 
generate income. On the other hand there seems to be an opinion that high oil 
prices are counter productive to the wider reform process.683 As long as 
Transneft enables the state to generate high levels of income from the sector it 
is unlikely that a competitive environment in the transport section will 
materialise. In the absence of pressure for further reform the present emphasis 
on western business values could in a worst case scenario (from a 
development point of view) be a short-term value maximising exit strategy.684 . 
The continued reliance on the state's export-monopoly and Transneft's hold 
over the industry favour a continuation of personalised exchange 
relationships.685 When oil prices again decline the value maximising strategy 
would be to utilise the patrimonial structures of state power in order to create 
surpluses. This would be true both from a state perspective and from an 
industry perspective. 
There is little evidence in the reforms initiated under Putin that the situation is 
likely to change. The new tax code effective as of January 2002 although 
simplified, has increased the general tax burden on the industry and continues 
a fiscally oriented system rather than a system enabling (and attracting) long-
682 Interviewee # 8. The basis for this alliance is a deal between big business and 
government. According to Interviewee #2 the basis for this deal is: 'What's done is done -we 
are where we are - but now you have to pay taxes, we don't want to see any interference in 
the government, we want to see you behaving as normal business persons'. 
683 Interviewees # 7 & 9. 
684 Interviewee # 8. 
685 A distinction should here be made between Transneft and the government. Transneft is a 
separate company that acts on behalf of the government. As such personalised exchange 
relationships in this respect are not to imply Transneft-industry relations. These are regulated 
on a fairly non-discriminating basis. (Interviewee # 11). Personalised exchange relationships 
refer to government-industry relations. 
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term investment activity. (See Chapter 7). In this respect Putin's 'strong 
state' approach should be seen as an attempt to strengthen the state's income 
collecting capacity rather than ,necessarily creating more state autonomy. 
Further, by streamlining the federal structure and approving of a continued 
trend of mergers and acquisitions in industry Putin seems to be trying to 
reduce transaction costs associated with the collection of income and resources 
by reducing the number of state-industry points of interaction. 
According to Donald lensen, Putin's policy continues the personalisation of 
authority, thus weakening the rule of law and civil society and has 
strengthened the state's coercive powers without reforming the bureaucracy 
that implements it.686 Robinson concludes that: 'Administrative reforms and 
measures to constrain powerful elite interests do not of and by themselves 
infuse Russia's constitutional structure with a democratic character even if 
they do increase the efficiency of the state and ensure some measure of 
bureaucratic impersonal ism in the short-run. If the will of the leader changes; 
so too can the character of reform that is too dependent on one person to carry 
it through' .687 
This very situation is implied by the characterisation of present developments 
behind the Western styled companies as a possible exit strategy. At the 
moment the companies in this group strive to increase profitability and 
productivity in order to increase the value of the assets. This allows them to 
either, sell out to a strategic partner (similar to the recent Alpha/Access-
Renova deal with British Petroleum) and transform assets into cash, or to 
continue to receive good dividends on their companies.688 Under these 
circumstances it is perhaps understandable that the companies most 
aggressively pursuing an asset valuation strategy (Yukos & Sibneft) are 
opponents of a PSA regime that would (potentially) create a situation where a 
686 Interview with Donald Jensen, Director of Communications at Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty and fonner Moscow US embassy employee, in COl Russia Weekly # 
244. 
687 Robinson, op cit., p. 173. 
688 Sibneft for instance has decided to pay $1.09 billion in dividends for 2002 after a net profit 
of $1.1 billion. (Bushueva, 'Sibneft' rasdast $1 mlrd [Sibneft hands out $1 billion)', 
Vedomosti, 17.3.2003). 
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foreign investor would be able to develop Russia's petroleum reserves 
independent of the Russian companies. 
For the state to attain a higher degree of autonomy it needs to be able to 
establish a revenue gathering mechanism that guarantees the state a sufficient 
level of income independent of bargaining procedures. Neither in the Soviet 
Union nor in post-Soviet Russia has this been the case. In the Soviet Union 
the overlap of organisational responsibility and authority created a strategic 
space in which to culture patrimonial structures of state power. The reciprocal 
of this structure of state power was a high degree of state capture. A similar 
situation existed in Russia throughout the initial reform period and the 
constitutional compromise of 1993.689 The state's weakness, with respect to 
ensuring income, rendered the need for a similar strategic space for 
manoeuvre. Unclear and at times incoherent legislation, the division of state 
authority, and the distribution of property gave the executive precisely such a 
space for strategic action. This situation led one analyst to characterise· 
Yeltsin as the "Leader-Arbiter".69o 
A similar trend is found in Putin's policy. The state's continued monopoly of 
crude transportation represents the most efficient tool in this arbitration 
process. The privatisation of Slavneft demonstrates the state's inability to 
capitalise on its de jure ownership. So far in his leadership there is little 
evidence that Putin is trying to break the hold of the "oligarchs". Upon 
coming to power Putin quietly assured property owners that previous 
distribution of property will not be challenged.69I This has ensured that the 
executive remains in its bargaining position, yet also that real state autonomy 
remains low. 
689 Robinson, op cif., pp. 70-71 & 163. 
690 Shevtsova, 'Can Electoral Autocracy Survive?', Journal of Democracy, 2000, vol. 11, no. 
3, p. 37. According to the EBRD, firm influence at the federal level is most likely to be on the 
political executive. However, the EBRD also found that firm influence locally was greater 
than nationally. (EBRD {I 999), op cil., p. 118 & 12.0). 
691 Interviewee # 7 & 11. However, this assurance rested on non-interference by the business 
elite in politics. This bargain represents a crude division of spheres of interest. Importantly 
though, the bargain is subjected to unilateral re-negotiation by the state as the state maintains a 
monopoly in defining what is the appropriate content of each sphere. 
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According to McFaul, a possible explanation for Putin's situation is the 
manner in which he became elected. Although winning the presidential 
election in the first round the dynamics in voter support leading up to his 
victory indicated that his election strategy would only be successful in the 
short-term. Thus making him unwilling to act against the interest of the 
influential forces in politics and economics.692 Putin's platform of being 
"everything to everybody" might have been a successful election strategy, 
however in order to maintain support he will be forced to accommodate the 
wishes of his supporters. In the absence of a separate election agenda 
endorsed by the public, Putin has no ideological (or philosophical) platform of 
legitimacy. His legitimacy therefore rests on his ability to accommodate the 
various demands made upon the executive. Examples of this has been the 
privatisation of Slavneft, where the state did little to intervene in the (at times 
armed) conflict surrounding the management dispute throughout 2002 (at a 
time when the company was still state owned!). Other examples are Putin's 
reluctance to break-up Gasprom,693 and his endorsement of a continued 
export-oriented policy in petroleum extraction.694 The latter example 
demonstrates a change attitude from the president. High oil prices have been 
an important factor generating revenues both for the state and the enterprises. 
However, upon coming to power Putin endorsed a policy that would reduce 
the dependence on raw material exports in order to increase value-added 
exports.695 
692 McFaul, 'Russia under Putin: One Step Forward Two Steps Back', Journal of Democracy, 
2000, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 25-26. McFaul argues that the drop in Putin's optimum vote in 
January 2000 and his eventual support 3 months later indicated that his "no-campaign"-
campaign would only be effective if elections where held swiftly. In the case of a conflict 
with parliament leading to new elections Putin's election strategy would have be based on a 
platform that no longer would be able to accommodate the conflicting and varied interests that 
he could unite in the first election. 
693 Belton, 'Putin Says Gazprom Too Powerful to Break Up', Moscow Times, 17.2.2003. 
694 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 7, no. 44, part 1, 7.3.2003. "Speaking to regional leaders and 
businessmen in Tyumen on 6 March, President Vladimir Putin noted that Western Siberia 
accounts for 90 percent of Russian natural-gas production and 65 percent of its oil production, 
Russian news agencies reported. "One can argue whether it is good or bad to be dependent on 
oil and gas exports, but this is an abstract dispute," Putin said. "The economic growth of the 
country has been achieved mainly because of the fuel and energy complex in Tyumen." He 
confirmed that Russia will strive to increase oil and gas production and exports next year". 
695 Putin, 'Vystuplenie na vserossiiskom soveshchanii po problem am razvitiya TEK Rossii v 
Surgute 3.3.2000 [Speech at the all-Russian conference on problems of the development of the 
TEK in Surgut 3.3.2000], Energeticheskaya Politika, 2000, no. 1-2, reprinted in Minenergo 
(2001), op cit., p. 780. In the same speech Putin said it was the state's responsibility to 
provide a transparent mechanism of export regulation and avoid bureaucratic abuse in this 
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There is however a fundamental distinction between the present situation and 
the situation immediately post-1991. During the transfer of de jure rights a 
low level and unclear protection of de jure owners' rights was instrumental to 
the redistribution process. Such right would have strengthened the legitimate 
threat of any ex post expropriation and protected the state from private 
appropriation. With the transfer of property beginning to settle down the new 
de jure owners will increasingly be interested in protecting the private sector 
from appropriation by the state. This again requires a normative framework of 
legislation binding on all parties. For such a framework to have long-term 
stability and credibility increased state autonomy is needed. In order for the 
state to sponsor a development that would approach a constitutional-
bureaucratic structure of infrastructural power the state needs to be ensured its 
survival independent of the bargaining process. 
The continued reliance on a transport monopoly, a fiscally oriented tax 
framework and an incomplete legislative framework should be an indication 
that, at least in the case of the oil industry, the state does not "trust" such an 
environment to materialise in the short to medium term. High levels of capital 
flight similarly indicate a continued distrust of the state as an impartial 
arbiter.696 
In order for the state to develop a constitutional-bureaucratic infrastructural 
power structure it is reliant on an administration (state apparatus) that is able 
to impartIally execute and implement the 'rules of the game'. One of the 
greatest sources of distrust seems to stem from the lack of belief that the state 
is able to develop such an apparatus. Commenting on the role of the Ministry 
of Fuel and Energy one oil industry executive said the following: 'The weaker 
the better, if it was removed altogether it would be even better. We have said 
openly for many years that we think this ministry totally superfluous ... They 
are trying to make the decision process more complex and less transparent in 
respect (p. 782), to clarifY the tax framework and reduce the TEK's tax burden (p. 782), and 
eliminate the state's debt to the industry (p. 783). 
696 On this issue see also: Robinson, op cit., p. 165-167. White, op cit., pp. 269-270. 
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order to improve their own ability to receive bribes. That's what they do' .697 
Another analyst referred to 'the hideous behaviour [corruption] on behalf of 
bureaucrats' as 'a real plague for the country - it's a disease.698 While such 
sentiments weaken the infrastructural power of the state, they are conducive to 
its continued reliance on a patrimonial-despotic structure of state power. This 
is apparent in another executive's assessment of corruption: 'obviously we do 
not like that, but that is the situation, so no point in crying up. You can get 
agreements for $10 000, that stuff is crazy in effect, but that exists, that is the 
case' .699 Up to a certain point the companies accept that these are the rules 
and they act accordingly. The difference between Russian and Western 
investors is that this point lies at a lower level for the latter. In the absence of 
a normative legislative framework and an impartial arbiter (court system) a 
good working relationship with the authorities is important in order to create 
some form of ex post security and protect investments and profits. 
Similarly the unsuccessful implementation of many important pieces of oil 
legislation have strengthened Soviet style institutions of economic interaction. 
The continued difficulty in finalising the PSA legislation is an example of this. 
Both local authorities and Duma representatives have increasingly become 
impatient with the wait for foreign investment to materialise, and have come 
to see PSA as an obstacle to field development. 700 While foreign investors 
have been waiting for the PSA regime to be finalised previously rewarded 
tender contracts have been voided in the absence of any development 
progress.701 
Stalled development progress has also been used by competitors and local 
authorities to exert pressure on federal and local authorities to renege on 
previously granted contracts. One such incident is RUSIA Petroleum situated 
697 Interviewee # 7. 
698 Interviewee # 12. One industry insider said: 'the [tax] system is very opaque. Regional 
bureaucrats have a position of power, because they can block things, and they do use that 
position of power for their own means to a certain extent'. (Interviewee # 11). 
699 Interviewee # 11. 
700 Gorst, 'For Better or for Worse', Petroleum Economist, Oct. 1997, p. 38. 
701 Ibid. In this case Exxon's license to the Central Khoreiverskaya Block in the Nenets 
Region was repealed by the Ministry of Natural Resources, a ruling that was endorsed by the 
Nenets administration. 
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in the region of Irkutsk. Until the creation of a joint venture between several 
of BP's Russian oil assets and several of the AlphalAccess-Renova Group's 
oil assets the division of ownership rights hindered the development of this 
company's licences. With the proposed merger deal the situation has finally 
changed, but now the Ministry of Natural Resources is contemplating voiding 
RUSIA's licenses due to lack of progress in their development.702 President 
Putin has, after a letter directed to him by the chairmen of Gasprom and 
Rosneft calling for a redistribution of licenses in Eastern Siberia and Yakutia, 
apparently endorsed this measure.703 
In a reversed situation Yukos has complained to vice-premier Khristenko 
about the lack of co-operation from the Ministry of Natural Resources with 
respect to what the company calls a routine license correction in one of its 
subsidiaries (Tomskneft). The document, already approved by the regional 
representatives of the Ministry of Natural Resources and regional authorities, 
has been stalled at the federal level until another expert group is established to 
examine the proposals. 704 
From this it is clear that even tough licenses and contracts are eligible to re-
negotiations (pending ex ante understanding) patrimonial structures of state 
power and state capture remain very important institutions of both political 
and economic interaction. According to Natalia Orlova (chief economist at 
Alfa Bank) this situation has not changed with Putin: 'In terms of the close 
connection of the government and the business groups the situation hasn't 
changed much ... Before, we had separate individuals dealing with the head of 
state, now it is the RSPP that has direct access to Putin'. 705 The reliance on a 
continued bargaining process and the vital role that the oil and gas industries 
play in generating state revenues clearly make a case for a continued high 
degree of state capture and the oil industry'S strength in the bargaining 
702 Bushueva, Tutushkin & Osetinskaya, 'Pokushenie na "sdelku veka" [Attempts on the "deal 
of the century"]', Vedomosti, 17.2.2003. 
703 Tutushkin & Bushueva, 'Gosudarstvennyi razmakh [State might]', Vedomosti, 16.2.2003. 
704 Tutushkin, 'Yukos zhaluetsya na MPR [Yukos complains about MPR]" Vedomosti, 
5.3.2003. 
705 Startseva, "Big Eight' Out-Earn the Government', Moscow Times, 9.8.2002. The RSPP is 
also referred to as the "union of oligarchs". 
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process. One analyst characterises the Russian oil companies as an 'integral 
part of the party of power' due to their financial strength.706 
Is there a case for institutional competition at state level? 
As defined in the introduction and Chapter 5 institutional competition exists 
where the dynamic interactions between formal and informal institutions 
shape the evolution of state and economy. In the case of the Russian oil 
industry clearly there is a discrepancy between an idealised institutional 
framework, sometimes represented in the legislative framework, and 
functioning formal and informal practices: Much of the reform objectives 
were based on the creation of constitutional-bureaucratic infrastructure of state 
power with a high degree of state autonomy. In the short-term the lack of 
infrastructural state power has meant that historic institutions of interaction 
and integration. have survived and continued to function. These historic 
institutions, or residual Soviet institutions, are represented in the 1993. 
constitutional compromise that relies heavily on a patrimonial structure of 
state power with a high degree of state capture. 707 
This compromise has its on gm in the traditional structure of income and 
resource appropriation in both the Soviet Union and pre-revolutionary Russia. 
706 Smith, Oil and Gas Interests in the Russian political Equation, Conflict Studies Research 
Centre, Occasional Paper 59, 1998, p. 3. 
707 In a study of Put in's federal reform Ross argues that Putin's creation of the 7 federal super-
districts and the appointment of a plenipotentiary representative (polpredy) to each district 
represents an attempt at reasserting federal authority over the regions and recapture control 
over federal agencies situated in the regions. Ross points out the danger of the polpredy going 
native, i.e. building up personal fiefdoms or act in accordance with the preferences of regional 
elites effectively 'creating yet another layer of bureaucracy between the President and the 
regions'. (Ross, 'Putin's Federal Reforms and the Consolidation of Federalism in Russia: One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back!', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2003, vol. 36, pp. 
29-47, this quote p. 37). From a transaction cost and patrimonial state power perspective 
though the reform can lead to eased interaction with the regions. The reforms will imply 
fewer nodes of interaction and hence less administrative resources being spent. The caveat 
being that interaction circumventing the polpredy may continue, in which case administrative 
costs would become higher. Also, an added layers of administration is likely to increase 
monitoring costs as opportunistic behaviour is ripe at all levels (Ellman, op cit., p. 1418). 
What is clear though, is that, rather than creating an economy and a state based on an 
intrastructural mode of power with a wide scope, Putin's reign has continued the development 
of a patrimonial-despotic state. The reforms allow the state to collect sufficient resources for 
state survival. If in addition the reduction in transaction cost outweigh the increased 
monitoring costs and cost arising trom opportunistic behaviour the state will increase its 
resources. 
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A patrimonial structure of policy implementation became a substitute for a 
strong infrastructural power base (limited scope of the state). Reorganisation 
of the administrative structure became a method by which the state could try 
to economise on transaction costs and increase its loyal constituency. A 
monopoly in ex post re-negotiation of the 'rules of the game' and use of 
coercion, became a method by which the state could preserve its position by 
making the loyal constituency dependent on the state for legitimacy and 
authority. While the system was, to some extent, conducive to protect the 
despotic-patrimonial state it was not conducive to the development of 
intensive economic growth. 
The great difference between the Soviet system and the present system is that 
under the present circumstances political and economic income is no longer 
tied up to a single economic model. This allows for a degree of pragmatism, 
which again allows for the interaction between state institutions and micro 
level institutions to affect the institutional development path of both the state 
and the economy. The question remains though, what kind of path Russia 
ends up with? This question will be examined in greater detail in the 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 10 
Institutional competition at corporate level? 
'It depends on what is the purpose - the final 
goal of the company. I would say that if the 
main goal is to maintain the business and 
keep it [] then the bureaucratic [SSC] way 
may be more efficient, more secure. But if 
the shareholder wants to create value and sell 
the business, then the second one [WSC] is 
better for them' . 
Interviewee # I 
Corporate models in the Russian oil industry. 
The two corporate models that constitute the basis for institutional competition 
at the micro level are the earlier mentioned Soviet Styled Company (SSC) 
form and the Western Styled Company (WSC) form. Both forms portray a 
high level of management control in the form of consolidated ownership. This 
sets the two forms apart from the Holding Type Company (HTC) form that 
constituted the initial re-organisational structure. 
consolidation has been different for the two forms. 
The approach to 
The Soviet Styled Company form centres on self-reliance. Integration in this 
model combines the earlier Soviet practice of controlling all aspects of 
petroleum operations with vertical integration. The Western Styled Company 
form on the other hand is more open to outsourcing services that are non-core. 
In contrast to the SSC this places a higher demand on the general operating 
environment and the presence of satisfying means of monitoring and conflict 
resolution, which again places higher demands on the general political and 
economic operating environment. In the absence of such an environment there 
has been a high degree of convergence between the de jure and the de facto 
ownership in the WSC. 
The Soviet Styled Companies. The SSC model combines aspects of 
privatisation described in Chapter 8. It incorporates both private and 
combined property forms. Its main characteristic is management de facto 
control and strong control over subsidiaries within the group. The corporate 
strategy followed by the companies in this group belongs to the active 
category with a clearly defined development strategy dominated by the 
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"advanced" group of insiders. The group label "Soviet" is not in any way 
meant to be derogatory, but rather a reflection of their managers' Soviet oil 
industry background.708 Management from financial organisations during the 
1990s did not displace the insider management group controlling these 
companies. Their managers' understanding of industry-government 
relationship IS still of a Soviet mentality, which allowed them to run their 
businesses as personal fiefdoms.709 One aspect of such industry-government 
relationship is the companies' attitude to PSA. While the WSC are opponents 
of PS A, the SSC (particularly) LUKoil is in favour. 71O 
LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz are the two proponents of this model. Former 
oilmen with roots in the Soviet oil industry and bureaucracy lead both 
companies. Both companies had clearly defined strategies at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Alekperov's LUKoil was the first VIC to consolidate subsidiaries' 
shares into a single share structure in 1996, while plans for a consolidated 
company had existed since 1991. Similarly Bogdanov's aspiration for 
Surgutneftegaz as early as 1991 was to control up to 80 per cent of a future 
joint-stock company.711 
Alekperov perhaps best sums up the strategic goal of these companies: 'We 
should look for reserves to increase our growth efficiency, while relying on 
our own production and human potential. We cannot wait for a favourable 
708 The label here is in line with what Hass argues in a study of Russian enterprises. He found 
that communist-era managers tended to follow Soviet models -' uniting enterprises related in 
sectors and production links to support familiar practices'. (Hass, op cif., p. 412). 
709 Interviewee # 8. An industry insider comparing Sibneft to Surgutneftegaz said: 'When you 
go to Noyabrsk, the town is clean and tidy, so is Omsk. You do see Sibneft flags all over the 
place and [they] do put money into the town, but [they] don't have five hotels and three 
sanatoriums and send all the kids off on holiday. It's a normal working contract basis with 
Sibneft. If you go to Surgut, and see Bogdanov's Surgutneftegaz it is the complete opposite, 
he is the Soviet model in action. He controls that town. Everything in there is his in effect, he 
makes sure everyone has got heat in the winter, there is bread on the table and there is food on 
the table - he controls it'. (Interviewee # 11). 
710 One industry executive maintained that the WSC were against PSA because such 
agreements would lessen the competitive advantage that the WSC had over the SSC. In effect 
transferring some of the advantages that these companies had obtained through their 
reorganisation efforts to the SSC and/or foreign companies. For this very reason the SSC 
were in favour of PSA as it would reduce their relative competetive disadvantage. 
(Interviewee # 11). 
711 Kryukov & Moe (1998), op cif., p. 36. 
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environment to be in place. In the existing complex macroeconomic situation 
and unstable political conditions, we should look for, find and realise a 
potential for stepping up the company's production and profits' .712 The 
sentiments expressed in this quote show much of the former Soviet economic 
credo - self-reliance and integration of services in order to maximise return in 
an unstable supply situation. Throughout the 1990s both LUKoil and 
Surgutneftegaz have belonged to the better performing oil companies in 
Russia. Figure 10.1 is a scatter plot showing production change 1992-2002. 
The fitted lines show the relative performance of the different models. The 
SSC throughout the 1990s can be seen to have turned around their production 
more quickly than the HSC. WSC did not figure until 1999. For the period 
1994-99 the SSC was the best performing company model in Russia. 
Figure 10.1 - Company model performance 1994-2002. 
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O&C, 2000, no. 7-8. Accessed at: www.oilcapital.ru. No page numbers. 
291 -
It enjoyed two specific advantages over the HSC. Firstly, its managers had a 
clearer corporate strategy and took an active part in the reorganisation of the 
company. Secondly, the managers of these companies were swift to assert 
their control over their respective subunits. LUKoil had been formed on a 
"comradely" basis. During the 'shares-for-Ioans' proceedings 
organisations/firms affiliated and controlled by the holding company received 
the state's shares in trust. In the case of LUKoil its investment company, 
Nikoil, acquired the state's 16 per cent share making it the largest non-state 
shareholder. In the following years other LUKoil affiliates acquired LUKoil 
and LUKoil subsidiaries' shares.713 Although LUKoil's core business is 
consolidated, its extensive diversification into other businesses has made the 
organisational structure excessively large, complex and non-transparent. 714 
Further consolidation and streamlining of the company is therefore necessary 
in order to increase investment attractiveness. 
In the case of Surgutneftegaz Neftlnvest obtained a 40 per cent share packet in 
NK Surguteneftegaz in June 1994. Although this share packet has since been 
sold on it has remained within the NK Surgutneftegaz group. During the 
'loans-for-shares' auction NK Surgutneftegaz's pension fund received a 40 per 
cent state share in 1995, Surgutfondinvest, another Surgutneftegaz affiliate, 
obtained this share packet in an investment tender in 1997.715 
Characteristic of both companies has been their ability to swiftly assert de 
facto property rights over units within their structure. Even before the 
eventual consolidation of shares into a single share structure these companies 
controlled their substructures through various affiliated companies. LUKoil 
was consolidated into a single share structure in 1996. In the case of 
Surgutneftegaz this process was longer and was carried out over two stages. 
In 1996 shares in DAO Surgutneftegaz's Kirishinefteorgsintez oil refinery 
were swapped for shares in DAO Surguteneftegaz along with shares in its 
713 For details see Kryukov & Moe (\998), op cif., pp. 24-26. 
714 Interviewee # 12. 
715 For details see 'Swap-2000 will end oil stock confusion', O&C, 2000, no. 2. Accessed at: 
www.oiIcapital.ru. No page numbers. 
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Surgutneftegaz group were de facto controlled by the holding company. In 
2000 shares in NK Surgutneftegaz were swapped for shares in OAO 
Surgutneftegaz resulting in a uniform share structure. 
Consolidation gave the companies greater financial independence and control 
over cash flow and corporate strategy than their remaining Russian 
counterparts until 1998. During the periods of non-payments and barter deals 
this made the model more robust and less prone to financial milking. 
Crucially de facto control over subsidiaries gave the companies control over 
the flow of export earnings. 
Although LUKoil has had several strategic partnerships with foreign oil firms 
it maintains a protective stance with respect to foreign involvement in the 
Russian oil industry. Commenting on the situation in his native Azerbaijan 
Alekperov said 'We will not let anyone into Russia'.717 Surgutneftegaz 
equally has refused to "surrender" operative control to strategic investors.718 
Nonetheless compared to the WSC firms the ownership structure of these 
companies is more dominated by foreign investors. In the case of LUKoil in 
excess of 50 per cent of its shares are owned by ADR shareholders, while 
international investors own 35 per cent of Surgutneftegaz.719 Crucially though 
foreign share ownership has not been converted into operative control. As in 
Soviet times there is an important difference between de jure ownership and 
de facto ownership. 
Both companies maintain very good relations with the authorities. Besides 
Rosneft (which is state controlled) LUKoil was the only company that has 
been permanently represented at the Ministry of Fuel and Energy's advisory 
716 OAO Surgutneftegaz is the producing subsidiary within the holding structure of NK 
Surgutneftegaz. Both are controlled by Bogdanov. 
717 Chernikov, op cit. 
718 'Swap-2000 ... ', op cit. 
719 Interviewee # 8. The ADR ownership structure is unclear as the ADR share controlled by 
management is unknown, i.e. offshore companies controlled by management. (Interviewee # 
I1 ). 
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board.720 Surgutneftegaz's tax record and "responsible" behaviour has 
lessened the official scrutiny of its privatisation process.721 
Despite some commonalties the two companIes have shown different 
development strategies. LUKoil for instance has invested in a huge business 
empire. It is involved in several countries outside Russia (Iraq, Romania, the 
Czech Republic, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan and the USA), it operates its 
own icetanker fleet and is involved in the development of automobiles suitable 
for operation in arctic conditions. Surguteneftegaz on the other hand has 
remained regionally confined. Its production operations are located in and 
around the town of Surgut, while its' refining capacity is located in 
Leningradskaya Oblast '. While as the value creation/profit coefficient for 
LUKoil has been one of the lowest throughout the 1990s, Surguteneftegaz's 
has been on of the highest. 722 
The key characteristics of this model are de facto asset control, defined 
development strategy, independence and strong political connections. The 
relatively low levels of management shareholding makes creating shareholder 
value a lesser objective.723 
Western Styled Companies. This company style evolved later than the SSC. 
The 1998 financial collapse in Russia must be seen as an important 
contributing factor. The WSC grew out of the private and bank controlled 
compames. Having initially portrayed a passive development strategy 
dominated by the "backward" group of insiders these companies became 
bank/FIG property after the "loans-for-share" process, and were managed by 
personnel from the financial sector that took an active role in the formation of 
the companies' strategy. (See Chapter 8). This strategy initially focused on 
720 Pleines, op cil., p. 20. 
721 'Swap-2000 .. .', op cil. 
722 See tables and discussion below. Also see Pleines, op cil., pp. 9-12. Questions also remain 
surrounding the interests of the LUKoil leadership in generating profit or not. It has invested 
in a huge business empire, but has done little (so far) to increase profitability of this empire. 
(Interviewee # 11). 
723 Interviewee # 8. 
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providing financial means to the respective owners rather than developing the 
oil producing capacity of the companies. With consolidation of ownership and 
control the WSC firm strategy has gradually shifted to one of developing the 
value of the respective assets. 724 In Figure 10.1 they belong to the HTC until 
199811999. The introduction of WSC can be seen as a structural break in the 
figure. The three companies in this group are Yukos, Sibneft, and TNK. 
Having been in a position to start the consolidation process earlier, Yukos and 
Sibneft are further along the consolidation path. 
In financial terms the consolidation strategies of the SSC and the WSC differ. 
While the share consolidation of both LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz involved 
new share issues, the consolidation of Yukos, Sibneft and TNK involved cash 
outlays.725 As such the owners and shareholders of these companies utilised 
accumulated cash due to transfer pricing and capital flight in order to finance 
their consolidation.726 Transfer pricing in this respect had a two-fold 
advantage from the point of view of shareholders in these companies. Firstly,· 
purchasing oil at discounted prices allowed them to accumulate the differential 
between procurement and selling price - a form a rent extraction similar to the 
one employed by the Soviet leadership.727 Secondly, transfer pricing 
depressed the value of the assets they were buying thus limiting the ability of 
minority shareholders to obtain favourable (or just) compensation for their 
stakes during buy-outs and share swaps. 728 
724 Interviewee # 11. 
725 Mazalov, op cit., p. 39. 
726 Transfer pricing and capital flight further allowed the companies to structure the flow of 
investments in such a way that capital could be moved out of the country in a "legal" manner. 
Offshore structures were used to accumulate cash and invest in Russia through leasing 
agreements with the "mother" company. As operations had to generate investment capital, 
these measures allowed the companies to reduce tax exposure and recorded investments. 
According to one source investments of this form may have approximated 30% of total 
investments. (Vodyanov et al., 'Neftyanoi Kompleks Rossii [The Russian Oil Industry]" 
Ekspert,2000. At: http://www.ekspert.ru. (Accessed October 2000). 
727 Such accumulation of capital was often unrelated from an accounting-financing point of 
view to the oil company, but rather served the interests of the companies' shareholders and de 
facto owners. (Interviewee # 11). 
728 Mazalov, op cif., p. 68. 
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The financial collapse altered the relationship between the banks and the 
assets they controlled. In order to survive the corporate strategies of these 
companies were restructured, from primarily being part of a financial group to 
being developed as enterprises in their own right. The FIGs had typically been 
centered on a bank and a key industrial asset (with cash flowing from the latter 
to the former). Following the 1998 crisis the core industrial units have begun 
to make money, which has led to an untangling of the former FIG and offshore 
control structure. 729 The role of the banks has been diminished and partly 
become superflous as many of the companies have started to develop more 
normal relations with financial institutions.73o 
The new strategy incorporated three elements: asset consolidation and a 
unified share structure; western style management; strategic co-operation with 
non-Russian firms. The understanding of industry-government relationships 
in these companies is more of a capitalist sense.73 1 This implies less 
government interference in return for economic rent. At the time being there 
seems to be a "Kremlin-capitalist" alliance that provides room for the WSC 
approach to take hold and grow. 732 
However, this "Kremlin-capitalist" alliance should not be taken to far. By 
default minority shareholders in these companies make a profit as a result of 
the altered corporate strategy, but the majority of shares are owned by a 
narrow group of investors/managers. At Yukos a manager-dominated block 
owns roughly two thirds. Abramovich and managers control almost 90 per 
cent of Sibneft.733 The AlphalAccess-Renova group controls 100 per cent of 
TNK industrial holding, which again controls 100 per cent of TNK 
International Ltd., which again holds 97 per cent of OAO Tyumen Oil 
company, which again controls 100 per cent of its respective producing 
subsidiaries.734 Thus a select group of investors/owners stand to benefit from 
729 'Russia', Euromoney, April 2001, p. 8. 
730lbid. 
731 Interviewee # 8. 
732 Interviewee #8. 
733 Ibid. 
734 Co~~any presentation/hand-out. With the merger of the AlphalAccess-Renova group's oil 
assets and BP's Russian assets a new holding will be formed in which the two parties each 
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an Increase in shareholder value. However, the objective of creating 
shareholder value is not universal in this group. While Yukos has actively 
engaged in establishing a better corporate image to increase its valuation, 
Sibneft's share increase has been a by-product of its asset improving strategy 
(which in much is similar to Yukos' development strategy). Yukos's company 
objective is to increase shareholder value, while Sibneft's company objective 
is to increase asset value. 735 
The financial collapse of 1998 and reduced state ownership altered the 
relationship between company and financial organisation, and to some extent 
demonstrates the difference in corporate strategy between the SSC and the 
WSc. Before 1998 capitalisation of the Russian oil industry was driven by an 
undue optimism on behalf of investors without the appropriate valuation of the 
risk attached to these investments.736 Post 1998 on the other hand investors 
have become more cautious. Real reforms in the economy and corporate 
culture are needed to drive the petroleum stock market. While the managers 
of the SSC are oilmen the owners of the WSC are investors. As such their 
primary concern is not running an oil company but creating value.737 
Increasing enterprise value in the WSC could therefore be seen as an exit 
strategy rather than an objective in itselC38 Nonetheless the emphasis on 
corporate governance as a driver behind foreign investment and share-price 
evaluation has resulted in both the legislature and several companies 
improving standards of regulation and behaviour. In 2001 a national corporate 
will control 50 per cent. TNK Industrial Holdings further control 85% of Sidanko, while TNK 
International Ltd. and OAO Tyumen Oil Company hold 93% of Onako, which again holds a 
61 % stake in Orenburgneft. The other major shareholder in Orenburgneft is Sibneft. With the 
recent merger agreement between AlphaJAccess-Renova's and BP's Russian oil assets the 
structure has changed. See below. 
735 Interviewees # 7 & 11. 
736 Interviewee # 8. See also Gorst, op cit., p. 37. 
737 'In Sibneft, Yukos and TNK you have a very different situation [compared to LUKoil and 
Surgutneftegaz]. You have shareholders that demand financial results, from basically a higher 
management team'. (Interviewee # 2). In companies where the de facto owners can assert 
their interest over de jure owners' interest company strategy may not necessarily be geared 
towards maximising shareholder value. Thus for the WSC an important element is the 'matter 
of how much power the shareholders have over the management'. (Ibid.) For the SSCs on the 
other hand, 'There are old men [oo.] who after having received their education worked all their 
life in the oil sector such as Mr. Bogdanov [Surgutneftegaz] [.oo] they think more in terms of 
production, what's important for them is more production. And for other managers more 
important are high profits'. (Interviewee # 12). 
738 Interviewee # 8. 
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governance code was formulated under the auspice of the Federal Securities 
Commission. Several amendments to the Joint Stock Company Law became 
effective on 1 January 2002. However, 'good corporate governance seems 
still to be viewed, by and large, primarily as an instrument for c[ u ]rrying 
favour with foreign investors' .739 
If one views corporate governance as an institution, then long-term survival 
(investment in) of this institution would indicate an institutional shift (as it 
differs from Soviet management practices). On the other hand if corporate 
governance were a short-term maximising strategy then one would expect a 
reversal if a different institutional structure promises greater return. 
(Institutional competition would eliminate such institutions that are not goal 
maximising). The recent merger agreement between Yukos and Sibneft may 
indicate a possible shift in this respect. While Yukos has been a champion of 
corporate governance 2000-2002 (resulting in share price appreciation) it will 
be changing its statutes in order to facilitate a possible merger with Sibneft.· 
Yukos' statute has explicitly forbidden the placing of share packets on closed 
subscription in order to increase transparency. With the agreement in 
principle to a merger with Sibneft, Yukos is to alter its statutes in order to sell 
shares to six offshore structures controlled by the Sibneft leadership.740 
Reorganisation of the corporate structure has facilitated the control over cash 
flows and made organisation more conducive to creating economic dividends. 
For instance Yukos in 1998 reorganised its assets into an Exploration and 
Production Unit (E&P Unit) and a Refining and Marketing Unit (R&M Unit). 
Wh~re possible non-core activities are contracted instead of produced in-
house. Such reorganisation has allowed the organisation to better monitor its 
investments and make daily operational adjustments. The shift has been away 
from the traditional functional-territorial approach that left the operating units 
with considerable room for self-government and social responsibilities, to an 
approach where investments can be better controlled/monitored as a result of 
739 Krasnitskaya, 'Corporate Governance: Russia's Evolution', Troika Dia\og, 200 \, p. \ O. 
740 Bushueva, Osetinskaya & SafTonov, 'Yukos odolzhit $3 mlrd na pokukpy Sibnefti [Yukos 
borrows $3 billion in order to purchase Sibneft]', Vedomosti, 12.5.2003. 
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sleeker organisations and use of better monitoring practices. For instance 
Yukos and Sibneft monitor all well production in real-time, by sophisticated 
computer technology.741 These reorganisations have resulted In more 
transparency, which again has contributed to share price growth. 
The consolidation process described in Chapter 8 gave these companies 
greater control with corporate strategies, it increased their investment 
attractiveness and gave them access to international financial markets on better 
terms. The result of this restructuring was the ability to take advantage of 
organisational synergies. For instance, after consolidation the flow of 
resources and revenues could be controlled "in-house" reducing tax exposure 
and allowing for optimal asset use. TNK thus reduced its cost per barrel 
(including administrative overheads) from $12 in 1998 to $2.8 in 2000.742 
The companies in this group have pioneered the use of Western engineering 
firms to employ more efficient drilling and maintenance techniques and' 
technology. At the same time the shedding of non-core business has been a 
vital factor in reducing costs. All the companies in this group have reduced 
their social responsibilities and spun-off loss making enterprises. In the case 
of Yukos loss-making oilfields were spun-off and transferred to local 
administrations in order to maintain local employment.743 During 1999 and 
2000 TNK laid off 40 per cent of its work force. 744 During 1998/99 Sibneft 
too was able to give away and spin-off several non-core businesses. The WSC 
firms' strategy during the immediate post-crisis years sets them apart from the 
SSC. In this period these companies managed to capitalise on a window of 
opportunity, brought about by low oil prices and profitability, that allowed 
them to remove from their books several non-profitable and non-core activities 
741 Interviewees # 7 & 11. 
742 Poruban, 'Tyumen Oil adopts Western-style management', OGJ, Week of February 28, 
2000. At: http://ogLpennnet.com/home.cfin. No page numbers. Part of the reduction is 
attributable to the devaluation of the Rouble in 1998 as well, which substantially reduced the 
cost of Russian inputs. (TNK is however not producing at the lowest cost in Russia. For 
production costs of the other companies see below). 
743 Kryukov, 'Adjustment to change: the case of the oil and gas industry', in Harter & Easter, 
Shaping the economic space in Russia, Ashgate, 2000, pp. 120-21. 
744 Poruban, op cit. 
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thereby reducing expenses and consumption of management resources.745 
This again has allowed the WSC to a greater degree to contract service and 
non-core activities leading to substantial economising.746 
The acceptance of local and regional administrations of these spin-offs is also 
partly a result of the consolidation process itself. As long as each entity within 
a VIC remained an independent unit, local and regional administrations could 
exert pressure and employ their tax powers to extract rent from these 
companies. However, with the consolidation of the companies, the revenue 
centre of each unit shifted to the VIC's headquarters, which often were located 
outside their immediate region of operation. Particularly since the 
establishment of the VICs had taken the form of forward integration this was 
the case for non-production related enterprises. The structure of rent 
extraction has therefore, altered from one of direct appropriation of income 
through ownership and redistribution, to one of appropriation of income 
through taxation. As a consequence of this change there has been a gradual 
shift away from the emphasis of political income to economic income. If this 
proves to be a long-term trend the relevant authorities could increasingly 
become more interested in creating the necessary conditions for firm 
profitability and efficiency. 
745 According to one source this window of opportunity is now closing. 'Today in 2003 you've 
had a long period of healthy oil prices, the oil companies have all been doing very well, most 
of them are showing growth - of different amount - it is very difficult for the manager of an 
oil company to go to the local governor or the local region and say 'take this brick plant take 
this ... whatever school or hotel... we don't want it anymore'. The governor is going to say 
'look my budget hasn't gone up ... you guys have just had $30 for a year, what are you talking 
about you haven't got any money to pay it!' In 1998/99 you could do that and that's what we 
did. I'm not saying we were super-smart, but it was a very good decision ... and it has enabled 
us to get rid of a lot of the non-core assets that we don't need. (Interviewee # 11). Not 
withstanding spin-offs and reorganisation all Russian companies still have a number of non-
core assets on their books. The difference between the WSC and SSC is that the former has 
relatively less than the SSC. 
746 One of the interviewees described this situation as follows. 'Its really only Yukos and 
Sibneft that have done that ... and to some extent TNK. The others may have been starting to 
talk about it or moving down that road, but they haven't got there yet. It is not a slam-dunk in 
effect to say that they have started it and that it is going to work, because there is a lot of 
internal resistance to not using connected service companies. I mean, a lot of the guys out in 
the field ... stepbrother or whatever. .. works in the service company, and they'll give the 
contract to him because it's the brother and stuff. (Interviewee # 11). 
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In early 2000 the share of income from oil and gas taxation amounted to 40% 
in the Komi Republic, 50% in Tatarstan, 30% in Bashkortostan, 50% in Omsk 
Oblast, 60% in Tomsk and Tyumen Oblast, 85% in XMAO and 95% in 
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. 747 
The effects of such restructuring has given the WSC the lowest production 
cost per barrel of all the Russian oil companies. In 2002 Sibneft had the 
lowest cost with $1.70 per barrel in 2002, TNK $2.46, while LUKoil's cost 
was $2.66.748 Yukos has the highest long-term credit rating of any private 
Russian company rated by Moody's and Standard & POOr. 749 
The reorganisation of these companies has increased transparency, improved 
economic efficiency and profitability, and contributed to a different 
management style through co-operation with non-Russian firms and the 
transfer of Western management resources to Russia. The WSC strategy has 
paid dividends in the form of access to international capital markets on more 
preferential terms than other Russian companies, and a rapid increase in the 
capitalisation of these. companies. Yukos and Sibneft began to publish their 
accounts according to US GAAP principles in 1998 with accounts going back 
to 1996. 
However, the consolidation process has not been a quiet one. As described in 
Chapter 8 this occurred at the expense of minority shareholders (1997-99). 
Neither is the process over. Yukos is still in the process of absorbing VNK. 
TNK and Sidanko will form part of a new Russian oil company in partnership 
with BP. In April 2003 Yukos and Sibneft agreed in principle to a renewed 
747 Kryukov et ai., Regional'nye aspekty reformirovaniya nalogovoi sistemy v neJtegazovom 
sektore Rossii [Regional aspects of taxation reform in the Russian oil and gas sector], IEiOPP 
CO RAN, 2001, p. 18-19. Company headquarters are located in: Surgutneftegaz (Surgut -
XMAO), LUKoil (Moscow), Yukos (Moscow), Sidanko (Moscow), Rosneft (Moscow), 
Slavneft (Moscow), TNK (Tyumen), Sibneft (Omsk), VNK (Tomsk), while Tatneft, Bashneft 
and Onako' headquarters are in their respective regions. 
748 Sibneft and LUKoil in Korchagina, 'High Taxes Hurt Sibneft Profits', Moscow Times, 
2.4.2003. TNK at: http://www.tnk.ru [6.2.2003]. Yukos and Sibneft have similar production 
cost. Interviewee #11 and #7. 
749 Company news at: www.yukos.com [15.1.2003]. 
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merger attempt. Alongside these processes all companies are still acquiring 
assets in order to supplement their activity base. 
Holding Type Company. The residual company type incorporates the 
enterprises that remained under state control and/or could not consolidate their 
asset base into a single share structure. The companies in this group stem 
from the "backward" insider group. The companies in this group that had 
connections with financial groups developed into the WSC. The companies 
without such connections remained either state controlled or regionally 
dominated. (The exception in this case is Sidanko, which was connected to 
the powerful Interros FIG. In late 1997 the group made attempts to strengthen 
the control over its subsidiaries, but the FSC intervened on behalf of minority 
investors.7so Subsequently Sidanko lost several of its value creating units). 
This situation left them without a clear development strategy and without 
sufficient financial means to develop their companies. 
Throughout the past decade several of the companies in this category have 
been taken over by the SSC and WSC and have been (or are in the process of 
being) consolidated into these. With the sale of Slavneft in December 2002, 
the remaining companies in this group are Rosneft and Sidanko. Due to their 
particular circumstances Tatneft and Bashneft are omitted from this group. 
While the constituent parts of the other company models are no longer 
independently listed the units of Rosneft are listed separately from the holding 
company. This was ·also the case for Orenburgneftegaz (Onako), Komineft 
(KomiTEK), Tomskneft (VNK) and Megionneftegaz (Slavneft) before their 
holding companies were taken over by other companies. These sub-units are 
now at various stages of being fully absorbed into the asset base of the SSC 
and WSC. The lack of a consolidation strategy and financial means, as was 
shown in Chapter 8, was an instrument for the other companies to poach assets 
from these companies and finally absorb the holding companies. 
750 Moser & Oppenheimer, op cif., p. 316. 
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The continued dominance of "backward" insiders resulted in inefficient 
operations and low capital market evaluations of these companies. The 
absence of a controlling centre further aggravated this situation. In 2002 the 
Investment Company OLMA attributed the low capitalisation of Rosneft, and 
its daughter companies, to the company's low corporate culture, poor 
relationship with minority shareholders, and management actions incompatible 
with the interests of its main shareholder - the state. 751 
An example ofthe latter is Rosneft's purchase of Northern Oil (Severnoi Nefti) 
in 2003. While experts estimated the value of the company to be $320-350 
million Rosneft paid $600 million, leading analysts to brand Bogdanchikov 
the most ineffective manager of the industry. 752 (See Chapter 9 for details of 
the disputes surrounding Northern Oil). The anticipation of the transaction 
was thought to have led to a reduction in Standard & Poor's credit rating of 
the company. 753 
Thus, although Rosneft (seemingly) has managed to expand its asset and 
reserve base it has also demonstrated poor financial responsibility by paying 
too much for an asset of an uncertain nature. Success stems not from good 
management, but rather from state protection. In terms of incentive structure 
the case demonstrates a lack of a coherent development strategy. On one hand 
the Putin administration advocates market discipline and economic efficiency. 
On the other hand the government shields favoured companies from market 
competition and the rule of law. 
Institutional competition: company performance. 
What the above corporate model analysis shows is that throughout the 1990s 
three corporate models have developed. Compared to Soviet times this is a 
first in terms of industry development and a major pre-requisite for the 
751 Kozitsyn, 'Vyshaya mera [Capital punishment]', Vedomosti, 13.2.2003. 
752 Tutushkin & Bekker, 'Vavilov stal bogache na $600 mln [Vavilov became $600 million 
richer]" Vedomosti, 13.2.2003. 
753 Tutishkin, 'V S&P ne otsenili vybop Rosnefti [S&P did not appreciate Rosneft's choice]', 
Vedomosti, 12.2.2003. 
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emergence of institutional competition. For institutional competition to take 
place three elements should be present. Firstly, an economic environment that 
endorses the existence of different corporate models (political/ideological 
environment). These models will differ in organisation and in corporate 
strategies. Secondly, the existence of different corporate models. Finally, 
differences in performance as companies strive to maximise different 
operative and strategic goals. Which again, in the presence of the other 
conditions, may allow institutional competition to "select" the most 
"effective" models. 
The two first elements have been examined in the above, the next section 
considers company performance. Of particular interest is the examination of 
possible differences in production, economic efficiency, and stock market 
performance. 
Production and operation. 
In Soviet times production was very much a function of supply side 
constraints. Expansion of Soviet oil production came about as a result of 
massive investment in the production side of the upstream oil industry. 
Similarly the absence of centralised funding in the post-Soviet period 
contributed to a collapse in production volumes. What needs to be discovered 
is whether investment alone can explain the subsequent rise in oil production 
in the late 1990s and the first years of the 21 sI century. 
Given institutional competition one would expect there to be a significant 
difference in productive results. Table 10.1 summarises VIC output 1992-
2002. As can be seen from the table production started to flatten out in the 
mid-1990s. This coincided approximately with the consolidation process of in 
the SSCs and the second privatisation phases. 754 After 1998 there was a rise in 
754 In addition to consolidation of property the gradual liberalisation of prices (1992-1995), as 
described in Chapter 7, was an important pre-condition for making the industry "productive". 
The two arguments though, are closely related as efficient pressure for price liberalisation 
increased as the companies became more consolidation and assumed a stronger bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the respective authorities. Similarly the pressure for tax reductions (1994-
1997/2002) became more efficient as the companies became more consolidated. 
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oil production. This rise coincided with the third privatisation phase and the 
emergence of the WSC. 
Table 10.1 - vie oil & condensate production 1992-2002 (Million tons). 
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Important additional factors post -1998 have been the effects of the devaluation 
of the Rouble and high oil prices.755 However, these factors would be 
common to all the companies in question. Production decline flattened out 
between 1996-1998 while production has been increasing since 1999 . For the 
SSC group (1997) the turn around in production set in shortly after their 
consolidation, the same can be seen for the WSC group (1999). As can be 
seen from Figure 10.1 production increase in the WSC has been more rapid 
since 1999 than for SSC and HTC. Most of the HTCs enjoyed a brief 
improvement in production 199617 before continued decline. The exception is 
Slavneft where production has been declining all through the 1990s. Three of 
the companies in the HTC group (VNK, Onako and Slavneft) have 
subsequently been bought by the WSC. 
To what extent is this performance attributable to corporate style? In Chapter 
5 two factors were set out that are generally regarded as being important for 
production in the natural resources industries. Firstly, in line with general 
transaction cost economics it was assumed that better control/monitoring 
structures would decrease the cost of moral hazard and provide relative 
protection of investment, particularly so under circumstances of asset specific 
investments. Secondly, the protection of property rights and the perceived just 
distribution of such are seen as important factors to reduce investment risk. 
Both these factors are closely connected to the degree of integration. Thus the 
SSC ability and willingness to halt the production decline after 1996 can be 
attributed to their ability to control the flow of finances within the company, 
thus reducing transaction costs. The SSC's relatively good relationship with 
government circles and regional authorities ensured better post-investment 
protection. From a management point of view these factors made it desirable 
to increase production in order to maximise return to management. In this 
respect the two companies in this group differ. While as Surgutneftegaz in 
terms of net profit margin has been one of the best performing companies 
throughout the last decade, and certainly the best during the 1990s, LUKoil 
755 Interviewee # 12. 
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has not been able (willing) to run the same level of profits. (See table below). 
The reasons for this remains speculative, but in light of the relative low levels 
of de jure ownership by management (de facto owners) one must assume that 
the chosen strategy has enabled management to extract (a level) of income that 
they find desirable with. 
For the WSC the attractiveness of company development did not occur until 
later. These companies went through protracted periods of minority 
shareholder conflicts in order to achieve a degree of integration similar to that 
of the SSc. While as de facto owners of the SSC has remained the same 
throughout the period, these changed for the WSC as a result of the 'loans-for-
shares' deals of the mid 1990s, replacing "backward" insiders with personnel 
from financial organisations. The WSC did not attain a comparable level of 
corporate control until after 1999, thus the attractiveness of investing in 
production remained low. Also, with respect to post-investment protection, 
these companies were worse off than the SSC. With the end of central· 
funding in the 1990s the companies had to generate means for investment out 
of their own activities. Given the prohibitive formal tax take, only companies 
that were strongly placed in the bargaining process could afford to increase 
production without incurring "tax penalties". 756 The consolidation of the 
companies allowed them to have a single cost and profit centre, which reduced 
their exposure to both federal and regional/local taxation.757 Consolidation of 
de facto control allowed management to maximise their respective objectives 
by a) increasing monitoring and control structures thus safeguarding 
investments in-house, and b) protecting production and rent from outside 
expropriation. 
In the regression analysis below development drilling has been used as a proxy 
for analysing the relationship between production and corporate strategy. The 
basic hypothesis to be tested is whether there are strategy specific differences. 
756 If investments were a proof of the business generating profit and profit were exposed to 
excessive taxation, than not investing in order to conceal profit was the logical strategy. 
757 According to Shafranik & Kryukov, the ability of the regions to appropriate income from 
the oil industry began to decline in the mid-1990s (Shafranik & Kryukov, op cit., p. 220). 
This coincided with the consolidation of the oil companies. 
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The analysis is based on the original Soviet production associations (omitting 
Bashneft and Tatneft) in order to approximate homogeneity of subjects, 
development practice and history. Multivariate panel data analysis has been 
used in order to relax the assumption of independence between observations, 
i.e. the data analysed are repeated samples from a finite groups of 
observations. 
Table 10.2 - Regression models based on data 1995-2002. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
R2 
.67 .68 .50 .52 .54 
n 175 175 175 175 175 
Wald X2 (p>X2) 198** 198** 
F (p>F) 43.4** 51.7** 63** 
Constant 5662.9** 5658** -517.9** -497** -539** 
Prod Orl 9.19** 9.37** 1.56 1.64* 2.76** 
WSC 7.62** 7.84** 6.93** 7.03** 6.63** 
SSC 6.36** 5.88* 2.21* 1.78 
L\ Orl -1.62 -2.66* 1.55* 1.09* 1.21* 
L\ WSC Orl -8.46** -7.61** -5.4** -5 .02** -5.5** 
L\ SSC Orl -2.39 -1.21 
LMX2 261.1** 262.3** 25.3** 25.3** 25.3** 
Hausman X2 .0 .0 2398** 307** 307** 
Model I & 2; dependent variable: production mt. 
Model 3-5; dependent variable: production change mt. 
Source: See table 10.1 & 10.3. 
Note: Oue to the reorganisation of some PA the author, on the basis of adding up 
values for the spin-offs/reorganisations, has estimated totals for Langepasneftegaz, 
N izhnevartovskneftegaz, & Chemogomeft. 
Multivariate panel data regression: 29 groups (8ashneft & Tatneft omitted). Model 
1&2; random effect estimation (Hausman non-significant). Model 3-5; fixed effect 
estimation (Hausman significant). 
* * significant at the .00 level. * significant at .05 level. 
See Appendix C for full report. 
The hypothesis to be tested is whether security of property rights affects the 
level of investment, and whether such effects can be said to vary across the 
corporate groups. In the preceding analysis it has been argued that the WSC 
enjoys greater control over their subsidiaries resulting in greater control over 
assets and value created by the company. If this conclusion is correct one 
would expect the WSC to have higher levels of production per meter drilled as 
a result of minimising individual rent-seeking and value dissipation. Output 
growth in the Soviet Union was based on maintaining an increasing 
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investment in development drilling. The variables "wsc" and "ssc" are 
interaction terms between a company dummy variable and meters drilled. The 
baseline category is the HTC group, which is represented by the Prod _ Drl 
variable. From the results it is clear that the WSC has had a higher growth 
rate than the SSC, which in turn has had a higher growth rate than the HTC 
(models 1 and 2). This is consistent with Figure 10.1. 
The analysis thus confirms that degree of control and security of property has 
had a positive impact on levels of production. The coefficients for WSC and 
SSC confirm that company control has had an important effect on value 
creation in Russia. As argued in Chapter 5 this is in line with transaction cost 
econoYlics expectation and general natural resource management theory. The 
reorganisation into WSC and SSC has offered greater control with the revenue 
stream compared with the HTC by reducing principal-agent cost. From a 
wealth maximising perspective these company types have a greater incentive 
to invest. 
The variable "/1 Drl" relates change in development drilling to output. "/1 
Drl" is the baseline category of HTC, while "/1 WSC_Drl" and "/1 SSC_Drl" 
are interaction terms. As expected for mature fields this variable is negatively 
related (-2.66 - model 2) to output indicating a declining return on 
development drilling. For WSC this coefficient is even larger (-7.61). Model 
3-5 regress development drilling data on change in production (/1 production = 
production I - production 1-/). Again the models shows higher output growth 
for the WSC and a negative rate of return on change in development drilling 
for the WSC. This indicator is non-significant for the SSC (i.e. the data show 
no statistically significant direction) suggesting that there is no significant 
difference between the SSC and the HTC in this respect. This is also 
consistent with the argument in this thesis. The WSC strategy has been to 
improve share and asset valuation in order to maximise the return on their 
investment. Output growth and reorganisation has been the vehicles for 
realising this strategy. Success has allowed the owners of the WSC to extract 
value. On the other hand it has been argued that the SSC and the HTC have 
extracted value by means other than the share and capital market. 
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The results are consistent with the observed practice. While growth in the 
SSC and HTC has had a "traditional" character the WSC have made extensive 
use of western field and well management firms to increase productivity. For 
instance average daily well production at Sibneft has increased from 11.3 tons 
per well in 1996 to 19.1 tons per well in 2002. At the same time water cut has 
been reduced from 65.9 per cent to 61.1 per cent while the percentage of idle 
wells has increased from 37 to 46.758 Both Yukos and Sibneft reduced the 
total meters of development drilling in 2002 while increasing production. 
LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz on the other hand have aimed to reduce the 
number of idle wells. 759 LUKoil reduced the percentage of idle wells from 
18.5 in 1997 to 15.2 in 2001.760 During the same period average well 
productivity fell from 10.6 tons per day in 1997 to 8 tons per day in 2001. 761 
Surgutneftegaz increased its wells stock utilisation ratio from 0.84 in 1997 to 
0.89 in 2001.762 
Importantly though production in the WSC fell further than production in the 
SSC and their subsequent improvement is also a reflection of starting from a 
lower level. In the final column of Table 10.1 production in 2002 is expressed 
as an index of production of 1992. Apart from Yukos, both the other 
companies in the WSC have indexes that have not yet reached their 1992 
level, which is in line with most of the other companies. The WSC companies 
have benefited from the introduction of western technology and services, 
however starting from a lower point than the other companies it is hard to 
access at the present level how sustainable the high growth figures of the past 
few years will be. 
758 SibneJt Analyst Modelling Databook 2002. At: www.sibneft.ru. 
759 In many Soviet fields the number of wells was excessively high. As water flooding 
damaged fields the Soviets relied on in-fill drilling and sinking new wells in remaining and/or 
displaced oil pockets. The practice of getting damaged and idle wells on-line does therefore 
not necessarily make production efficient. 
760 LUKoil Annuai Report 1997 & LUKoil Annual Report 2001. Both at: www.lukoil.com. In 
order to increase profitability of its operation LUKoil in 2002 commenced a programme of 
well closure. (LUKoil Efficient Growth 2002. At: www.lukoil.com). 
761 1997 figure from http://www.1ukoil.com/aboutisubproduct.htm. 2001 figure authors 
calculation. 
762 SurgutneJtegaz Annual Report 2001. At: www.surgutneftegaz.ru. 
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The reserve-production ratio for these companies is still higher than compared 
to western companies, however, continued high levels of investment are 
needed. An important question will also be future oil prices. The rise in WSC 
production has profited from the devaluation in 1998, and then high oil prices 
1999-2002, which made investment in the up-stream sector more attractive, 
and gave better profit margins on otherwise less attractive projects. Thus, it 
remains to be seen whether the WSC will be performing to a similar level 
given a change of circumstances. Finally, the relative political calm of the 
first Putin years has been a factor stressed by several of the interviewees as a 
reason for improved production - changes in the tax structure, and the 
apparent security of property. 763 
At the present stage it is therefore hard to assess the potential for institutional 
competition based on production figures alone. The best performing company 
(the entire period seen as one) in terms of production has been Surgutneftegaz. 
Since 1998 the best performing companies have been the WSCs. With respect 
to future development several factors are important. Firstly, the companies' 
ability to utilise efficiently their capital and investment. The regression 
analysis shows that the better companies in this respect are the WSCs. 
Secondly, the companies need access to capital in order to develop new fields. 
The cost of establishing production at green-field sites will be significantly 
higher than the kind of investment that has contributed to production growth 
over the past few years. Thus a company's ability to raise capital (and reduce 
the cost of such capital) on international markets will be an important factor in 
future production scenarios.764 Secondly, the "Kremlin-capitalist alliance" is 
boosted by present high oil prices, which generates income for the state and 
for the companies. 
Development of green-field sites have a much longer payback period than 
present investment, and a stable tax and political regime will be necessary to 
763 Interviewees # 2,7,8, & 11. 
764 According to Interviewee # 2, 'We need significantly cheaper capital and more access to 
the international capital market, including equity before you see that [greenfield 
development]. Asked what drives the cost of capital Interviewee # 2 answered: 'The cost of 
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attract the needed capital. In the short run this could imply some sort of PSA. 
Power structures in Russia still have a highly patrimonial character, thus 
making a projection of the present apparent calm in to the future fraught with 
high risk. Therefore, unless an acceptable PSA regime is offered as an 
alternative to the licensing system the cost of capital in the development of 
green-fields is likely to remain high and thereby reducing investment 
attractiveness. 
Differences in future strategies can to some extent be seen from Table 10.3. In 
Chapter 5 it was argued that under circumstances of secure property rights 
companies were more likely to develop a long-term strategy of development. 
On the other hand, uncertainty with respect to stability of (political) 
development and property rights would translate into an emphasis on pumping 
existing reserves rather than preparing new reserves. 
Table 10.3 - Development to exploration drilling ratio. 
Source: RPI, FSU Oil and Gas Statistical Yearbook (2002), NeJtegazovaya 
Vertikal various issues, & Neftyanaya Torgovlya, N!! 1, 2003. Authors 
calculations. 
Note: Data for Onako 1999-2001 not available, consolidated into TNK for 
2002. VNK and KomiTEK consolidated into Yukos and LUKoil 
respectively. 
equity and the cost of debt, transparency and the confidence that people have in the Russian 
market'. 
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Table 10.3 shows the ratio of development drilling to exploration drilling. If 
one takes exploration drilling as a proxy for a long-term strategy (the payoff 
period for investments in new reserves can be up to 15 years) there is a clear 
difference between the SSC and the WSC. Despite different geographical and 
diversification strategies both LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz have a much lower 
ratio than Yukos, TNK and Sibneft. Partly this is due to the WSCs' objective 
of bringing their production reserve ratio to a par with that of western oil 
majors. While the Soviet reserve production ratio was 20-25:1 western 
standards in this respect are 10-12: 1.765 On the other hand if these trends turn 
out to be long-term they would lend credence to the 'exit strategy' option 
presented, previously. Similarly the slow development of new extraction 
regions is a testimony to short to medium term strategies rather than long-term 
strategies. The situation in this respect is different for the SSC. Two factors 
are important here. Firstly, the argument that the managers of these 
companies are interested in the long-term development of the companies as oil 
companies. Secondly, both retain a different attitude towards public-private, 
relations that would lead to the conclusion that closer political integration in 
these companies gives them greater long-term security. Both companies have 
enjoyed extremely good relations with federal and regional authorities. 
Presumably income from these companies is not only extracted through 
shareholder value and dividends. Thus, although income from these 
companies may be lower it may also be more stable. 
However, in the case of Surgutneftegaz its exploration is geographically very 
limited and its reserve additions are mainly from areas where it already 
operates, i.e. has developed infrastructure. LUKoil has been engaged in the 
exploration of the "new" areas in the Caspian basin and the Timan-Pechora 
area. In the long-term therefore LUKoil's reserve situation should be better 
than that of Surgutneftegaz. The WSC have relied on reserve acquisitions 
rather than exploration of new fields. 766 In other words apart from LUKoil 
765 Interviewee # 7 & 12. 
766 Thus capex (capital expenditure) in the WSC has been targeted at improving reserves 
already under production. 'You need to develop the field planning systems and the like. The 
extraction process is the reserve recovery, the reserve measurement, the reserve analysis ... all 
of that stuff. It is not just exploration of new fields, you need to add to that better 
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there seems to be little difference between the companies with respect to the 
exploration and development of new high risk and cost areas. 
Table 10.4 - Reserve Additions million tons 1991-2002. 
Source: Zapivalov, 'Petroleum Industry of Russia: the Past, Present and Future', 
Georesources, 2002, no. 6, p. 4. For 2002: 'Oil Finds Outpace Production', Moscow Times, 
22.1.2003. 
Apart from 2002, production of oil has been higher than reserve addition for 
most of the post-Soviet period - Table 10.4. Russia's reserve situation 
continues to grow increasingly costly. The recent increase in reserves are 
largely satellite fields of already existing fields and production from new 
fields is not expected to constitute more than 7 per cent of total production by 
2020.767 Estimates of remaining Russian production calculate that 65 per cent 
of future production will come from wells producing less than 1 0 tons per 
day.768 While this is not a uniquely Russian situation Russia's tax framework 
needs to be accommodating in order to create the necessary incentives for 
more exploration and development of new areas. The sustainability of high 
production growth is also questionable if (when) export prices should fall and 
make marginal production less attractive. 
Under the present conditions this points to a situation where, ceteris paribus, 
the probability of an institutional reversal remains a distinct possibility. The 
reserve situation, and thus long-term guarantee of resource flows, has been a 
constant motivation for calls for more state control and influence. 769 
understanding the assets that you have by using 3D seismic, horizontal drilling and things like 
that'. (Interviewee # 11). 
767 Zapivalov, 'Petroleum Industry of Russia: the Past, Present and Future', Georesources, 
2002, no. 6, p. 3. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Ibid., pp. 4-5. Interviewee # 6. 
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The increase in oil production since 1999 is reflective of a development shift 
in terms of improvements in well stock management and re-commissioning of 
idle wells and less reflective of new fields coming on-line.770 Such 
investments carry lower risk than exploration and green-field development and 
have shorter pay-off periods. 
Efficiency and profitability. 
Efficiency in this part refers to economic efficiency. As such it does not take 
into consideration the maximisation of objectives not reflected in the 
following analysis. In Chapter 5 a shift towards economic efficiency was seen 
as a possible indicator of institutional change, while differences in economic 
efficiency between different models was seen as a possible indicator of 
institutional competition. 
In the following analysis an examination of two possible indicators of such 
change will be presented. Productivity per worker will be taken as a measure 
for organisational improvements and a shift towards a more narrowly defined 
sphere of business activity. Profitability per worker will be taken as a measure 
of how well the company is able to shift towards a "capitalist" indicator of 
success and how well the company is able to take advantage of changing 
circumstances and utilise its assets. While inter-company comparisons will be 
interesting, of greater importance is the long-term trend within each company 
and corporate model. 
From Table 10.5 it can be seen that all companies increased their number of 
workers in the immediate period after the Soviet Union (1994-1995). This is 
in line with arguments presented earlier that until the eventual consolidation of 
the companies, each operating unit was more exposed to regional and federal 
pressure to maintain employment. Places like Surgut, Nizhnevartovsk and 
Noyabrsk are company towns where Surgutneftegaz, TNK and Sibneft are the 
major (if not sole) provider of employment. 
770 Mazalov, op cit., p. 44. 
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Table 10.5 - Number of workers. 
Surgut 68000 80700 80800 76700 77400 70100 86400 91 
Sidanko 79000 100600 97300 84200 80000. 
Rosneft 405000 75000 70000 62200 56100 47500 54600 51 
83000 110000 102000 100000 93700 102300 86300 I 
VNK 43436 48000 40400. 
Tatneft 80777 72900 75000 65500 46700 46000 52200 
Bashneft 15200 38400 60900 56900 104800 93300 44100 
Onako 10400 31900 31700 29100 27700 18700 20000. 
3000 18520 27300 27900 27600 27100 
48656 58000 56200 47000 42300 
59000· 53700 49100 39600 32100 
18803 11500 11500 10600. 
Source: Expert Rating, various years. At: httg:llwww.exgert.ru. 
Several analysts have commented how the initial insiders maintained the 
workforce in their respective workplaces as a form of "payment" for company 
control.771 Similar bargains were struck with local/regional authorities with 
respect to taxation and with the federal government with respect to exports. 
Before consolidation the individual producing units were comparatively more 
dependent on such networks in order to survive. Income surrendered under 
these circumstances was of a political nature rather than an economic nature. 
Although political connections remain very important consolidation has 
altered the relationship between the authorities at different levels and the 
companies in that the companies now are in a better bargaining position. 
What the company uses its bargaining strength for differs from company to 
company. The present existence of different company styles and the 
alterations to the structure of income appropriation therefore allow for an 
element of institutional competition. 
Consolidation of the companies was fraught with conflict with entrenched 
management in several of these company towns. After consolidation of the 
771 Earle & Estrin, Privatization Versus Competition; Changing Enterprise Behaviour in 
Russia, International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, Working Paper, no. WP-96-049, 
May 1996, p.12. At: httg:llwww.iiasa.ac.at.Kochevrinetal..opcit .• pp.380-82.This 
situation would have been most pressing before corporatisation and eventual privatisation 
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industry a shift towards a re-centralisation of the income bargaining process 
has occurred. With a shift towards greater industry independence there has 
also occurred a shift in the structure of income extraction and circulation. 
Consolidation often shifted the cost and revenue centre of these units out of 
their immediate area of operation, making them less exposed to local and 
regional pressure. 
With the lessening of exposure the consolidated companies were in a better 
position to reorganise their activities and divest themselves of non-core 
businesses. Table 10.6 shows the development of worker productivity for 
each company. The table shows that in terms of worker productivity there is 
little difference between the SSC and WSC. The ratio ranges between 3.3 and 
3.5. In the last entry for TNK, Onako has been added to the figure. As Onako 
is not fully integrated (consolidated) into TNK yet its figures have affected the 
ratio. The ratio for 2000 (3.4) will therefore be more representative of TNK 
core. 
Table 10.6 - Worker productivity (barrels per worker). 
3.7 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.9 3.4 3.5 0.09 
2.4 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8. 0.07 
0.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.1 0.19 
3.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.4 4.2 3.5 0.24 
1.9 1.7 2.0. 0.12 
2.1 2.5 2.4 2.7 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.3 0.19 
9.1 3.4 2.0 2.0 0.9 1.0 2.0 1.6 0.46 
5.4 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.9 2.5 . 0.20 
5.2 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.7 3.0 0.24 
3.1 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.3 0.14 
2.8 2.9 3.1 3.6 4.6 3.4 3.1 0.18 
1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4 . 0.14 
Source: Calculated from Tables 10.1 and 10.5. Conversion factor for tons to barrels = 
7.33. Authors calculations. 
Note: Column 10 shows the coefficient of variation 1995-200 I, and should be read as 
a measure of the variability of productivity over the period. Thus a low factor shows 
less change and vice versa. 
(I998-1993). With the clarification of means of ownership and consolidation of ownership 
management could begin to assert their preferences over that of their workers. 
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However, comparing the coefficient of variation between SSC and WSC the 
companies in the former group have a lower (.08-.09) values than in the latter 
(.14-.24) indicating that worker productivity has remained more constant for 
these companies than the WSC. This is also reflected in the yearly ratios 
where worker productivity has been increasing since consolidation. Again 
TNK differs in this respect as it is still in a consolidation process, and has been 
adding assets throughout the period making its ratio less stable. Importantly 
there is a difference within the SSC as well. While Surgutneftegaz since 
consolidation has shown a gradual improvement in worker productivity, 
LUKoil has experienced the opposite. 
Is there any evidence on institutional competition? Again the evidence is 
inconclusive. While the WSC have been performing better than the SSC since 
consolidation, their productivity per worker has only caught up with that of the 
SSC, and it remains to be seen to what extent they will be able to continue the 
modernisation process long-term and over take the SSC. However, this 
picture changes with respect to profitability. 
Table 10.7 shows the development of worker profitability 1994-2001. Again 
the coefficient of variation shows greater homogeneity for the SSC than for 
the WSC, indicating less variation in profitability for this group. As opposed 
to worker productivity, where the WSC have just caught up with the SSC, the 
WSC display far greater profitability than the SSc. (TNK's last entry again 
contains the figures for Onako where consolidation is still on going, and 2000 
will be a more representative figure for core TNK). 
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Table 10.7 - Worker profitability ($000 per worker). 
0.92 
9.94 10.05 31.47 20.10 0.71 
-5.52 4.01 1.37 0.35. 0.00 75.73 
0.87 2.64 4.76 0.00 -6.65 7.93 1.53 15.36 1.94 
1.27 3.52 0.82 1.72 -7.47 2.48 38.60 33.39 1.82 
2.41 3.55 4.13. 0.26 
0.10. 4.15 3.92 -10.27 11.09 16.40 9.37 1.73 
7.43 -2.11 3.84 3.64 0.50 4.94 9.82 7.49 0.88 
3.99 4.04 4.92 0.52 9.58 8.13. 0.62 
4.35 6.01 -1.47 12.00 20.39 5.52 0.96 
2.63 1.80 0.77 7.45 17.62 28.31 1.13 
0.71 0.59 -4.50 1.14 8.32 28.04 11.79 1.66 
0.00. 1.53 -26.96. -1.89 
Source: For workers; see table 10.5. For Profit; Expert Rating, at: http://www.expert.ru, 
except Yukos and Sibneft since 1998 company statements and LUKoil, Surgutneftegaz and 
TNK since 1999 company statements. Authors calculations. 
Note: Company statements are prepared in accordance with US GAAP. Column 10 shows 
the coefficient of variation 1994-2001, and should be read as a measure of the variability of 
profitability over the period. Thus a low factor shows less change and vice versa. 
All groups show a drastic rise in profitability due to rise in world oil prices 
and the effects of devaluation in 1998. For Russian oil companies 85-90 per 
cent of expenses are denominated in Roubles. The effect of the devaluation 
for an industry that generates most of its profits in dollars had an immediate 
positive effect on the companies. These effects would have been similar for 
all the companies though, thus leading to the conclusion that the WSC have 
been better able to take advantage of these circumstances due to their earlier 
divesting of non-core business, and reliance on western assistance in the 
development of their fields. Comparisons with the HTC become less 
significant as these accounts are not published on a comparative basis. Also, 
Rosneft, as the representative of the state, has had disproportionate access to 
the pipeline system, enabling them to export proportionally more of their 
crude production than the other producers do. 772 
772 Pleines, op cit., p. 23. According to Pleine's estimates Rosneft's exports (1995-99) were 
consistently higher than those for other companies. The percentages for oil majors (export out 
of production) in 2002 were: LUKoil (33.8%), Yukos (35.3%), Sibneft (39.2%), 
Surgutneftegaz (35.5%), Sidanko (32.6%), Tatneft (35.4%), TNK (34.2%), Bashneft (43.1 %), 
Rosneft (37.6%), Slavneft (37.2%). Apart from Sibneft Rosneft had the highest export level. 
Authors calculation from Neftyanaya Torgovlya,.N~ 1,2003. 
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This conclusion changes somewhat with respect to the net profit margin, 
which reflects management's ability to efficiently utilise capital equipment 
and control expenses - Table 10.8. Again the SSC show less variability over 
time than the WSC. In the case of the WSC the net profit margin rises 
significantly after consolidation of these companies. (See previous comments 
about TNK for final year entry). However in this respect they have only just 
caught up with the best performing SSC. Surgutneftegaz has consistently 
showed the best performance in terms of this indicator. Importantly 
Surgutneftegaz is the only VIC that has not engaged in transfer pricing.773 
Table 10.8 - Net profit margins (Million Dollars). 
0.17 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.48 
0.17 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.75 
0.38 0.10 0.14 0.00 -0.23 0.27 0.35 0.43 1.23 
0.08 0.13 0.04 0.06 -0.24 0.41 0.58 0.37 1.45 
0.14 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.07 -0.02. 0.69 
0.02 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.34 0.29 0.19 0.72 
0.34 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.73 
0.16 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.44 0.29. 0.67 
0.20 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.26 0.32 0.10 0.63 
0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.31 0.40 0.96 
0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 0.30 0.47 0.28 1.54 
KomiTEK* -0.12 0.04 0.17 -0.01 -0.63 0.30. -8.11 
Source: See table 10.7. Authors calculations. 
Note: Column \0 shows the coefficient of variation 1994-200 I, and should be read as a 
measure of the variability of profit margin over the period. Thus a low factor shows less 
change and vice versa. Net profit margin = Net profit (before interest and tax)/ Sales 
(turnover). 
LUKoil, although being the largest producer of oil in Russia, in both these 
profitability indicators has performed below Surgutneftegaz and the WSC. 
Part of the explanation is LUKoil' s very broad business interest and continued 
reliance on self-sufficiency. In 2001 LUKoil board of directors decided to 
change their development strategy to one more akin to the WSC. Objectives 
for the period 2001-2003 were to divest non-core businesses like drilling, 
service and construction units (152 unpromising and non-core units were 
773 Kryukov et al., op cit., p. 22. 
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divested), and Increase investments In operations with shorter payback 
periods.774 
The net margin development demonstrates another important factor, which 
affects the interpretation of the table. While hiding profits was an important 
objective before 1998 (and most likely after) the table could be interpreted as 
demonstrating a change in this respect. The interpretation of what constituted 
profits and costs were often a matter of negotiation between company officials 
and local/regional/federal authorities. Companies strove to under-report their 
sales/profits in order to reduce tax exposure. Thus transfer pricing out of the 
country, and various other means were employed in order to conceal profits. 
Changes in the structure of taxation and the consolidation of the companies 
have enabled them to defend their interests better, thus disclosure for the years 
1999-2001 should be seen as more reliable than the figures prior to this period. 
This raises the question whether on can speak of a change in the economic 
environment? What seems clear is that the present "Kremlin-capitalist 
alliance" has been fruitful for both parties, however, indications as to what 
may happen if there should be a substantial reduction in oil prices, or there is a 
new leadership are still unanswered. Russia still lacks a stable and attractive 
tax and operational regime for green-field developments. Nonetheless based 
on the presented indicators it seem appropriate to conclude that in terms of 
profitability there is a difference between the two models. The WSC perform 
better than the SSC on this indicator, LUKoil's shift in corporate strategy 
seems to reflect the validity of this statement. A similar strategic shift is 
occurring in Rosneft, the last state owned oil company. Beginning in 2003 
Rosneft is to divest non-core units and return development licenses to the state 
in order to optimise its present and future activity.775 
774 LUKoil annual report 2001, p, 24 & 5. The main objective of the company's future 
strategy is to 'maintain and, possibly, increase the profitability of the Company's operations'. 
(~.4). At: http://www.lukoil.com. 
75 Tutushkin & Bushueva, 'Rosneft' sbrasyvaet ballast [Rosneft discards ballast]" Vedomosti, 
27.2.2003. 
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For the period post-1998 it is therefore appropriate to speak of institutional 
competition in terms of economic profitability. However, the longevity of this 
situation is still undetermined, as environmental factors play an important role, 
competition needs to generate rewards, both at a company level and at a macro 
level for the situation to develop into a shift in the development path. The 
aforementioned differences in PSA support amongst the companies and their 
attitude to industry-government relations is for instance one area where the 
government can affect the incentive structure. 
Stock market performance. 
In the aftermath of the 1998 financial collapse company shares in Russia 
plummeted. While share prices before 1998 were driven by the lack of due 
diligence on behalf of particularly western investors the share market post 
1998 has reflected a more sombre mood.776 Development in share price has to 
a greater extent become a function of investors' confidence in the company's 
commitment to restructuring, corporate strategy, and adherence to western 
standards of accounting, transparency and corporate governance. These are 
standards of evaluation that break significantly with Soviet standards of 
evaluation. 
Although neither of the companies (in any of the groups) in question have 
reached western levels yet, the companies in the WSC have performed better 
on stock market indicators than have the SSC. Thus the two "winners" in 
terms of share price development between 1999-2003 are Yukos and to lesser 
extent Sibneft, while both companies have outperformed the SSc. Figure 10.2 
shows the stock market performance 1995-Q3 2003. Entries are in index form 
with Q4 1997 equal to 100. At the end of 1997 oil companies reached their 
highest quotation before the crash. 
776 Interviewee # 8. 
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Figure 10.2 - Stock market performance. (Q4 1997=100). 
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Note: Q4 has been chosen as the benchmark, as several of the companies were not listed until Q4. 
Generally end 1997 was the highest quotation for the oil companies pre economic crash. 
TNK is omitted from the figure, as its shares are not listed in the Russian 
Trading System (RTS). Of the four companies that fall into the SSC and WSC 
categories only LUKoil has not managed to obtain a share price that exceeds 
its pre-1998 quotation. This is partly a reflection of LUKoil's relatively 
poorer performance 1999-2001 in terms of efficiency. LUKoil's development 
strategy during 1996-2001 has focused on diversification both nationally and 
internationally, thus long-term LUKoil presents one of the better investment 
opportunities of the Russian companies. Its domination in the high yield area 
of Timan-Pechora and Northern Caspian has significantly improved the -
company's reserve base and reduced development risk. Its productivity 
indicators should improve as these areas start large-scale production. 
Although LUKoil has commenced a restructuring programme that is to 
increase its short-term investment attractiveness as well, it remains to be seen 
to what extent it will be able to capitalise on restructuring benefits. An 
important factor will be the overall economic and political climate. (See 
above on window of opportunity). 
Common for the SSC is their lower stock market performance than the WSC. 
This is also connected with corporate strategy. The SSC are less transparent 
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companies. Their de facto owners run the companies to different standards 
than the WSC. While the WSC have focused on creating shareholder value, 
the SSC have focused on growing production. 777 Calculation of dividend is 
illustrative of this. Both LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz have paid less than the 
10 per cent dividend standard. LUKoil has done so by paying 10 per cent on 
net profit calculated from a reduced number of assets compared to the groups 
entire asset base, while Surgutneftegaz has used reduced profit calculations in 
order to calculate the 10 per cent dividend.778 This disregard for investors is 
illustrative of a problem that has been fundamental in the entire post-Soviet 
period. In order to monitor- investments de jure ownership rights are 
insufficient. This is the reason why the companies have expended a lot of 
effort on consolidating assets within their groups. Consolidation gave them 
control with cash flows and export earnings. While this certainly was the case 
during 1993-99 subsequent behaviour by some of the companies (primarily the 
WSCs) may indicate a change. On the other hand most of these companies are 
dominated by a very select group of shareholders (making the minority group· 
very small indeed) and the strategy will have to prove itself in the coming 
years (Duma and presidential elections, possibly falling oil prices) to indicate 
a sustained shift.779 
Equity investment gives an investor the right to a portion of the cash flow 
generated by the company after expenses and taxes. In the case of LUKoil 
and Surgutneftegaz the investors do not know what portion of the cash flow 
generated they can claim, in other words there is uncertainty with respect to de 
jure ownership.780 In terms of historic institutions this situation in the SSC 
show continuity with economic behaviour during the Soviet period. The 
ownership uncertainty in this group makes it possible for management to 
divert part of cash flow to private purposes. 
777 See also footnote 536 on share price and divergence of manager's and owner's interest. 
778 Alien, LUKoil versus Surgutneftegas, Renaissance Capital, May 2000. 
779 Future uncertainty with respect to corporate governance can perhaps be found in the recent 
Yukos-Sibneft deal. Also in the wake of the TNK-BP deal, minority shareholders have sought 
to have parts of TNK's assets frozen. (Bushueva & Volkov, 'TNK-BP prosyat doplatil' 
[TNK-BP requested to pay-up]', Vedomosti, 11.6.2003). 
780 Alien, op cit. 
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For both companies this situation has improved over the past years. Both 
companies have now published accounts to US GAAP standards for the period 
1999-2001, in the case ofSurgutneftegaz its 2002 publishing of the US GAAP 
results was a first in the company's history and may signal a shift in 
management attitude. While Surgutneftegaz has been possibly the "best" oil 
company throughout the 1990s (in terms of production) investment 
attractiveness in the firm has been hampered by the company's regional 
character, and investors' lack of operative influence. From an investor's point 
of view Surgutneftegaz's policy of saving profits and not expanding its 
business, casts doubts over the long-term return on investments and 
management's development plans. In addition Surgutneftegaz has continued 
its practice of paying dividends on reduced profit statements. According to 
Russian legislation dividends are to be paid on net profits, however legislation 
does not specify how net profit is to be calculated. Surgutneftegaz's continued 
practice of deducting capital expenditures and other payments before declaring 
profit for shareholders has substantially reduced the sum available to 
shareholders. 78 1 On a comparative level Surgutneftegaz's dividend policy has 
averaged only 3-4 per cent of standard net profit calculation for the past 
years. 782 A standardised method of calculating net profits is likely to be 
codified during the Duma's 2003 spring session (March), the first reading of 
the amendment passed in 2002.783 However, Surgutneftegaz has called in its 
annual shareholders' meeting early in order to avoid possible calculation 
changes. 784 
LUKoil has likewise drawn recent criticism from investors due to conducting 
a policy that is seen to favour management rather than shareholders. In 
February 2003, LUKoil purchased a 27 per cent share package in its own 
(fully controlled) subsidiary LUKoil-Perm.785 According to investor's the 
781 Golybovich, 'SurgutneJtegaz ekonomit [Surgutneftegaz saves]', Vedomosti,28.2.2003. 
782 Allan, op cif. 
783 Reyters, 'Miserly Surgutneftegaz Keeps Dividend Policy', Moscow Times, 3.3.2003. 
784 Golybovich, 28.2.2003, op cif. 
785 Tutushkin, 'LUKoil ne pozhalel pochti $400 mln [LUKoil did not regret almost $400 
million]', Vedomosti,25.2.2003. 
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funds should rather have been spent developing LUKoil's assets, than 
converting management shares into cash.786 
The WSC on the other hand have tried to improve investment attractiveness in 
their companies by improving transparency and being seen to accommodate 
shareholders' interests. Western management, outsourcing, shareholder 
dividends and organisational optimisation reflect a realisation that in order to 
increase market value of the firm, these measures are necessary. This strategy 
provides management and owners with two possibilities. In the case of the 
need for an exit strategy increased market value will give greater return upon 
the sale of these companies. In the case of running an oil firm, these measures 
reduce the cost of capital, which reduces the cost of development projects and 
thus increases profitability. 
Common for the companies in this group is a low free float of shares. While 
LUKoil and Surguteneftegaz's free float share is 70 and 43 per cent, the free 
float share of Yukos and Sibneft is only 17 and 12 per cent.787 In the case of 
TNK only 3 per cent are not controlled by the offshore TNK International Ltd. 
The low free float share of these companies has made share manipulation a 
distinct possibility,788 while the structure of ownership is such that only a few 
investors stand to make substantial gains from the policy. Nonetheless, the 
share value of these companies reflects a greater trust in the development of 
these companies. BP, which perhaps has come to symbolise the risk that 
foreign investors took in the 1990s, during 2002 sold off its LUKoil stake and 
in 2003 announced a $6.75 Billion investment in a joint venture with the 
AlphalAccess-Renova Group to create Russia's third largest oil company.789 
786 Somov & Braslavskaya, 'Management of Yesterday: Experts Fire Salvos of Criticism at 
Lukoil, Gazprom, Rosneft and Surgutneftegaz', RusEnergy, vol. 2, issue 55, March 2003. 
787 Datastream. (Feb. 2003). In 2002 Sibneft released a I % stake of its shares to free float, and 
promised to increase the total share over the next 2-3 years. Bushueva & Khrennikov, 
'Abramovich and Ko zarabotayut $IOOmln [Abramovich and Co. earn $100 million]" 
Vedomosti,21.5.2002. 
788 Interviewee # 8. 
789 BP acquired a stake in LUKoil through its take over off Arco. In 1997 BP purchased a 
10% stake in Sidanko. This stake was subsequently increased to 25% as part of a settlement 
package with AlphaJAccess-Renova over asset disputes between Sidanko and TNK. In the 
course of 1999-200 I TNK acquired 85% control over Sindako. During the past two years 
disputed assets have gradually been returned to Sidanko (Chernogorneft & 
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BP's CEO John Brown attributed the renewed trust in the Russian oil industry 
to the management and ownership of structure of TNK's assets established in 
2001.790 
With regards to share pnce development there is a distinct difference in 
performance between the two styles. In terms of market value per million 
barrels of production Yukos and Sibneft are respectively priced at $47.2 
million and $52.8 million, while LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz are priced at 
$22.5 million and $31.6 million. Ceteris paribus if share price development is 
taken as an indicator of market trust, then the WSC in a long-term perspective 
should be more proficient at raising capital at a lower price in order to develop 
and expand their firms. This conclusion hinges on a third factor though. 
While there is at the moment a shift towards the WSC the longevity of this 
development is dependent on the state's willingness to allow this model to 
develop. At the moment the state seems to be in favour of the realignment, 
however, the opportunity cost of this support is at the moment minimal since 
high oil prices have created a favourable rent situation for both the state and 
the companies. Tendencies of an environment not susceptible to further 
reform can perhaps be found in the above discussion around a window of 
opportunity. On the other hand the legislature's recent endorsement of 
clarifying dividend rules in favour of standard western dividend principles is a 
sign of a positive shift due to institutional competition. However, only if these 
rules are actually enforced and the state maintains a less intrusive role given 
altered circumstance will it be possible to speak of a shift in development path. 
Differences in stock -market performance could further indicate a difference in 
rent extraction between the two models. In Forbe's latest list of billionaires 12 
of Russia's 17 billionaires are from the oil industry, with 10 connected to the 
WSc.791 According to one investment banker in Russia: 'if Khodorkovsky 
Var'yeganneftegaz). For comparison FDI in Russia 1998-2002 was $3.6 billion. (Munter, 
'Russian assets soar on BP deal', Financial Times, 11.2.2003. At: http://www.ft.com). 
790 'BP, Alfa Group, Access-Renova create new Russian company', OGJ Online, 11.2.2003. 
At: http://ogLpennnet.com/home.cfm. 
791 Yefimova, 'Russia No. 4 on Forbes' Billionaires List', Moscow Times, 3.3.2003. With 
fortunes above $2 billion are: Khodorkovsky (Yukos), Abramovich (Sibneft), Fridman (TNK), 
& Vekselberg (TNK). 
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steals now it is just pointless, because the maximum he can steel in a year -
you know, realistically - is going to be $1 Billion, and he has created in 2 
years $17 Billion of value. He has gone from zero market capitalisation 
[about $600 Million] to $17 ~ Billion, he has created a massive ... and he can 
double that again. Because Yukos is still pretty undervalued relative to 
emerging markets, and if he keeps growing the way he has been growing he 
can create $30 Billion in value in three years - it is just extraordinary how 
much value you can create. LUKoil could do the same. They were not as 
undervalued as Yukos, therefore the leap is not as great, but they could easily 
be a $25 or $30 Billion company rather then the $10 Billion company they are 
now. So I mean, if management motivation was there and they owned enough 
stock and they actually saw the end result there would be a huge incentive for 
them to turn things around. At the moment it is all happening very slowly [at 
LUKoil]' .792 
While the WSC are generating extractable rent through the stock market, the· 
SSC are maintaining rent extraction through diversion of cash flow. Path 
dependency and social capital can explain both structures of rent extraction. 
In Chapter 5 it was argued that present behaviour was, under circumstances of 
uncertainty and time pressure, more likely to be a form of continuation of past 
behaviour. Management in the SSC are very competent oilmen from the 
Soviet era. By Soviet standards they run very efficient firms. However, their 
primary goal is to develop their business and generate rent for themselves. 
Unlike a classic western division between shareholders and management, the 
SSC continue the Soviet practice of contesting the de jure owners' right to 
property. This is reflected both in dividend policy and the unproductive use of 
company resources. 
The classic western ownership division is not a precise description of the WSC 
either. To what extent it in actual terms is possible to differentiate 
management from owners remains somewhat unclear. While Abramovich 
(Sibneft) and Friedman (TNK) are not directly in charge of the firms, their 
792 Interviewee #8. 
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influence is still very large. Khodorkovsky on the other hand is the CEO of 
Yukos. What distinguishes these firms, in this respect, is that neither of these 
owners are former oilmen. Since the financial collapse their wealth 
maximising strategy has been to improve shareholder value in order to create 
value for themselves as the main beneficiaries of this policy. 
Nor are all outstanding minority shareholder issues brought to a satisfactory 
conclusion. Share prices in both Orenburgneft and Megionneftegaz were 
driven by take over speculations (see Figure 10.2). The settlement with 
minority shareholders in both these companies is still not resolved.793 
Sibneft's (and Tatneft's) recent attempt at expanding its asset base bears 
resemblance to minority shareholder abuse in the late 1990s. In a conflict with 
the Moscow/Central Fuel Company for the control of Moscow Oil Refinery 
(MNPZ), both sides conducted separate extra ordinary shareholders meetings 
approving separate councils of directors. The SibneftlTatneft side in addition 
voted to transform preferred shares into ordinary shares, thus increasing their· 
voting share from 46.8 to 55.5 per cent. 794 The two companies further refused 
to deliver oil to the refinery until its demands were met. The matter was 
resolved in early 2003 and there is now joint management of the refinery by 
Sibneft, Tatneft and the former managers. 
In the case of Yukos, a lawsuit, prepared by former minority shareholders in 
one of its subsidiaries (Samaraneftegaz), has been accepted to the 
Constitutional Law Court to examine alleged breeches of minority 
shareholders' rights during the consolidation process.795 If this lawsuit were to 
be successful it would have far reaching consequences for all the consolidated 
companies. In other words it is difficult to assess at the present whether 
changes in corporate governance reflect a sustainable long-term strategy, or if 
it represents a short-term maximising strategy. Part of the answer to this 
question will be the overall political and economic environment. 
793 Bushueva, 'Aktsionery Onako khotyat spravedlivosti [Onako's shareholders want justice)" 
Vedomosti,5.11.2002. 
794 Tutushkin & Kozitsyn, 'MNPZ snova delyat [MNPZ again divided], Vedomosti, 
21.10.2002. 
795 Neimysheva, 'Reviziyaproshlogo [Revision of the past)', Vedomosti,27.2.2003. 
329 -
The SSC strategy continues an investor unfriendly policy reminiscent of 
Soviet times. The continued antagonistic relationship between de jure and de 
facto ownership and the structure of rent extraction by management is 
conducive to operate in a non-transparent market and political environment. 
The WSC strategy on the other hand, assuming it is a long-term strategy, will 
need qualitative changes in the institutional structure in order to succeed. As 
such the WSC contribute to creating an environment where institutional 
competition might bring Russia on to a different development path. For the 
WSC (long-term) strategy to succeed the development of informal trust 
relationships, a bureaucracy and government/presidency abiding by 
established rules (i.e. ex post stability), non-discriminatory 'rules of the game', 
and secure property rights are essential. These elements all represent a break 
with past institutions. According to Kryukov, positive effects of the hitherto 
transformation have been: a strengthening of decentralisation through a more 
flexible system of economic institutions; a more flexible regulatory system of 
laws and norms; a widening of contractual relations; and a shift towards the 
use of financial/economic indicators of measurement rather than physical 
indicators. 796 
To what extent a new environment will materialise is dependent on the ability 
of the various participants in the circulation of income and resources to 
achieve/maximise their objectives. This will be examined further in the 
conclusion, suffice here to say that the WSC strategy does provide the 
necessary fall back strategy in case such changes should not occur. The 
present optimism and moderate trust in Putin's leadership provides for a 
possible sell-off to a strategic investor - the TNK-BP scenario. Should this 
strategy not succeed a reversion to previous behaviour is still possible.797 The 
present environment, however, allows for the functioning of the forces of 
institutional competition and if continued might create a virtuous circle that 
can bring a shift to Russia's development path. 
796 Kryukov (2000), op cif., pp. 27-28. 
797 Interviewee #8. 
Conclusion. 
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'But now we come to the other case, where a 
private citizen becomes the ruler of his country 
neither by crime nor by any other outrageous 
act of violence but by the favour of his fellow 
citizens []. I say that one becomes a prince in 
this case with the favour of the people or of the 
nobles. []. A man who becomes prince with 
the help of the nobles finds it more difficult to 
maintain his position than one who does so 
with the help of the people. As prince, he finds 
himself surrounded by many who believe they 
are his equals, and because of that he cannot 
command or manage them the way he 
wants,.798 
Niccolo Machiavelli 
So ... how will Russia develop, and more specifically what will become of 
Russian oil? The principal argument of this thesis has been that institutions at 
each level of the institutional matrix condition the development of lower 
placed institutions and that organisations are established in order to minimise 
transaction costs associated with principal-agent factors running through the 
institutional matrix. In the Soviet Union the first order dimension - structure 
of state power and development strategy - conditioned the development of 
both the organisational structure and administrative planning. 
Both these second order dimension facilitated the maintaining of a 
patrimonial-despotic structure of state power. Fragmentations of the 
organisational structure tried to reduce the information over-load at the top of 
the organisation by establishing unsophisticated organisations and standards of 
evaluation. The organisational structure was to complement administrative 
planning by reducing monitoring cost. Efficient administrative planning 
would allow the centre to control the circulation of income and resources and 
thereby strengthening the state's hold over the incentive structure. Controlling 
the incentive structure was necessary in order to maintain a patrimonial-
despotic structure of state power. 
One of the side effects of these arrangements was that they implied a de facto 
displacement of operational control and influence. In terms of information 
798 Machiavelli, The Prince, Penguine Classics, 1961 [1531], pp. 31-32. 
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and distribution of resources this strengthened the position of the ministries 
versus the central planning agencies. In terms of information and operations 
this strengthened the position of the production associations. Such de facto 
displacement of operational control led to the emergence of a series of 
informal practices and economic institutions that distorted the flow of income 
and resources. 
As complexity and spatial distribution increased the transaction costs 
associated with the institutional matrix increased too. As fields started to 
mature and operations became increasingly idiosyncratic development costs 
soared. Coupled with inefficiencies stemming from the planning process and 
associated agency costs the oil industry was becoming a de facto burden to 
further industrialisation and social welfare. 
Agency costs were also linked to the Soviet incentive structure and the 
circulation of income and resources. Plan fulfilment had a legitimising effect-
in that it "proved" the superiority of the Soviet system and hence the vanguard 
function of the CPSU's leadership. Importantly a distinction has been made 
here between the operative and strategic goals of the Soviet state power. The 
operative goal was the implementation of state power and control. The 
strategic goal was the efficient functioning of the economy. In organisations 
experiencing time and resource pressure, as has been shown in this thesis and 
well documented in organisational literature, departmentalisation and 
principal-agent factors can result in the displacement of strategic goals by 
operative goals. 
Similarly the circulation of income and rent was construed to extend and 
perpetuate the Soviet structure of state power. This again implied a de facto 
acceptance by the leadership of rent dissipation. Rent dissipation in this 
respect served two functions. Firstly it contributed to the implementation of 
the planning process through various informal institutions. Secondly, and as 
importantly, it contributed to the implementation of state power by allowing 
accumulation of income outside the formal channels, which again constituted 
an incentive for agents to preserve the formal source of income (constituency 
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building). Both these elements were "maintained" through an ideological 
absence of property rights resulting in a conflict between de jure owners and 
de facto owners. 
Permeating the entire institutional matrix and increasing transaction costs 
associated with its functioning was the failure of the Soviet system to develop 
a strong infrastructural base of state power. Power and control were cultivated 
through a large bureaucracy that showed characteristics of patrimonial 
(personal) loyalty structures rather than Weberian bureaucracy characteristics. 
This was not only a feature of the Soviet system, but had also been a feature of 
the Tsarist system. On the one hand this facilitated the implementation of 
narrowly defined (primarily) political objectives. On the other hand it 
increased transaction costs through a distrust of the state and therefore, 
reduced the return on investment in institutional reform. As the economy 
grew and became more complex the scope of the state was reduced. 
Organisational reform in the Soviet Union was aimed at reducing transaction 
costs associated with the functioning of state power. As resource pressure 
increased and economic growth dissipated, reforms were increasingly aimed at 
increasing economic efficiency. The convergence of strategic aims with 
operational aims constituted a central dilemma for the Soviet system. On the 
one hand continued economic growth had an important legitimising role, on 
the other hand altering the institutional structure to accommodate growth 
would affect the ideological basis of the Soviet system and thus undermine 
legitimacy claims. The fragility of this balance of interest and state power 
came to the fore during Gorbachev's radical reform period, resulting in the 
gradual formalisation of former informal institutions and a modification to the 
circulation of income and rent and the associated bargaining process. 
The great challenges that the post-Soviet leadership faced were to maintain the 
integrity of the state, while altering the institutional matrix of the state's 
functioning in order to generate economic growth. The two factors were 
highly interconnected. Maintaining the integrity of the state could only be 
achieved if the state had sufficient resources to survive. These resources could 
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only be generated if economic growth created them. The reform period 1987-
1991 had increased the participants in and altered the structure of income and 
resource circulation. This again reduced the state's access to resources, 
thereby creating even stronger resource pressure. These then were the factors 
that conditioned the political and economic environment in which institutional 
and organisational reform of the Russian oil industry has taken place. 
From the inception of oil industry reform under the aegis of the Russian 
leadership this dilemma has haunted all reform attempts and created the basis 
for a strong path dependency. Seizing control over' oil flows during the 
twilight period of the Soviet Union established a basis upon which to secure 
income for'the state's survival. With the dissolution of the Soviet' Union 
maintaining Russian supremacy in the oil industry became an important factor 
in protecting the integrity of the Russian state in the presence of strong 
centripetal forces. 
Similarly the reorganisation of the industry into a series of vertically 
integrated companies continued a Soviet trend where organisational reform 
aimed at maintaining the state's central role in the circulation and distribution 
of income and resources. At the same time the modified structure of income 
circulation resulted in a continued contestation of the state's position in the 
structure of income circulation and the state's right to appropriate income. 
From 1987/88-1996 oil production in the Russian declined from 569 to 301 
million tons per year. While redistribution of resources (investment) had been 
a pillar of the Soviet leadership's legitimacy claim, the modification of the 
state's investment responsibility brought to the fore the conflict between de 
jure and de facto owners that had affected transaction costs in the Soviet 
system as well. However, this struggle represented only one part of the 
struggle over property rights. Equally important was the struggle over what 
was the state? In the Soviet Union property rights had been very ambiguous, 
and the functioning of the system and minimisation of transaction costs hinged 
(to some extent) upon individual actors' acceptance of the state's central 
position in the circulation of income and resources. A patrimonial-despotic 
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structure of state power ensured the acceptance of a sufficiently large number 
of actors for the system to function. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dissipation of the state's 
ability to finance and maintain the extent of the Soviet state apparatus, 
previous actors in the circulation of income and resources began to claim the 
right to assets "under their care". Under the circumstances this was a perfectly 
logical development. Property in the Soviet Union belonged to the state only 
as long as the state fulfilled its vanguard role. In the absence of the state's 
ability to maintain its former position its authority regarding property claims 
was diminished. This resulted in a situation where actors that took on some of 
the state's former patrimonial duties could claim the right to property on an 
equal footing with the state. 
Property in the Soviet Union had not been an ownership issue, but rather a 
function of the state's patrimonial role. Thus, throughout the Soviet period 
there had been a steady accumulation of income outside the official state 
channels as the economy grew and some of the state's patrimonial roles 
shifted away from the central planning and party organs to local and enterprise 
levels - through informal practices. This situation is clearly reflected in the 
reorganisation of the oil industry. On the one hand the state tried to maintain 
its former right to income appropriation through a system of majority 
ownership in the newly created VIes. On the other hand the loose 
amalgamations of productive units ensured insiders' ability to further usurp 
part of the revenue stream and part of the state's patrimonial role. 
One of the dilemmas faced by the Russian leadership in the first post-Soviet 
years (1992-1994/5) was the bridging of the institutional gap separating the 
tools of state survival from the creation of a more efficient economy. Price 
liberalisation and monetary policies recommended by the IFIs assumed that 
this gap could be negotiated in a matter of a few years. Most western advice 
to Russia in general and the oil industry specifically was based on the 
understanding that Russia would be able to establish a constitutional-
bureaucratic structure of state power with a strong infrastructural base. In the 
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immediate post-Soviet years the gap between the Soviet institutional matrix 
and the IFIs aspirations represented the strategic space for institutional 
competition. 
As has been argued throughout this thesis, institutions - political and 
economic - are ex ante agreements on the rules of the game. Building and 
maintaining institutions is a fonn of investment, and capital will be invested in 
institutions that ex ante promise greater returns. Returns will be discounted as 
a result of high transaction costs. In the immediate post-Soviet years 
transaction costs associated with the IFI proposals were prohibitive. 
Infonnation asymmetry, moral hazard and time and resource pressure allIed to 
an emphasis on the operational goal of state survival rather than structural 
economic reform (still the strategic goal). These factors again contributed to 
the triumph of the patrimonial-despotic structure of the Soviet period over the 
IF Is constitutional-bureaucratic structure. 
It should be kept in mind here that institutional reform and competition is a 
multi-dimensional process. While the former structure of state power and 
income circulation successfully competed with the exogenously induced 
institutional structure in the oil industry, this has not necessarily been the case 
in all economic sectors and disciplines in Russia. In sectors of less importance 
for state finances - i.e. small and medium sized enterprises - time and 
resource pressure has been less, perhaps allowing these sectors to develop in 
conjunction with a different institutional matrix. Not withstanding this 
possibility, all economic sectors in Russia have been impeded by the Soviet-
IFI institutional gap. This is perhaps best seen in the slow development of 
small and medium sized enterprises and the lack of government attention to 
this, which again is a result of the state preoccupation of maintaining the 
fonner structure of income circulation. 
Bargaining with a few large enterprises will in this respect consume less 
government/management time (transaction costs) than bargaining with 
thousands of smaller enterprises. Fewer nodes of interaction reduce the 
transaction costs associated with the patrimonial structure of state power. 
336 -
However, it also represents a continuation of the trade-off between state power 
implementation and possible growth effects as a result of greater economic 
efficiency through competition. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union the structure of income (political versus 
economic) was altered. The Soviet leadership had structured income 
appropriation in a way conducive to maintaining the state's patrimonial role. 
With the modification of the income circulation structure (1987/88-1993) the 
political aspects of income were altered. Economic rent and political income 
were drastically reduced as production plummeted, transaction costs reduced 
potential rent, capital left the country and an increasing part of value 
generation took place outside the state monitored channels. These elements of 
institutional competition constituted economic institutions of an endogenous 
nature. They originated in former informal economic institutions (property 
rights contestation, propensity to defect in the light of low levels of state trust) 
and uncertainty created by the Soviet-IFI institutional gap. 
An important part of the argument of this thesis has been that institutions of an 
endogenous nature have a greater probability of dominating institutional 
competition than institutions of an exogenous nature. The IFIIWestern 
institutional matrix that was offered at the beginning of the 1990s differs from 
the Soviet institutional matrix in almost every aspect - particularly so in the 
mode of state power. This does not imply that Russians are categorically 
different from humans anywhere else, or that the "laws of economics" do not 
work in Russia. (Both the Soviet and post-Soviet experience demonstrates 
that Russians are "economic men"). It means however that the institutional 
matrix in Russia has generated a different incentive structure than that present 
in many "developed" economies. The IFI/Western advice at the beginning of 
the 1990s failed to take the weight of the historic institutional matrix into 
account. In short their institutional design was flawed not because Russia 
could not go where they wanted her to, but because they didn't fully 
appreciate where Russia came from. Perhaps if Western advice and initial 
reform proposals had taken into account the close relationship between state 
power and circulation of income and principal-agent characteristics associated 
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with the institutional structure, progress could have been made sooner. 
However, not only the IFIs should have considered these factors. Russian 
policy makers themselves made the mistake of not appreciating the 
extraordinary impact at all levels of the institutional matrix if an institutional 
shift was to be achieved. 
Again though, transformation is a multi-dimensional process and oil industry 
development differed from that of many other sectors. The oil industry was 
not directly subjected to shock therapy, nor was it preserved in its previous 
monolithic form. An important reason for this was the state's dependence on 
generating income from this sector. With the structural changes that had 
occurred during the Gorbachev years the state's ability to generate income had 
been diminished while simultaneously the very structure of income began to 
change. With profit retention and self-financing a criterion that was 
incompatible with political surplus had been introduced. Once these 
institutions had been formalised the relationship between state power and· 
income circulation had to change as well for the system to take on a semblance 
of efficiency. 
It has been stressed throughout the thesis that under conditions of uncertain 
property rights in extractive industries investors are· unlikely to produce at all 
if property rights of product are uncertain and unlikely to sink capital into the 
development of resources if subsoil property rights are uncertain. Experience 
in the post-Soviet oil industry supports these claims. The first phase of 
privatisation did little to modify the principal-agent factors characteristic of 
the previous regime, thus both production and development of the industry 
abated in this period. Simultaneously, state income was substantially less than 
it could have been and the industry did not take on the wanted "engine effect". 
The second phase of privatisation began to change the previous structure. 
Ownership over product became more certain, though the state (at all levels of 
administration) continued to levy an unsustainable level of taxes and duties. 
In this period the companies that managed to obtain de facto control over their 
subsidiaries - the SSCs - stopped the fall in production. Similarly, when the 
WSCs obtain de facto control over their subsidiaries they too managed to halt 
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the fall in production. The degree of de jure ownership then affected the 
difference in structure of rent appropriation between these two styles. 
Importantly, these reforms were accompanied by a shift in the structure of 
income circulation. In the Soviet Union income had circulated along the lines 
of centre-ministries-enterprises. In the late Soviet and immediate post-Soviet 
period this structure was mainly retained. (Rosneftegaz - then Rosneft -
supplanted the former MNP's operative responsibilities but proved 
ineffective). The first phase of privatisation saw this change to centre (and 
regionalllocal authorities)-VICs-enterprises, while the second and third phase 
of privatisation gradually changed this to centre (and regionalllocal 
authorities)-VIes. An important element of the restructuring of the 1990s has 
been the gradual reduction of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy's and other 
branch ministries' influence. Although successors to most of the former 
Soviet ministries exist, their role throughout the 1990s has been gradually 
diminishing and has, at times, been at odds with the interest of other ministries 
and branches of governme!1t. 
Although the structure of income circulation began to change income 
circulation still maintained an important aspect of the previous structure·-
hierarchical bargaining and thereby the maintaining patrimoniallpersonal 
exchange relationships and a continuing high degree of state capture. The 
state retains an element of autonomy by maintaining a monopoly in ex post re-
negotiation of the 'rules of the game' that ensures a level of "bureaucratic 
competition". Such "bureaucratic competition" ensures that the bargaining 
strength of state's bargaining partners and vehicles remains balanced. This 
has created a strong path dependency in the state's position in the structure of 
circulation of income and resources. 
On the other hand the difference in consolidation strategy displayed by the two 
company categories contains a necessary element for institutional competition 
if an environment conducive to letting them compete exists. The drawback is 
that either model is still dependent on portraying a high degree of political 
integration at all levels of state administration. This creates a unifying 
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structure of state income appropriation - a degree of hierarchical bargaining. 
On the other hand the structure by which the companies extract rent "from 
themselves" is momentarily conducive to the establishment of a situation 
where institutional competition may bring about a shift in the general structure 
of rent retention in the oil industry. This, however, will only be the case if the 
WSC method of rent extraction - shareholder price and share dividends - is 
not a short-term exit strategy, but proves a viable long-term strategy, and exit 
threat is not diminished through political integration. 
The WSC strategy is moving towards a Kuznets pattern of growth. The SSC 
strategy of rent extraction still portrays a high element of rent extraction 
through the antagonism between de jure owner and de facto owners. This 
leads to a situation where capital employed is not necessarily drawn to its most 
productive use but to a use where verification and measurement becomes more 
subjective. On the other hand, the WSC strategy can only constitute an 
element of competition if it remains the choice strategy for rent extraction in 
the long-term. 
If the state (at all levels of administration) allows either strategy to function 
then market forces and agency self-interest could result in an institutional 
shift. How likely is this though? There are signs that the state is trying to 
accommodate the existence of both strategies. A recent amendment proposal 
to the joint-stock legislation is a positive development. On the other hand, the 
opportunity cost of this strategy to the state, at the present, is very low. There 
are signs to the contrary that a possible reversal/stagnation is under foot as 
well. Tax policy remains a contested area and recent developments cast doubt 
over the corporate governance commitment amongst the some of the 
companies that have been championing this strategy (2000-2002). At local 
and regional levels there has been growing resistance to further restructuring 
(in terms of slimming social responsibilities and burdens) of the sector. The 
oil industry'S position in the accumulation of state finances and the interplay 
between the sectors propensity to "minimise" state appropriation (distrust of 
the state) and the continued structure of hierarchical bargaining are non-
conducive to the establishment of a constitutional-bureaucratic structure of 
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state-industry relations. Finally, limited institutional competition has 
developed in a high growth period (that has allowed the state to seemingly 
fulfil its patrimonial role better than in previous years) and stable political 
parameters. If either should change there remains a credible threat that the 
state may use its monopoly to re-negotiate ex post. The anticipation of such a 
re-negotiation would be likely to induce a shift in the Nash equilibrium that is 
the circulation of income and resources. All in all this might lead to a 
situation where the two models co-exist rather then compete. 
If this should turn out to be the case then it is questionable whether a virtuous 
circle can develop that might induce a different development path in Russia. 
One of the fundamental difficulties in reforming Russia's political and 
economic structure stems from the fact that the state's historic role and 
behaviour is itself a major source of non-negligible transaction costs. This 
makes investments in political and economic institutions (unrelated to the 
historic institutional matrix) fraught with uncertainty. 
In terms of the post-Soviet reform parameters this means that path dependency 
in evolutionary strategy stems from transaction costs associated with the 
functioning of the institutional structure. Partly these transaction costs relate 
to the human capability to process information and make rational choices. 
The argument of this thesis has been that in complex situations and 
time/resource pressure human abilities are limited in this respect (bounded 
rationality). Thus policy formation and economic behaviour is not a process 
anchored in pure rationality because short-term versus long-term rationality 
and individual versus collective rationality differ. The new institutional 
economic framework used in this thesis has tried to incorporate these elements 
of human behaviour and what they mean for institutional development in the 
Russian oil industry. 
Hence, institutional investment, the post-Soviet oil industry has gone through 
a series of Nash equilibria rather than establishing a Pareto equilibrium. 
Policy formation at state level has been reactive rather than proactive, while 
the lower levels (regional and local) and industry actors have acted both 
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reactively and proactively. Particularly at industry level, actors' ability to 
create new organisations to maximise opportunities at any given time has been 
impressive. The state's weak infrastructural power, its dependence on 
patrimonial structures of income collection and the discrepancy between 
operational goals and strategic goals have contributed to a situation where 
organisational ingenuity and energy at industry level has not substantially 
contributed towards general welfare. 
What this thesis has shown is that institutional uncertainty (due to high 
transaction costs) has created a strong path dependency in the development of 
the post-Soviet oil industry. The analysis of economic institutions has allowed 
the thesis to link these transaction costs with the institutional matrix found in 
the Soviet Union and the interrelationship between different institutional 
dimensions. It has found that there seems to be a strong relationship between 
previous patterns of behaviour in a situation where institutional uncertainty 
prevails and there is a high degree of idiosyncratic transacting (i.e. the 
existence of potential quasi-rents). 
On the other hand the thesis has also identified the existence of institutional 
competition at both the second and third dimensional level. (Although many 
of the reforms initiated and formally recommended by the leadership 
constitute an institutional basis for institutional competition also in the first 
dimension, the maximisation of operational goals over strategic goals has, for 
the time being, suppressed any de facto competition). Particularly important 
in this respect is the second dimension of organisational institutionalisation. 
Whereas the Soviet economy was severely restricted by politically 
(ideologically) induced fences, the Russian economy has a more pragmatic air 
to it. This is again linked with the circulation of income. While the centre had 
a monopoly on determining income circulation in the Soviet Union the 
transition period has altered this foundation of Soviet power. The functioning 
of this monopoly was closely linked with a right to establish and reshuffle the 
organisational structure in order to minimise transaction costs associated with 
the execution of its patrimonial-despotic state structure. 
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In the post-Soviet period the state has gradually come to accept an altered role. 
Although it initially tried to maintain its hold over the circulation of income in 
the oil industry its (at first) de facto acceptance of relinquishing its organising 
monopoly (and then dejure acceptance) has created a situation where the state 
has to respond to organisational and institutional changes. In other words the 
Russian state has become a Nash player rather than a static (Soviet) player. 
This on one hand implies that the state like other actors will be more 
responsive to rewarded behaviour, on the other hand it could imply that the 
degree of state capture will increase as the state becomes increasingly 
dependent on rewards from a selective section of the Russian population. 
\ 
Importantly though, the state retains a monopoly in re-negotiating the 'rules of 
the game' ex post. This maintains a level of "bureaucratic competition", 
which ensures that no other actor singularly is strong enough to compete with 
the state for this monopoly. 
However, path dependency in the development has not only been a function of 
the historic institutional matrix. The Soviet oil industry had by the early 1990s 
already entered into a mature stage of development. Easily accessible fields 
with good geological characteristics had long been worked. The older regions 
in the Northern Caucasus and Volga-Urals area were in a declining life stage. 
The West Siberian resources had entered a mature stage. "Newer" areas like 
Eastern Siberia, the Sakhalin Island group, the Komi area and the continental 
shelf have been insufficiently explored to assess the investment risk and 
production potential. In addition, the poorly developed infrastructure in these 
areas and increasingly complex geological conditions of remaining reserves 
make these capital-intensive areas under the best of regimes. The Russians 
cannot alter the location of these resources, nor can they realistically alter the 
location of consumption in the short term. These factors alone contribute to an 
increased investment risk connected with the further development of Russian 
oil. 
While the present structure has allowed aspects of the previous patrimonial 
structure of income circulation to prevail and, under the favourable 
international oil prices of the early 2000s, even allowed oil production to 
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increase again, the present structure and environment is not necessarily suited 
to the development of new resources. The merger and acquisition trend of the 
late 1990s has followed international precedence and resulted in economies of 
scale benefits for existing reserves. However, unless the government 
structures the tax and regulation framework to encourage high-risk - possibly 
marginal return - projects, the present industry structure will not be conducive 
to the large scale development of new resources. While the VIC structure, 
after the various rounds of property transfers, has been adapt at increasing 
production and reducing some costs, the lack of a truly competitive element in 
auxiliary industries and administrative dislike of further restructuring adds to 
the factors hampering the development of a market driven competitive 
industry. The industry response to this environment is, not surprisingly, 
continued political integration and use of its position in the income circulation 
structure to protect value maximisation and self-interest. 
Wither then Russian oil? From the evidence presented in this thesis Russian 
oil will continue to develop and remain an important element of Russian state 
finances in the foreseeable future. However, apart from the WSC there is as 
yet only little evidence of a shift towards a Kuznets pattern of growth (and 
there remain question marks surrounding the longevity of the WSC model). 
Such a shift can only be accomplished with the support of the state and will 
only succeed ifits in the interest of both state and industry. 
This rather simple conclusion has far reaching consequences for the 
development of the sector and implicitly conceals many of the institutional 
barriers to achieving such a shift. Without greater state accountability distrust 
of the state will continue. Without state trust both the state and industry may 
favour a patrimonial structure of state power. A patrimonial structure of state 
power will not be conducive to the establishment of a strong infrastructural 
base. Without a better infrastructural base a convergence between operational 
and strategic goals will be difficult since short-termism (and a propensity to 
defect from collective rationality) will be non-conducive to reducing 
transaction costs associated with the working of the institutional matrix. 
Without a reduction of transaction costs the interest of actors will be non-
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conducive to institutional investment. Without institutional investment path 
dependency of institutional development will tie Russia and Russian oil to a 
development path that will not achieve the goals and aspirations many had 
hoped for after seven decades of Soviet rule. 
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Postscript. 
The events described in this thesis are based on events that took place until the 
spring of 2003. However, during the summer of 2003 events have occurred, 
that warrant a postscript. This section is intended to illustrate the 
applicability of the framework of analysis used in this thesis to present and 
future events. 
One of the arguments running throughout this thesis has been that the mode of 
state power and circulation of income and resources are closely interrelated. 
This has generated a specific institutional and incentive matrix. The prospect 
for reform through institutional competition, or continuity through path 
dependency will be determined by the ability of actors to maximise their 
objectives. In Chapter 10 it was argued that limited institutional competition 
in company behaviour (1999-2002) could be the result of the relatively low 
opportunity cost of this competition to the state. In other words, as long as the 
state seemed to be fulfilling its objectives, industry could develop with a 
degree of competition/difference in corporate strategy. This was one of the 
effects of the 'Kremlin-capitalist' alliance. 
During this time the parameters were quite stable. Firstly, the economic 
downturn in 1998 opened up a window of opportunity for company 
restructuring. Secondly, the 'party of power' secured a strong position in the 
state Duma (December 1999). Thirdly, Putin was elected president (spring 
2000). Fourthly, the 'Kremlin-capitalist' alliance ensured a degree of regime 
continuity. Finally, continued high oil prices after 1999 ensured a high level 
of potential income. Thus, from a state perspective institutional competition at 
company level carried a relatively low opportunity cost as long as the state 
continued to ensure income. During this period the state could ensure both 
political income and economic due to high levels of growth. 
With the upcoming election season (Duma elections in December 2003 and 
presidential elections in the spring of 2004) the relative weight of these two 
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forms of income is changing. In democracies there is a propensity to increase 
the relative weight of political income during elections, as parties and 
candidates vie for the support of the electorates. 799 In Russia political income 
is derived from the ability to control the circulation of income and resources 
and direct these towards uses that reinforce the patrimonial-despotic structure 
of state power upon which policy implementation depends. 
An important element of Putin's reform agenda has been the lowering of 
transaction costs associated with the hierarchical bargaining that stems from 
the mode of state power. While as the Ye Its in period drastically increased the 
number of bargaining participants (politically in terms of the ascent of the 
regions and economically in terms of privatisation), Putin has sought to reduce 
the number of (direct) bargaining participants. Examples of this are his 
federal reform, continued privatisation, merger and acquisition in the oil 
industry, maintaining Gasprom as a monopoly and finally, plans to let Russian 
Communal Systems (RCS) take control of parts of housing infrastructure in 
exchange for assuming responsibility for communal services in regions where 
that infrastructure exists (the maintenance and repair of buildings and the 
supply of basic services such as water, electricity, heat, gas, sewage and 
garbage). 800 This briefly sketched situation is the background for 
understanding the turmoil that has surrounded Y ukos this summer. 
799 Democracy is here used in.the widest sense possible and is strictly meant to indicate some 
kind of voting system were candidates of different backgrounds and with different 
programmes compete for the support of voters in their constituency/polity. What constitutes 
political income varies from society to society. 
800 With regards to Gazprom, Putin said 'Gazprom is a powerful political and economic lever 
of influence over the rest of the world ... Gazprom is light and heat in the homes of the 
population. It is the activity of enterprises ... Taking this into account, the state has been very 
careful about reforming the gas sector. We will continue to be careful in the future'. (Belton, 
'Putin Says Gazprom Too Powerful to Break Up', Moscow Times, 17.2.2003). Russian 
Communal Systems is a consortium consisting of Gasprom, Unified Energy Systems (UES), 
Interros, Renova, Evrofinance bank, YevrazHolding and Kuzbassrazrezugol. (Startseva, 
'Putin and Chubais Move to Clean House', Moscow Times, \5.5.2003). If the reform goes 
through it would achieve two goals. Firstly, the bill of these services in 2002 came to $17.7 
billion, 30% of which were covered by federal and regional budgets. However, a large 
amount of the funds are misappropriated by municipal authorities, leaving 70% of communal 
services companies bankrupt and a source of back wages (Ibid.). Shifting responsibilities to 
the RCS would go some way to separate political income from economic income at regional 
and local levels while strengthening the state's access to political income (through Gasprom 
and UES). The reform could therefore contribute to strengthening the position of the centre 
versus the regions. Secondly, transaction costs in providing these services from a state point 
of view would be reduced as the number of negotiating partners would be reduced. In other 
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On 22 April 2003 two of Russia's leading oil companies, Yukos and Sibneft, 
announced a second attempt to merge their businesses. The merger 
announcement followed another high profile oil transaction announcement 
between the Tyumen Oil Company (TNK) and British Petroleum (BP) in 
February 2003. Both transactions were immediately praised as being signs of 
the Russian economy's coming of age and evidence of the stability that had 
come to Russia with Vladimir Putin's ascent to the presidency. Since 1999 
both Yukos and Sibneft have pioneered standards of operation and corporate 
governance that differed from Soviet practice. This made them favourites of 
the Moscow stock market and with investors. 
However, on 2 July 2003 the Prosecutor General's Office arrestedPlaton 
Lebedev on charges of theft of state property to the amount of $280 million 
relating to a 1994 privatisation of the fertiliser company Apatit. Lebedev is 
the director of Yukos's parent company Menatep, which controls 60.5 per cent 
of Yukos's shares. Subsequently, a list of charges have been brought against 
Yukos affiliates and employees ranging from murder and tax evasion to illegal 
property transfers. 
Two favourite explanations have circled the media since July. Either an 
alleged break by Mikhail Khodorkovsky of the gentleman's agreement 
("Kremlin-capitalist" alliance) between the President and the oligarchs, or a 
palace struggle between the St. Petersburgers (Putin's entourage) and the 
Family (Boris Yeltsin's former entourage) is taking place. Importantly though 
the two are closely interconnected. 
The first explanation relates to a tacit agreement struck between the president 
and the oligarchs shortly after Putin's inauguration in 2000. In return for not 
mingling in politics the oligarchs were to keep their spoils from the tainted 
privatisation deals of the 1990s. The deal represented a first step in the 
strengthening of the state's bargaining position that has been an implicit part 
words, the state would negotiate with ReS, while ReS in turn would negotiate with local and 
municipal authorities. The interest of Res will to some extent differ from that of the regions 
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of Putin's strong state rhetoric. During the Yeltsin years the oligarchs' most 
effective strategy of property protection was to usurp the state itself. A 
structure of principal-agent relationships and networks flourished that allowed 
the oligarchs access to the executive. The oligarchs were thus allowed 'to 
extract at will' .801 
By founding opposition parties and openly criticising the Kremlin 
Khodorkovsky is to have broken this tacit agreement. By threatening the 
property of the richest man in the country Putin is sending a signal to the 
oligarchs that the 3-year-old bargain will only be honoured if all parties 
remain faithful to the agreement. The actions brought against Yukos 
eventually led Arkadii Vol'skii, president of RSPP, to petition Yukos to 'play 
by the rules' .802 
The second explanation relates to the men behind Putin, the so-called siloviki 
- security and law enforcement officials - that constitutes the Putin loyal clan. 
In an apparent struggle between the Family and the siloviki the latter is trying 
to bolster its position and Putin's dependence on them before the upcoming 
Duma and presidential elections.803 By attacking big business the siloviki have 
been launching a campaign that enjoys widespread support in the population. 
In recent poll by ROMIR 77% of those questioned agreed with a partial or 
complete revision of past privatisations.804 Ultimately what might be at hand 
is a struggle for property transfers from one political clan to another. 
While state autonomy is an important element in Putin' s approach access to 
revenues and resources are equally important elements in the upkeep of the 
state and the legitimacy of the head of state. The interconnectivity of the two 
and local authorities thereby possibly introducing a higher degree of hard budget constraints 
and enforcement of payment. 
801 Hedlund, 'Property Without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatisation', Europe-Asia 
Studies, 2001, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 213-237. 
802 'President RSPP Arkadii Vol'skii prizval Yukos igrat' po pravilam [Arkadii Volskii, 
president ofthe RSPP, calls on Yukos to play by the rules]', 30.7.2003. At: www.strana.ru. 
803 Simon Saradzhyan & Igor Semenenko, 'Just How Far Will Putin Let the Pendulum 
Swing?', Moscow Times, 18.7.2003. 
804 Fedyukin, 'Otnyat' i podelit [Take away and divide]" Vedomosti, 18.7.2003. 
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explanations is therefore to be found in the structure of state power and the 
dynamic relationship between the circulation of resources and the mode of 
state power. 
Most observers would probably agree that the likelihood of a presidential 
election upset is slim to non-existent. The alleged breach by Khodorkovsky of 
the 'gentleman's agreement' is therefore not likely to be the impetus behind 
recent occurrences. Neither is the siloviki plot entirely convincing. The 
economic resources necessary for state survival ¥e outwith the control of this 
group and any attempt at large-scale redistribution would prompt more capital 
to leave the country and investment/production to decline again. 805 If the 
siloviki scenario is correct there is a likelihood of endangering the flow of 
resources that the state depends upon. Assuming that the state leadership are 
maximising actors it is unconvincing to argue that such an attempt is 
underway. 
Rather one should examine what the conflict reveals about the institutional 
structure in Russia. While as the WSC form in the period (1999-2002) 
imposed a low opportunity cost upon the state this is gradually beginning to 
change. As argued in the thesis, for the WSC form to successfully compete 
with the SSC form fundamental changes in the relationship between the state 
and the economy have to take place. Foremost of these would be a change in 
the accountability of the state in terms of greater ex post contractual stability. 
This again would imply a shift towards a 'rule of law' society rather than a 
'rule by law' society. With a rapidly expanding economy in the aftermath of 
the 1998 economic collapse the state was in a position to accommodate both 
models as it was in a position to appropriate sufficient funds for its survival. 
As described in Chapter 10, in this period growth in the WSC was faster than 
in the SSc. 
805 Capital flight since 1996 has remained stable at $20-30 billion per year. The Putin years 
have not seen a decline of the outflow of capital. (Lavrentieva, 'Capital Flight Soared in 
2002, Most Economists Say', Moscow Times, 15.1.2003). 
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However, at the same time the WSC instigated a beginning retreat from the 
traditional Soviet model, for instance the social responsibilities traditionally 
assumed by the Soviet "firm" (thus generating political income). Under these 
circumstances high oil prices and rapid growth went some way to recompense 
the authorities at different levels for the added cost (mainly lost political 
income) they experienced as a result of such restructuring. The growing 
resistance to further restructuring (and hence further reduction of political 
income) was commented on in Chapter 10. Throughout the thesis the state has 
been identified as major source of high transaction costs, i.e. distrust of state 
officials and the state's commitment to ex post stability. 
What the Yukos affair demonstrates is that this very situation remains an 
important obstacle to reform and long-term investment. Although the RTS 
index fell by almost 100 points from 520 immediately after the turmoil broke 
it recovered to above 500 in less than a month.806 However, this should not be 
taken as an indication of the limited implication or low seriousness of the 
situation but rather as an indication that Russian equities already trade at a 
heavy political discount. 
The Russian business elite has come to expect and anticipate sudden changes 
in the political climate of the country. An indication of this is the low-level 
reactions from other companies that followed the affair. 807 Seemingly 
unprovoked attacks on the business elite have occurred repeatedly during 
Putin's reign.- Seemingly because there are no clear-cut catalysts for the 
attacks and yet they are not unprovoked. In a system where there is no ex ante 
consensus with regards to the 'rules of the game', ex post stability can at best 
be a finite number of Nash equilibria. This again implies that upon the 
alteration of any of the parameters constituting the equilibrium a re-
positioning can occur. Opportunity cost considerations determines whether 
such a re-positioning will take place or not. 
806 'RTS Recovers From Yukos Scandal, Breaks 500 Mark', Moscow Times, 18.8.2003. 
807 Jack, 'Yukos affair has Russia's oligarchs squirming in their seats', Financial Times, 
13.8.2002. 
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Throughout the thesis it has been argued that the WSC form could constitute a 
possible exit strategy. Both the BP-TNK deal and the Yukos-Sibneft deal 
could be interpreted as the beginning of an exit based on the anticipation that 
the state would be likely to re-position as a result of the gradual entrenchment 
of Putin' s own team and with the upcoming election season. In both cases the 
Russian investors have been able to convert their equity ownership into value 
outwith the reach of the state. From a state point of view the two deals differ 
though. While as BP is an international actor, and therefore likely to behave 
differently in the circulation of income and resources, YukosSibneft remains a 
Russian actor. 808 As such the merger is positive for the state as it reduces 
transaction costs when dealing with the oil industry. 809 On the other hand, it is 
imperative for the state to ensure that YukosSibneft remains a Russian kind of 
actor. The WSC form constitutes a partial break with Soviet practice. For it 
to reach its natural conclusion (i.e. to develop further along "Western" lines), 
changes in the overall political and economic institutional matrix is necessary. 
If the state is to continue its reliance on a patrimonial-despotic structure of 
state power it needs to maintain its monopoly in unilaterally being able to re-
negotiate any state-society or state-industry agreements. 
For the WSC form to come to its natural conclusion the state would have to 
give up this monopoly position, which again would imply an institutional shift 
in the circulation of income and resources. On the other hand, the WSC form 
at its present development stage is not an inherent threat to the structure of 
state power as such. Path dependency in state survival strategy constitutes an 
inhibiting factor to the further development of the WSC form. Thus 
Khodorkovsky's alleged breach of the gentleman's agreement and the Kremlin 
clan struggle are mere symptoms rather than causes. Both can be said to be 
true, but neither explains the present turmoil. 
808 'Written all over the Yukos affair is the bureaucracy's desire not to allow other big Russian 
corporations to follow in the footsteps of the Tyumen Oil Co., which in essence sold its 
business to BP'. (Markov, 'The Yukos Affair and Putin's 2nd Term', Moscow Times, 
29.7.2003). However, there are continued speculations and rumours that a foreign investor 
may come and secure a strategic investment in YukosSibneft. 
809 The Anti-Monopoly Ministry approved the merger on 14 August 2003. (,Ministry 
Approves YukosSibneft Merger', Moscow Times, 15.8.2003). 
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In Russian politics, election time is a time for re-negotiating pacts and 
alliances. Based upon the relative weight of the various participants in the 
circulation of income and resources agreements are being struck that will 
constitute the basis for rent-seeking and income appropriation in the coming 
term. From a state point of view the system remains most efficient if the state 
can draw on the support of groups and alliances that compete for state favours. 
For instance it is not in the state's interest to eliminate either the family or the 
siloviki. As long as these groups compete the state can protect its monopoly 
position by ensuring that neither group becomes too strong by favouring one 
group over another. Similarly it is not in the interest of the state to eliminate 
big business since big business can be used effectively to counter regional 
influence. Both the polpredy (potentially) and vertically integrated companies 
in this respect reduce the bargaining position of the regions by weakening 
regional hold over sources of income. 
As such, the Yukos affair should be seen as an element of the patrimonial-" 
despotic structure of state power in which the state secures a monopoly 
position in terms of defining spheres of interest and unilaterally re-negotiating 
agreements ex post. The state maintains this position by relying on several 
bargaining hierarchies that to some extent are mutually exclusive and 
competing. Competition is maintained by the state's ability to re-negotiate ex 
post. 
According to the influential RSPP's leader Lebedev paying a "fine" of $220 
million could have solved Yukos's skirmish with the state at an early stage.SIO 
Lebedev's refusal to pay the fine constituted a direct threat to the state's 
monopoly in re-negotiating the rules of the game ex post. The escalation of 
the conflict followed as a result of the state trying to force Yukos to remain a 
Russian kind of actor. For instance, faced with a fine situation in February 
2003, LUKoil decided to pay the fine in return for stability.811 However, the 
810 Strana.ru, 30.7.2003, op cit. 
811 Neimysheva, 'Illyuziya /'got [Illusion of privilege]', Vedomosti,6.2.2003. LUKoil, like all 
other companies, used loopholes in the tax framework to minimise tax payment. According to 
the letter of the law, LUKoil was not obliged to pay any tax-fine. The incidence is thus, a 
further example of the state's ability to re-negotiate ex post the 'rules of the game' and the 
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Anti-monopoly Ministry's decision to approve the Yukos and Sibneft's 
merger plans also illustrate that the state will be careful in impeding/upsetting 
the relative weight of its bargaining partners in order to maintain them in 
status of competition.812 
The recent BP-TNK and Yukos-Sibneft deal should also be taken as 
indications that there was an anticipation that a re-negotiation could be 
imminent. All these Russian companies are undervalued compared to their 
international peers. Thus, theoretically the Russian investors could have held 
out for greater trade-inn profits. The WSC development strategy likewise 
indicate that there remains great uncertainty and ex post instability. These 
companies have focused on investment strategies with short pay-off periods in 
order to maximise short- term profits. The BP-TNK deal is the culmination of 
BP's long involvement in Russia, however on the back of a long period of 
growth and seeming political stability the deal was struck at a very opportune 
moment. Similarly, the YukosSibneft deal, in the short-term, maximises 
investors' investment and allows them to take value out of the company. 
According to one industry analyst' Abramovich and Khodorkovsky are two of 
the cleverest guys in Russia. They are always ahead of the curve. These guys 
got their assets for next to nothing and now they are cashing out' .813 
What the Yukos affair therefore, demonstrates is that the Russian state 
continues to rely on a patrimonial-despotic structure of state power with path 
dependency being created by the state's need to maintain its position in the 
circulation of income and resource. This creates an institutional matrix that is 
functioning of the patrimonial-despotic structure of state power. The different behaviour of 
the WSC and the SSC also illustrates, to some extent, the potential threat of the WSC to the 
state's traditional role in the circulation of income and resources. 
812 The Anti-Monopoly Ministry's however, also ensures that there remains a bargaining 
element ex post. There is a 30% monopoly limit. On a national level YukosSibenft will a 
29% market share. If the companies continue to grow at a faster pace than other Russian 
companies the company could very well break this limit. More imminent though is the 
regional position, where the new company will exceed the 30% limit, particularly in the down-
stream sector. The Anti-Monopoly Ministry's decision therefore states that 'that the merged 
firm grant fair access to its regional retail markets and refineries'. If this does not occur than 
the firm may be forces to sell of some of its refining capacity in Omsk, Achinsk and Angarsk. 
(,Ministry Approves YukosSibneft Merger', Moscow Times, 15.8.2003). 
813 James Fenker, Trokia Dialog, cited in Belton, 'Are Some Oligarchs Going to Cash Out?', 
Moscow Times, 14.7.2003. 
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characterised by repeated end game agreements and continued high 
transaction costs through ex post instability. While the situation is conducive 
to protect the state's interest in the short term, it is not conducive to ensure the 
development of a 'rule of law' society and a shift to an indirect system of 
resource mobilisation. To paraphrase Fisher Ames, this may mean that 
Russians not only will have wet feet but remain soaked from the waist 
down.814 
814 'Monarchy is like a sleek craft, it sails along weII until some bumbling captain runs it into 
the rocks; democracy, on the other hand, is like a raft. It never goes down but, dammit, your 
feet are always wet'. (Ames, cited in Rosen, 'Public Finance' Irwin, 1992, p. 119). 
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Appendix A - Interviewees. 
1. International Oil Company executive, 'Manager Government and Industry 
Relations', 25 January 2002, 1045-1200. 
2. Russian Oil Company executive, 'Vice-President Director of Corporate 
Finance', 28 March 2002, 1515-1600. 
3. International Oil Company executive, 'Business Development Manager & 
Deputy Head of XXX X Representation in Russia', 19 March 2002, 1215-
1330. 
4. Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation Official, 'XXXX of 
Department for Foreign Economic Relations', 29 March 2002, 1230-1315. 
5. Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation Official, 'XXXX Bilateral 
Economic Relations Division', 29 March 2002. 1200-1230. 
6. Academic, 'XXXX of Department of Mining Law', Gubkin Russian State 
University of Oil and Gas, 65 Leninsky Prospect, 27 March 2002, 1300-
1445. 
7. Russian Oil Company executive, 'Director International Information 
Department, 26 March 2002, 1100-1200. 
8. Investment Banker, 'Managing Director Research XXXX', 8 April 2002, 
1115-1200. 
9. Consultant, 'State Duma's Commission on PSA' & 'State Duma's 
Committee on Budget & Taxes', 9 April 2002, 1100-1215. 
10. International Oil Company executive, 'Country Manager XXXX', 19 
March 2002, 1100-1215. 
11. Russian Oil Company executive, 'Head of Corporate Finance', 22 March 
2002, 1000-1115. Telephone interview, 30 May 2003. 
12. Investment Banker, 'Oil and Gas Industry Specialist', 18 March 2002, 
1200-1315. 
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Appendix B - vie formation. 
1. Surgutneftegaz: 
Government Decision N~ 271, 19.3.1993, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa Neftyanaya kompaniya SurgutneJtegaz [On the 
founding of the open joint stock oil company Surgutneftegaz]', Sob.Akt. N~ 
15,st.1275. 
2. LUKoil: 
Government Decision N~ 299, 5.4.1993, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa Neftyanaya kompaniya LUKoil [On the 
founding of the open joint stock oil company LUKoil]', Sob.Akt. N~ 15, st. 
1289. Amended: Government Decision N~ 861, 1.9.1995, '0 
sovershenstvovanii struktury aktsionernogo obshchestva Neftyanaya 
kompaniya LUKoil [On the improvement of the joint stock oil company 
LUKoil], Sob.Zak., N~ 37, st. 3610. 
3. Yukos: 
Government Decision N~ 354, 15.4.1993, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa Neftyanaya kompaniya YUKOS [On the 
founding of the open joint stock oil company Yukos]" Sob. A kt. N~ 17, st. 
1547. Amended: Government Decision N~ 864, 1.9.1995, '0 
sovershenstvovanii struktury aktsionernogo obshchestva Neftyanaya 
kompaniya YUKOS [On the improvement of the joint stock company 
Yukos], Sob.Zak., N~ 37, st. 3613. 
4. Rosneft: 
Government Decision N~ 357, 22.4.1993, 'Ob uchrezhdenii 
gosydarstvennogo predpriyatiya RosneJt' [On the founding of the state 
company Rosneft]"Sob.Akt. N~ 17, st. 1556. 
5. Slavneft: 
Government Decision N~ 305, 8.4.1994, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa NeJtegazovaya kompaniya SlavneJt' [On the 
founding of the open joint stock oil and gas company Slavneft]', Sob. Zak. 
N~ 16, st. 1385. Amended: Government Decision N~ 867, 1.9.1995, '0 
sovershenstvovanii struktury aktsionernogo obshchestva NeJtegazovaya 
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kompaniya SlavneJt' [On the improvement of the joint stock company 
Slavneft], Sob.Zak., NQ 37, st. 3616. 
6. VSNK: 
Government Decision NQ 306, 8.4.1994, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa Vostochno-Sibirskaya neJtegazovaya 
kompaniya [On the founding of the open joint stock company East-
Siberian Oil and Gas Company (VSNK)]" Sob.Zak. NQ 16, st. 1386. 
7. Sidanko: 
Government Decision NQ 452, 5.5.1994, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa Sibirsko-Dal 'nevostochnaya Neftyanaya 
kompaniya [On the founding of the open joint stock company Siberian-
Far-Eastern Oil Company (SIDANKO)]" Sob.Zak. NQ 3, st. 253. 
Amended: Government Decision NQ 866, 1.9.1995, '0 sovershenstvovanii 
struktury aktsionernogo obshchestva Sibirsko-Dal 'nevostochnaya 
Neftyanaya kompaniya [On the improvement of the joint stock company 
SIDANKO], Sob.Zak., NQ 37, st. 3615. 
8. VNK: 
Government Decision NQ 499, 20.5.1994, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa Vostochnaya neftyanaya kompaniya [On the 
founding of the open joint stock company Eastern Oil Company (VNK)]' , 
Sob.Zak. NQ 5, st. 501. Amended: Government Decision NQ 863, 1.9.1995, 
'0 sovershenstvovanii struktury aktsionernogo obshchestva Vostochnaya 
neftyanaya kompaniya [On the improvement of the joint stock company 
VNK], Sob.Zak., NQ 37, st. 3612. 
9. Onako: 
Government Decision NQ 715, 19.6.1994, 'Ob uchrezhdenii aktsionernogo 
obshchestva otkrytogo tipa Orenburgskaya neftyanaya aktsionernaya 
kompaniya [On the founding of the open joint stock company Orenburg 
Oil Company (Onako)]', Sob.Zak. NQ 9, st. 1046. Amended: Government 
Decision NQ 862, 1.9.1995, '0 sovershenstvovanii struktury aktsionernogo 
obshchestva Orenburgskaya neftyanaya aktsionernaya kompaniya [On the 
improvement of the joint stock company Onako], Sob.Zak., NQ 37, st. 3611. 
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10. TNK: 
Government Decision N!! 802, 9.8.1995, 'Ob obrazovanii otkrytogo 
aktsionernogo obshchestva Tyumenskaya neftyanaya kompaniya [On the 
formation of the open joint stock company Tyumen Oil Company 
(TNK)]" Sob.Zak. N!! 33, st. 3404. 
11. Sibneft: 
Presidential Decree N!! 872, 24.8.1995, 'Ob obrazovanii otkrytogo 
aktsionernogo obshchestva Sibirskaya neftyanaya kompaniya [On the 
formation of the open joint stock company Siberian Oil Company 
(Sibneft)]', Sob.Zak. N!! 36, st. 3530. 
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Appendix C - Statistical Appendix. 
The models. 
The models (1-5) estimate the effects of different corporate strategies on 
production performance. The baseline category in all the models is the HTC 
category. The variables used to estimate the models are listed below. It 
should be kept in mind that only a limited number of potential variables have 
been used to estimate the models. This is one of the reasons that only the 
original Soviet PAs have been used as these initially will have portrayed a 
higher degree of homogeneity. The objective of the models is to the effects of 
ownership structure and corporate strategy in subsequent divergence of 
performance. 
In order to allow for heterogeneity across the observations panel data analysis 
has been used in order to estimate the regression coefficients for the different 
company categories (xtreg).815 The basic regression model takes the form 
Yij =X'itft + Z'ia + cif. 
There are K regressors in Xit, not including the constant. Individual group 
effects (heterogeneity) is Z'ia where Zi contains a constant term and a set of 
observable group/individual variables, which are taken to be constant over 
time. 
Two models will be considered in the following analysis. A 'Fixed effects' 
model where Zi is unobserved but correlated with Xit. In this case the fi is 
biased and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variable. Therefore 
the model 
Yij =X'itft + ai + cit, 
815 Unless otherwise stated the following sections are based on Greene, Econometric Analysis, 
Prentice Hall, Chapter 13. 
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where ai=Z'ia, embodies all the observable effects. In this model the ai is a 
group specific constant term. 
Where the heterogeneity can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the included 
variables the model 
Yij =X'itj3 + a +ui + cit, 
will be estimated. This is the 'random effects' model where ui is a group 
specific random element similar to cit. However, 'for each period, there is but 
a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period'. 
Selection between the two models has been made on the basis of Hausman' s 
specification test (xthaus). 'If one believes the model is correctly specified 
and the test returns a significant result, then this can be interpreted as evidence 
that the random effects [ui], and the regressors, X'it, are correlated' .816 Thus 
testing the appropriateness of fitting the 'random effects' model to the data. 
Variables: 
Production [Prod]: 
Yearly production in thousand tons. 
Production change [ vol_ cng]: 
Change in yearly production in thousand tons. 
Production drilling [prod_drl]: 
Production drilling, thousand meters. 
Production drilling WSC [wsc]: 
Interactive term; production drilling*dummy variable for WSc. 
Production drilling SSC [ssc]: 
Interactive term; production drilling*dummy variable for SSc. 
Production drilling change [drl_ cng]: 
816 Stata Reference P-Z, Release 5, p. 631. 
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Change in production drilling, thousand meters. 
Production drilling change WSC [WSC_drX]: 
Interactive term; production drilling change *dummy for WSC. 
Production drilling change SSC [SSC_drX]: 
Interactive term; production drilling change*dummy for SSC. 
MODEL I: 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): pa_num 
R-sq: within = 
between = 
overall = 
0.4820 
0.6970 
0.6713 
Random effects u i - Gaussian 
corr{u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) 
Number of obs 175 
Number of groups = 29 
Obs per group: 
Wald chi2(6) 
Prob> chi2 
min= I 
avg= 6 
max=7 
197.85 
0.0000 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 9.187817 2.08668 4.403 0.000 5.097999 13.27764 
wsc 7.623667 1.731937 4.402 0.000 4.229133 11.0182 
ssc 6.361401 2.428582 2.619 0.009 1.601468 11.12133 
drl_cng -1.622398 1.742836 -0.931 0.352 -5.038294 1.793498 
SSC drX -2.393567 2.711496 -0.883 0.377 -7.708002 2.920867 
WSC drX -8.457189 2.872621 -2.944 0.003 -14.08742 -2.826955 
cons 5662.876 705.3822 8.028 0.000 4280.352 7045.4 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
sigma_u 2431.7676 
sigma_e 1417.361 
rho .74642651 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
. xthaus 
Hausman specification test 
---- Coefficients ----
Fixed 
prod Effects 
Random 
Effects 
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Difference 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 4.058374 9.187817 -5.129443 
wsc 7.261715 7.623667 -.3619521 
ssc 6.571045 6.361401 .2096442 
drl_ cng .2651665 -1.622398 1.887564 
SSC drX -.9142919 -2.393567 1.479275 
WSC drX -7.740438 -8.457189 .7167512 
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2( 6) = (b-B)'[SI\(-I)](b-B), S = (SJe - SJe) 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000 
MODEL 2: 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i) : pa_num 
R-sq: within = 0.4810 
between = 0.7042 
overall = 0.6764 
Random effects u i - Gaussian 
corr(IU, X) = 0 (assumed) 
Number of obs = 
Number of groups = 
Obs per group: min = I 
avg = 6 
max = 7 
Wald chi2(5) = 198.54 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
175 
29 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod 
Interval] 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 9.368831 2.094702 4.473 0.000 5.263291 
13.47437 
wsc 7.843811 1.727758 4.540 0.000 4.457467 
11.23015 
ssc 5.875364 2.382992 2.466 0.014 1.204786 
10.54594 
drl_cng -2.660436 1.352056 -1.968 0.049 -5.310418 
.010455 
-
WSC drX -7.610452 2.722706 -2.795 0.005 -12.94686 -
2.274046 
cons 5658.044 700.5103 8.077 0.000 4285.069 
7031.019 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
sigma_u 2385.6431 
sigma_e 1413.3556 
rho .74019917 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
. xthaus 
Hausman specification test 
---- Coefficients ----
Fixed 
prod I Effects 
Random 
Effects 
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Difference 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 4.114498 9.368831 -5.254332 
wsc 7.33380 I 7.843811 -.5100091 
ssc 6.250732 5.875364 .375368 
drl_cng -.0845635 -2.660436 2.575873 
WSC drX -7.452239 -7.610452 .1582131 
-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2( 5) = (b-B)'[S"(-I)](b-B), S = (SJe - S_re) 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000 
MODEL 3: 
. xtreg vol_cng prod_drl wsc ssc drl_cng SSC_drX WSC_drX 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): pa_num 
R-sq: within = 0.6165 
between = 0.6053 
overall = 0.5881 
Random effects u i - Gaussian 
corr(uJ, X) = 0 (assumed) 
Number of obs = 175 
Number of groups == 29 
Obs per group: min = I 
avg= 6 
max= 7 
Wald chi2(6) 
Prob> chi2 
239.86 
0.0000 
vol_cng Coef. Std. Err. Z P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl .0730897 .4609989 0.159 0.874 -.8304515 .976631 
wsc 6.112196 .6236462 9.801 0.000 4.889872 7.33452 
ssc 1.265759 .4640275 2.728 0.006 .3562815 2.175236 
drl_ cng 1.506967 .6772094 2.225 0.026 .1796614 2.834273 
SSC drX .0311591 1.025843 0.030 0.976 -1.979456 2.041774 
WSC drX -3.652814 1.185876 -3.080 0.002 -5.977088 -1.32854 
cons -46.2532 83.06885 -0.557 0.578 -209.0652 116.5587 
sigma_u 
sigma_e 
rho 
o 
713.79294 
o (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
. xthaus 
Hausman specification test 
---- Coefficients ----
Fixed 
vol_cng Effects 
Random 
Effects 
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Difference 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
prod _ drl 1.563819 .0730897 1.49073 
wsc 6.92768 6.112196 .8154837 
ssc 2.206724 1.265759 .940965 
drl_ cng 1.551585 1.506967 .0446173 
SSC drX -1.208462 .0311591 -1.239621 
WSC drX -5.399577 -3.652814 -1.746763 
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2( 6) 
Prob>chi2 
= (b-B)'[S"(-I)](b-B), S = (SJe - S_re) 
= 2398.35 
=,0000 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Group variable (i) : pa_num 
Numberofobs 175 
R-sq: within = 0.6507 
between = 0.6063 
overall ') 0.5028 
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.7842 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Number of groups = 29 
Obs per group: min = I 
avg= 6 
max=7 
F(6,140) 43.47 
Prob> F 0.0000 
T P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 1.563819 .829307 1.886 0.061 -.075765 3.203404 
wsc 6.92768 .6252377 11.080 0.000 5.691551 8.163808 
ssc 2.206724 1.08816 2.028 0.044 .0553726 4.358075 
drl_cng 1.551585 .6302338 2.462 0.015 .3055786 2.797591 
SSC drX -1.208462 1.018923 -1.186 0.238 -3.222928 .8060039 
WSC drX -5.399577 1.030404 -5.240 0.000 -7.436742 -3.362412 
cons -517.8748 132.4345 -3.910 0.000 -779.705 -256.0446 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1026.7317 
713.79294 
sigma_u 
sigma_e 
rho .6741655 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u i=O: F(28, 140) = 3.59 Prob> F = 0.0000 
MODEL 4: 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i) : pa _ num 
R-sq: within = 0.6180 
between = 0.6033 
overall = 0.5880 
Random effects u i - Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) 
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Number of obs 175 
Number of groups = 29 
Obs per group: min = 1 
avg= 6 
max=7 
Wald chi2(5) 243.80 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
vol_ cng I Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl .1160381 .4802079 0.242 0.809 -.8251522 1.057228 
wsc 6.300634 .6156963 10.233 0.000 5.093891 7.507376 
ssc 1.26109 .4896781 2.575 0.010 .3013382 2.220841 
drl_cng 1.590221 .4994048 3.184 0.001 .6114058 2.569037 
WSC drX -4.003088 1.054551 -3.796 0.000 -6.069969 -1.936206 
cons -58.81152 89.93642 -0.654 0.513 -235.0837 117.4606 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
sigma_u 163.29094 
sigma_e 714.82148 
rho .04959498 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
. xthaus 
Hausman specification test 
---- Coefficients ----
Fixed Random 
vol_cng Effects Effects Difference 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
prod _ drl 1.638001 .1160381 1.521963 
wsc 7.022959 6.300634 .7223258 
ssc I. 783351 1.26109 .5222617 
drl_ cng 1.08933 1.590221 -.500891 
WSC drX -5.018652 -4.003088 -1:015564 
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2( 5) = (b-B)'[S"(-I)](b-B), S = (SJe - S_re) 
= 307.57 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Group variable (i) : pa _ num 
R-sq: within = 0.6472 
between = 0.6235 
overall = 0.5215 
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.7612 
Number of obs 175 
Number of groups = 29 
Obs per group: min = 1 
avg= 6 
max =7 
F(5,141) 
Prob> F 
= 51.74 
= 0.0000 
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vol_cng Coef. Std. Err. T P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 1.638001 .8281365 1.978 0.050 .0008317 3.27517 
wsc 7.022959 .6209486 11.3 10 0.000 5.795387 8.250532 
ssc 1.783351 1.029424 1.732 0.085 -.2517485 3.818451 
drl_cng 1.08933 .4959784 2.196 0.030 .10881492.069845 
WSC_drX -5.018652 .9804801 -5.119 0.000 -6.956994 -3.08031 
Cons -497.0589 131.4555 -3.781 0.000 -756.9375 -237.1803 
943.23848 
714.82148 
sigma_u 
sigma_e 
rho .63519583 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u i=O: F(28, 141) = 3.53 Prob > F = 0.0000 
MODELS: 
. xtreg vol_cng prod_drl wsc drl_cng WSC_drX 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): pa_num 
R-sq: within = 0.6211 
between = 0.5818 
overall =0.5697 
Random effects u i - Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) 
Number of obs 175 
Number of groups = 29 
Obs per group: min = 1 
avg= 6 
max=7 
Wald chi2(4) 
Prob> chi2 
= 229.08 
= 0.0000 
vol_ cng Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod _ drl 1.253641 .1872442 6.695 0.000 .8866491 1.620633 
wsc 5.392126 .5196463 10.377 0.000 4.373638 6.410614 
drl_cng 1.733681 .5056168 3.429 0.001 .7426901 2.724672 
WSC_drX -4.260303 1.069913 -3.982 0.000 -6.357294 -2.163312 
cons -139.7813 84.73468 -1.650 0.099 -305.8583 26.29559 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
sigma_u 155.15866 
sigma_e 719.84067 
rho .04439731 (fraction of variance due to uJ) 
. xthaus 
Hausman specification test 
---- Coefficients ----
Fixed Random 
vol_cng Effects Effects Difference 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 2.760758 1.253641 1.507117 
wsc 6.636278 5.392126 1.244152 
drl_cng 1.216752 1.733681 -.5169286 
WSC drX -5.498781 -4.260303 -1.238478 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2( 4) 
Prob>chi2 
= (b-B)'[SI\(-I)](b-B), S = (SJe - S_re) 
= 47.49 
= 0.0000 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Group variable (i): pa_num 
R-sq: within = 0.6397 
between = 0.6276 
overall = 0.5386 
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.7168 
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Number of obs 175 
Number of groups = 29 
Obs per group: min = I 
avg= 6 
max= 7 
F(4,142) 
Prob> F 
63.03 
0.0000 
vol_cng Coef. Std. Err. T P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prod_drl 2.760758 .5191534 5.318 0.000 1.734489 3.787026 
wsc 6.636278 .5835124 11.373 0.000 5.482784 7.789772 
drl_ cng 1.216752 .4939382 2.463 0.015 .2403298 2.193175 
WSC drX -5.498781 .9470977 -5.806 0.000 -7.371014 -3.626548 
cons -539.3922 130.0712 -4.147 0.000 -796.5184 -282.2659 
841.18649 
719.84067 
sigma_u 
sigma_e 
rho .5772677 (fraction of variance due to uJ) 
Ftestthatallu i=O: F(28,142)= 3.75 Prob> F = 0.0000 
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Newspapers & Periodicals, Web Resources and Official 
Publications. 
Newspapers & Periodicals: 
1. Vedomosti. At: http://www.vedomosti.ru. 
2. Moscow Times. At: http://www.moscowtimes.ru. 
3. Financial Times: At: http://www.ft.com. 
4. Pravda. 
5. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. 
6. Ekspert. At: http://www.expert.ru. 
7. Oil and Gas Journal. At: http://ogLpennnet.com!home.cfm. 
8. Oil and Capital. At: http://www.oilcapital.rulmain.asp?IDR=2402. 
9. Neftyanaya Torgovlya. 
10. NeJtegazovaya Vertikal'. At: http://www.ngv.ru. 
11. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. 
12. Die Zeit. At: http://www.zeit.de. 
13. Rossiiskaya Gazeta. At: http://www.rg.ru. 
14. Ekonomika i Zhizn. 
15. RFLINewsline. 
16. RusEnergy. 
Web Resources: 
1. http://www.referent.ru. Legislative database. 
2. http://law.optima.ru'. Legislative database. 
3. http://www.enippf.ru. Online energy information source. 
4. http://www.strana.ru. Online newspaper. 
5. http://www.rian.rulrianlintro.cfm. Online newspaper. 
6. http://nefte.rulindex.shtml. Online oil information source. 
7. http://www.neftegaz.ru. Online oil information source. 
8. http://www.lukoil.com. LUKoil. 
9. http://www.onako.com. Onako. 
10. http://www.sibneft.rulindex.shtml. Sibneft. 
11. http://www.sidanco.rulestartpage. Sidanko. 
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12. http://www.slavneft.ru. Slavneft. 
13. http://www.surgutneftegas.ruleng/index.xpml. Surgutneftegaz. 
14. http://www.tnk.ru. TNK. 
15. http://www.tnk.com. TNK International. 
16. http://www.yukos.com/main.asp. Yukos. 
17. http://www.worldbank.org. World Bank. 
18. http://www.mte.gov.ru. Ministry of Energy. 
19. http://www.apsanet.org. American Political Science Association. 
20. http://www.iiasa.ac.at. International Institute of Applied Systems 
Analysis. 
Other Publications: 
1. Narodnoe Khozyaistvo (Goskomstat). 
2. Stran Chlenov SEV (Goskomstat). 
3. Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (Goskomstat). 
4. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsli. 
5. National Accounts and Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables 
(United Nations). 
6. Eurostat (Statistisches Bundesamt). 
7. Stata Reference P-Z for release 5. 
8. Datastream. 
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